Walker v. Brazier (INMATE 1)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ROYCHESTER WALKER, #292219, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:20-CV-111-WHA

)

COMMANDER BRAZIER, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Roychester Walker, an indigent inmate confined in the Houston County Jail,

initiated the instant 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action on February 19, 2020. In this civil action,

Walker challenges the constitutionality of conditions at the Houston County Jail. Doc. 1

at 3.

The order of procedure entered in this case required Walker to “immediately inform

the court and the defendants or, if counsel has appeared on behalf of the defendants, counsel

of record of any change in his address[,]” and advised him that “[f]ailure to provide a

correct address to this court within ten (10) days following any change of address will result

in the dismissal of this action. The plaintiff shall also diligently and properly prosecute

this action or face the possibility it will be dismissed for failure to prosecute.” Doc. 4 at

3–4, ¶8. The docket maintained by the court in this case indicates Walker received a copy

of this order. However, the postal service returned as undeliverable an order entered on

May 13, 2020, Doc. 12, because Walker no longer resided at the last address he had

provided to the court for service.1

Based on the foregoing, the court entered an order “that on or before June 3, 2020

the plaintiff show cause why this case should not be dismissed for his failure to comply

with the orders of this court and his failure to adequately prosecute this action.” Doc. 13

at 2. The court “specifically cautioned [the plaintiff] that if he fails to respond to this order

the Magistrate Judge will recommend that this case be dismissed due to his failure to keep

the court apprised of his current address and because, in the absence of such, this case

cannot proceed before this court in an appropriate manner.” Doc. 13 at 2. As of the present

date, Walker has failed to provide the court with his current address pursuant to the

directives of the orders entered in this case. The court therefore concludes that this case

should be dismissed.

The court has reviewed the file to determine whether a less drastic measure than

dismissal is appropriate. See Abreu-Velez v. Board of Regents of Univ. System of Georgia,

248 F. App’x 116, 117–18 (11th Cir. 2007). After such review, the court finds that

dismissal of this case is the proper course of action. Initially, the court notes that Walker

is an indigent individual and the imposition of monetary sanctions against him would be

ineffectual. Moreover, Walker has failed to comply with the directives of the orders

entered by this court regarding provision of a current address. It likewise appears that

Walker is simply no longer interested in the prosecution of this case and any additional

1The last address provided to the court by the plaintiff is the Houston County Jail.

effort to secure his compliance would be unavailing and a waste of this court’s scarce

resources. Finally, this case cannot properly proceed when Walker’s whereabouts are

unknown.

Accordingly, the court concludes that Walker’s failure to comply with the orders of

this court warrant dismissal of this case. Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir.

1989) (holding that, as a general rule, where a litigant has been forewarned dismissal for

failure to obey a court order is not an abuse of discretion). The authority of courts to impose

sanctions for failure to prosecute or obey an order is longstanding and acknowledged by

Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S.

626, 629–30 (1962). This authority empowers the courts “to manage their own affairs so

as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Id. at 630–31; Mingo v.

Sugar Cane Growers Co-Op of Fla., 864 F.2d 101, 102 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that a

“district court possesses the inherent power to police its docket.”). “The sanctions imposed

[upon dilatory litigants] can range from a simple reprimand to an order dismissing the

action with or without prejudice.” Id.

For the above stated reasons, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate

Judge that this case be dismissed without prejudice.

On or before July 1, 2020, the parties may file objections to the Recommendation.

A party must specifically identify the factual findings and legal conclusions in the

Recommendation to which the objection is made. Frivolous, conclusive, or general

objections to the Recommendation will not be considered.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and legal conclusions set

forth in the Recommendations of the Magistrate Judge shall bar a party from a de novo

determination by the District Court of these factual findings and legal conclusions and shall

“waive the right to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order based on unobjected-to

factual and legal conclusions” except upon grounds of plain error if necessary in the

interests of justice. 11TH Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc.,

996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993) (“When the magistrate provides such notice and a

party still fails to object to the findings of fact and those findings are adopted by the district

court the party may not challenge them on appeal in the absence of plain error or manifest

injustice.”); Henley v. Walker, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989).

DONE this 17th day of June, 2020.

/s/ Charles S. Coody

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE