finding that challenge to parole regulation mooted by release on parole as a favorable decision would not entitle petitioner to any additional relief
How later courts described this case
- finding that challenge to parole regulation mooted by release on parole as a favorable decision would not entitle petitioner to any additional relief
- explaining that a federal court no longer has jurisdiction over a case that has become moot
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
GARY FRANCIS ANUSAVICE, )
Reg. No. 22490-038, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) CASE NO.: 2:19-CV-90-WHA-CSC
) [WO]
WARDEN WOODS, )
FPC MONTGOMERY, )
)
Respondent. )
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
This case is before the Court on a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus filed by Gary Anusavice [“Anusavice”]. At the time he filed the Petition,
Anusavice was incarcerated at the Federal Prison Camp in Montgomery, Alabama, serving
a 97-month prison sentence for violations of 26 U.S.C. § 7201, Tax Evasion, and 18 U.S.C.
§ 1347, Health Care Fraud. Doc. 15-1 at 3. Anusavice argues in this Petition that he meets
the eligibility requirements found in 34 U.S.C. § 60541(g) for early release to home
confinement under the First Step Act of 2018.1 Doc. 2 at 3–4. Consequently, Anusavice
seeks an order directing the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to transfer him to home
confinement to serve the remaining portion of his imposed sentence less any earned good
time earned. Doc. 2 at 4.
1 Pub. L. No. 115–391, §§ 504, 603, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018).
Respondent filed a Response and supporting evidentiary materials arguing the
Petition is due to be dismissed because Anusavice failed to exhaust his available
administrative remedies through the BOP prior to filing his Petition. Doc. 15. Respondent
also argues the Petition is due to be denied because Anusavice is entitled to no relief on his
claims. Id. The Court granted Anusavice an opportunity to respond to Respondent’s
Response but he did not do so. Review of the Court’s docket and information obtained
from the BOP’s website reflect Anusavice was released from custody during the pendency
of this action.2
II. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction & Venue
The law is settled that a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for writ of habeas corpus is the
proper vehicle for a prisoner to challenge the manner, location, or execution of his sentence.
See Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 236 (2001); Williams v. Pearson, 197 F. App’x 872, 877
(11th Cir. 2006). Anusavice maintains he is eligible to serve the remaining portion of his
imposed sentence on home confinement under the First Step Act because he meets the
eligibility requirements under the Act. Doc. 1 at 6. Since Anusavice challenges the
execution of his sentence, his claim is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. And “[j]urisdiction
is determined at the time the action is filed[.]” United States v. Edwards, 27 F.3d 564 (4th
Cir. 1994). Thus, venue is proper before this Court as Anusavice was incarcerated in this
district when he filed the Petition. Fernandez v. United States, 941 F.2d 1488, 1495 (11th
2 Available at https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited August 24, 2021).
Cir. 1991) (holding that, generally, a 28 U.S.C. § 2241petition for habeas corpus relief
“may be brought only in the district court . . . in which the inmate is incarcerated.”); Brown
v. Warden of FCI Williamsburg, 2019 WL 1780747, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 25., 2019), Report
and Recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 1773382 (D.S.C. Apr. 23, 2019) (finding “[a]
petition under § 2241must be brought against the warden of the facility where the prisoner
is being held [at the time he files the petition], 28 U.S.C. § 2242; Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542
U.S. [426,] 434–35 (2004), and ‘in the district of confinement rather than in the sentencing
court,’ [U.S. v. Miller, 871 F.2d 488, 490 (4th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).]”).
B. Mootness
To obtain relief in this habeas action, Anusavice must demonstrate he “is [currently]
in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Under Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution, federal courts
are barred from hearing matters, including habeas petitions, in the absence of a live case or
controversy. See e.g., Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998); Deakins v. Monaghan, 484
U.S. 193, 199 (1988). For a live case or controversy to exist at all time in the litigation,
the petitioner “must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the
defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Lewis v. Continental
Bank, 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990); see also North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971)
(per curiam ) (observing that “federal courts are without power to decide questions that
cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them”).
“[A] case is moot when it no longer presents a live controversy with respect to which
the court can give meaningful relief.” Soliman v. U.S. ex rel. INS, 296 F.3d 1237, 1242
(11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “When effective relief
cannot be granted because of later events, the [case] must be dismissed as moot.”
Westmoreland v. National Transportation Safety Board, 833 F.2d 1461, 1462 (11th Cir.
1987); American Rivers v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Service, 126 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding that “[i]f an event occurs that prevents the court from granting effective
relief, the claim is moot and must be dismissed.”). “It has long been settled that a federal
court has no authority to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to
declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before
it.” Church of Scientology of California v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975)
(explaining that a federal court no longer has jurisdiction over a case that has
become moot). In the specific context of habeas petitions, the case or controversy
requirement warrants a finding of mootness if: (1) the petitioner has received the relief
requested in the petition; or (2) the court is unable to provide the petitioner with the relief
sought. See Munoz v. Rowland, 104 F.3d 1096, 1097–98 (9th Cir. 1997).
Anusavice’s ultimate objective in filing this action was to be transferred to home
confinement to serve the remaining portion of his imposed sentence. Anusavice has since
been released from custody, however, and the Court cannot give him meaningful habeas
relief on his claim nor is there any allegation Anusavice would be subject to any future
adverse consequences related to his claim for relief. See Bailey v. Southerland, 821 F.2d
277, 278 (5th Cir. 1987). Because there is no longer a case or controversy to litigate,
Anusavice’s request for habeas relief is moot and the Petition is due to be dismissed. See
United States ex rel. Graham v. United States Parole Comm’n, 732 F.2d 849, 850 (11th
Cir. 1984) (finding that challenge to parole regulation mooted by release on parole as a
favorable decision would not entitle petitioner to any additional relief).
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS the 28 U.S.C. §
2241 Petition for Habeas Corpus relief filed by Gary Anusavice be DISMISSED with
prejudice as moot.
The parties may file objections to the Recommendation by September 8, 2021. A
party must specifically identify the factual findings and legal conclusions in the
Recommendation to which objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or general objections
will not be considered. This Recommendation is not a final order and, therefore, it is not
appealable. Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s findings and
recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) shall bar a de novo determination by the
District Court of legal and factual issues covered in the Recommendation and waives the
right of a party to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to
factual and legal conclusions accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon
grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. 11TH Cir. R. 3-1; Resolution Trust Co. v.
Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993); Henley v. Johnson, 885
F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989).
Done, this 25th day of August 2021.
/s/ Charles S. Coody
CHARLES S. COODY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE