Shrader v. Walker (INMATE 1) (LEAD)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

JASON SHRADER, #245505, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:21-CV-138-WHA-JTA

)

CLIFF WALKER, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

JASON SHRADER, #245505, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:21-CV-139-WHA-JTA

)

CHARLES GRADDICK, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION1

Due to the similarity of the clams presented in the complaints, the court consolidated

the above styled 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions for review. In these complaints, Jason Shrader,

a state inmate currently incarcerated at the Staton Correctional Facility, challenges the

failure of the defendants to hold an open hearing to consider him for parole in June of 2020,

two years from his last parole consideration date, and seeks his release on parole. Shrader

1 All documents and attendant page numbers cited in this Recommendation are those assigned by the Clerk in the

docketing process.

names Cliff Walker, Dwayne Spurlock and Leigh Gwathney, members of the Alabama

Board of Pardons and Paroles, and Charles Graddick, the former director of the parole

board, as defendants. Doc. 1 at 2. Shrader seeks monetary damages, a prompt parole

consideration date, and his release on parole. Doc. 1 at 6.

Upon thorough review of the claims presented by Shrader, the undersigned finds

that this case is due to be dismissed prior to service of process in accordance with the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii).2

II. DISCUSSION

A. Request for Monetary Damages

1. Official Capacity Claims – Sovereign Immunity

With respect to Shrader’s request for monetary damages from defendants Walker,

Spurlock, Graddick and Gwathney in their official capacities for decisions related to the

scheduling of a parole consideration date and the suitability of Shrader for release on

parole, they are entitled to sovereign immunity. Official capacity lawsuits against state

employees are “in all respects other than name, . . . treated as a suit against the entity.”

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. 159, 166 (1985). As the Eleventh Circuit has held,

the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from entertaining suits by

private parties against States and their agencies [or employees]. There are

2 This court granted Shrader leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Thus, the court is obligated to screen the

complaints for possible summary dismissal. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Specifically, the screening procedure

requires the court to “dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that— . . . the action . . . is

frivolous or malicious; . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . seeks monetary relief

against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii); see also 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)-(2) (“On review [of a prisoner’s complaint], the court shall identify cognizable

claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint— . . . is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or . . . seeks monetary relief from a

defendant who is immune from such relief.”).

two exceptions to this prohibition: where the state has waived its immunity

or where Congress has abrogated that immunity. A State’s consent to suit

must be unequivocally expressed in the text of [a] relevant statute. Waiver

may not be implied. Likewise, Congress’ intent to abrogate the States’

immunity from suit must be obvious from a clear legislative statement.

Selensky v. Alabama, 619 F. App’x 846, 848–49 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). Thus, a state official may not be sued in his/her official capacity

unless the state has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Pennhurst State School

& Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984), or Congress has abrogated the State’s

immunity, see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996).

Neither waiver nor abrogation applies here. The Alabama Constitution states

that “the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of

law or equity.” Ala. Const. Art. I, § 14. The Supreme Court has recognized

that this prohibits Alabama from waiving its immunity from suit.

Selensky, 619 F. App’x at 849 (citing Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (holding

consent is prohibited by the Alabama Constitution). “Alabama has not waived its Eleventh

Amendment immunity in § 1983 cases, nor has Congress abated it.” Holmes v. Hale, 701

F. App’x 751, 753 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Carr v. City of Florence, Ala., 916 F.2d 1521,

1525 (11th Cir.1990)). In light of the foregoing, the defendants are entitled to sovereign

immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for claims seeking monetary damages from them

in their official capacities. Selensky, 619 F. App’x at 849; Harbert Int’l, Inc. v. James, 157

F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that state officials sued in their official capacities

are protected under the Eleventh Amendment from suit for damages); Edwards v. Wallace

Community College, 49 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that damages are

unavailable from state official sued in his official capacity). Such requests for monetary

damages from the defendants in their official capacities are therefore subject to summary

dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).

2. Individual Capacity Claims

Insofar as Shrader seeks monetary damages from defendants Walker, Spurlock,

Graddick and Gwathney in their individual capacities for actions relative to the parole

consideration process and/or the denial of parole, he is likewise entitled to no relief. The

Eleventh Circuit has long recognized that parole board officials are entitled to quasi-

judicial immunity from suits requesting damages based upon decisions relative to parole

consideration, including decisions to grant, deny or revoke parole. Fuller v. Georgia State

Board of Pardons and Parole, 851 F.2d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 1988); Cruz v. Skelton, 502

F.2d 1101, 1101–02 (5th Cir. 1974). Under these circumstances, the actions of parole

officials are inextricably intertwined with their decision-making authority and they are

therefore immune from damages. Consequently, Shrader’s requests for monetary damages

against the defendants in their individual capacities are also due to be summarily dismissed

in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).

