Johnson v. Faulkner (INMATE 1)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CLYDE JAMES JOHNSON, JR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:20-CV-154-WHA

) (WO)

)

CHARLES FAULKNER, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Clyde James Johnson, Jr., a pro se inmate, initiated the instant 42 U.S.C. § 1983

action on March 5, 2020. In this civil action, Johnson challenges the constitutionality of

his arrest for receiving stolen property by officers of the Dothan Police Department in

August of 2019.

The order of procedure entered in this case required Johnson to “immediately inform

the court and the defendants or, if counsel has appeared on behalf of the defendants, counsel

of record of any change in his address[,]” and advised him that “[f]ailure to provide a

correct address to this court within ten (10) days following any change of address will result

in the dismissal of this action. The plaintiff shall also diligently and properly prosecute

this action or face the possibility it will be dismissed for failure to prosecute.” Doc. 4 at

3–4, ¶8. The docket maintained by the court in this case indicates Johnson received a copy

of this order. However, the postal service returned as undeliverable an order entered on

May 26, 2020 (Doc. 11) because Johnson no longer resided at the last address he had

provided to the court for service.1

Based on the foregoing, the court entered an order requiring Johnson to inform the

court of his current address on or before June 16, 2020. Doc. 12 at 2. This order directed

Johnson to “show cause why this case should not be dismissed for his failure to comply

with the order of this court requiring provision of a current address and due to his failure

to adequately prosecute this action.” Doc. 12 at 2. The court “specifically cautioned

[Johnson] that if he fails to respond to this order the Magistrate Judge will recommend that

this case be dismissed due to his failure to keep the court apprised of his current address

and because, in the absence of such, this case cannot proceed before this court in an

appropriate manner.” Doc. 12 at 2. As of the present date, Johnson has failed to provide

the court with his current address pursuant to the directives of the orders entered in this

case. The court therefore concludes that this case should be dismissed.

The court has reviewed the file to determine whether a less drastic measure than

dismissal is appropriate. See Abreu-Velez v. Board of Regents of Univ. System of Georgia,

248 F. App’x 116, 117–18 (11th Cir. 2007). After such review, the court finds that

dismissal of this case is the proper course of action. Initially, the court notes that Johnson

is an indigent individual and the imposition of monetary or other punitive sanctions against

him would be ineffectual. Moreover, Johnson has failed to comply with the directives of

the orders entered by this court regarding provision of a current address. It likewise appears

1The last address provided to the court by the plaintiff is the Houston County Jail.

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that Johnson is simply no longer interested in the prosecution of this case and any additional

effort to secure his compliance would be unavailing and a waste of this court’s scarce

resources. Finally, this case cannot properly proceed when Johnson’s whereabouts are

unknown.

Accordingly, the court concludes that Johnson’s failure to comply with the orders

of this court warrant dismissal of this case. Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th

Cir. 1989) (holding that, as a general rule, where a litigant has been forewarned dismissal

for failure to obey a court order is not an abuse of discretion). The authority of courts to

impose sanctions for failure to prosecute or obey an order is longstanding and

acknowledged by Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Link v. Wabash

R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629–30 (1962). This authority empowers the courts “to manage

their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Id. at

630–31; Mingo v. Sugar Cane Growers Co-Op of Fla., 864 F.2d 101, 102 (11th Cir. 1989)

(holding that a “district court possesses the inherent power to police its docket.”). “The

sanctions imposed [upon dilatory litigants] can range from a simple reprimand to an order

dismissing the action with or without prejudice.” Id.

For the above stated reasons, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate

Judge that this case be dismissed without prejudice.

On or before July 9, 2020 the parties may file objections to the Recommendation.

A party must specifically identify the factual findings and legal conclusions in the

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Recommendation to which the objection is made. Frivolous, conclusive, or general

objections to the Recommendation will not be considered.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and legal conclusions set

forth in the Recommendations of the Magistrate Judge shall bar a party from a de novo

determination by the District Court of these factual findings and legal conclusions and shall

“waive the right to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order based on unobjected-to

factual and legal conclusions” except upon grounds of plain error if necessary in the

interests of justice. 11TH Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc.,

996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993) (“When the magistrate provides such notice and a

party still fails to object to the findings of fact and those findings are adopted by the district

court the party may not challenge them on appeal in the absence of plain error or manifest

injustice.”); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989).

DONE this 25th day of June, 2020.

/s/ Charles S. Coody

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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