holding that, generally, where a litigant has been forewarned dismissal for failure to obey a court order is not an abuse of discretion
How later courts described this case
- holding that, generally, where a litigant has been forewarned dismissal for failure to obey a court order is not an abuse of discretion
- “When the magistrate provides such notice and a party still fails to object to the findings of fact and those findings are adopted by the district court the party may not challenge them on appeal in the absence of plain error or manifest injustice.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
KEVIN EUGENE LANCASTER, #224246, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:20-CV-555-RAH
) (WO)
)
REGINALD KINCEY, )
)
Defendant. )
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is pending before the court on a complaint filed by
Kevin Eugene Lancaser, an indigent state inmate. In the instant complaint, Lancaster
alleges the defendant used excessive force against him during a search on February 21,
2020 at the Easterling Correctional Facility. Doc. 1 at 2–3. He requests that the court
“hold Reginald Kincey accountable for his action.” Doc. 1 at 4.
The defendant filed a special report supported by relevant evidentiary materials,
including affidavits and applicable institutional documents and medical records, in which
he addresses the claim presented by Lancaster. See Docs. 15-1 thru 15-4. Specifically, the
defendant adamantly denies using force against Lancaster.
Upon review of the defendant’s report and supporting evidentiary materials, the
court entered an order directing Lancaster to file a response to these documents. Doc. 16.
The order advised Lancaster that his failure to respond to the report and supplement thereto
as directed in the order would be treated by the court “as an abandonment of the claims
set forth in the complaint and as a failure to prosecute this action.” Doc. 16 at 1
(emphasis in original). Additionally, the court “specifically cautioned [Lancaster] that
if he fails to file a response in compliance with the directives of this order the
undersigned will recommend that this case be dismissed for such failure.” Doc. 16 at
1 (emphasis in original). The time allotted Lancaster to file a response in compliance with
this order expired on December 11, 2020. Doc. 16 at 1. As of the present date, Lancaster
has failed to file a response in opposition to the defendant’s special report as ordered by
the court. In light of such failure, the court finds that this case should be dismissed.
The court has reviewed the file to determine whether a less drastic measure than
dismissal is appropriate. See Abreu-Velez v. Board of Regents of Univ. System of Georgia,
248 F. App’x 116, 117–18 (11th Cir. 2007). After such review, it is clear that dismissal of
this case is the proper course of action. Specifically, Lancaster is indigent. Thus, the
imposition of monetary or other punitive sanctions against him would be ineffectual.
Additionally, his inaction in the face of the defendant’s report and this court’s order
suggests a loss of interest in the continued prosecution of this case. Finally, it likewise
appears that any additional effort by this court to secure Lancaster’s compliance would be
unavailing and a waste of this court’s scarce judicial resources. Consequently, the court
concludes the abandonment of this case by Lancaster and his failure to comply with an
order of this court warrant dismissal. Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir.
1989) (holding that, generally, where a litigant has been forewarned dismissal for failure
to obey a court order is not an abuse of discretion). The authority of courts to impose
sanctions for failure to prosecute or obey an order is longstanding and acknowledged by
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S.
626, 629–30 (1962). This authority empowers the courts “to manage their own affairs so
as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Id. at 630–31; Mingo v.
Sugar Cane Growers Co-Op of Fla., 864 F.2d 101, 102 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that a
“district court possesses the inherent power to police its docket.”). “The sanctions imposed
[upon dilatory litigants] can range from a simple reprimand to an order dismissing the
action with or without prejudice.” Id.
For the above stated reasons, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate
Judge that this case be dismissed without prejudice.
On or before January 19, 2021 the parties may file objections to the
Recommendation. A party must specifically identify the factual findings and legal
conclusions in the Recommendation to which the objection is made. Frivolous, conclusive,
or general objections to the Recommendation will not be considered.
Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and legal conclusions set
forth in the Recommendations of the Magistrate Judge shall bar a party from a de novo
determination by the District Court of these factual findings and legal conclusions and shall
“waive the right to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order based on unobjected-to
factual and legal conclusions” except upon grounds of plain error if necessary in the
interests of justice. 11TH Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc.,
996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993) (“When the magistrate provides such notice and a
party still fails to object to the findings of fact and those findings are adopted by the district
court the party may not challenge them on appeal in the absence of plain error or manifest
injustice.”); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989).
DONE this 5th day of January, 2021.
/s/ Charles S. Coody
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE