Opinion

Dixon v. Alabama Board of Pardon and Paroles (INMATE 2)

Court
District Court, M.D. Alabama
Filed
May 11, 2022
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 31.1%

holding that the “sole remedy in federal court” for a state prisoner challenging the constitutionality of his incarceration is a petition for writ of habeas corpus.

How later courts described this case

  • holding that the “sole remedy in federal court” for a state prisoner challenging the constitutionality of his incarceration is a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
  • holding that the “exclusive remedy” for a state inmate’s claim challenging the basis for or validity of his current incarceration “is to file a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254”
  • holding that the district court properly dismissed Plaintiff’s § 1983 complaint challenging an adverse parole decision where the challenged “decision has not been reversed, expunged, set aside, or called into question, as Heck mandates.”
  • observing that “Heck clarifies that Preiser is a rule of cognizability, not exhaustion”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

WILLIAM D. DIXON, #234 960, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:22-CV-179-ECM-KFP

) [WO]

ALABAMA BOARD OF PARDONS )

AND PAROLES, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Pro se Plaintiff William Dixon, a state inmate, brings this Complaint under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Dixon names as defendants the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles and

John Anthony. On May 7, 2020, Dixon had a parole revocation hearing. He alleges

improprieties occurred during the proceeding which violated his Fourteenth Amendment

rights to due process. Dixon requests this Court compel the Alabama Board of Pardons and

Paroles to pay him $100,000 for violating his constitutional rights during the challenged

parole proceedings. Doc. 1 at 2–4.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the Court granted Dixon leave to proceed in forma pauperis (see Doc. 3),

his Complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), which requires a

court to dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief

against a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. §

1915A(b). A claim is frivolous if it “lacks and arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim is also frivolous when the defendant is

immune from suit, the claim seeks to enforce a right that clearly does not exist, or an

affirmative defense, such as the statute of limitations, would defeat the claim. Id. at 327;

Clark v. Georgia Pardons & Paroles Bd., 915 F.2d 636, 640 n.2 (11th Cir. 1990).

The Court may also dismiss a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or any

portion of the Complaint (see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)), for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted. To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks

omitted). To state a claim to relief that is plausible, the plaintiff must plead factual content

that “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id.

In analyzing § 1915 cases, “the court is authorized to test the proceeding for

frivolousness or maliciousness even before service of process or before the filing of the

answer.” Ali v. Higgs, 892 F.2d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 1990). “It necessarily follows that in the

absence of the defendant or defendants, the district court must evaluate the merit of the

claim sua sponte.” Id.

An early determination of the merits of an IFP proceeding provides a

significant benefit to courts (because it will allow them to use their scarce

resources effectively and efficiently), to state officials (because it will free

them from the burdens of frivolous and harassing litigation), and to prisoners

(because courts will have the time, energy and inclination to give meritorious

claims the attention they need and deserve). “We must take advantage of

every tool in our judicial workshop.” Spears [v. McCotter], 766 F.2d [179,

182 (5th Cir. 1985)].

Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1986).

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles

To the extent Dixon seeks relief from the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles,

the parole board is an extension of the State of Alabama. As such, it is absolutely immune

from suit.

[T]he Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from entertaining suits

by private parties against States and their agencies [or boards]. There are two

exceptions to this prohibition: where the state has waived its immunity or

where Congress has abrogated that immunity. A State’s consent to suit [via

waiver of immunity] must be unequivocally expressed in the text of [a]

relevant statute. Waiver may not be implied. Likewise, Congress’ intent to

abrogate the States’ immunity from suit must be obvious from a clear

legislative statement.

Selensky v. Alabama, 619 F. App’x 846, 848–49 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). Thus, neither the State of Alabama nor its agencies may be sued

unless the state has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Pennhurst State School

& Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984), or Congress has abrogated the state’s

immunity, see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996).

Neither waiver nor abrogation applies here. The Alabama Constitution states

that “the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of

law or equity.” Ala. Const. art. I, § 14. The Supreme Court has recognized

that this prohibits Alabama from waiving its immunity from suit. Pugh, 438

U.S. at 782, 98 S.Ct. 3057 (citing Ala. Const. art. I, § 14.)

Selensky, 619 F. App’x at 849. “Alabama has not waived its Eleventh Amendment

immunity in § 1983 cases, nor has Congress abated it.” Holmes v. Hale, 701 F. App’x 751,

753 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Carr v. City of Florence, Ala., 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir.

1990)). Consequently, any claims lodged against the State of Alabama or its agencies are

frivolous and are, therefore, due to be dismissed with prejudice 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (iii).

B. The Parole Revocation Challenge

Dixon had a parole revocation hearing on May 7, 2020. He alleges Defendant

Anthony denied his request for a continuance to obtain documentary evidence and

discovery for presentation at the hearing. Dixon also alleges that there was no fact-finding

hearing during the revocation proceeding, which denied him due process, and that his

parole contract was breached by the parole board’s determination that he was guilty of

committing a new offense even though the state court dismissed the new charges against

him at the prosecution’s request. Finally, Dixon alleges the parole board failed to provide

him with a written statement containing an explanation of the reasons supporting the

decision to revoke his parole and the evidence it relied on to do so. Doc. 1 at 2–3.

Under well-established law, Dixon is entitled to no relief on these claims, as they

challenge the fundamental legality of his incarceration. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641

(1997); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475

(1973). Federal law provides that claims challenging an alleged improper revocation of

parole for which release from prison is sought or which may result in release from

imprisonment should be raised in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus.

See Heck, 512 U.S. at 481 (explaining that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a

state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and [a ruling in his

favor would result in] immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come

within the literal terms of § 1983.”); Edwards, 520 U.S. at 645 (holding that the “sole

remedy in federal court” for a state prisoner challenging the constitutionality of his

incarceration is a petition for writ of habeas corpus.); Cook v. Baker, et al., 139 F. App’x

167, 169 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that the “exclusive remedy” for a state inmate’s claim

challenging the basis for or validity of his current incarceration “is to file a habeas corpus

petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254”).

The Supreme Court emphasized “that a claim either is cognizable under § 1983 and

should immediately go forward, or is not cognizable and should be dismissed.” Balisok,

520 U.S. at 649. “Later, in Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d

253 (2005), the Supreme Court reviewed its prior holdings in this area and summarized

that ‘a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent previous invalidation [of the adverse

action resulting in his incarceration])—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable

relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct [resulting in confinement]

or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate

the invalidity of confinement or its duration.’ Id. at 81–82, 125 S.Ct. at 1248.” Robinson v.

Satz, 260 F. App’x 209, 212 (11th Cir. 2007).

The principles espoused in Heck and Balisok foreclosing review of claims that go

to the fundamental legality of a prisoner’s confinement in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action apply

when an inmate is challenging his confinement due to a revocation of parole. See Green v.

McGill-Johnston, 685 F. App’x 811, 812 (11th Cir. 2017) (holding that Plaintiff’s

“allegations, if proven true, would have necessarily implied the invalidity of [the adverse

parole decision] . . . and his resulting imprisonment. . . . Because [Plaintiff’s] allegations

would imply the invalidity of his confinement, the Heck-bar applies and [Plaintiff’s] § 1983

claims must be dismissed.”); White v. Gittens, 121 F.3d 803, 807 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding

that “[a] favorable decision in the § 1983 proceeding would necessarily call into question

the validity of the state’s decree revoking [Plaintiff’s] parole and ordering him back to

prison. Heck therefore applies, and the § 1983 action is not cognizable in a federal court .

. . unless the parole revocation ‘has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive

order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called

into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.’”);

Littles v. Board of Pardons and Paroles Div., 68 F.3d 122, 123 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding

that the district court properly dismissed Plaintiff’s § 1983 complaint challenging an

adverse parole decision where the challenged “decision has not been reversed, expunged,

set aside, or called into question, as Heck mandates.”); Holt v. Gibbs, 2009 WL 111643, at

*2 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 14, 2009) (finding “Heck applies to parole and probation revocation

proceedings”).

The conduct of parole officials that forms the basis for Dixon’s incarceration as a

parole violator has not been reversed, expunged, impugned, or invalidated in an appropriate

state or federal action. Under the circumstances of this case, Heck and its progeny bar

Dixon’s use of any federal civil action, other than a petition for habeas corpus relief under

28 U.S.C. § 2254, to mount a collateral attack on the validity of the decision to revoke his

parole. Heck, 512 U.S. at 489 (explaining that “[w]e do not engraft an exhaustion

requirement upon § 1983, but rather deny the existence of a cause of action. Even a prisoner

who has fully exhausted [all] available state remedies has no cause of action under § 1983

unless and until the [challenged decision] is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned

by the grant of a [federal] writ of habeas corpus [or some appropriate state court action].”);

Abella v. Rubino, 63 F.3d 1063, 1066 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995) (observing that “Heck clarifies

that Preiser is a rule of cognizability, not exhaustion”). Consequently, Dixon’s challenges

to the constitutionality of Defendants’ conduct resulting in the decision to revoke his parole

and his current imprisonment based on such action is not cognizable in this civil matter, as

it provides no basis for relief at this time. Therefore, the Complaint is due to be summarily

dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).1

C. Supplemental Jurisdiction

Insofar as Dixon seeks relief for a violation of state law, review of a pendent state

law claim is appropriate only upon exercise of this Court’s supplemental jurisdiction. In

the posture of this case, however, the undersigned concludes that exercise of supplemental

jurisdiction over any state law claim Dixon seeks to present is inappropriate.

Two factors determine whether state law claims lacking an independent

federal jurisdictional basis can be heard in federal court with a federal claim

over which the court has jurisdiction. To exercise pendent jurisdiction [or

what is now identified as supplemental jurisdiction] over state law claims not

otherwise cognizable in federal court, “the court must have jurisdiction over

1 Dixon is advised that any federal petition for writ of habeas corpus he files is subject to the

procedural limitations imposed upon such petitions, in particular, the exhaustion of state court

remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus [filed] on

behalf of a [state inmate] shall not be granted unless it appears that . . . the applicate has exhausted

the remedies available in the courts of the State[.]”).

a substantial federal claim and the federal and state claims must derive from

a ‘common nucleus of operative fact.’” Jackson v. Stinchcomb, 635 F.2d 462,

470 (5th Cir.1981) (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86

S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966)). See generally C. Wright, A. Miller & E.

Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3567 pp. 443–47

(1975).

L.A. Draper and Son v. Wheelabrator Frye, Inc., 735 F.2d 414, 427 (11th Cir. 1984).

Exercising supplemental jurisdiction is discretionary. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725–26; see also

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (provides a district court discretion to “decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . [when] the district court has dismissed all claims

over which it has original jurisdiction”). “If the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial,

Gibbs strongly encourages or even requires dismissal of the state claims.” L.A. Draper and

Son, 735 F.2d at 428.

Because of the resolution of the federal claim presented by Dixon, the undersigned

concludes that any pendent state law claim regarding the challenged parole revocation

proceeding is due to be dismissed without prejudice. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726 (if the federal

claims are dismissed prior to trial, the state claims should be dismissed as well); see also

Ray v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 677 F.2d 818 (11th Cir. 1982).

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles

be DISMISSED with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (iii), as this

Defendant is absolutely immune from suit.

2. Plaintiff’s due process claims challenging the fundamental legality of his

incarceration as a parole violator be DISMISSED without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), as such claims currently provide no basis for relief.

3. Plaintiff’s pendent state law claims be DISMISSED without prejudice, as the

Court declines the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the claims.

4. This case be DISMISSED prior to service of process under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(i–iii).

Further, it is ORDERED that by May 25, 2022, the parties may file objections to

this Recommendation. The parties must specifically identify the factual findings and legal

conclusions in the Recommendation to which objection is made. Frivolous, conclusive, or

general objections will not be considered by the Court. The parties are advised that this

Recommendation is not a final order and, therefore, is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s findings and

recommendations in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) will bar a party from a de novo

determination by the District Court of legal and factual issues covered in the

Recommendation and waive the right of the party to challenge on appeal the District

Court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions accepted or adopted by

the District Court except on grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); 11TH CIR. R. 3-1. See Stein v. Reynolds Sec.,

Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206

(11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

Done this 11th day of May, 2022.

/s/ Kelly Fitzgerald Pate

KELLY FITZGERALD PATE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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