United States v. Jermaine Carl Curtis

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-11627

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JERMAINE CARL CURTIS,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cr-00026-AW-GRJ-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 24-11627

Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Jermaine Carl Curtis, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se,

appeals an order of the district court denying his motion for a sen-

tence reduction. The government moves for summary affirmance.

After careful review, we grant the government’s motion and af-

firm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2017, a grand jury indicted Curtis of: one count of con-

spiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances,

specifically hydromorphone—commonly known as dilaudid—and

100 grams or more of heroin, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(i),

(b)(1)(C), 846 (“Count One”); one count of possession of a firearm

in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C.

§§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i), 2 (“Count Two”); and two counts of possession

of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2)

(“Count Three and Count Four”).

Curtis later agreed to plead guilty to Counts One and Two

in a written plea agreement. The plea agreement stated that, be-

cause of his prior drug convictions, Curtis faced a mandatory min-

imum ten-year term of imprisonment for Count One and a man-

datory minimum five-year term of imprisonment for Count Two.

It also explained that these two mandatory minimum terms had to

run consecutively to each other. The agreement left Curtis’s ulti-

mate sentence “solely to the discretion of the district court.” Curtis

signed the plea agreement and pled guilty before a magistrate

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24-11627 Opinion of the Court 3

judge. The district court accepted Curtis’s plea and set the case for

sentencing.

Before sentencing, a probation officer prepared a presen-

tence investigation report (“PSI”) that calculated Curtis’s guideline

imprisonment range to be 120 to 125 months’ imprisonment for

Count One and 60 months for Count Two, with the terms served

consecutively. At sentencing, in September 2018, the district court

sentenced Curtis to 125 months’ imprisonment for Count One and

60-months’ imprisonment for Count Two, with the two sentences

to be served consecutively. In total, the district court sentenced

Curtis to 185-months’ imprisonment. Curtis did not appeal.

In February 2021, Curtis moved for compassionate release

under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). He argued that his lengthy sen-

tence and his status as a low-level non-violent offender justified a

sentence reduction. He also argued that compassionate release

was available under the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391,

§ 401, 132 Stat. 5194, 5220-21 (“First Step Act”), which, he asserted,

allowed the district court to consider his arguments about what

constituted an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for a sen-

tence reduction. He expressed regret for his past actions and ar-

gued that, while incarcerated, he had been “a model inmate” with

an excellent prison record and who had enrolled in vocational and

educational courses. The district court denied this motion, noting

that while Curtis identified “commendable” facts he had not shown

an “extraordinary and compelling reason[]”necessary for a sen-

tence reduction under Section 3582(c)(1)(A). Curtis did not appeal.

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4 Opinion of the Court 24-11627

In July 2021, 1 Curtis moved for a sentence reduction under

Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) for the second time, arguing that his sen-

tence would have been substantially shorter if he had been sen-

tenced after the passage of the First Step Act. He asserted that this

disparity constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason for a

sentence reduction. He also argued that he did not pose a danger

to the community and could become a productive member of so-

ciety if released. The district court denied Curtis’s second motion,

again concluding that he had not established an extraordinary and

compelling reason for a sentence reduction. The court noted that,

under United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2021), super-

seded in part on other grounds by U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (2023), it was

bound by the policy statements in the then-in-effect version of the

Sentencing Guidelines. The court also noted that, even if Curtis

had established an extraordinary and compelling reason for release,

the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) did not warrant a reduction in his

sentence. Curtis appealed this ruling, but we dismissed his appeal

for want of prosecution.

In November 2022, Curtis moved for a sentence reduction

for a third time under 18 U.S.C. § 3582. He argued that non-

1 In March 2021, Curtis moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

He argued that his counsel was ineffective in several respects and contended

that he was actually innocent of Count Two and that his enhanced sentence

for Count One was improper. A magistrate judge recommended that Curtis’s

§ 2255 motion be summarily dismissed as untimely, and the district court ac-

cepted that recommendation and denied Curtis a certificate of appealability.

Curtis did not seek a certificate of appealability from this Court.

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24-11627 Opinion of the Court 5

retroactive changes in law constituted an extraordinary and com-

pelling reason for his release. The district court denied Curtis’s

third motion, incorporating its earlier rulings denying relief and ex-

plaining that Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481 (2022), did not

entitle Curtis to relief because he still had not shown an extraordi-

nary and compelling reason for release. Curtis appealed this ruling

as well, but we dismissed his appeal as untimely.

In December 2023, Curtis filed a fourth motion for a sen-

tence reduction, arguing that Amendment 821 to the Sentencing

Guidelines and U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 (2023) would lower his criminal

history category and his guidelines range. The government op-

posed this motion, arguing that Amendment 821 had no effect on

Curtis’s sentence because, even though he would have received

one less criminal history point, the guidelines range for a defendant

in Curtis’s position with one less criminal history point was the

same. The district court denied Curtis’s fourth motion as well, rea-

soning that Amendment 821 did not affect Curtis’s guidelines

range. The court explained that the § 3553(a) factors—including

the serious nature of Curtis’s offense and his prior convictions—

still did not warrant a reduced sentence. Curtis did not appeal this

ruling.

In April 2024, Curtis filed the instant motion for a sentence

reduction, his fifth motion under Section 3582. 2 His motion cited

2 We note that, while Curtis’s motion cites to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) several

times, he styled his motion as a “motion for compassionate release” which is

typically the title of a motion brought under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). See,

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6 Opinion of the Court 24-11627

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5) and contended that the recent revisions to

that section of the Guidelines had expanded the list of extraordi-

nary and compelling reasons that warranted a sentence reduction.

Curtis disclaimed reliance on U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6), which re-

quires a movant to have served at least ten years of their sentence.

Instead, Curtis argued that, under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5) (“Other

Reasons”), the district court should consider his rehabilitation

alongside other factors—such as the circumstances of his offense

and intervening legislation and amendments to the Sentencing

Guidelines that would have caused him to receive a shorter sen-

tence if sentenced now—as establishing an extraordinary and com-

pelling reason for his release. He contended that, after the passage

of the First Step Act, the mandatory minimum for Count One was

now 5 years. He contended that this disparity constituted an ex-

traordinary and compelling reason and, given that change, he as-

serted his Guidelines range would be 78 to 97 months’ imprison-

ment.

Next, Curtis argued that his rehabilitation efforts were rele-

vant under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). He contended that he did not pose

e.g., United States v. Amato, 48 F.4th 61, 63 (2d Cir. 2022) (“Section 3582(c)(1),

colloquially known as the ‘compassionate release’ provision . . .”). The district

court construed Curtis’s motion to be one under subsection 3582(c)(1)(A) ra-

ther than one under subsection 3582(c)(2). Curtis does not argue that this

characterization was erroneous, so we follow suit and address his arguments

under subsection 3582(c)(1)(A). Nothing in this opinion should be read as ad-

dressing the availability or appropriateness of relief under subsection

3582(c)(2).

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24-11627 Opinion of the Court 7

a threat to the community and explained that he had only one non-

violent disciplinary infraction during his incarceration. He also as-

serted that his proposed re-entry plan would prevent recidivism. In

support of his motion, Curtis attached various documents, includ-

ing his proposed release plan, his inmate work performance rating

showing an “outstanding” rating, his educational transcript, and

certificates of completion for various educational courses.

The district court denied Curtis’s motion. It noted that Cur-

tis had filed several prior motions, but it explained that he had,

again, not shown a qualifying extraordinary and compelling reason

for release under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. It concluded that Curtis was

correct that he could not rely on the “unusually long sentence” pro-

vision of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) because he had not served ten

years of his sentence. It also reasoned that Curtis’s disparity argu-

ments did not show an extraordinary or compelling reason for a

sentence reduction.

Second, and separately, the district court concluded that a

reduction in Curtis’s sentence was not appropriate based on the

§ 3553(a) factors. It referenced its prior order, where it had ex-

plained that “Curtis’s offense was serious” and had “a long criminal

history, including several previous drug convictions, [and] a violent

robbery.” The court acknowledged Curtis’s efforts at self-improve-

ment and his work in prison but determined that, given all the

§ 3553(a) factors, a sentence reduction was not warranted.

Curtis’s appeal followed.

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8 Opinion of the Court 24-11627

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary disposition is appropriate either where time is of

the essence, such as “situations where important public policy is-

sues are involved or those where rights delayed are rights denied,”

or where “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a mat-

ter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the out-

come of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the ap-

peal is frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158,

1162 (5th Cir. 1969). 3

“We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a sen-

tence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).” United States v.

Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021). “After eligibility is es-

tablished, we review the district court’s denial of a prisoner’s

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for an abuse of discretion.” Id. The abuse

of discretion standard of review is deferential, and “there will be

occasions in which we affirm the district court even though we

would have gone the other way had it been our call.” Rasbury v.

