Opinion

Floyd v. Houston County (INMATE 1)

Court
District Court, M.D. Alabama
Filed
Jan 10, 2020
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 31.1%

holding that, as a general rule, where a litigant has been forewarned dismissal for failure to obey a court order is not an abuse of discretion

How later courts described this case

  • holding that, as a general rule, where a litigant has been forewarned dismissal for failure to obey a court order is not an abuse of discretion

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MICKEY W. FLOYD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:19-CV-1008-ECM-WC

)

HOUSTON COUNTY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff initiated this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action challenging conditions at the Houston

County Jail. Upon receipt of this case, the court entered an order requiring Plaintiff to

submit an appropriate affidavit in support of a motion for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis or pay the requisite filing/administrative fees. Doc. 3. The Clerk mailed a copy

of this order to Plaintiff at the last address he provided for service.1 The postal service

returned this order as undeliverable because Plaintiff no longer resided at this address.

Based on the returned mail, the court entered an order requiring Plaintiff to inform

the court of his current address on or before January 6, 2020. Doc. 4. This order specifically

cautioned Plaintiff that “[i]f [he] fails to respond to this order, the Magistrate Judge will

recommend that this case be dismissed due to his failure to keep the court apprised of his

current address and because, in the absence of such, this case cannot proceed before this

court in an appropriate manner.” Doc. 4. As of the present date, the court has received no

response from Plaintiff to the aforementioned order, nor has Plaintiff provided the court

with an address where he may be served as is necessary to proceed in this case. The court

therefore concludes that this case should be dismissed.

The court has reviewed the file to determine whether a less drastic measure than

dismissal is appropriate. See Abreu-Velez v. Board of Regents of Univ. System of Georgia,

248 F. App’x 116, 117–18 (11th Cir. 2007). After such review, the court finds that

dismissal of this case is the proper course of action. Initially, the administration of this

case cannot properly proceed in Plaintiff’s absence. It likewise appears that Plaintiff is no

longer interested in the prosecution of this case as he has not made his whereabouts known

to the court. Finally, under the circumstances of this case, the court finds that any

additional effort by this court to secure Plaintiff’s compliance would be unavailing and a

waste of this court’s scarce judicial resources. Consequently, the undersigned concludes

that this case is due to be dismissed. See Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir.

1989) (holding that, as a general rule, where a litigant has been forewarned dismissal for

failure to obey a court order is not an abuse of discretion). The authority of courts to impose

sanctions for failure to prosecute or obey an order is longstanding and acknowledged by

Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S.

626, 629–30 (1962). This authority empowers the courts “to manage their own affairs so

as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Id. at 630–31; Mingo v.

Sugar Cane Growers Co-Op of Fla., 864 F.2d 101, 102 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that a

“district court possesses the inherent power to police its docket”). “The sanctions imposed

[upon dilatory litigants] can range from a simple reprimand to an order dismissing the

action with or without prejudice.” Id.

For the above stated reasons, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate

Judge that this case be dismissed without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to provide the

court with a current address. Further, it is

ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to this Recommendation on or

before January 24, 2020. A party must specifically identify the factual findings and legal

conclusions in the Recommendation to which objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or

general objections will not be considered. Plaintiff is advised that this Recommendation

is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s findings and

recommendations in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) shall bar a

party from a de novo determination by the District Court of legal and factual issues covered

in the Recommendation and waives the right of the party to challenge on appeal the district

court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions accepted or adopted by

the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); 11TH CIR. R. 3-1. See Stein v. Lanning

Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661

F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

DONE this 10th day of January, 2020.

/s/ Wallace Capel, Jr.

WALLACE CAPEL, JR.

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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