Opinion

State of New Jersey v. Ross Brown

Court
New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
Filed
Oct 29, 2024
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 31.1%

adopting the Strickland two-part test in New Jersey

How later courts described this case

  • adopting the Strickland two-part test in New Jersey

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3692-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ROSS BROWN,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________

Submitted September 10, 2024 – Decided October 29, 2024

Before Judges Gilson and Bishop-Thompson.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law

Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 19-08-2104.

Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for

appellant (Andrew R. Burroughs, Designated Counsel,

on the briefs).

Theodore N. Stephens, II, Essex County Prosecutor,

attorney for respondent (Hannah Kurt, Assistant

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Ross Brown appeals from the Law Division's June 12, 2023

order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an

evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

I.

We discern the following facts from the record. On June 9, 2019, as

Lindsey Dawson was about to sit down at Starbucks on Broad Street in Newark,

defendant pushed her from behind, took her laptop and cell phone, and said,

"thanks for the computer" while fleeing. Dawson used a bystander's phone to

call 9-1-1, chased defendant down the street, and retrieved her laptop. In

response, defendant stated: "[A]t least I have your phone."

Newark police officer D. Avila1 responded to Starbucks and met with

Dawson and two witnesses. Avila was shown a video of the robbery taken by

one of the witnesses. Avila instructed Dawson to email the video to Newark

police department; however, the record does not show that Dawson or the

witness emailed the video to the police. While speaking with Dawson, Avila

received an alert that a person matching defendant's description was in a Nike

store on Broad Street.

1

The record does not contain Avila's first name.

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2

Dawson heard the alert, walked to the store, and retrieved her phone from

defendant. When Avila entered the Nike store, Dawson identified defendant as

the person who robbed her. Avila detained defendant until additional Newark

police officers arrived at the store. As defendant was placed in handcuffs, he

stated: "I didn't rob her." Avila told defendant the incident was on video.

Dawson also told defendant the incident was on video, and defendant replied:

"yes, but I didn't rob you. It was on a table. I didn't know it was yours." Dawson

then walked outside and asked the witness to email the video to her. Shortly

thereafter, Dawson told Avila she had the video, and Avila told Dawson to email

the video to another responding officer. Dawson left the scene to go to the police

station.

In August 2019, an Essex County grand jury indicted defendant on a single

count of second-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(A)(1). Following the grand

jury indictment, on September 10, defendant's public defender submitted a

request for an investigator to obtain camera footage from the Starbucks and Nike

stores, determine whether the police were given the surrounding stores camera

video footage, arrange an interview with Dawson, and obtain defendant's

medical records. The investigation report dated October 28 reflected the

investigator was unable to obtain any video footage because Nike, Blaze Pizza,

A-3692-22

3

and the Prudential Insurance Company street cameras retained video for only

one month, Starbucks no longer had video footage, Dunkin Donuts retained

video footage for only two and one-half months, and the business at 659 Broad

Street was permanently closed.

In January 2021, defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree robbery.

During the plea colloquy, defendant admitted guilt in taking Dawson's laptop

without permission and causing her physical harm. Defendant testified he

reviewed the plea forms and authorized his counsel to sign the forms on his

behalf because he was unable to meet with counsel due to the COVID-19

pandemic. Defendant also stated he was satisfied with his attorney's advice and

recommendations. The court accepted defendant's plea allocution and

determined his guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily made. During

defendant's presentence investigation report interview, defendant contradicted

his plea allocution and told the probation officer that he did not touch Dawson.

On April 12, 2021, defendant was sentenced to a three-year prison term

with an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier subject to the No Early Release

Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7, and three-year parole supervision. A judgment of

conviction was filed on April 13, 2021. Defendant did not challenge his

conviction or sentence on direct appeal. He was paroled on July 3, 2021.

A-3692-22

4

Ten months later, on May 28, 2022, defendant filed a self-represented

PCR petition, claiming trial counsel failed to (1) obtain camera footage, (2)

interview witnesses, and (3) obtain a psychological examination for defendant.

He also claims that he met with counsel on only three occasions, was under

duress at the time he entered his guilty plea, and his guilty plea was

"questionable." Appointed PCR counsel filed a supplemental brief, asserting

trial counsel failed to (1) raise a Brady2 violation for the failure of preserving

the video footage, (2) timely pursue and investigation, and (3) pursue pre-trial

motions to dismiss the indictment, and compel discovery or other motions.

Counsel further argued that cumulative errors prejudiced defendant, a prima

facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel had been established, an

evidentiary hearing was warranted, and the PCR petition was not procedurally

barred.

Following oral argument, the PCR court issued an oral opinion and

memorializing order denying defendant's petition without an evidentiary hearing

after considering the parties' submissions, investigative report, and the body-

worn camera footage. In the oral decision, the PCR court considered defendant's

arguments presented in both the self-represented petition and counsel's brief and

2

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

A-3692-22

5

determined that defendant failed to establish a prima facie showing of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. This appeal ensued.

II.

Defendant raises the following points for our consideration:

POINT I

AS DEFENDANT HAD MET HIS BURDEN TO

ESTABLISH A CASE OF INEFFECTIVE

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, THE PCR COURT

ERRED WHEN IT DENIED HIS PCR PETITION.

1. Trial counsel failed to undertake a meaningful

investigation of the case.

2. Defendant did not make an informed guilty plea

to second-degree robbery.

3. Trial counsel's cumulative errors denied

defendant a fair proceeding.

