Smith v. Chick-Fil-A RSA Regions Tower (MAG+)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

PETER J. SMITH, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2:19-cv-128-WKW-SRW

)

CHICK-FIL-A RSA REGIONS TOWER, )

and CHICK-FIL-A, INC., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER and RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Peter J. Smith, proceeding pro se, initiated this lawsuit on February 15,

2019, by the filing of a civil rights complaint against defendants “Chick-Fil-A RSA

Regions Tower” and “Chick-Fil-A, Inc.” for failing to serve him the food that he paid for.

Doc. 1. Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Docs. 2, 2-1. Pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915,

[A]ny court of the United States may authorize the commencement,

prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or

criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security

therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement

of all assets such [person] possesses that the person is unable to pay

such fees or give security therefor. Such affidavit shall state the nature

of the action, defense or appeal and affiant’s belief that the person is

entitled to redress.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The court granted Plaintiff in forma pauperis status and directed

that he file an amended complaint. Doc. 10. The court instructed,

The amended complaint shall comply with the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and shall (i) clearly state which causes of action Plaintiff intends

to state against Defendants, and (ii) for each cause of action alleged, set

forth all of the material facts giving rise to the cause of action clearly and

concisely, without omitting any of the necessary facts as discussed in this

order. The amended complaint may not incorporate the allegations of

Plaintiff’s original complaint, or any other document, by reference; in other

words, the amended complaint must stand on its own.

Id. at 4–5. After an extension of time was granted to him (Doc. 13), Plaintiff filed an

amended complaint on November 8, 2019. Doc. 14. Upon review of the one-page

amended complaint, the court finds that Plaintiff’s amended complaint is due to be

dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). In relevant part, § 1915(e) provides,

“the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or

appeal . . . is frivolous or malicious [or] . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Although the court construes pro se pleadings liberally, see Hughes v. Lott, 350

F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003), pro se litigants must nonetheless follow the procedural

rules, and the court will not be required to rewrite a deficient pleading. See GJR Invests.,

Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other

grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 710 (11th Cir. 2010) (relying on Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards govern

[a court’s] review of dismissals under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)[.]” Mitchell v. Farcass,

112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). See also Jones v. Brown, 649 F. App’x 889, 890

(11th Cir. 2016) (citing Mitchell, supra) (“We review the district court’s dismissal for

failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) de

novo, applying the same standards that govern Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6).”). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court

must view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,

accepting all of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts as true. Am. United Life

Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1057 (11th Cir. 2007). Pro se

pleadings are liberally construed and held to a less stringent standard

than pleadings drafted by attorneys. Powell v. Lennon, 914 F.2d 1459,

1463 (11th Cir. 1990). However, in order to survive a motion to dismiss,

the plaintiff’s complaint must contain facts sufficient to support a

plausible claim to relief. [Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678].

Id. Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that a plaintiff file a “short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed

factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-

harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Therefore, even if liberally construed, Plaintiff’s amended

complaint (Doc. 14), must minimally satisfy Rule 8 to survive review under § 1915(e).

This court has reviewed Plaintiff’s amended complaint (Doc. 14) in light of the foregoing

principles.

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff states the following facts: (1) that his “food

stamps increased to $194 per month;” (2) “Title II violation”; and (3) “Violation of Civil

Rights Act of 1964 as it pertains to Race and Gender. I am a Black American Male. The

Chick-Fil-A manager is a white female.” Doc. 14. Plaintiff claims “compensatory and

punitive damages in the amount of $2 million and for a pattern of discrimination carried

out by Chick-Fil-A against me please see prior Chick-Fil-A case.” Id. Plaintiff also

attempts to incorporate the allegations set forth in his original complaint (Doc. 1) “such

as wire fraud, etc.” Doc. 14.

An amended complaint entirely supersedes all prior complaints. See Pintando v.

Miami-Dade Housing Agency, 501 F.3d 1241, 1243 (11th Cir. 2007); Fritz v. Standard

Life Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1982) (finding that under the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint). Once a

complaint is amended, the only issues before the court are those raised in the amended

document, and the plaintiff may not rely upon or incorporate by reference his prior

pleadings. Accordingly, the court finds that the cursory allegation of “wire fraud, etc.”

fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted and is due to be dismissed. Mitchell,

112 F.3d at 1490; see 18 U.S.C. § 1343.

That leaves Plaintiff’s Title II claim. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

prohibits discrimination on the grounds of race, color, religion, or national origin in

places of public accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a). The chief purpose of this title

is “to [re]move the daily affront and humiliation involved in discriminatory denials of

access to facilities ostensibly open to the general public.” Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298,

307–308 (1969) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 18) (quotation marks

omitted). To state a cause of action under this statute, Plaintiff “must allege that (1) the

restaurant affects commerce, (2) the restaurant is a public accommodation, and (3) the

restaurateur denied plaintiff full and equal enjoyment of the restaurant.” Bobbitt by

Bobbitt v. Rage, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 2d 512, 521 (W.D.N.C. 1988) (citing 42 U.S.C. §

2000a; Wooten v. Moore, 400 F.2d 239, 241 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. DeRosier,

473 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1973)). The court notes that Plaintiff’s remedy, if any, would be

limited to injunctive relief only, not the $2,000,000 damages that he seeks. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000a-3(a).

Plaintiff’s allegations of race and gender discrimination are brief, vague, and

conclusory, and they fail to allege facts sufficient to support a plausible claim for relief as

required by Iqbal. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The statement, “I am a Black American

Male [and] the Chick-Fil-A manager is a white female” (Doc. 14), offered without any

supporting factual detail, is insufficient to allege unlawful discrimination, and fails to

pass muster under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Although the amended complaint

makes a general reference to race and gender, Plaintiff does not allege specifically that he

was not given his food order, denied service, other otherwise discriminated against on the

basis of his race or gender. Plaintiff’s amended complaint, even liberally construed, does

not state any claim upon which relief could be granted. Mitchell, 112 F.3d at 1490.

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that this

matter be DISMISSED prior to service of process in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B) and that Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the Complaint (Doc. 15) be DENIED

AS MOOT.

It is further ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to this

Recommendation on or before December 9, 2019. A party must specifically identify the

factual findings and legal conclusions in the Recommendation to which objection is

made; frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered. Failure to file

written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations in accordance

with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) shall bar a party from a de novo

determination by the District Court of legal and factual issues covered in the

Recommendation and waives the right of the party to challenge on appeal the district

court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions accepted or adopted by

the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); 11th Cir. R. 3-1; See Stein v. Lanning

Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661

F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

DONE, on this the 25th day of November, 2019.

/s/ Susan Russ Walker

Susan Russ Walker

United States Magistrate Judge