stating that “[p]rocedural requirements established by Congress for gaining access to the federal courts are not to be disregarded by courts out of a vague sympathy for particular litigants”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “[p]rocedural requirements established by Congress for gaining access to the federal courts are not to be disregarded by courts out of a vague sympathy for particular litigants”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
ALBERTO TREJO, )
AIS 266435, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) CASE NO. 2:24-CV-269-RAH-KFP
)
OFFICER K. FAIR, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Alberto Trejo, an inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, is
confined at Kilby Correctional Facility in Mt. Meigs, Alabama. Plaintiff filed this action
using this Court’s standard form for complaints brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. 1.
He names Officer K. Fair and Arnold Mercado, Chief Law Enforcement Officer for the
Alabama Department of Corrections. Id. After review and consideration of Plaintiff’s
filing, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that this case be DISMISSED for the reasons set
forth below.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 7), his
Complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), which requires that,
despite the payment of a filing fee or any portion thereof, the Court must dismiss the case
at any time if it determines the Complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). To state a
claim on which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). To state a plausible claim for
relief, a plaintiff must plead factual content that “allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In applying § 1915,
“the court is authorized to test the proceeding for frivolousness or maliciousness even
before service of process or before the filing of the answer.” Ali v. Higgs, 892 F.2d 438,
440 (5th Cir. 1990).
An early determination of the merits of an IFP proceeding provides a
significant benefit to courts (because it will allow them to use their scarce
resources effectively and efficiently), to state officials (because it will free
them from the burdens of frivolous and harassing litigation), and to prisoners
(because courts will have the time, energy and inclination to give meritorious
claims the attention they need and deserve). “We must take advantage of
every tool in our judicial workshop.” Spears [v. McCotter], 766 F.2d [179,
182 (5th Cir. 1985)].
Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1986). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)
(stating court shall review civil action by prisoner against governmental entity or officer or
employee before docketing, if feasible, or as soon as practicable after docketing).
III. THE COMPLAINT
Plaintiff sues Defendants Fair and Mercado for acting with deliberate indifference
to his safety by allowing a DEA agent to question him in front of other inmates during a
shakedown of his dorm. Doc. 1 at 2–3. Because of this encounter, Plaintiff alleges
Defendants knew he would be labeled a “snitch” and become a target for prison gangs. Id.
at 3. Plaintiff alleges Defendants acted unconstitutionally by making him appear to be an
informant so he would fear for his life and ultimately agree to approach Defendants with
information. Id. For relief, Plaintiff seeks $1 million in damages and his release from the
Alabama Department of Corrections to a pending federal detainer. Id. at 4. According to
the Complaint, the incident about which Plaintiff complains occurred on March 11, 2020.
Id. at 2.
IV. DISCUSSION
The statute of limitations is usually raised as an affirmative defense. In an action
proceeding in forma pauperis under § 1983, the Court may consider affirmative defenses
apparent from the face of the Complaint. Clark v. State of Ga. Pardons & Paroles Bd.,
915 F.2d 636, 640 n.2 (11th Cir. 1990); Ali, 892 F.2d 438. “[I]f the district court sees that
an affirmative defense would defeat the action, a section 1915[(e)(2)(B)(i)] dismissal is
allowed.” Clark, 915 F.2d at 640. “The expiration of the statute of limitations is an
affirmative defense the existence of which warrants dismissal as frivolous.” Id. at 640 n.2
(citation omitted); Smith v. Shorestein, 217 F. App’x 877, 880 (11th Cir. 2007) (same).
“All constitutional claims brought under § 1983 are tort actions, subject to the
statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the § 1983 action
has been brought.” McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation
omitted). The governing limitations period in Alabama is two years. Id. (citing Ala. Code
§ 6-2-38 and Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 876 F.2d 1480, 1483 (11th Cir. 1989)). Generally,
the limitations period begins to run from the date “the facts which would support a cause
of action are apparent or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard
for his rights.” Brown v. Georgia Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 335 F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th
Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
By Plaintiff’s own admission, the events described in the Complaint occurred in
March 2020, but Plaintiff did not file this action until April 30, 2024,1 which is more than
two years after the limitations period expired. Thus, it is clear from the face of the
Complaint that this action is time-barred and due to be dismissed. See Baldwin Cnty.
Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984) (stating that “[p]rocedural requirements
established by Congress for gaining access to the federal courts are not to be disregarded
by courts out of a vague sympathy for particular litigants”).
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that this action be DISMISSED
with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).2
Further, it is ORDERED that by July 25, 2024, the parties may file objections to
this Recommendation. The parties must specifically identify the factual findings and legal
1 The Court considers April 30, 2024, to be the filing date of the Complaint. Although the Clerk stamped
the petition “filed” on May 3, 2024, Plaintiff signed the document on April 30, 2024, and a pro se inmate’s
complaint is deemed by law to have been filed the date it is delivered to prison officials for mailing. Houston
v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271–272 (1988); Adams v. United States, 173 F.3d 1339, 1340–41 (11th Cir. 1999);
Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 780 (11th Cir.1993).
2 Courts may dismiss a pro se complaint without affording an opportunity to amend when the potential
amendment would be futile. Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that “[a]
district court need not, however, allow an amendment . . . where amendment would be futile”); Troville v.
Venz, 303 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2002). Because Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are barred by the applicable
two-year statute of limitations, the Court finds that any amendment would be futile. See Bowhall v. Dep’t
of Def., No. 2:10-CV-607, 2010 WL 4806970, at *4 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 22, 2010), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 2:10-CV-607-WKW, 2010 WL 4791649 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 18, 2020) (noting that, because
plaintiff’s claims were clearly barred by Alabama’s two-year statute of limitations, they warranted dismissal
as frivolous and any amendment would be futile).
conclusions in the Recommendation to which objection is made. Frivolous, conclusive, or
general objections will not be considered. This Recommendation is not a final order and,
therefore, is not appealable.
Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) will bar a party from a de novo determination by
the District Court of legal and factual issues covered in the Recommendation and waive
the right of the party to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order based on unobjected-
to factual and legal conclusions accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon
grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. 11th Cir. R. 3–1.
DONE this 11th day of July, 2024.
/s/ Kelly Fitzgerald Pate
KELLY FITZGERALD PATE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE