The opinion
Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 525
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CV-24-184
TAMELA COX AND ADRIAN Opinion Delivered October 30, 2024
BENNETT
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY
APPELLANTS CIRCUIT COURT, TENTH DIVISION
[NO. 60JV-20-728]
V.
HONORABLE SHANICE JOHNSON,
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF JUDGE
HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR
CHILDREN
APPELLEES AFFIRMED
STEPHANIE POTTER BARRETT, Judge
Tamela Cox and Adrian Bennett appeal the Pulaski County Circuit Court’s
termination of their parental rights to their daughters, MC2 (DOB 10/25/08), MC3 (DOB
04/05/11), and MC4 (DOB 12/22/13).1 Although Cox and Bennett filed separate briefs
on appeal, they both argue that it was not in their daughters’ best interest for their parental
rights to be terminated. We affirm the terminations.
1
At the time the case was opened, Bennett was listed as the putative father of MC1
(DOB 01/06/07) and MC2, but the circuit court ultimately found that DNA testing
established that he is the biological father of MC1 and MC2. Cox’s and Bennett’s parental
rights were not terminated as to their daughter MC1. Cox also has an older daughter who
was initially taken into DHS custody but turned eighteen during the case and requested to
be dismissed from the case, which the court granted in the permanency-planning order filed
on April 25, 2022.
According to affidavits attached to the petition for ex parte emergency custody filed
on October 29, 2020, the family had an extensive history with the Arkansas Department of
Human Services (DHS). On October 21, 2020, the child-abuse hotline received a report
that thirteen-year-old MC1 had been forced to have sex with a twenty-six-year-old man on
several occasions in the last month, and she had been having sex with other adult males;
Bennett was receiving money for her sexual encounters; and she was engaging in self-harm.
In response to the allegations, Bennett told the family-service worker (FSW) that MC1 ran
away when she did not get her way, he could usually find her, and he made police reports
when MC1 ran away; he admitted knowing that MC1 was having sex with adult men, two
of whom he knew, and that some of the men had threatened MC1, but he denied that he
sex trafficked MC1. Bennett said that he got MC1 a pregnancy test and attempted to admit
her to a mental-health hospital when he learned she was having sex. Cox told the FSW that
MC1 was always running away, and she “supposed” MC1 was having sex because she kept
coming home with STDs, but she denied knowing anything about sex trafficking. Cox
refused to take a drug screen, admitting that she had used THC and cocaine the day before.
MC2, MC3, and MC4 all told the FSW that they felt safe at home, and they denied being
touched in a sexual manner or being asked to perform sexual acts. They agreed MC1 ran
away “a lot.” A second affidavit from another FSW included allegations of educational
neglect and sexual abuse. A third affidavit from an investigator for the Crimes Against
Children Division of the Arkansas State Police (CACD) stated that MC1 frequently ran away
from home; she had an extensive history of sexual abuse with multiple offenders beginning
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when she was nine; it was suspected that she was currently having sex with adult men; and
she had multiple STDs, including gonorrhea and chlamydia, which had gone untreated
because she was a runaway.
The North Little Rock police located MC1 on October 21 at a house in North Little
Rock, and she agreed to go to the Child Protection Center (CPC). When Cox was notified
MC1 had been located, Cox refused to go to the CPC, stating that she did not have a ride,
and she did not want to deal with MC1. In a videotaped interview, MC1 said that she and
her cousin had been staying at the home of her thirty-three-year-old “uncle,” although she
could not remember how to pronounce his name. She said that Cox blamed her for DHS
being in their lives, and that if she told the truth, her parents got upset. She said that her
parents smoke marijuana, and her mother takes pills. MC1 proceeded to talk about her
“uncle”; she said that while he did not try to have sex with her, he had grabbed her and her
cousin by their throats. MC1 also told the investigator that she and her thirty-six-year-old
boyfriend had engaged in sex more than six times; she had been raped at least four times;
and her parents had received $200 in exchange for her performing sexual acts with men.
Bennett denied trafficking his children, although he admitted he knew the man MC1
claimed had paid $200 to have sex with her. He stated that MC1’s “uncle” was married to
his niece and that MC1 knew her thirty-six-year-old boyfriend because he had dated Cox
while Bennett and Cox were separated.
Forensic interviews were conducted with MC2, MC3, MC4, and Cox’s older
daughter. MC2, who said she did not attend school, said that MC1 ran away often. MC3
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reported that she had not been hurt or inappropriately touched, although she did get
“whoopings” with a switch; the police were often called to their house; and that MC1 ran
away often. MC4 knew that MC1 was at CPC because MC1 had run away; that MC1
smoked weed; that nothing bad had happened to MC4; and that while she had been spanked
with belts and switches, she had not had a spanking in a long time. Cox’s oldest daughter
denied being hurt at home, but she admitted that Cox and Bennett fought often and that it
was a toxic relationship; she believed they needed counseling.
The children were removed from Cox and Bennett because the circumstances
presented an immediate danger to their health and physical well-being; they had not, could
not, or would not provide the necessary supervision to protect the children from potential
harm; and their substance abuse seriously affected their ability to care for the children. It
was noted that Cox did not want to deal with MC1 and that sexual abuse was suspected,
suggesting that child safety may be an immediate concern.
On October 29, the circuit court entered an ex parte order placing emergency custody
with DHS, finding that it was contrary to the children’s welfare to remain with their parents.
The circuit court specifically found that the children were at risk of substantial harm due to
suspected sexual abuse and drug use.
A probable-cause hearing was held on November 4. Testimony revealed ongoing
concerns regarding drug use by Cox and Bennett and their refusal to submit to drug screens,
concerns of sexual abuse to MC1, and the likelihood of abuse to, or exposure to abuse of,
the other children. On November 10, the circuit court entered an order finding that
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probable cause still existed for the children to remain in DHS custody. It reserved its findings
on reasonable efforts by DHS until the adjudication hearing but found that services and
placements met the juveniles’ needs. Cox and Bennett were awarded four hours of weekly
supervised online visitation.
An adjudication hearing was held on December 16 and 21, 2020, and an order
adjudicating the children dependent-neglected based on chronic neglect, inadequate
supervision, sexual abuse, educational neglect, medical neglect, and parental unfitness was
entered on December 22. Evidence presented at that hearing included testimony that on
October 23, 2020, after undergoing hair-follicle testing, MC4 tested positive for
methamphetamine and THC; MC3 tested positive for methamphetamine, cocaine, and
THC; and MC2 tested positive for methamphetamine and cocaine. Dr. Rachel Clingenpeel
diagnosed the children as neglected; there were longstanding concerns regarding their health
and safety.
Bennett, who was living with his sister, testified that he was looking for adequate
housing; that MC1 had been receiving counseling; and that he was receiving only about one
hour of weekly visitation instead of the four hours he had been granted. Cox stated that she
was willing to work the services offered to be reunited with her children. Cox also wanted
more visitation, even though she had exercised visitation only twice, and she had never
exercised visitation with MC1.
The circuit court found that DHS had not made reasonable efforts to prevent removal
because its safety plan included the maternal grandmother, whose boyfriend was an alleged
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sexual perpetrator; Bennett was not referred for any services and had only two drug screens;
and Cox had two home visits and was offered drug screens, but no other services. The circuit
court found it unconscionable that DHS had not offered mental-health services to the family
based on their needs and history. However, the circuit court found that the services and
placements met the children’s health, safety, and educational needs. The court ordered that
Cox and Bennett receive at least four hours of supervised visitation per week.
A review hearing was held on August 18, 2021. The circuit court ordered that the
children remain in DHS custody and found that their placements—MC1 in a qualified
residential treatment program (QRTP); MC2 in a therapeutic foster home; MC3 in
residential treatment; and MC4 in a foster home—were meeting the children’s special needs
and best interest. The goal of the case remained reunification with Cox with a concurrent
goal of guardianship or adoption with a fit and willing relative. The court noted that Cox
had less than partially complied with the case plan and court orders because she was still
testing positive for multiple illegal drugs; had not participated in mental-health treatment;
and was not cooperative with DHS. The court found she had made minimal progress.
Bennett was found to have substantially complied with the case plan and court orders, having
participated in some visitations and completed his drug-and-alcohol assessment; however, he
had not followed the assessment recommendations, and he had not participated in any
mental-health treatment. The court found that DHS had made reasonable efforts to place
the children together, but the court found it was in the best interest of the juveniles to be
separated, given that each juvenile had special needs, and there was not a foster home
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available to take the sibling group and meet each of their needs. However, the court found
DHS had not made reasonable efforts to ensure that the children had regular, consistent
visitation or other ongoing contact with each other, and DHS had not made reasonable
efforts to provide family services or keep the parents apprised of a change in caseworkers,
and it had not used due diligence to identify and provide notice to all adult relatives of the
children.
A permanency-planning hearing was held on October 13 and 28, 2021, and an order
was filed on April 25, 2022. The goal of the case remained reunification with a fit parent
with a concurrent goal of guardianship with a fit and willing relative. The court found that
the case plan, services, and placement in foster homes met the children’s special needs and
best interest—MC1 had been placed in a QRTP but was now in an acute/subacute stay; MC2
was in a therapeutic foster home; MC3 was currently in residential treatment; and MC4 was
doing well in her foster home. Cox was found to have partially complied with the case plan,
and Bennett was found to have more than partially—but less than substantially—complied
with the case plan; both Cox and Bennett were failing to submit to drug screens. The circuit
court found that DHS had not made reasonable efforts to ensure regular and consistent
visitation between the children; and although DHS had not made reasonable efforts to
provide family services since the last hearing, DHS had now remedied the issues that led to
that finding by setting up necessary referrals, appointments, and visitation links, although
MC3’s placement did not permit online visitation, and MC1 chose not to participate in
visitation. The court ordered Cox and Bennett to participate in drug rehabilitation,
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complete their psychological evaluations, participate in counseling, and submit to drug
screens.
A permanency-planning hearing was held on July 15, and an order was entered on
August 10. The goal of the case remained reunification with a fit parent with a concurrent
goal of guardianship with a fit and willing relative. The court found that the case plan,
services, and placement in foster homes met the children’s special needs and best interest—
MC1 was in a provisional foster home with her maternal grandmother; MC2 was in a
residential treatment facility; MC3 was placed in a QRTP; and MC4 was in a foster home.
The court expressed concern about MC1’s placement with her maternal grandmother since
the grandmother’s boyfriend was an offender on some of the children; DHS was ordered to
ensure the placement was appropriate. Both Cox and Bennett were found to have more
than minimally—but less than partially—complied with the case plan; both admitted to using
illegal drugs and continued to test positive for illegal substances. The court found DHS had
not made reasonable efforts to ensure that the children had regular, consistent contact with
each other or to provide family services; although the court appreciated the new case worker’s
efforts to coordinate visitation and perform drug screens, it did not make up for the problems
that had plagued the case. The circuit court made a finding of aggravated circumstances in
the permanency-planning order, concluding that there was little likelihood that continuing
to offer services to the family would result in a successful reunification because Cox and
Bennett had not benefited from the services available to them.
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Another review hearing was held on October 19, 2022, and an order was entered on
December 30; the circuit court found it was in the children’s best interest to remain in DHS
custody. Specifically, the court found that the children could not be placed with Cox, either
permanently or on a trial basis, because there had been no progress in individual or family
therapy; Cox still blamed MC1 for the children being in foster care; she still had not resolved
her substance-abuse issues; and she had no stable housing. The children could not be placed
with Bennett because he was still not participating in therapy, and he was still using illegal
substances. However, the goal remained reunification with a concurrent goal of
guardianship or adoption with a fit and willing relative. The court determined that it was
not in the children’s best interest to remain separated, and they were not receiving services
to address the sibling-relationship issues. The court found that Cox and Bennett had
minimally complied with the case plan, and neither had made progress toward remedying
the reasons for the children’s removal because both were still using illegal drugs and needed
drug treatment. The court found that DHS had not made reasonable efforts to ensure that
the children had regular and consistent visitation with each other, and although there had
been testimony that some of the siblings did not get along, there had been no sibling therapy.
The court again found that DHS had not made reasonable efforts to provide family services.
A review hearing was held on March 13, 2023, and the resulting order was filed on
June 30. It ordered that the children remain in DHS custody, although the goal remained
reunification with a concurrent goal of guardianship with a fit and willing relative. The court
found that Cox had made no progress in either individual or family therapy; she still had
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substance-abuse issues; and she had no stable housing. Bennett continued to use and test
positive for illegal substances, he was not addressing his substance-abuse issues, and he was
not participating in therapy. The court found that the case plan, services, and placements
met the children’s special needs and best interest. The court reserved a reasonable-efforts
finding by DHS given that the current caseworker was new to the case, although it found
DHS had used reasonable efforts to maintain ongoing sibling contact. The court found that
Cox and Bennett had minimally complied with the case plan—while participating in
visitation and counseling, both were still using illegal substances and had demonstrated no
progress toward alleviating the reasons for the children’s removal.
A permanency-planning hearing was held on July 10, 2023; the order, which was not
filed until August 25, changed the permanency goal to adoption with a fit and willing relative
with a concurrent goal to place custody with a fit parent. The court found that while the
placements of the children met their special needs, it was not in their best interest to be
separated—both MC1 and MC3 had been in eighteen placements, MC2 had fifteen
placements, and MC4 had eight placements. The court found Cox and Bennett had
minimally complied with the case plan—there was a lack of progress, especially in the area of
substance abuse—and DHS had made reasonable efforts toward reunification, offering foster-
home placements, supervised parental visitation and sibling visitation, individual and family
therapy, parenting classes, transportation, medical services, drug-and-alcohol screenings and
testing, placement referrals, and clothing and shoe vouchers.
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DHS and the attorney ad litem filed a petition to terminate Cox’s and Bennett’s
parental rights on August 23, 2023. The grounds asserted for termination were (1) the
children had been adjudicated dependent-neglected and had continued out of custody of
the parent (Cox) and noncustodial parent (Bennett) for a period of twelve months, and
despite a meaningful effort by DHS to correct the conditions causing removal, the conditions
had not been remedied, see Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341 (b)(3)(B)(i)(a), (b) (Supp. 2023); (2)
subsequent factors, see id. § 9-27-341 (b)(3)(B)(vii)(a); and (3) aggravated circumstances—little
likelihood of successful reunification, see id. § 9-27-341 (b)(3)(B)(ix) (a)(3)(A). DHS also
alleged that it was in the children’s best interest for Cox’s and Bennett’s parental rights to
be terminated.
At the termination hearing, Cox testified that she and Bennett were currently living
with her mother, and her only income was from Social Security. She said that her children
were taken into custody due to sexual-assault charges; she agreed that there were also issues
of substance abuse and exposure to illegal drugs, but she denied that she was the source of
that problem. Cox admitted that she had used marijuana two days before the termination
hearing and cocaine a month or two before; she said that the drugs helped her anxiety,
depression, and panic attacks because she had not seen a doctor to have her prescription
medications refilled in a year and a half. Although she did not have a medical marijuana
card, she asserted that smoking marijuana is not a crime, and she did not believe that she
was addicted to marijuana or cocaine. She testified that she had participated in drug
counseling but had not finished the program. She admitted that she could not take her
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children home that day, but that DHS had been helping her look for appropriate housing;
she believed that was the only barrier to having her children returned to her. She believed
that the only service her children needed was counseling; she had participated in two family-
counseling sessions with MC1 and none with her other children. Cox admitted she had not
had many visits with her children.
Bennett testified that he and Cox were living with Cox’s mother because she had
health issues and could not live by herself. He admitted he had used marijuana with his
children in the house, and while Cox had previously used illegal substances, he claimed she
did not do that any longer, and she had never used them in front of the children. He
admitted using marijuana two days before the termination hearing, even though he did not
have a medical marijuana card, and using cocaine a month or two before the termination
hearing, but he denied being addicted to it, and he did not believe he needed drug treatment.
He said that he was not aware that MC1 was being sexually assaulted until it was reported,
and he denied that he was responsible for the sexual assaults, stating that he could not be
responsible for something that happened when MC1 ran away. Bennett testified that he
had completed parenting classes, and he had attended four drug-treatment classes, but he
had stopped after his and Cox’s son was killed and had not resumed the classes. Bennett
had participated in two family-therapy sessions with MC1. He believed that he was in a
position to take his children home from the termination hearing, even though he did not
have a home of his own. Bennett was currently working three days a week at the Super 8
Motel, and he also did lawn service for his pastor.
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Amber Smith, the program coordinator at Haven House and MC1’s therapist,
testified that MC1 preferred to use male pronouns and was working on trauma processing
in therapy, but there had been little to no progress because MC1 had been consistently in
crisis since arriving at Haven House. Smith testified that she had asked for discretion in
determining whether Cox and Bennett had visitation with MC1 because there was a direct
correlation between visitation and MC1’s dysregulation; there was a connection between
visitation and MC1’s hospitalizations.
Dorthea Sanchez, the CASA worker appointed to the case, testified that her
recommendation was for parental rights to be terminated so that the children could move
forward. She said that at this point, the children were “stagnant”; they were all receiving
therapy, but she was unsure that they were benefiting from it. She said that MC1, MC2,
and MC3 had issues after visitation; they wanted visitation, but after they went, they would
spiral down. Sanchez was concerned that if the children were returned to their parents, they
would be going back into the same situation from which they were removed. Sanchez
admitted that she had had no contact with Cox or Bennett during the case.
Christopher Rudy, a DHS adoption specialist, testified that he had run a data match
for all four children using various mental, developmental, and behavioral characteristics. He
noted that some of the children may require counseling, and he also noted histories of self-
harm; runaway tendencies; educational needs for the children; and the age, gender, and race
of each child. For MC1, there were fifty-nine matches; for MC2, there were seventy-four
matches; for MC3, there were seventy-eight matches; and for MC4, there were one hundred
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fifty-eight matches. There were no matches for the sibling group as a whole, but Rudy
testified that was subject to change.
Kayla Perry, the DHS caseworker since May 2023, testified that the children were
initially removed due to MC1’s sexual abuse; additionally, there were allegations of drug
abuse, neglect, inadequate supervision, and educational neglect. Perry opined that Cox and
Bennett had made no progress toward remedying the conditions that had caused removal,
and she recommended termination of parental rights as to all four children due to the
continued use of illegal substances by Cox and Bennett.
After the termination hearing, the circuit court denied the termination of parental
rights as to MC1. While finding there was little likelihood that continuing to offer services
to Cox and Bennett would result in MC1 being placed with them, it found that it was not
in MC1’s best interest for parental rights to be terminated. In making this decision, the
circuit court stated that it had considered the likelihood of adoption, her age, and the specific
trauma she had dealt with, including the number of acute placements during the pendency
of the case. However, as to MC2, MC3, and MC4, the circuit court granted the petition to
terminate parental right on all bases pled in the petition. The circuit court noted that it had
made no reasonable-efforts findings throughout the case because early in the case, DHS had
an issue with providing appropriate services to Cox and Bennett, but as of the July 10, 2023
permanency-planning hearing, looking at the case as a whole, the court did find that DHS
had made reasonable efforts. The court found Cox and Bennett were in no greater a position
at the termination hearing than when the case began; there was an opportunity to achieve
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permanency; and the most appropriate goal was to terminate parental rights and move
forward with adoption with a fit and willing relative.
Termination of parental rights is a two-step process requiring a determination that
the parent is unfit and that termination is in the best interest of the children. Williams v.
Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2022 Ark. App. 162. The first step requires proof of one or more
statutory grounds for termination; the second step, the best-interest analysis, includes
consideration of the likelihood that the juveniles will be adopted and of the potential harm
caused by returning custody to the parent. Id. Each of these requires proof by clear and
convincing evidence, which is the degree of proof that will produce in the finder of fact a
firm conviction regarding the allegation sought to be established. Id.
Termination of parental rights is an extreme remedy and derogation of a parent’s
natural rights; however, parental rights will not be enforced to the detriment or destruction
of the health and well-being of the children. Collier v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2022 Ark.
App. 100, 641 S.W.3d 67. We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo, but we
will not reverse the circuit court’s ruling unless its findings are clearly erroneous. Isom v. Ark.
Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2022 Ark. App. 159. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. In determining whether a
finding is clearly erroneous, due deference is given to the circuit court’s opportunity to judge
the credibility of witnesses. Gascot v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2022 Ark. App. 57.
15
Neither Cox nor Bennett challenges the grounds relied on by the circuit court for
termination; therefore, we need not review whether the circuit court erred in finding that
statutory grounds for termination existed. See Robinson v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark.
App. 251, 520 S.W.3d 702. The only argument on appeal is that termination of their
parental rights was not in their children’s best interest. We disagree.
A best-interest finding must be based on consideration of at least two factors: (1) the
likelihood of adoption if parental rights are terminated and (2) the potential harm caused by
continuing contact with the parent. Baxter v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 508.
It is the overall evidence—not proof of each factor—that must demonstrate termination is in
the children’s best interest. Id.
Cox argues that the evidence failed to prove that termination of her parental rights
was in the children’s overall best interest. She contends that the circuit court is required to
consider adoptability in making a best-interest determination, although she acknowledges
that abundant evidence of adoptability is not required. She argues that DHS failed to offer
sufficient evidence that permanency for MC2, MC3, and MC4 could be achieved through
adoption; in support of that assertion, she points to the numerous placements of each child
during the pendency of the case. She contends that the testimony from adoption specialist
Rudy should be disregarded because he had received the case only a month before the
termination hearing and had never met the children. While Cox acknowledges that this was
not a situation in which the testimony as to adoptability was that “all children are adoptable,”
see Grant v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 636, 378 S.W.2d 227, she asserts that
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it is “utterly illogical” to conclude that adoption was likely for children who had as many
placements as her children during their stay in DHS custody, including numerous stays in
mental-health facilities, and that if their history and inability to maintain placements is not
a barrier to adoption, it was “unclear that DHS will ever acknowledge a barrier can ever exist
for any child.” Cox also contends that the circuit court failed to consider the impact
termination would have on family relationships, especially between the siblings, noting that
the circuit court had consistently found that DHS had not made reasonable efforts to place
the children together or to ensure that they had consistent visitation with each other.
