Barnett v. Jones (INMATE 2)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

SOLOMON JAMALL BARNETT, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:19-CV-855-WHA

) [WO]

SHERIFF JAY JONES, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This action is pending on Plaintiff’s complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On January

6, 2020, the court entered an order granting Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis. Doc. 3. The Clerk mailed a copy of this order to Plaintiff at the last service address on

record.1

On January 15, 2020, Plaintiff’s copy of the January 6, 2020, order, was returned to the

court marked as undeliverable because Plaintiff is no longer housed at the last service address the

court has on file for him. Accordingly, the court entered an order on January 16, 2020, requiring

that by January 27, 2020, Plaintiff file with the court a current address or show cause why this case

should not be dismissed for his failure to adequately prosecute this action. Doc. 4. This order

specifically advised Plaintiff this case could not proceed if his whereabouts remained unknown

and cautioned him that his failure to comply with its directives would result in the dismissal of this

case. Id. The court has received no response from Plaintiff to the January 16, 2020, order nor has

1The last address provided by Plaintiff is the Russell County Jail.

he provided the court with his current address. The court therefore concludes this case should be

dismissed.

The court has reviewed the file to determine whether a measure less drastic than dismissal

is appropriate. See Abreu-Velez v. Board of Regents of Univ. System of Georgia, 248 F. App’x

116, 117–18 (11th Cir. 2007). After such review, the court finds that dismissal of this case is the

proper course of action. First, the administration of this case cannot properly proceed in Plaintiff’s

absence. Next, it appears Plaintiff is no longer interested in the prosecution of this case as he has

failed to provide the court with a current service address. Finally, under the circumstances of this

case, the court finds that any additional effort by the court to secure Plaintiff’s compliance would

be unavailing and a waste of the court’s scarce judicial resources. Consequently, the undersigned

concludes this case is due to be dismissed. See Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir.

1989) (holding that, as a general rule, where a litigant has been forewarned dismissal for failure to

obey a court order is not an abuse of discretion.). The authority of courts to impose sanctions for

failure to prosecute or obey an order is longstanding and acknowledged by Rule 41(b) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629–30 (1962).

This authority empowers the courts “to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and

expeditious disposition of cases.” Id. at 630–31; Mingo v. Sugar Cane Growers Co-Op of Fla.,

864 F.2d 101, 102 (11th Cir. 1989) (observing that a “district court possesses the inherent power

to police its docket.”). “The sanctions imposed [upon dilatory litigants] can range from a simple

reprimand to an order dismissing the action with or without prejudice.” Id.

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge this case be

DISMISSED without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute this action.

2

It is

ORDERED that on or before February 20, 2020, Plaintiff may file an objection to the

Recommendation. Any objection filed must specifically identify the factual findings and legal

conclusions in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which Plaintiff objects. Frivolous,

conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. This

Recommendation is not a final order and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file a written objection to the proposed findings and recommendations in the

Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of

factual findings and legal issues covered in the report and shall “waive the right to challenge on

appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions” except upon

grounds of plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust

Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d

790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989).

Done, this 6th day of February 2020.

/s/ Charles S. Coody

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

3