POINT II

AS THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL

FACTS IN DISPUTE, THE PCR COURT ERRED

WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANT'S PCR PETITION

WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

The factual and legal determinations made by a PCR court are reviewed

de novo when an evidentiary hearing is not held. State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391,

420-21 (2004); State v. Lawrence, 463 N.J. Super. 518, 522 (App. Div. 2020).

A PCR court's decision to proceed without an evidentiary hearing is reviewed

A-3692-22

6

for an abuse of discretion. State v. Vanness, 474 N.J. Super. 609, 623 (App.

Div. 2023) (citing State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 401 (App. Div. 2013)).

When the defendant's basis for relief is premised on a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, he is required to satisfy the two-prong test enunciated in

Strickland by demonstrating that: (1) counsel's performance was deficient, and

(2) the deficient performance prejudiced the accused's defense. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) and State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987)

(adopting the Strickland two-part test in New Jersey). A failure to satisfy either

prong of the Strickland standard requires the denial of a PCR petition. State v.

Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 542 (2013).

When reviewing such claims, courts apply a strong presumption that

defense counsel "rendered adequate assistance and made all significant

decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Strickland, 466

U.S. at 690. "[C]omplaints 'merely of matters of trial strategy' will not serve to

ground a constitutional claim of inadequacy[.]" Fritz, 105 N.J. at 54 (citations

omitted).

The mere raising of a claim for PCR does not entitle the defendant to an

evidentiary hearing and the defendant "must do more than make bald assertions

that he [or she] was denied the effective assistance of counsel." State v. Porter,

A-3692-22

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216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013) (quoting State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170

(App. Div. 1999)); see also R. 3:22-10(e)(2) (stating that a court shall not hold

an evidentiary hearing if "the defendant's allegations are too vague, conclusory

or speculative"). Thus, "when a [defendant] claims his trial attorney

inadequately investigated his case, he must assert the facts that an investigation

would have revealed, supported by affidavits or certifications based upon the

personal knowledge of the affiant or the person making the certification."

Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170.

Also, our Supreme Court has ruled that PCR proceedings are not a

substitute for a direct appeal. State v. Hannah, 248 N.J. 148, 178 (2021). The

Court has explained that a defendant is "generally barred from presenting a

claim on PCR that could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal" unless one

of three exceptions applies. Ibid. (quoting Nash, 212 N.J. at 546); see also R.

3:22-4(a)(1)-(3).

We are satisfied from our review of the record that defendant failed to

make a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We,

therefore, need not address whether defendant's arguments are barred by Rule

3:22-4.

A. Failure to Investigate and Obtain the Witness Video.

A-3692-22

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Defendant argues that his trial counsel failed to undertake a meaningful

investigation of his case in failing to ensure that all discovery had been produced

to the defense. In making this argument, defendant highlights the body worn

camera footage where both Avila and Dawson reference the witness video and

request the video be emailed to Dawson then to the police. Defendant also

argues during the grand jury proceeding, a police officer testified the witness

video was in the possession of the police and trial counsel made no effort to

obtain the video. Accordingly, trial counsel's failure to demand full discovery

from the State, including all video evidence, was not objectively reasonable and

deprived him of a "complete defense." We disagree.

Defendant has failed to demonstrate how the witness video would have

shown that he did not commit second-degree robbery. During the plea colloquy

defendant admitted that he caused physical harm to Dawson while taking her

laptop but now argues that he did not touch her. We agree with the PCR court,

defendant's contention during the presentence investigation interview and the

PCR petition directly contradicts his plea allocution. To further buttress his

argument, defendant contends a police officer testified at the grand jury hearing

that the witness video was in the police's possession; however, those transcripts

are not a part of the record on appeal. We agree with the PCR court it was

A-3692-22

9

unclear whether the police even collected the video from Dawson. Defendant is

required to make more than a bald assertion and a unsupported reference to

grand jury testimony to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. See

Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170.

B. Defendant's guilty plea.

In regard to his guilty plea, defendant argues (1) he met with counsel on

only three occasions, (2) was under duress at the time he entered his guilty plea,

and (3) his guilty plea was "questionable."

In the context of a guilty plea, a defendant must demonstrate: (1) counsel's

performance was not "within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in

criminal cases," and (2) "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pled guilty and would have

insisted on going to trial." State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994) (alteration

in original) (first quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266 (1973); and

then quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). Defendant's arguments

are unavailing.

Simply put, the record does not support defendant's arguments. The plea

transcript shows the court repeatedly informed defendant of his right to a jury

trial; defendant stated he understood that right and he was pleading guilty

A-3692-22

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because he was guilty. Moreover, the transcript also reflects detailed questions

were posed to defendant to determine whether he was satisfied with trial

counsel's services, advice, and recommendations. There was no statement made

by defendant expressing dissatisfaction with counsel, the failure to receive all

discovery, or duress; and therefore, the court was satisfied defendant "freely"

and "voluntarily" entered a guilty plea. Defendant has failed to "present

specific, credible facts" in the record to support his arguments that his guilty

plea was "questionable." See State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145, 158 (2009).

Defendant has demonstrated neither deficient performance by trial

counsel nor any actual prejudice; and therefore, he fails to satisfy the two-prong

Strickland/Fritz standard for relief. Therefore, we are satisfied the PCR court

did not abuse its discretion in concluding defendant was not entitled to an

evidentiary hearing.

To the extent we have not addressed defendant's remaining arguments, we

are satisfied they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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