IRS (In re Rasbury), 24 F.3d 159, 168 (11th Cir. 1994). That is because

“the abuse of discretion standard allows ‘a range of choice for the

district court, so long as that choice does not constitute a clear error

of judgment.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 745

(11th Cir. 1989)). Finally, in exercising its discretion, a district court

must give enough explanation so that we can give its decision

3 All Fifth Circuit decisions issued by the close of business on September 30,

1981, are binding precedent in this Court. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d

1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

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24-11627 Opinion of the Court 9

“meaningful appellate review.” Giron, 15 F.4th at 1345 (quoting

United States v. Johnson, 877 F.3d 993, 997 (11th Cir. 2017)).

III. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Curtis argues first that the district court failed to

provide a sufficient explanation in denying his motion. On the

merits, he contends that, under the First Step Act, he would have

received a shorter sentence than he is now serving. He maintains

that this disparity—between his current sentence and what his sen-

tence would have been under the First Step Act: (1) is relevant to

the § 3553(a) factors; and (2) constitutes an extraordinary and com-

pelling reason for his release. He asserts that we have, in other

cases, contemplated sentence reductions based on intervening

changes of law and the district court abused its discretion in failing

to do the same. Finally, he contends that the district court abused

its discretion in weighing the § 3553(a) factors and he highlights his

rehabilitation efforts during his incarceration.

As noted above, the government moves for summary affir-

mance on two independent grounds. First, it contends the district

court properly concluded that Curtis failed to establish an extraor-

dinary and compelling reason for compassionate release. It asserts

that Curtis did not establish an extraordinary and compelling rea-

son under subsections U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)-(4), or a circum-

stance similar in gravity to one of them under U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.13(b)(5). It notes that Curtis has not yet served ten years of

his imprisonment sentence, so he was ineligible for a sentence re-

duction under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6). Second, assuming that

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10 Opinion of the Court 24-11627

Curtis had established an extraordinary and compelling reason, the

government argues that the district court properly denied relief

based on the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. It notes that Curtis com-

mitted serious crimes, has a lengthy criminal history, and has a sig-

nificant portion of his sentence to serve. Thus, it argues the district

court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a sen-

tence reduction.

In response to the government’s motion, Curtis reiterates

that, if he were sentenced today, his sentence would be signifi-

cantly shorter. He also argues that the § 3553(a) factors warrant a

reduction in his sentence, as he has accepted responsibility for his

crimes, has served approximately half of his sentence, and has com-

pleted several educational programs while incarcerated and only

has received one disciplinary report.

The policy statements applicable to § 3582(c)(1)(A) are

found in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13; United States v.

Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237-38 (11th Cir. 2021). A district court may

grant compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A) if: (1) an extraor-

dinary and compelling reason exists; (2) a sentencing reduction

would be consistent with U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13; and (3) the § 3553(a)

factors weigh in favor of compassionate release. Tinker, 14 F.4th at

1237-38. When the district court finds that one of these three

prongs is not met, it need not examine the other prongs. Giron,

15 F.4th at 1348.

Section 1B1.13 states that a defendant’s sentence may be re-

duced, upon motion of the defendant, where “extraordinary and

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24-11627 Opinion of the Court 11

compelling reasons warrant the reduction,” the defendant-movant

“is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the commu-

nity, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g),” and the court considers

the applicable factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a).

The current version of Section 1B1.13 provides that

“[e]xtraordinary and compelling reasons exist under any of the fol-

lowing circumstances or a combination thereof:” the “[m]edical

circumstances of the defendant,” the “[a]ge of the defendant,” the

“[f]amily circumstances of the defendant,” and if the defendant was

the victim of abuse while serving a term of incarceration. Id.

§ 1B1.13(b)(1)-(4). In addition, under a subsection titled “Other rea-

sons,” a defendant may show an extraordinary and compelling rea-

son for release if he “presents any other circumstance or combina-

tion of circumstances that, when considered by themselves or to-

gether with any of the reasons described [in § 1B1.13(b)(1)-(4)], are

similar in gravity” to the other examples listed. Id. § 1B1.13(b)(5).

The Guidelines clarify that the rehabilitation of a defendant, by it-

self, is not an extraordinary and compelling reason under the policy

statement. Id. § 1B1.13(d); see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). Instead, re-

habilitation can be considered together with other circumstances

to determine whether and to what extent a reduction is warranted.

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(d).

Finally, subsection 1B1.13(b)(6), titled “[u]nusually long sen-

tence,” provides that:

If a defendant received an unusually long sentence

and has served at least 10 years of the term of

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12 Opinion of the Court 24-11627

imprisonment, a change in the law (other than an

amendment to the Guidelines Manual that has not

been made retroactive) may be considered in deter-

mining whether the defendant presents an extraordi-

nary and compelling reason, but only where such

change would produce a gross disparity between the

sentence being served and the sentence likely to be

imposed at the time the motion is filed, and after full

consideration of the defendant’s individualized cir-

cumstances.

Id. § 1B1.13(b)(6).

Under § 3553(a), a sentencing court must impose a sentence

that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to reflect the se-

riousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, to provide

just punishment for the offense, to afford adequate deterrence, and

to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The court also must consider, among other

factors, the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history

and characteristics of the defendant, as well as “the need to avoid

unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar

records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” Id.

§ 3553(a)(1), (6). Though the district court must consider all rele-

vant § 3553(a) factors, “the weight given to each factor is commit-

ted to the sound discretion of the district court,” and it may attach

great weight to one factor over the others. United States v. Butler,

39 F.4th 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2022). Sentencing courts are also af-

forded “broad leeway in deciding how much weight to give to prior

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24-11627 Opinion of the Court 13

crimes the defendant has committed.” Id. at 1355-56. Generally,

an appellant bears the burden to show that a district court unrea-

sonably weighed or applied the § 3553(a) factors. See United States

v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008).

The government has established that summary affirmance

is appropriate. To begin, we conclude that the district court’s order

is sufficient and we can engage in meaningful appellate review. Gi-

ron, 15 F.4th at 1345. The district court’s explanation was detailed,

addressed Curtis’s arguments, and provided a basis for the court’s

decision to deny the motion. It also referenced the orders denying

Curtis’s prior motions and explained how the new evidence Curtis

submitted did not change the outcome.

Turning to the merits, we conclude that the government is

correct as a matter of law that Curtis did not establish an extraor-

dinary and compelling reason under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b). Groen-

dyke Transp., 406 F.2d at 1161-62.

First, Curtis did not argue before the district court or on ap-

peal—nor does the record show—an extraordinary and compelling

reason for a sentence reduction under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)-(4).

See, e.g., United States v. Morley, 99 F.4th 1328, 1337 (11th Cir. 2024)

(citing Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th

Cir. 2014)) (noting that a party can abandon an issue by not raising

it on appeal). Curtis has also disclaimed reliance on U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.13(b)(6), and is ineligible under that subsection because he

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14 Opinion of the Court 24-11627

has not yet served ten years of his sentence.4 U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.13(b)(6).

Second, Curtis has not established eligibility under the

“other reasons” subsection, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5). The Guide-

lines provide that Curtis’s arguments about changes of law are not

proper considerations under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5). See U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.13(c) (“Except as provided in subsection (b)(6), a change in

law . . . shall not be considered for purposes of determining

whether an extraordinary and compelling reason exists under this

policy statement.”). His remaining arguments about the “other

reasons” subsection relate to his rehabilitation in prison. However,

the Guidelines also instruct that these facts, standing alone, cannot

constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for release.

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(d). Therefore, we conclude that the district

court did not err in concluding Curtis had not shown a qualifying

extraordinary and compelling reason for relief. Tinker, 14 F.4th at

1237-38; Giron, 15 F.4th at 1348.

Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion when

considering the § 3553(a) factors. The district court considered

Curtis’s rehabilitation efforts—along with the aggravating factors

of his criminal history, the circumstances of this offense, and the

other aims of § 3553(a)—and it reasonably concluded that the

4 We note that, whether we calculate ten years from the date of Curtis’s sen-

tencing in 2018 or from the date of his initial arrest on the indictment in this

case in 2017—the date from which his 185-month total sentence runs, see

18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)—Curtis has not yet served ten years of his sentence.

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24-11627 Opinion of the Court 15

positive factors did not outweigh the negative factors such that a

sentence reduction was warranted. See Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355.

Curtis has not shown that the court improperly balanced the §

3553(a) factors. See United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th

Cir. 2010) (en banc) (explaining, in the direct appeal context, that we

will “vacate [a] sentence if, but only if, we ‘are left with the definite

and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error

of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sen-

tence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated

by the facts of the case.’” (quoting United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d

1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008))).

IV. CONCLUSION

We do not minimize the admirable steps towards rehabilita-

tion Curtis has taken. However, our review is limited to determin-

ing whether the district court erred in concluding that he did not

establish one of the extraordinary and compelling reasons in

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b) and whether it abused its discretion in con-

cluding that the § 3553(a) factors did not favor a sentence reduc-

tion. Because the government is clearly right as a matter of law

that there was no reversible error on those issues, we GRANT its

motion for summary affirmance. Groendyke Transp., 406 F.2d at

1161-62.

AFFIRMED.