Bennett also challenges the circuit court’s best-interest finding in terminating his
parental rights, attacking DHS’s failure to provide services for him, to facilitate that the
children be placed together or to maintain the sibling bond, and to ensure the children’s
stability. He argues that hearings were not timely held, even though he admits that
continuances were agreed upon by counsel. He noted that MC3 and MC4 wanted their
family back together, but he admitted that conflict between MC1 and MC2 prevented
placement of the children together; nevertheless, he argued that the children had not
requested that parental rights be terminated. Bennett also challenges the testimony of
adoption specialist Rudy as to adoptability, arguing that there were no matches for the sibling
group as a whole, the adoption specialist did not know the effect of adopting the children
individually, he had not met with the children before making his recommendation, and he
did not know the effect that separation would have on the children. He also argues, like
Cox, that that it was “utterly illogical” to say there were “no barriers” to adoption in this
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case; given the multiple placements in the case, it was unclear that DHS would ever
determine that a barrier could ever exist. Bennett admitted that he had failed his children
with his continued drug use, but he argued that his children had no more stability, safety, or
consistency in DHS custody than in his custody, and if they were in his custody, they were
with their parents, they had each other, and they felt loved and safe.
We hold that the circuit court’s termination of parental rights was in the children’s
best interest. Clearly, there was potential harm in returning the children to the custody of
Cox and Bennett. The court is not required to find that actual harm would result or to
affirmatively identify a potential harm. Parks v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2024 Ark. App.
488, ___ S.W.3d ___. The potential-harm evidence must be viewed in a forward-looking
manner and considered in broad terms. Id. The circuit court found one ground for
termination was that the issues causing removal had not been remedied; both Cox and
Bennett were still testing positive for illegal substances at the time of the termination hearing.
A parent’s drug use and failure to comply with court orders supports a potential-harm
finding. Id. A parent’s past behavior is often a good indicator of future behavior and may
be viewed as a predictor of likely potential harm should the children be returned to the
parents’ care and custody. Id. To the extent Cox and Bennett contend that DHS failed to
prove potential harm because DHS did not offer appropriate services during the case, we
have repeatedly rejected this argument because a best-interest finding does not require
evidence of reasonable efforts. Id.
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As for adoptability, the circuit court is required only to consider adoptability in
determining the overall finding of best interest in termination cases. Baker v. Ark. Dep’t of
Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark. App. 549, 680 S.W.3d 450. A caseworker’s testimony that a child is
adoptable is sufficient to support an adoptability finding. Strickland v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum.
Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 608, 567 S.W.3d 870.
In this case, the circuit court clearly considered adoptability; it was one of the factors
stated for denying termination of parental rights as to MC1, yet it granted the petition as to
the other three children. There was evidence of numerous matches for each child, even
given their unique and challenging histories. Additionally, the Juvenile Code does not
require certainty, let alone a guarantee, that siblings be adopted as a group. Wilkerson v. Ark.
Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2024 Ark. App. 88, 684 S.W.3d 319. Here, as in Fisher v. Arkansas
Department of Human Services, 2017 Ark. App. 693, 542 S.W.3d 168, the circuit court heard
evidence concerning adoptability of the children, the fact that they would likely not be
adopted together, the children’s behavioral and mental-health challenges, and Cox’s and
Bennett’s substance-abuse issues and instability, and it weighted the evidence in favor of
termination. The evidence does not bear out Cox’s and Bennett’s claims that if this case
does not prevent “barriers” to adoption, then no case can be said to have any barriers to
adoption. There was evidence of numerous potential matches for each child, even given
their mental-health and behavioral issues. Bennett’s argument that the children had not
requested termination of parental rights is of no consequence since such a request is not a
requirement for termination of parental rights. As to the arguments regarding DHS’s
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shortcomings during the pendency of this case, while DHS admits that it failed to provide
services in a timely manner, this has no bearing on whether the children are adoptable. The
circuit court’s finding that it was in the children’s best interest to terminate parental rights
was not clearly erroneous.
Affirmed.
GRUBER and MURPHY, JJ., agree.
Jennifer Oyler Olson, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for separate appellant
Tamela Cox.
Dusti Standridge, for separate appellant Adrian Bennett.
Kaylee Wedgeworth, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services, Office of Chief Counsel, for
appellee.
Dana McClain, attorney ad litem for minor children.
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