Floyd v. Franklin (INMATE 1)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

ANTONIO FLOYD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:20-CV-2-ALB

)

BILL FRANKLIN, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Antonio Floyd, an indigent inmate acting pro se, initiated this 42 U.S.C. § 1983

action on January 2, 2020. Doc. 1. In this civil action, Floyd challenges the

constitutionality of conditions at the Elmore County Jail.

The order of procedure entered on January 7, 2020 instructed Floyd to immediately

inform the court of any new address. Doc. 4 at 3–4, ¶8 (“The plaintiff shall immediately

inform the court and the defendants or, if counsel has appeared on behalf of the defendants,

counsel of record of any change in his address. Failure to provide a correct address to this

court within ten (10) days following any change of address will result in the dismissal of

this action. The plaintiff shall also diligently and properly prosecute this action or face the

possibility it will be dismissed for failure to prosecute.”). The docket indicates Floyd

received a copy of this order. However, the postal service returned as undeliverable an

order entered on April 7, 2020 (Doc. 19) because Floyd no longer resided at the last address

he had provided to the court for service.1

1The last address provided by Floyd is the Elmore County Jail.

Based on the foregoing, the court entered an order noting Floyd’s failure to provide

a current address and requiring that on or before May 5, 2020 he “show cause why this

case should not be dismissed for his failure to comply with the orders of this court and his

failure to adequately prosecute this action.” Doc. 20 at 2. The court “specifically cautioned

[Floyd] that if he fails to respond to this order the Magistrate Judge will recommend that

this case be dismissed due to his failure to keep the court apprised of his current address

and because, in the absence of such, this case cannot proceed before this court in an

appropriate manner.” Doc. 20 at 2. As of the present date, Floyd has failed to provide the

court with his current address pursuant to the directives of the orders entered in this case.

The court therefore concludes that this case should be dismissed.

The court has reviewed the file to determine whether a less drastic measure than

dismissal is appropriate. See Abreu-Velez v. Board of Regents of Univ. System of Georgia,

248 F. App’x 116, 117–18 (11th Cir. 2007). After such review, the court finds that

dismissal of this case is the proper course of action. Initially, the court notes that Floyd is

an indigent individual and the imposition of monetary or other punitive sanctions against

him would be ineffectual. Moreover, Floyd has failed to comply with the directives of the

orders entered by this court regarding provision of a current address. It likewise appears

that Floyd is simply no longer interested in the prosecution of this case and any additional

effort to secure his compliance would be unavailing and a waste of this court’s scarce

resources. Finally, this case cannot properly proceed when Floyd’s whereabouts are

unknown.

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Accordingly, the court concludes that Floyd’s failure to comply with the orders of

this court warrant dismissal of this case. Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir.

1989) (holding that, as a general rule, where a litigant has been forewarned dismissal for

failure to obey a court order is not an abuse of discretion). The authority of courts to impose

sanctions for failure to prosecute or obey an order is longstanding and acknowledged by

Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S.

626, 629–30 (1962). This authority empowers the courts “to manage their own affairs so

as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Id. at 630–31; Mingo v.

Sugar Cane Growers Co-Op of Fla., 864 F.2d 101, 102 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that a

“district court possesses the inherent power to police its docket.”). “The sanctions imposed

[upon dilatory litigants] can range from a simple reprimand to an order dismissing the

action with or without prejudice.” Id.

For the above stated reasons, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate

Judge that this case be dismissed without prejudice.

On or before May 26, 2020 the parties may file objections to the Recommendation.

A party must specifically identify the factual findings and legal conclusions in the

Recommendation to which the objection is made. Frivolous, conclusive, or general

objections to the Recommendation will not be considered.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and legal conclusions set

forth in the Recommendations of the Magistrate Judge shall bar a party from a de novo

determination by the District Court of these factual findings and legal conclusions and shall

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“waive the right to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order based on unobjected-to

factual and legal conclusions” except upon grounds of plain error if necessary in the

interests of justice. 11TH Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc.,

996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993) (“When the magistrate provides such notice and a

party still fails to object to the findings of fact and those findings are adopted by the district

court the party may not challenge them on appeal in the absence of plain error or manifest

injustice.”); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989).

DONE this 12th day of May, 2020.

/s/ Charles S. Coody

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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