holding that, generally, where a litigant has been forewarned dismissal for failure to obey a court order is not an abuse of discretion
How later courts described this case
- holding that, generally, where a litigant has been forewarned dismissal for failure to obey a court order is not an abuse of discretion
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
CORY L. ELLIS, #205307, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:19-CV-1068-RAH
) (WO)
)
WALTER MYERS, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is pending before the court on a complaint filed by
Cory L. Ellis, an indigent state inmate currently confined at the Bullock Correctional
Facility. In the instant complaint, Ellis alleges the lack of adequate security and inaction
by the defendants resulted in his attack by other inmates during a prior term of incarceration
at the Easterling Correctional Facility. Doc. 1 at 3. He seeks “[t]o be removed from
Easterling Corr[ectional] Facility [and] ‘Justice’.” Doc. 1 at 4.
The defendants filed a special report and a supplement to this report supported by
relevant evidentiary materials, including affidavits, applicable institutional documents and
medical records, in which they address the claims presented by Ellis. See Doc. 38, Docs.
38-1 thru 38-8, Doc. 40 and Docs. 40-1 thru 40-4. Specifically, the defendants deny
violating Ellis’ constitutional rights with respect to the assault committed against him by
other inmates.
Upon review of the defendants’ report, supplement thereto, and supporting
evidentiary materials, the court entered an order directing Ellis to file a response to these
documents. Doc. 41. The order advised Ellis that his failure to respond to the report would
be treated by the court “as an abandonment of the claims set forth in the complaint and
as a failure to prosecute this action.” Doc. 41 at 1 (emphasis in original). Additionally,
the order “specifically cautioned [the plaintiff] that [his failure] to file a response in
compliance with the directives of this order the undersigned will recommend that this
case be dismissed for such failure.” Doc. 41 at 1 (emphasis in original). The time allotted
Ellis to file a response in compliance with this order expired on July 20, 2020. Doc. 41 at
1. As of the present date Ellis has failed to file a response in opposition to the defendants’
special report and supplement to this report as directed by the court. In light of such failure,
the court finds that this case should be dismissed.
The court has reviewed the file to determine whether a less drastic measure than
dismissal is appropriate. See Abreu-Velez v. Board of Regents of Univ. System of Georgia,
248 F. App’x 116, 117–18 (11th Cir. 2007). After such review, it is clear that dismissal of
this case is the proper course of action. Specifically, Ellis is an indigent inmate. Thus, the
imposition of monetary or other punitive sanctions against him would be ineffectual.
Additionally, his inaction in the face of the defendants’ reports and this court’s order
suggests a loss of interest in the continued prosecution of this case. Finally, it likewise
appears that any additional effort by this court to secure Ellis’ compliance would be
unavailing and a waste of this court’s scarce judicial resources. Consequently, the court
concludes the abandonment of this case by Ellis and his failure to comply with an order of
this court warrant dismissal. Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989)
(holding that, generally, where a litigant has been forewarned dismissal for failure to obey
a court order is not an abuse of discretion). The authority of courts to impose sanctions for
failure to prosecute or obey an order is longstanding and acknowledged by Rule 41(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629–30
(1962). This authority empowers the courts “to manage their own affairs so as to achieve
the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Id. at 630–31; Mingo v. Sugar Cane
Growers Co-Op of Fla., 864 F.2d 101, 102 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that a “district court
possesses the inherent power to police its docket.”). “The sanctions imposed [upon dilatory
litigants] can range from a simple reprimand to an order dismissing the action with or
without prejudice.” Id.
For the above stated reasons, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate
Judge that this case be dismissed without prejudice.
It is further
ORDERED that on or before August 18, 2020, the parties may file objections to the
Recommendation. The parties are advised that they must specifically identify the factual
findings and legal conclusions in the Recommendation to which objection is made.
Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered by the Court. The
parties are also advised that Recommendation is not a final order and, therefore, is not
appealable.
Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s findings and
recommendations in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) shall bar a
party from a de novo determination by the District Court of legal and factual issues covered
in the Recommendation and waives the right of the party to challenge on appeal the District
Court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions accepted or adopted by
the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.
Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); 11TH CIR. R. 3-1. See Stein v. Lanning
Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661
F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
DONE this 4th day of August, 2020.
/s/ Stephen M. Doyle
STEPHEN M. DOYLE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE