Opinion

Floyd v. Wilson (INMATE 2)

Court
District Court, M.D. Alabama
Filed
Aug 19, 2019
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 31.1%

“Generally, the departments and subordinate entities of municipalities, counties, and towns that are not separate legal entities or bodies do not have the capacity to sue or be sued in the absence of specific statutory authority.”

How later courts described this case

  • “Generally, the departments and subordinate entities of municipalities, counties, and towns that are not separate legal entities or bodies do not have the capacity to sue or be sued in the absence of specific statutory authority.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

TWMAINE XAVIER FLOYD, )

#302 423, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:19-CV-588-ALB

) [WO]

JOHNNIE WILSON, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff is an inmate incarcerated at the Kilby Correctional Facility in Mt. Meigs,

Alabama. He brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for damages and injunctive relief alleging

Defendant Wilson subjected him to excessive force on June 30, 2019, during his incarceration at

the Lee County Detention Center. Plaintiff names as defendants Officer Johnnie Wilson and the

Lee County Detention Center. Upon review, the court concludes that dismissal of Plaintiff's claims

against the Lee County Detention Center prior to service of process is appropriate under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).1

I. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff names the Lee County Detention Center as a defendant. The law is settled that

in order to state a claim for relief under Section 1983, a plaintiff must satisfy two

elements. First, a plaintiff must allege that an act or omission deprived him “of

some right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States.” Hale v. Tallapoosa Cty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). Second, a

plaintiff must allege that the act or omission was committed by “a person acting

under color of state law.” Id. While local governments qualify as “persons” under

Section 1983, state agencies and penal institutions are generally not considered

1 A prisoner who is allowed to proceed in forma pauperis in this court will have his complaint screened in

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This screening procedure requires the court

to dismiss a prisoner’s civil action prior to service of process if it determines that the complaint is

frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

legal entities subject to suit. See Grech v. Clayton Cty., 335 F.3d 1326, 1343 (11th

Cir. 2003). Consequently, a county jail [is] not [a] viable defendant[] under Section

1983. Williams v. Chatham Cty. Sherriff’s Complex, Case No. 4:07-CV-68, 2007

WL 2345243, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 14, 2007) (“The county jail . . . has no

independent legal identity and therefore is not an entity that is subject to suit under

Section 1983.”).

Bell v. Brown, 2017 WL 3473845, at *5 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 11, 2017); see Ex parte Dixon, 55 So.3d

1171, 1172 n.1 (Ala. 2010) (“Generally, the departments and subordinate entities of municipalities,

counties, and towns that are not separate legal entities or bodies do not have the capacity to sue or

be sued in the absence of specific statutory authority.”).

In light of the foregoing, it is clear the Lee County Detention Center is not a legal entity

subject to suit and is, therefore, due to be dismissed as a defendant under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

II. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. Plaintiff's claims against the Lee County Detention Center be DISMISSED with

prejudice prior to service of process pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i);

2. The Lee County Detention Center be TERMINATED as a party; and

3. This case be referred to the undersigned for additional proceedings.

It is further

ORDERED that on or before September 3, 2019, Plaintiff may file an objection to the

Recommendation. Any objection must specifically identify the findings in the Recommendation

to which Plaintiff objects. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by

the District Court. Plaintiff is further advised this Recommendation is not a final order and,

therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the

Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of

factual findings and legal issues covered in the report and shall “waive the right to challenge on

appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions” except upon

grounds of plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust

Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d

790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989).

Done, this 19th day of August 2019.

/s/ Charles S. Coody

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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