Opinion

Rudolph v. McCoy (INMATE 1)

Court
District Court, M.D. Alabama
Filed
Dec 15, 2020
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 31.1%

acknowledging that the authority of courts to impose sanctions for failure to prosecute or obey an order is longstanding and empowers courts “to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.”

How later courts described this case

  • acknowledging that the authority of courts to impose sanctions for failure to prosecute or obey an order is longstanding and empowers courts “to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.”
  • holding that, as a general rule, where a litigant has been forewarned dismissal for failure to obey a court order is not an abuse of discretion.
  • “When the magistrate provides such notice and a party still fails to object to the findings of fact [and law] and those findings are adopted by the district court the party may not challenge them on appeal in the absence of plain error or manifest injustice.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

TRAVIS SENTELL RUDOLPH, #312044, )

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:20-CV-867-WHA

) (WO)

MONICA McCOY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff, an inmate confined at the Easterling Correctional Facility, recently

initiated the instant 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Doc. 1. Plaintiff did not submit the $350 filing

fee or $50 administrative fee upon the initiation of this case and, instead, filed an

application seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis before the Court. Doc. 2. Based on

the financial information provided by Plaintiff in support of his application, see Doc. 2 at

3, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A), the court determined Plaintiff owed an initial

partial filing fee of $11.93. Doc. 3 at 1–2. The Court therefore ordered Plaintiff to file the

required initial partial filing fee on or before November 17, 2020. Doc. 3 at 2. The Court

cautioned Plaintiff “if he fails to pay the initial partial filing fee in compliance with this

order the Magistrate Judge will recommend that this case be dismissed and such dismissal

will not be reconsidered unless exceptional circumstances exist.” Doc. 3 at 3.

As of the present date, Plaintiff has not provided the Court with the initial partial

filing fee. The foregoing reflects Plaintiff’s lack of interest in the continued prosecution

of this case. This action cannot properly proceed absent Plaintiff’s participation in the

proceedings. Under the circumstances of this case, the undersigned finds that lesser

sanctions than dismissal are not appropriate. See Abreu-Velez v. Board of Regents of Univ.

System of Georgia, 248 F. App’x 116, 117–18 (11th Cir. 2007). Thus, this case is due to

be dismissed. See Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that, as

a general rule, where a litigant has been forewarned dismissal for failure to obey a court

order is not an abuse of discretion.); see also Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629–

31 (1962) (acknowledging that the authority of courts to impose sanctions for failure to

prosecute or obey an order is longstanding and empowers courts “to manage their own

affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.”); Mingo v. Sugar

Cane Growers Co-Op of Fla., 864 F.2d 101, 102 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that “[t]he

district court possesses the inherent power to police its docket. . . . . The sanctions imposed

[upon dilatory litigants] can range from a simple reprimand to an order dismissing the

action with or without prejudice.”).

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that this case

be dismissed without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to pay the initial partial filing fee in

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A) as ordered by this court.

On or before December 29, 2020, Plaintiff may file objections to the

Recommendation. Plaintiff must specifically identify the factual findings and legal

conclusions in the Recommendation to which the objection is made. Frivolous, conclusive,

or general objections to the Recommendation will not be considered.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and legal

conclusions set forth in the Recommendations of the Magistrate Judge shall bar a party

from a de novo determination by the District Court of these factual findings and legal

conclusions and shall “waive the right to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order

based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions” except upon grounds of plain error

if necessary in the interests of justice. 11TH Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust Co. v.

Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993) (“When the magistrate

provides such notice and a party still fails to object to the findings of fact [and law] and

those findings are adopted by the district court the party may not challenge them on appeal

in the absence of plain error or manifest injustice.”); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794

(11th Cir. 1989).

Done this 15th day of December, 2020.

/s/ Charles S. Coody

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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