B. Parole Consideration Date

To the extent Shrader argues he is entitled to a specific parole consideration date,

this claim likewise entitles him to no relief, as it is foreclosed by Slocum v. Ga. State Bd.

of Pardons and Paroles, 678 F.2d 940 (11th Cir. 1982). In Slocum, the Eleventh Circuit

deemed such a “unique theory . . . without merit.” 678 F.2d at 942. The relevant portion

of the Court’s opinion reads as follows:

Petitioner argues that even if there is no statutorily created liberty interest in

parole, particular [statutory parole] provisions . . . create a protectable

entitlement to parole consideration. Specifically, petitioner cites the

requirement . . . that parole consideration “shall be automatic” upon the

expiration of a set period of confinement and language . . . that the board

include in the parole file “as complete information as may be practically

available. . . .” If these provisions create a protectable expectancy in parole

consideration, petitioner argues that the consideration must comport with due

process standards. Petitioner’s unique theory is without merit. Unless there

is a liberty interest in parole, the procedures followed in making the parole

determination are not required to comport with standards of fundamental

fairness. See Brown v. Lundgren, 528 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429

U.S. 917, 97 S. Ct. 308, 50 L. Ed. 2d 283 (1976). In Staton v. Wainwright,

665 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1982) (former Fifth Circuit decision), the court

concluded that no liberty interest in parole was created by the Florida

statutes. The court, therefore, rejected appellant’s claim that his due process

rights were violated when he did not receive an initial parole interview within

the time required under the parole laws. The analysis in Staton was adopted

by the Eleventh Circuit in Hunter v. Florida Parole and Probation

Commission, 674 F.2d 847 (11th Cir. 1982), where the court held that no due

process violation could be shown through an allegation that the Florida

Parole and Probation Commission improperly calculated a prisoner’s

“presumptive parole release date.” Accordingly, in the instant case

petitioner[’s] . . . allegation that the . . . parole board has not accorded him

adequate parole consideration does not entitle him to [relief].

Slocum, 678 F.2d at 941–42.

Shrader does not possess a liberty interest in being granted parole that is protected

by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. Heard v. Georgia State Board of Pardons

and Paroles, 222 F. App’x 838, 840 (11th Cir. 2007); Monroe v. Thigpen, 932 F.2d 1437,

1441 (11th Cir. 1991); Ellard v. Alabama Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 824 F.2d 937, 941–

942 (11th Cir. 1987); Thomas v. Sellers, 691 F.2d 487, 488–89 (11th Cir. 1983). Absent

the existence of a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole, “the procedures

followed in making the parole determination are not required to comport with the standards

of fundamental fairness.” O’Kelley v. Snow, 53 F.3d 319, 321 (11th Cir. 1995); Slocum,

678 F.2d at 941–42; Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 32 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that because

applicable Texas parole statutes confer “no liberty interest in obtaining parole” Texas

inmate could not “complain of the constitutionality of procedural devices attendant to

parole decisions.”). Thus, the due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment do

not apply to either the parole decision making process, Thomas, 691 F.2d at 488–89, or the

parole consideration process. Slocum, 678 F.2d at 941–42. As is relevant to this claim, the

failure to provide parole review within the time required under parole rules or to properly

calculate the presumptive date of release on parole does not constitute a violation of due

process. Slocum, 678 F.2d at 942.

C. Release on Parole

In accordance with well-established law, Shrader’s claim alleging entitlement to

release on parole is not properly before the court in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Edwards v.

Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); Preiser v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).

In sum, applicable federal law provides that claims seeking release from

imprisonment must be raised in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus. See

Heck, 512 U.S. at 481 (The law directs that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a

state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and [a ruling in his

favor would result in] immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come

within the literal terms of § 1983.”); Edwards, 520 U.S. at 645 (The sole remedy in federal

court for a state prisoner challenging the constitutionality of his incarceration is a petition

for writ of habeas corpus.); Cook v. Baker, 139 F. App’x 167, 169 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding

that the “exclusive remedy” for a state inmate’s claim challenging the basis for or validity

of his current incarceration “is to file a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254[.]”). The Supreme Court emphasized in Balisok “that a claim either is cognizable

under § 1983 and should immediately go forward, or is not cognizable and should be

dismissed.” 520 U.S. at 649. “Later, in Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 125 S. Ct. 1242,

161 L. Ed. 2d 253 (2005), the Supreme Court reviewed its prior holdings in this area and

summarized that ‘a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent previous invalidation

[of the adverse action resulting in his incarceration])—no matter the relief sought (damages

or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct [resulting in

confinement] or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily

demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.’ Id. at 81–82, 125 S. Ct. at 1248.”

Robinson v. Satz, 260 F. App’x 209, 212 (11th Cir. 2007).

The principles espoused in Heck and Balisok foreclosing review of claims which go

to the fundamental legality of a prisoner’s confinement in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action apply

when an inmate is challenging his confinement due to the denial of parole. See Green v.

McGill-Johnston, 685 F. App’x 811, 812 (11th Cir. 2017) (holding Plaintiff’s “allegations,

if proven true, would have necessarily implied the invalidity of [the adverse parole

decision] . . . and his resulting imprisonment. . . . Because [Plaintiff’s] allegations would

imply the invalidity of his confinement, the Heck-bar applies and [Plaintiff’s] § 1983

claims must be dismissed.”); Littles v. Board of Pardons and Paroles Div., 68 F.3d 122,

123 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that the district court properly dismissed Plaintiff’s § 1983

complaint challenging an adverse parole decision where the challenged “decision has not

been reversed, expunged, set aside, or called into question, as Heck mandates.”); Jackson

v. Vannoy, 49 F.3d 175, 177 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding “Heck applies to proceedings that call

into question the fact or duration of parole.”); White v. Gittens, 121 F.3d 803, 807 (7th Cir.

1997) (holding that when “[a] favorable decision in the § 1983 proceeding would

necessarily call into question the validity of the state’s decree revoking [or denying

Plaintiff’s] parole and ordering him back to [or released from] prison. Heck therefore

applies, and the § 1983 action is not cognizable in a federal court . . . unless the [adverse]

parole [decision] ‘has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,

declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into

question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.’”) ;

Holt v. Gibbs, 2009 WL 111643, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 14, 2009) (finding “Heck applies to

parole and probation revocation proceedings.”) (citing Vannoy, supra).

Under the circumstances of this case, Heck and its progeny bar Shrader’s use of any

federal civil action, other than a petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,

to mount a collateral attack in which he asserts his entitlement to release on parole. Heck,

512 U.S. at 489 (“We do not engraft an exhaustion requirement upon § 1983, but rather

deny the existence of a cause of action. Even a prisoner who has fully exhausted [all]

available state remedies has no cause of action under § 1983 unless and until the

[challenged action] is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a

[federal] writ of habeas corpus [or some appropriate state court action].”); Abella v. Rubino,

63 F.3d 1063, 1066 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995) (“Heck clarifies that Preiser is a rule of

cognizability, not exhaustion.”). Consequently, Shrader’s challenges to the

constitutionality of his current imprisonment due to a denial of parole are not cognizable

in this civil action as these challenges provide no basis for relief at this time and such

challenges are therefore due to be summarily dismissed pursuant to the provisions of 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).3

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages from defendants Cliff Walker, Dwayne

Spurlock, Charles Graddick and Leigh Gwathney for any decisions related to parole

consideration or release on parole be DISMISSED with prejudice in accordance with 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).

2. Plaintiff’s clams alleging violations of his constitutional rights with respect to

the setting of a specific date for parole consideration be DISMISSED with prejudice

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

3. Plaintiff’s clams alleging violations of his constitutional rights regarding release

on parole be DISMISSED without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) to the

rights of Plaintiff to seek relief in an appropriate cause of action.

4. This case be DISMISSED prior to service of process in accordance with the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii).

3 Shrader is advised that any federal petition for writ of habeas corpus that he files is subject to the

procedural limitations imposed upon such petitions, in particular, the exhaustion of state court remedies.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus [filed] on behalf of a [state

inmate] shall not be granted unless it appears that . . . the applicate has exhausted the remedies available in

the courts of the State[.]”).

On or before March 13, 2021, the plaintiff may file objections to this

Recommendation. The plaintiff must specifically identify the factual findings and legal

conclusions in the Recommendation to which the objection is made. Frivolous, conclusive,

or general objections to the Recommendation will not be considered.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and legal

conclusions set forth in the Recommendations of the Magistrate Judge shall bar a party

from a de novo determination by the District Court of these factual findings and legal

conclusions and shall “waive the right to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order

based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions” except upon grounds of plain error

if necessary in the interests of justice. 11TH Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust Co. v.

Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993) (“When the magistrate

provides such notice and a party still fails to object to the findings of fact [and law] and

those findings are adopted by the district court the party may not challenge them on appeal

in the absence of plain error or manifest injustice.”); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794

(11th Cir. 1989).

DONE this 26th day of February, 2021.

/s/ Jerusha T. Adams

JERUSHA T. ADAMS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE