holding that the “sole remedy in federal court” for a state prisoner challenging the constitutionality of his incarceration is a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
How later courts described this case
- holding that the “sole remedy in federal court” for a state prisoner challenging the constitutionality of his incarceration is a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
- holding that the “exclusive remedy” for a state inmate’s claim challenging the basis for or validity of his current incarceration “is to file a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254”
- holding that the district court properly dismissed Plaintiff’s § 1983 complaint challenging an adverse parole decision where the challenged “decision has not been reversed, expunged, set aside, or called into question, as Heck mandates.”
- observing that “Heck clarifies that Preiser is a rule of cognizability, not exhaustion”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
WILLIAM D. DIXON, #234 960, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) CASE NO. 2:22-CV-179-ECM-KFP
) [WO]
ALABAMA BOARD OF PARDONS )
AND PAROLES, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff William Dixon, a state inmate, brings this Complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Dixon names as defendants the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles and
John Anthony. On May 7, 2020, Dixon had a parole revocation hearing. He alleges
improprieties occurred during the proceeding which violated his Fourteenth Amendment
rights to due process. Dixon requests this Court compel the Alabama Board of Pardons and
Paroles to pay him $100,000 for violating his constitutional rights during the challenged
parole proceedings. Doc. 1 at 2–4.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because the Court granted Dixon leave to proceed in forma pauperis (see Doc. 3),
his Complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), which requires a
court to dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
against a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b). A claim is frivolous if it “lacks and arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke
v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim is also frivolous when the defendant is
immune from suit, the claim seeks to enforce a right that clearly does not exist, or an
affirmative defense, such as the statute of limitations, would defeat the claim. Id. at 327;
Clark v. Georgia Pardons & Paroles Bd., 915 F.2d 636, 640 n.2 (11th Cir. 1990).
The Court may also dismiss a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or any
portion of the Complaint (see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)), for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks
omitted). To state a claim to relief that is plausible, the plaintiff must plead factual content
that “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id.
In analyzing § 1915 cases, “the court is authorized to test the proceeding for
frivolousness or maliciousness even before service of process or before the filing of the
answer.” Ali v. Higgs, 892 F.2d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 1990). “It necessarily follows that in the
absence of the defendant or defendants, the district court must evaluate the merit of the
claim sua sponte.” Id.
An early determination of the merits of an IFP proceeding provides a
significant benefit to courts (because it will allow them to use their scarce
resources effectively and efficiently), to state officials (because it will free
them from the burdens of frivolous and harassing litigation), and to prisoners
(because courts will have the time, energy and inclination to give meritorious
claims the attention they need and deserve). “We must take advantage of
every tool in our judicial workshop.” Spears [v. McCotter], 766 F.2d [179,
182 (5th Cir. 1985)].
Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1986).
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles
To the extent Dixon seeks relief from the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles,
the parole board is an extension of the State of Alabama. As such, it is absolutely immune
from suit.
[T]he Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from entertaining suits
by private parties against States and their agencies [or boards]. There are two
exceptions to this prohibition: where the state has waived its immunity or
where Congress has abrogated that immunity. A State’s consent to suit [via
waiver of immunity] must be unequivocally expressed in the text of [a]
relevant statute. Waiver may not be implied. Likewise, Congress’ intent to
abrogate the States’ immunity from suit must be obvious from a clear
legislative statement.
Selensky v. Alabama, 619 F. App’x 846, 848–49 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). Thus, neither the State of Alabama nor its agencies may be sued
unless the state has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Pennhurst State School
& Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984), or Congress has abrogated the state’s
immunity, see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996).
Neither waiver nor abrogation applies here. The Alabama Constitution states
that “the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of
law or equity.” Ala. Const. art. I, § 14. The Supreme Court has recognized
that this prohibits Alabama from waiving its immunity from suit. Pugh, 438
U.S. at 782, 98 S.Ct. 3057 (citing Ala. Const. art. I, § 14.)
Selensky, 619 F. App’x at 849. “Alabama has not waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity in § 1983 cases, nor has Congress abated it.” Holmes v. Hale, 701 F. App’x 751,
753 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Carr v. City of Florence, Ala., 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir.
1990)). Consequently, any claims lodged against the State of Alabama or its agencies are
frivolous and are, therefore, due to be dismissed with prejudice 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (iii).
B. The Parole Revocation Challenge
Dixon had a parole revocation hearing on May 7, 2020. He alleges Defendant
Anthony denied his request for a continuance to obtain documentary evidence and
discovery for presentation at the hearing. Dixon also alleges that there was no fact-finding
hearing during the revocation proceeding, which denied him due process, and that his
parole contract was breached by the parole board’s determination that he was guilty of
committing a new offense even though the state court dismissed the new charges against
him at the prosecution’s request. Finally, Dixon alleges the parole board failed to provide
him with a written statement containing an explanation of the reasons supporting the
decision to revoke his parole and the evidence it relied on to do so. Doc. 1 at 2–3.
Under well-established law, Dixon is entitled to no relief on these claims, as they
challenge the fundamental legality of his incarceration. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641
(1997); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475
(1973). Federal law provides that claims challenging an alleged improper revocation of
parole for which release from prison is sought or which may result in release from
imprisonment should be raised in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus.
See Heck, 512 U.S. at 481 (explaining that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a
state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and [a ruling in his
favor would result in] immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come
within the literal terms of § 1983.”); Edwards, 520 U.S. at 645 (holding that the “sole
remedy in federal court” for a state prisoner challenging the constitutionality of his
incarceration is a petition for writ of habeas corpus.); Cook v. Baker, et al., 139 F. App’x
167, 169 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that the “exclusive remedy” for a state inmate’s claim
challenging the basis for or validity of his current incarceration “is to file a habeas corpus
petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254”).
The Supreme Court emphasized “that a claim either is cognizable under § 1983 and
should immediately go forward, or is not cognizable and should be dismissed.” Balisok,
520 U.S. at 649. “Later, in Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d
253 (2005), the Supreme Court reviewed its prior holdings in this area and summarized
that ‘a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent previous invalidation [of the adverse
action resulting in his incarceration])—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable
relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct [resulting in confinement]
or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate
the invalidity of confinement or its duration.’ Id. at 81–82, 125 S.Ct. at 1248.” Robinson v.
Satz, 260 F. App’x 209, 212 (11th Cir. 2007).
The principles espoused in Heck and Balisok foreclosing review of claims that go
to the fundamental legality of a prisoner’s confinement in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action apply
when an inmate is challenging his confinement due to a revocation of parole. See Green v.
McGill-Johnston, 685 F. App’x 811, 812 (11th Cir. 2017) (holding that Plaintiff’s
“allegations, if proven true, would have necessarily implied the invalidity of [the adverse
parole decision] . . . and his resulting imprisonment. . . . Because [Plaintiff’s] allegations
would imply the invalidity of his confinement, the Heck-bar applies and [Plaintiff’s] § 1983
claims must be dismissed.”); White v. Gittens, 121 F.3d 803, 807 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding
that “[a] favorable decision in the § 1983 proceeding would necessarily call into question
the validity of the state’s decree revoking [Plaintiff’s] parole and ordering him back to
prison. Heck therefore applies, and the § 1983 action is not cognizable in a federal court .
. . unless the parole revocation ‘has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called
into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.’”);
Littles v. Board of Pardons and Paroles Div., 68 F.3d 122, 123 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding
that the district court properly dismissed Plaintiff’s § 1983 complaint challenging an
adverse parole decision where the challenged “decision has not been reversed, expunged,
set aside, or called into question, as Heck mandates.”); Holt v. Gibbs, 2009 WL 111643, at
*2 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 14, 2009) (finding “Heck applies to parole and probation revocation
proceedings”).
The conduct of parole officials that forms the basis for Dixon’s incarceration as a
parole violator has not been reversed, expunged, impugned, or invalidated in an appropriate
state or federal action. Under the circumstances of this case, Heck and its progeny bar
Dixon’s use of any federal civil action, other than a petition for habeas corpus relief under
28 U.S.C. § 2254, to mount a collateral attack on the validity of the decision to revoke his
parole. Heck, 512 U.S. at 489 (explaining that “[w]e do not engraft an exhaustion
requirement upon § 1983, but rather deny the existence of a cause of action. Even a prisoner
who has fully exhausted [all] available state remedies has no cause of action under § 1983
unless and until the [challenged decision] is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned
by the grant of a [federal] writ of habeas corpus [or some appropriate state court action].”);
Abella v. Rubino, 63 F.3d 1063, 1066 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995) (observing that “Heck clarifies
that Preiser is a rule of cognizability, not exhaustion”). Consequently, Dixon’s challenges
to the constitutionality of Defendants’ conduct resulting in the decision to revoke his parole
and his current imprisonment based on such action is not cognizable in this civil matter, as
it provides no basis for relief at this time. Therefore, the Complaint is due to be summarily
dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).1
C. Supplemental Jurisdiction
Insofar as Dixon seeks relief for a violation of state law, review of a pendent state
law claim is appropriate only upon exercise of this Court’s supplemental jurisdiction. In
the posture of this case, however, the undersigned concludes that exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction over any state law claim Dixon seeks to present is inappropriate.
Two factors determine whether state law claims lacking an independent
federal jurisdictional basis can be heard in federal court with a federal claim
over which the court has jurisdiction. To exercise pendent jurisdiction [or
what is now identified as supplemental jurisdiction] over state law claims not
otherwise cognizable in federal court, “the court must have jurisdiction over
1 Dixon is advised that any federal petition for writ of habeas corpus he files is subject to the
procedural limitations imposed upon such petitions, in particular, the exhaustion of state court
remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus [filed] on
behalf of a [state inmate] shall not be granted unless it appears that . . . the applicate has exhausted
the remedies available in the courts of the State[.]”).
a substantial federal claim and the federal and state claims must derive from
a ‘common nucleus of operative fact.’” Jackson v. Stinchcomb, 635 F.2d 462,
470 (5th Cir.1981) (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86
S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966)). See generally C. Wright, A. Miller & E.
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3567 pp. 443–47
(1975).
L.A. Draper and Son v. Wheelabrator Frye, Inc., 735 F.2d 414, 427 (11th Cir. 1984).
Exercising supplemental jurisdiction is discretionary. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725–26; see also
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (provides a district court discretion to “decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . [when] the district court has dismissed all claims
over which it has original jurisdiction”). “If the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial,
Gibbs strongly encourages or even requires dismissal of the state claims.” L.A. Draper and
Son, 735 F.2d at 428.
Because of the resolution of the federal claim presented by Dixon, the undersigned
concludes that any pendent state law claim regarding the challenged parole revocation
proceeding is due to be dismissed without prejudice. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726 (if the federal
claims are dismissed prior to trial, the state claims should be dismissed as well); see also
Ray v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 677 F.2d 818 (11th Cir. 1982).
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS as follows:
1. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles
be DISMISSED with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (iii), as this
Defendant is absolutely immune from suit.
2. Plaintiff’s due process claims challenging the fundamental legality of his
incarceration as a parole violator be DISMISSED without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), as such claims currently provide no basis for relief.
3. Plaintiff’s pendent state law claims be DISMISSED without prejudice, as the
Court declines the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the claims.
4. This case be DISMISSED prior to service of process under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i–iii).
Further, it is ORDERED that by May 25, 2022, the parties may file objections to
this Recommendation. The parties must specifically identify the factual findings and legal
conclusions in the Recommendation to which objection is made. Frivolous, conclusive, or
general objections will not be considered by the Court. The parties are advised that this
Recommendation is not a final order and, therefore, is not appealable.
Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s findings and
recommendations in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) will bar a party from a de novo
determination by the District Court of legal and factual issues covered in the
Recommendation and waive the right of the party to challenge on appeal the District
Court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions accepted or adopted by
the District Court except on grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.
Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); 11TH CIR. R. 3-1. See Stein v. Reynolds Sec.,
Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206
(11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
Done this 11th day of May, 2022.
/s/ Kelly Fitzgerald Pate
KELLY FITZGERALD PATE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE