Hollendorfer v. California Horse Racing Board CA4/1

Filed 10/28/24 Hollendorfer v. California Horse Racing Board CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

JERRY HOLLENDORFER, D082647

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2020-

00016369-CU-WM-CTL)

CALIFORNIA HORSE RACING

BOARD,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,

Ronald F. Frazier, Judge. Affirmed.

couto&associates, Drew J. Couto; Law Office of Leif Kleven and Leif H.

Kleven for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Chris A. Knudsen, Assistant Attorney

General, and Gary S. Balekjian, Deputy Attorney General, for Defendant and

Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

Horse trainer Jerry Hollendorfer appeals from a judgment denying his

petition for a writ of mandate and damages against the California Horse

Racing Board (CHRB), which oversees California horse racing under the

state’s Horse Racing Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 19400 et seq.).1

Two racing association entities denied him participation in race meets

under their race meet agreements (RMAs) with the trainer organization,

California Thoroughbred Trainers (CTT), after he experienced six equine

deaths. He sought relief in multiple ways: complaints to the CHRB, with

hearing requests under Section 19573; grievances to CTT, which filed

administrative complaints with the CHRB; and lawsuits (in part with CTT,

and all settled). The CHRB investigated Hollendorfer’s complaints and

determined no hearing was due. CTT withdrew one administrative

complaint, and the CHRB dismissed the other on mootness grounds.

Hollendorfer then filed this action, alleging the CHRB erred in various

ways, including by denying his hearing request and in its handling of CTT’s

administrative complaints. He also alleged the CHRB’s failure to carry out

its mandatory duties violated Government Code section 815.6. The trial

court rejected each claim, concluding he established no duty to provide a

hearing and lacked standing to challenge the CTT proceedings. The court

also denied his request to present live testimony.

Hollendorfer challenges these determinations and maintains more

generally that the CHRB deprived him of due process. We conclude he

establishes no reversible error, and affirm the judgment for the CHRB.

1 Further statutory references are to the Business and Professions Code,

and rule references are to title 4 of the California Code of Regulations, unless

noted.

2

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Horse Racing in California

For context, we begin by describing the laws and regulations governing

horse racing in California. Pursuant to article IV, section 19, subdivision (b)

of the California Constitution, the Legislature has “ ‘enacted a comprehensive

scheme of legislation designed to regulate almost every aspect of legalized

horse racing and wagering.’ ” (Youst v. Longo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 64, 81, italics

omitted.) This statute is known as the Horse Racing Law. (§ 19400.)

The Horse Racing Law vests the CHRB with “[j]urisdiction and

supervision” over horse racing in the state. (§ 19420.) Its responsibilities

include “[a]dministration and enforcement of all laws, rules, and regulations

affecting horse racing,” and it can delegate to racing officials known as

stewards. (§ 19440, subds. (a)(3), (b).) The CHRB is authorized to “prescribe

rules, regulations, and conditions . . . under which all horse races with

wagering” are conducted. (§ 19562.) Pursuant to this broad regulatory

power, the CHRB has promulgated extensive rules. (See Rule 1400 et seq.)

Both the Horse Racing Law and the CHRB rules contain provisions

regarding exclusions from race meet “inclosures” (i.e., areas licensed to

operate meets). (§ 19410.) Under Section 19572, the CHRB can and has

issued rules “provid[ing] for the exclusion or ejection” of certain persons, such

as a “known bookmaker . . . .” (§ 19572; e.g., Rules 1980 [identifying “classes

of persons”], 1981 [racing associations “shall exclude and eject from their

inclosures” such persons], 1983 [excluded or ejected person may apply for

hearing on “question of whether he is within . . . [prohibited] classes”].) It

also enacted Rule 1989, which provides in part that “[a]ny person may be

removed or denied access for any reason deemed appropriate” by the racing

association. (Rule 1989(b).)

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Section 19573 states, in pertinent part, that “[a]ny person who,

pursuant to a rule of the board, is excluded . . . may apply to the board for a

hearing on the question of whether the rule is applicable to him. [¶] The

board shall hold the hearing either at its next regular meeting . . . or at such

other place and time as the board and the applicant may agree upon.”

The Horse Racing Law also addresses horsemen’s organizations.

Section 19613 designates CTT as the representative for thoroughbred horse

trainers, and Section 19613.1 addresses matters for negotiation with the

racing associations, specifying certain topics and leaving others to CHRB

discretion. The CHRB has issued rules addressing the horsemen’s

organizations and agreements (Rule 2040 et seq.). We address these and

other statute sections and rules further in our discussion.

B. Underlying Events

1. Hollendorfer, CTT, and the Racing Associations

Hollendorfer is a licensed thoroughbred horse trainer with around four

decades of experience. He is a member of CTT. (§ 19613.)

The Stronach Group owns the racing associations at Santa Anita Park

Racecourse (Los Angeles Turf Club Inc., I & II; LATC) and Golden Gate

Fields (Pacific Racing Associations, Inc. I & II; PRA). The Del Mar

Thoroughbred Club operates at the Del Mar Fairgrounds and Racetrack

(DMTC; with LATC and PRA, the “Racing Associations”).

CTT entered 2018-2019 RMAs with LATC and PRA respectively, and a

summer 2019 RMA with DMTC. The RMAs have certain common provisions,

and related Stall Applications. Section 5, which is incorporated in the Stall

Application, provides the Racing Association can set procedures that limit

participation for reasons that are not arbitrary and capricious (with decisions

subject to CTT agreement). Section 6 has rules for stall assignments and

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allocations, including a bar on arbitrary and capricious denials, and

grievance procedures. Exhibit A has Stall Application language, with Section

1 reserving Racing Association discretion to deny applications (subject to CTT

review, and with the final decision by the Racing Association).

2. The Racing Associations Deny Participation to Hollendorfer

There were numerous equine deaths at Stronach race meets in 2018

and 2019, leading to what Hollendorfer calls “intense . . . scrutiny” by the

media and others. From December 2018 to June 2019, several horses died at

Golden Gate. Hollendorfer trained two of these horses. During the same

period, many more horses died at Santa Anita. Hollendorfer trained four of

these horses, for a total of six equine deaths.

According to Hollendorfer’s deposition, on or around June 22, 2019,

Santa Anita management told him that he had to remove his horses from

that track and Golden Gate Fields. The same day, Stronach issued a press

release stating:

“Individuals who do not embrace the new rules and safety

measures that put horse and rider safety above all else, will

have no place at any Stronach Group racetrack. We regret

that Mr. Hollendorfer’s record in recent months at both

Santa Anita and Golden Gate Fields has become

increasingly challenging and does not match the level of

safety and accountability we demand. Effective

immediately, Mr. Hollendorfer is no longer welcome to

stable, race or train his horses at any of our facilities.”

Hollendorfer filed a stall application for the 2019 Del Mar Summer

Race Meet. On July 5, 2019, DMTC sent him a letter rejecting the

application, which stated:

“In addition to being constrained by a lack of space, we also

must take into consideration all the relevant circumstances

to ensure that no decision is made arbitrarily or

capriciously. As we’ve discussed with you, in your case,

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these circumstances include not only your long career, but

also the recent actions taken by The Stronach Group and

New York Racing Association, among other things. [¶]

Based on our careful consideration of all these

circumstances we regret to inform you that we are unable

to grant your application . . . . Nor, under the

circumstances, will we accept any racing entries for any

horse where you are listed as the official trainer. We have

the right to take such action under our stabling application,

the terms of which you agreed to by submitting your

application.”

On September 26, 2019, Hollendorfer tried to enter a horse at a race

meet at Santa Anita. A staff member advised him there was no change in

status and they would not accept his entry.

3. Hollendorfer and CTT Seek Relief from CHRB and in Court

Hollendorfer’s counsel sent letters to the CHRB in July and September

2019 regarding DMTC and LATC respectively. Each requested a hearing

under Section 19573 and made a complaint under Rule 1765 (which provides

for investigation of alleged misconduct by licensees). CHRB counsel

forwarded the letters to its Chief Investigator, Shawn Loehr, who conducted

investigations and determined the Racing Associations denied Hollendorfer

participation under the RMAs and there were no CHRB rule violations.

CTT also filed complaints with the CHRB in July 2019, alleging

DMTC’s denial violated its RMA and Stronach’s ban violated the RMAs for

LATC and PRA. The CHRB assigned a hearing officer. CTT settled with

DMTC and withdrew its complaint. In February 2020, the hearing officer

issued a proposed decision that the LATC/PRA matter was moot because the

RMAs had expired, which the CHRB adopted.

Hollendorfer and CTT filed actions in superior court as well, starting in

July 2019, including a lawsuit against DMTC in San Diego Superior Court

through which they obtained a preliminary injunction. They sued PRA in

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Alameda Superior Court, and Hollendorfer filed an action against LATC in

Los Angeles Superior Court (it is unclear if CTT joined). Hollendorfer states

these cases have settled.

C. Litigation

In May 2020, Hollendorfer filed a petition for writ of mandate and

damages against the CHRB. His operative petition had three causes of

action: (i) traditional mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085;

(ii) administrative mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5;

and (3) violation of Government Code section 815.6. He sought, inter alia,

that the CHRB be ordered to (i) set a hearing under Section 19573 and

(ii) direct the Racing Associations to take various actions involving the RMAs

and to participate in hearings.

The parties filed briefs, submitted evidence, and lodged and

supplemented the administrative record. Prior to the October 2022 hearing

on his mandate claims, Hollendorfer filed a request to introduce live

testimony from the executive director of CTT, which the court denied. In

November 2022, the trial court issued an order denying the petition for writ

of mandate.

In January 2023, the CHRB filed a motion for judgment on the

pleadings on the Government Code section 815.6 claim, which Hollendorfer

opposed. In June 2023, the trial court entered an order granting the motion.

The trial court entered judgment for the CHRB in July 2023.

Hollendorfer timely appealed.

III. DISCUSSION

Hollendorfer argues the trial court erred by denying his petition for

writs of mandate, denying his request for live testimony, and granting

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judgment on the pleadings for his Government Code section 815.6 claim. We

reject these contentions.

A. Applicable Legal Standards

1. Statutory and Regulatory Interpretation

“Interpretation of a statute or regulation is . . . an issue of law for the

court [citations], as is the question whether a regulation is consistent with

the authorizing statute [citations]. Thus, we must review the interpretations

of the [agency] and the trial court de novo, and come to our own independent

conclusions on these issues.” (Spanish Speaking Citizens’ Foundation, Inc. v.

Low (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1214.)

“Our fundamental task in interpreting a statute is to determine the

Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We first examine

the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. We do

not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory

framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to

harmonize the various parts of the enactment. If the language is clear, courts

must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would

result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory

language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may

consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and

public policy.” (Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc. v. City of Los

Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 737 (Concerned Communities).)

A regulation also “must fit ‘within the scope of authority conferred’ by

the Legislature.” (Association of California Ins. Companies v. Jones (2017)

2 Cal.5th 376, 390; In re Gadlin (2020) 10 Cal.5th 915, 926 [regulations must

be “ ‘consistent and not in conflict with’ ” statute].)

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The courts take “ ‘ultimate responsibility for the construction of the

statute,’ ” while according “ ‘great weight and respect to the administrative

construction.’ ” (Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998)

19 Cal.4th 1, 12.)

2. General Appellate Review and Briefing Standards

It is a “well-established rule of appellate review that a judgment or

order is presumed correct and the appellant has the burden of demonstrating

prejudicial error.” (Hotels Nevada, LLC v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc. (2012)

203 Cal.App.4th 336, 348 (Hotels Nevada); see Soule v. General Motors Corp.

(1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 573-574 (Soule) [“judgment may not be reversed on

appeal” absent a miscarriage of justice, citing Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13].)

An appellant’s opening brief must “fairly set forth all the significant

facts, not just those beneficial to the appellant.” (In re S.C. (2006)

138 Cal.App.4th 396, 402.) It is also the appellant’s burden to “ ‘identify and

establish deficiencies in the evidence.’ ” (Holguin v. Dish Network LLC (2014)

229 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1326 (Holguin).) Further, an appellant must raise all

points in the opening brief, or forfeiture may result. (Raceway Ford Cases

(2016) 2 Cal.5th 161, 178 (Raceway) [“We generally do not consider

arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.”]; In re Groundwater

Cases (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 659, 693 (Groundwater Cases) [“Basic notions

of fairness dictate that we decline to entertain arguments that a party has

chosen to withhold until the filing of its reply brief, because this deprives the

respondent of the opportunity to address them on appeal.”].)

All briefing must be supported by reasoned argument, authority, and

accurate citation to the record. (Badie v. Bank of America (1998)

67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785 (Badie) [“When an appellant fails to raise a

point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and

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citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.”]; WFG National Title

Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 894 (WFG

National) [“[W]e may decide that the appellant has forfeited a point urged on

appeal when it is not supported by accurate citations to the record.”].) Briefs

must “[s]tate each point under a separate heading or subheading” as well.

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); Pizarro v. Reynoso (2017)

10 Cal.App.5th 172, 179 (Pizarro) [“Failure to provide proper headings

forfeits issues that may be discussed in the brief but are not clearly identified

by a heading.”].)

Here, Hollendorfer’s opening brief contains a largely one-sided

description of the record; some arguments are repetitive and/or inadequately

briefed; and he raises new points on reply. We address each properly-raised

and briefed point once, in the place most logical for our discussion. His

briefing has two further issues. He contends the CHRB concedes certain

points by not addressing them. A “respondent’s failure to address an issue

raised in the opening brief” is “not a concession.” (Golden Door Properties,

LLC v. County of San Diego (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 467, 557, fn. 48 (Golden

Door); cf. Smith v. Smith (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1078 [even when no

respondent’s brief is filed, appellant has an “ ‘affirmative burden to show

error’ ”].) He also cites a trial court ruling in a different CHRB case as

“persuasive and binding authority.” Trial court orders have “no precedential

value . . . .” (Crab Addison, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th

958, 963, fn. 3.)2

2 He asserts estoppel based on the trial court ruling too. The point

concerns an issue we do not reach (Rule 1989), and would lack merit anyway;

he fails to address the elements of estoppel, or show they are met.

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B. Traditional Mandate

The trial court denied Hollendorfer’s traditional mandate claim because

he did not establish a hearing was required under Section 19573. He does

not show this ruling was erroneous, or any other reversible error.

1. Additional Facts

a. Request for Hearing and Complaint as to DMTC

Hollendorfer’s counsel, Drew Couto, sent the request for hearing under

Section 19573 and complaint under Rule 1765 on July 23, 2019. He

identified DMTC’s stated reasons for the exclusion (i.e., his long career,

recent actions by Stronach and the New York Racing Association, its rights

under the Stall Application, and “PR”), and said, “[a]t no time . . . did DMTC

identify CHRB Rule 1989 . . . as a basis for his exclusion.” (Italics omitted.)

He also cited eight CHRB rules “upon which [the] request” was made.

CHRB counsel Robert Brodnik responded the next day, stating, in part,

that the CHRB “will not grant a hearing on the basis of an association’s

action under Rule 1989.” Couto responded by letter the same day, seeking

clarification and other information.

The superior court issued its preliminary injunction in the DMTC case

on July 26. CHRB counsel contacted Couto to ask if the issues raised in his

July 23 letter still required CHRB attention. Couto responded with

questions.

On July 30, Brodnik sent a letter to Couto that elaborated on the

CHRB’s position that Rule 1989 did not support a hearing under Section

19573. He concluded by stating, “If your complaint is based upon different

grounds, or if you would like to clarify your position, please feel free to do so.

Nevertheless, your initial letter has been forwarded to Chief Investigator

Shawn Loehr for investigation.”

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b. Loehr’s Investigation into DMTC

Loehr conducted an investigation and prepared a report. We describe

pertinent portions of his report, with additional detail from emails between

him and Couto.

On July 31, 2019, Loehr sent Couto an email stating Brodnik forwarded

his letter, and asking for the “specifics of [his] complaint,” if different from

Rule 1989. Couto responded the next day, citing the eight rules listed in his

July 23 request, and they exchanged further emails.

Loehr contacted DMTC counsel on August 5. He met with their counsel

and executives on August 8. DMTC said they had met with Hollendorfer and

Couto on June 26, told him he could not race at Del Mar this summer, and

explained the factors leading to that decision. DMTC said they relied on

Section 1 of his Stall Application, and did not give him a rule section. They

also said they did not exclude him under Rule 1989(b), he was never fully

barred from Del Mar, and they proposed he transfer his horses to his

assistant trainer.

Loehr also obtained DMTC documents, including the summer 2019

RMA and the Stall Application. He quoted Section 6 of the RMA, which

stated in part that in the “allocation . . . of stall space,” DMTC “will not

discriminate in any way against any trainer . . . by way of any arbitrary or

capricious” conduct. Loehr also obtained, among other things, DMTC’s July 5

letter advising Hollendorfer that they decided not to allocate him stalls.

Loehr noted he began transferring horses to his assistant trainer after July 5.

Later in August, Loehr emailed Couto, asking if it was his position that

DMTC made its decision arbitrarily and/or capriciously and, if so, to provide

his rationale. Couto responded a few days later. He raised concerns about

CHRB’s impartiality, and, citing court proceedings, said the CHRB “should

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step back . . . at this time.” They exchanged further emails about his

concerns and the investigation status.

Loehr completed his report in October 2019. He noted he contacted

Couto for his position on whether DMTC acted arbitrarily and capriciously,

and he did not supply evidence that DMTC acted in this manner.

Loehr set forth his findings. Pertinent here, he found “DMTC made a

business decision to not grant [Hollendorfer] stall space or allow him to enter

horses during the Del Mar Summer Meet based on many factors,” listing his

“ban from Santa Anita and Golden Gate Fields,” his “ban from the New York

Racing Authority,” “having a high percentage (15%) of horse fatalities at

Santa Anita and Golden Gate Fields,” a media story, a statement by CTT’s

president, and government pressure on the industry. He determined these

factors did “not appear to fit within the definitions of arbitrary or capricious.”

He also determined “none of the specific CHRB rules alleged in the

complaint . . . have been violated” by DMTC, and addressed each one.

c. Loehr’s Investigation into LATC

After Santa Anita rejected Hollendorfer’s entry on September 26, 2019,

Couto sent the CHRB another request for hearing under Section 19573 and

complaint under Rule 1765 as to LATC. He argued the refusal to accept the

entry violated four CHRB Rules. The letter did not mention Rule 1989.

Brodnik sent the complaint to Loehr the next day, September 27, and

he again investigated and prepared a report. Loehr called Couto and asked if

they had given him authority for the ban back in June 2019. Couto told him

no authority was given and Rule 1989(b) was never stated.

Loehr also contacted LATC counsel on September 27, and had a

meeting that afternoon in the LATC executive offices. They confirmed

Hollendorfer’s request to enter a horse at Santa Anita was denied. They

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noted they were allowing horses to be entered under his assistant trainer’s

name. They explained the RMA and stall application gave them authority to

deny stable space and refuse race entry, as long as the decision was not

arbitrary and capricious. They also said he was banned from the facility, and

that was the primary reason. When asked about the authority for the

Stronach ban, they said they had not quoted it to Hollendorfer, but had

“multiple authorities,” stating they knew about Rule 1989(b); Santa Anita

was private property, from which they could ban people; and, again, that the

RMA and Stall Application provided authority.

Loehr also obtained LATC documents, including the 2018-2019 RMA

and Stall Application. He then provided his findings, stating:

“Both the Stall Application and the [RMA] give the [LATC]

the authority to deny race entries as long as the decision is

not ‘arbitrary or capricious’. The LATC decision to deny

[Hollendorfer’s] entry is based upon his June 22, 2019

ban from all Stronach Group tracks. This specific

complaint is not about the ban, but about the denial of

Mr. Hollendorfer’s attempt to enter a horse. Because, [he]

is banned from Santa Anita, the denial of [his] entry at

Santa Anita does not appear to be arbitrary or capricious.”

As with the DMTC investigation, Loehr determined none of the rules

cited in the complaint were violated, and addressed each one.

d. CHRB Letters

In early October 2019, CHRB counsel Brodnik sent Couto letters as to

DMTC and LATC, each stating the CHRB “conducted a thorough

investigation” and found no rule violations. Couto asked for elaboration.

Later that month, Brodnik sent Couto a further letter as to DMTC,

addressing the eight rules cited in his complaint and explaining why DMTC

did not violate them. In December 2019, Couto sent an email to the CHRB’s

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executive director and others, raising various concerns. Hollendorfer

represents he did not receive a response.

e. Trial Court Ruling

The trial court explained that Hollendorfer contended the CHRB “had a

mandatory duty to hold a hearing after [he] was excluded” by the Racing

Associations, and it quoted the first sentence of section 19573 (“ ‘Any person

who, pursuant to a rule of the board, is excluded . . . .’ ”). The court noted

that CHRB’s counsel referenced Rule 1989 in his July 24 response, but found

each complaint was “referred to an investigator who determined [the]

complaint was unfounded.” The court said it reviewed the lodged records and

considered counsel arguments, and found Hollendorfer “has not sufficiently

demonstrated a hearing was required pursuant to [section] 19573.” The court

also rejected his claim that the CRHB’s “actions were ‘tainted by pervasive

bias and conflicts of interest,’ ” stating, “[R]egardless of the existence or non-

existence of the alleged biases and conflicts of interests, [he] has failed to

demonstrate they influenced or impacted [CHRB’s] investigations in any

way.”

2. Additional Law Regarding Traditional Mandate

A traditional writ of mandate “may be issued by any court to any

inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of

an act which the law specially enjoins.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085, subd. (a).)

To obtain relief, a petitioner must show “ ‘ “(1) A clear, present and

usually ministerial duty on the part of the respondent . . . ; and (2) a clear,

present and beneficial right in the petitioner to the performance of that

duty.” ’ ” (CV Amalgamated LLC v. City of Chula Vista (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th

265, 278 (CV Amalgamated).)

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A court “ ‘may issue a writ of mandate to compel a public agency or

officer to perform a mandatory duty.’ ” (CV Amalgamated, supra,

82 Cal.App.5th at p. 279.) “Often, the crucial issue . . . is whether the act . . .

is a mandatory and ministerial duty, or . . . a quasi-legislative and

discretionary act.” (Ibid., italics omitted; see Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma

County Union High School Dist. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 916 (Kavanaugh)

[“ ‘A ministerial act is an act that a public officer is required to perform in a

prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority and

without regard to his own judgment or opinion concerning such act’s

propriety or impropriety, when a given state of facts exists.’ ”].)

A court may also “issue a writ when a public agency has abused its

discretion in carrying out a discretionary function.” (CV Amalgamated,

supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 279, italics omitted; id. at p. 280 [judicial inquiry

addresses whether “ ‘action was arbitrary, capricious or entirely without

evidentiary support, and whether it failed to conform to procedures required

by law’ ”].) “Normally, mandate will not lie to control a public agency’s

discretion, that is to say, force the exercise of discretion in a particular

manner. However, it will lie to correct abuses of discretion.” (County of Los

Angeles v. City of Los Angeles (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 643, 654.)

When an “ ‘appellate court reviews a trial court’s judgment on a

petition for a traditional writ of mandate, it applies the substantial evidence

test to the trial court’s findings of fact and independently reviews the trial

court’s conclusions on questions of law, which include the interpretation of a

statute and its application to undisputed facts.’ ” (CV Amalgamated, supra,

82 Cal.App.5th at p. 280.)

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3. Hollendorfer Does Not Establish the CHRB Had a

Mandatory Duty Under Section 19573 to Hold a Hearing

Here

a. Section 19573

We begin with a threshold statutory interpretation question: when, if

ever, does Section 19573 require a hearing? We conclude an exclusion based

on a CHRB rule is a necessary predicate to any hearing requirement under

Section 19573. We further conclude the CHRB decides if there is a qualifying

exclusion, and has discretion over how to reach that determination.3

Section 19573 states: “Any person who, pursuant to a rule of the board,

is excluded or ejected from any inclosure where horse racing is authorized

may apply to the board for a hearing on the question of whether the rule is

applicable to him. [¶] The board shall hold the hearing either at its next

regular meeting . . . or at such other place and time as the board and the

applicant may agree upon. [¶] If, upon the hearing, the board determines that

the rule does not or should not apply to the applicant, it shall notify all [track

operators] . . . of such determination. [¶] If the board determines that the

exclusion or ejection was proper, it shall make . . . an order to that effect.”

(See § 19404 [board means CHRB].)

First, the plain language of Section 19573 reflects its focus is on rule-

based exclusions only. It states “[a]ny person who, pursuant to a rule of the

3 We note neither party supplied legislative history, but as we shall

explain, certain language is clear and, for the potential ambiguity implicated

by the facts here (who decides if there was a qualifying exclusion, and how),

there is essentially one reasonable interpretation (the CHRB, in its

discretion). We also note that although Hollendorfer mentions Rule 1983

(allowing hearing applications by excluded members of banned classes), he

did not cite it in his requests to the CHRB and does not provide substantive

analysis here. We do not address it further.

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board, is excluded” from a racing inclosure may apply for a hearing—not just

any person. It also states the hearing concerns whether the “rule is

applicable” and whether the “rule does not or should not apply”—not just if

an exclusion, or any other denial of participation, was sound or fair.

Thus, even if the phrase “shall hold the hearing” were mandatory (an

issue on which the parties disagree), it does not support entitlement to a

hearing when, as here, there was no rule-based exclusion in the first place.

(Cf. Kavanaugh, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 916 [ministerial act is required

“when a given state of facts exists”]; see Greenberg v. Hollywood Turf Club

(1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 968, 980 (Greenberg) [rejecting plaintiff’s claim that the

CHRB “should hold a hearing to determine if a racing association has acted

properly in excluding a person for any reason,” stating, “We find nothing in

the applicable statutes or . . . regulations . . . , which declares the existence of

any such right.”].)4

Second, Section 19573 is silent as to who decides if an exclusion was

rule-based, and how. We conclude the most reasonable interpretation, if not

the only one, is that the CHRB must determine if there was a qualifying

exclusion and how it does so is within its discretion.

Starting with the text of Section 19573, the phrase “may apply to the

[CHRB] for a hearing” implies the CHRB decides whether to grant the

application—and that decision requires the CHRB to determine if a

qualifying exclusion occurred. Turning to the statutory context, Sections

19440 and 19562 place broad authority in the CHRB to set and administer

4 See also Richardson v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2018)

25 Cal.App.5th 102, 110-113 (although Vehicle Code required DMV to revoke

driving privileges once it determined a person could not safely operate a

vehicle, it had discretion to determine whether person was safe to drive).

18

the rules for horse racing. Section 19572, which directly precedes Section

19573, specifically states the CHRB “may, by rule, provide for the

exclusion . . . from any inclosure where horse races are authorized,” and it

has adopted such rules. (Rule 1980 et seq.) It is fully consistent with this

statutory scheme for the CHRB to be the entity to decide if a rule-based

exclusion occurred. The CHRB is also in the best position to determine what

did happen, not what a person seeking a hearing (or an entity seeking to

avoid one) claimed happened.

For similar reasons, we conclude the CHRB has discretion over how to

determine if there was a qualifying exclusion. Here, there was no material

dispute as to why Hollendorfer was denied participation (i.e., under the

RMAs and Stronach ban), and the CHRB conducted investigations that

concluded with letter determinations. But one can envision other scenarios,

like the person and entity disagreeing on the facts (or both claiming without

evidence a rule was applied), which could implicate different approaches. We

see no basis to limit the CHRB’s flexibility in this regard.5

5 Hollendorfer notes Greenberg said that if the plaintiff there asserted he

was excluded under a CHRB rule, he “would have been entitled to a hearing.”

(Greenberg, supra, 7 Cal.App.3d at p. 980.) Even if this were not dicta, there

is no indication the court was considering the interpretation issues before us.

(Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 85, fn. 4

[“ ‘[C]ases are not authority for propositions that are not considered.’ ”].) We

note the CHRB contends, inter alia, that no “predicate rule violation was

found to justify a hearing,” and “excluded” in Section 19573 refers to barred

classes under Section 19572 and Rule 1980. It is unclear if they are

suggesting a person would have to prove a violation, of certain rules, to

obtain a hearing (rather than having a rule-based exclusion, proper or not).

We need not address this further here, as Hollendorfer was not excluded

under a rule at all.

19

Hollendorfer maintains he is entitled to a hearing under Section 19573.

We are not persuaded.

First, Hollendorfer argues Section 19573 “mandate[s] if requested . . . a

hearing on the question of the applicability of ‘a rule’ . . . to any person

excluded,” citing Morton v. Hollywood Park, Inc. (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 248

(Morton). To the extent he means it suffices merely to ask about rule

applicability, we disagree. Section 19573 applies to someone excluded

“pursuant to a rule,” not any person unable to access a race meet who queries

whether a rule relates to their situation. Given the breadth of CHRB

regulation, that could cover nearly any situation, rendering the phrase

“pursuant to a rule” a nullity. (Cf. O.G. v. Superior Court (2021) 11 Cal.5th

82, 98 [“ ‘An interpretation that renders statutory language a nullity is

obviously to be avoided’ ”].)

Morton did not hold otherwise. There, a racing association removed the

plaintiff under Rules 1980 and 1990 (a predecessor to Rule 1989). (Morton,

supra, 73 Cal.App.3d at pp. 251-252.) He sought a hearing, the state’s

attorney did not obtain evidence he was excluded under Rule 1980, and told

him removal under Rule 1990 was a private matter. (Morton, at p. 252.) He

sued for injunctive relief and damages, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the

dismissal of his case. (Id. at pp. 252-254.) It explained that by “acquiescing

in that attorney’s advice,” he failed to exhaust available remedies via a writ

petition under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. (Morton, at p. 254.) The

court noted “Section 19573 provides for a hearing on the question of the

applicability of ‘a’ rule to any person excluded or ejected,” not just Rule 1980.

(Morton, at p. 254.) Thus, Morton still involved a rule-based removal, and

focused on exhaustion regardless.

20

Second, Hollendorfer argues that under Section 19431, the CHRB can

only take official actions with a four-member vote, further evidencing that

Section 19573 provides a hearing. Section 19431, subdivision (c) states: “At

least four members of the board shall concur in the taking of any official

action or in the exercise of any of the board’s duties, powers, or functions.” If

he is objecting to a staff investigation of hearing entitlement, we are not

persuaded. The CHRB oversees all horse racing in the state; by defining

what requires a four-member concurrence, this section implies there are

situations that do not require one. (See, e.g., §§ 19427 [appointment of

employees], 19440, subd. (b) [delegation to stewards], 19613.1 [matters

covered by agreements].) This argument seems to either ignore the “may

apply to the [CHRB] for a hearing” language in Section 19573, or to assume

the decision whether to grant that hearing is an official action.

Third, Hollendorfer expressly disputes the investigation was a “valid

administrative action[ ],” contending the CHRB “failed to demonstrate” there

were “any lawful delegations of powers or duties to . . . staff members,” citing

Sections 19400, 19420, 19431, and 19440.6 But he provides no substantive

analysis as to how these sections limit CHRB discretion under Section 19573

to use an investigator. Only section 19440 discusses delegation, and none

focus on staff. Further, Rule 1765, which Hollendorfer cited in his

complaints, contemplates the use of investigators. (Rule 1765 [complaints

6 See Sections 19400 (statute’s title is Horse Racing Law), 19420 (placing

jurisdiction over horse racing with the CHRB), 19431 (CHRB offices, records,

and voting), and 19440 (CHRB responsibilities and delegation).

21

described therein “shall be referred to the [CHRB] and investigated by the

[CRHB] or its investigators” (italics added)].)7

Fourth, Hollendorfer belatedly contends on reply that an investigation

does not satisfy due process, citing Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles

County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197 and Jamgotchian v. Ferraro

(9th Cir. 2024) 93 F.4th 1150. Even if the point were not forfeited, the cases

do not establish an investigation is inadequate for the purpose at issue here:

determination of hearing entitlement. Indeed, Today’s Fresh confirms the

“precise dictates of due process are flexible and vary according to context.”

(Today’s Fresh, at p. 212; see id. at p. 228 [“ ‘[i]n general, “something less”

than a full evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative

action’ ”; “no presumption in favor” of a full hearing].) As for Jamgotchian, it

involved state claim exhaustion and is inapposite. (Jamgotchian, at pp. 1152,

1154, 1158 [CHRB affirmed steward decision after hearing; district court

erred by concluding that decision, in “combination with [plaintiff] not seeking

review . . . in state court,” precluded federal constitutional claim].)

Finally, Hollendorfer asserts the “mandatory nature of the hearing

requirement is even more compelling” when the situation involves a “licensed

trainer” with vested constitutional rights. He explains trainers “have a

property interest in their licenses” sufficient to invoke due process, citing

Barry v. Barchi (1979) 443 U.S. 55 (Barry), and the state “may not hinder a

licensee’s vested right to practice their profession, without due process,”

citing Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130. It was the Racing Associations

who denied his participation, not the CHRB; he does not establish the denials

7 Hollendorfer also argues an “investigator’s responsibility” is “only to

gather pertinent facts,” citing Section 19431 and Morton. Neither addresses

investigators.

22

amounted to a revocation of his license; and, regardless, he does not explain

why this would implicate Section 19573. (See Tisher v. California Horse

Racing Bd. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 349, 355 (Tisher) [Bixby “does not support

a conclusion plaintiffs have a vested, fundamental right to utilize their

licenses at Los Alamitos, a private racetrack”]; see further discussion of

revocation issue and Tisher, post; see § 19461 [addressing proceedings

governing license revocation by the CHRB].) The cases cited by Hollendorfer

involve different contexts or issues, and do not aid him. (See People v. JTH

Tax, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1260 [rejecting reliance on “generic

authorities” regarding due process and cases, including Bixby, for which

appellant supplied “little, if any, explanation of their relevance” to his case].)8

Hollendorfer also contends the CHRB’s position “affords more rights to

individuals suspected of engaging in immoral conduct” than licensees.

(Capitalization omitted.) We disagree. “Any person” excluded pursuant to a

CHRB rule can apply for a hearing under Section 19573, and licensees may

also have avenues for relief not available to the public. For example, they

may be able to pursue grievances via their horsemen’s organizations or file

civil litigation, both approaches taken by Hollendorfer here. (Cf. Flores v. Los

Angeles Turf Club, Inc. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 736, 748 [“An administrative remedy

8 See Barry, supra, 443 U.S. at pp. 57-61, 63-66, 68 (state did not violate

due process by suspending trainer’s license without a predeprivation hearing,

based on an expert finding that horse had drugs in its system, but the

authorizing statute did violate his rights by not “assur[ing] a prompt

postsuspension hearing”); Bixby, supra, 4 Cal.3d at pp. 146-147 (independent

judgment review applies to agency action when a vested right, like the right

to practice one’s profession, is involved); see also, e.g., Dare v. Board of

Medical Examiners (1943) 21 Cal.2d 790, 799-801 (upholding use of

independent judgment review in license revocation case).

23

is not rendered inadequate by the fact that a particular applicant cannot

qualify for relief under it.”].)

b. Investigation Findings

We now turn to the CHRB’s findings, and conclude they support the

conclusion that no hearing was due here under Section 19573.

Loehr found, inter alia, that each Racing Association could deny

Hollendorfer entry under the RMA, so long as the determination was not

arbitrary and capricious; DMTC relied on reasons including the Stronach ban

and high percentage of horse deaths; and LATC, a Stronach entity, relied on

the existing ban. These findings reflect Hollendorfer was not excluded

“pursuant to a rule of the board,” and thus was not a person who “may apply”

for a hearing under Section 19573.

Hollendorfer does not establish otherwise.

First, Hollendorfer argues that when CHRB “incorrectly assumed” he

was excluded under Rule 1989, this “assumption should have . . . afforded”

him a hearing. We disagree. The CHRB’s discretion over how to determine if

there was a rule-based exclusion reasonably includes deciding when the

determination process has concluded. Hollendorfer provides no reason to

limit this discretion by requiring the CHRB to treat an initial response as a

decision. Indeed, doing so could chill communication and impede issue

resolution. We need not and do not reach his remaining arguments regarding

Rule 1989, including his reliance on Fipke v. California Horse Racing Bd.

(2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 505, 516 in this regard.

Second, despite Hollendorfer’s concession that Loehr’s investigation

“unequivocally revealed” he was “excluded based on the . . . . RMAs,” he

claims the investigation “identified Rules 2040 (Horsemen’s Organizations)

and 2041 (Agreements Binding on Members) as providing contractual/RMA

24

justification” for his exclusion. Loehr did not identify Rule 2040 in either

report. He did mention Rule 2041 in the DMTC report, but only in a

concluding section where he addressed the “specific CHRB [rule] sections

alleged” by Couto. Hollendorfer relatedly contends the CHRB knew or should

have known his exclusion violated Rules 1542 (Power to Refuse Entry and

Deny Eligibility) and 2045 (Prohibited Provisions of Horsemen’s

Agreements), and it was also inconsistent with Rule 1510 (Knowledge of

Rules).

To the extent Hollendorfer cites these rules to suggest there was a rule-

based exclusion because he was denied participation under RMAs governed

by CHRB rules (or in alleged violation of them), we disagree. We view this as

a variation of his claim that one can seek a hearing on “applicability of ‘a

rule,’ ” without more, which we addressed and rejected above.9

Third, Hollendorfer criticizes the investigation generally, including

based on purported delays in its commencement and Loehr’s deposition

testimony reflecting an alleged lack of experience in horse racing

investigations and familiarity with the rules. But he does not explain how

these issues, even if substantiated, could have impacted the investigation

findings, and thus cannot establish prejudicial error. (Hotels Nevada, supra,

203 Cal.App.4th at p. 348; Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 573-574.) Nor does

the record support his concerns. CHRB counsel responded promptly to the

initial complaint, and Loehr started investigating each complaint within a

day of receiving it. As for Loehr’s background, he had prior experience in a

different agency; he explained his staff had never “investigated violations of

9 To the extent Hollendorfer cites additional rules on reply, including in

connection with his arguments contesting the RMA race meet provisions (see

post), we deem those points forfeited.

25

these particular sections” either, and because the complaint was unique and

complicated, it made sense for him to do it; and his reports addressed every

rule cited in the complaints.

c. Fair Procedure

Hollendorfer also argued in his opening brief that a hearing was

required under the common law doctrine of fair procedure, which, he stated,

“protects against arbitrary decisions by private organizations that effectively

deprive an individual of their ability to practice a . . . profession . . . .” He

contended, in part, that the CHRB was “well aware of its obligations,” citing

an email from CHRB Chairman Charles Winner, and yet “failed to convene

the hearing mandated by law” and was “complicit” in letting the ban occur.

In its respondent’s brief, the CHRB emphasized the fair procedure doctrine

applies only to private entities. (See Potvin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

(2000) 22 Cal.4th 1060, 1066.) On reply, Hollendorfer says he “generally

agrees,” but argues the CHRB was “held to the higher standard of due

process” and it “cannot shield its own failure to provide due process” by

ceding authority to Racing Associations that it knew “had failed to afford . . .

[f]air [p]rocedure.”

Hollendorfer’s contentions here, belated and otherwise, lack merit. For

one thing, the Winner email does not help him. On June 22, 2019, an

individual at Stronach sent Winner and others at the CHRB a press release

from Los Alamitos Race Course that stated they would “ ‘gladly provide

stalls’ ” to Hollendorfer and “ ‘[u]nless forbidden by the [CHRB], . . . intend to

permit entries’ ” from him. Winner responded, stating, “We will simply

respond to the media, if asked, that it is a los al [sic]. The chrb would have to

abide by due process laws.” Although his meaning is not fully clear, he

appears to confirm CHRB would provide applicable due process. Further,

26

Hollendorfer essentially concedes the fair procedure doctrine does not apply

directly to the CHRB, and supplies no legal authority establishing that fair

procedure violations by the Racing Associations support a due process

violation by the CHRB (much less a specific right to a hearing under Section

19573).

4. Hollendorfer Does Not Establish Grounds for Traditional

Writ Relief Based on the RMAs

Hollendorfer also argues, in substance, that it was improper for the

CHRB to let the Racing Associations use RMA provisions to limit his

participation, which allowed them to essentially revoke his license and ban

him from racing. We are not persuaded.

Before we proceed, we clarify the scope of our analysis. Hollendorfer

focuses on the alleged impropriety and application of the RMA provisions. He

does not show any lack of record support for Loehr’s findings that the Racing

Associations did not act arbitrarily or capriciously under the RMAs, or the

findings that no CHRB rules were violated. His speculation elsewhere as to

bias or conflicts of interest does not suffice. He forfeits any challenge in these

respects. (Holguin, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 1326; see ibid. [claim of

insufficient evidence is deemed waived unless appellant sets forth “ ‘ “all the

material evidence on the point” ’ ” (italics omitted)].)

It is also unclear if Hollendorfer means the RMA issues further

support a hearing under Section 19573, or are separate grounds for writ

relief. If the former, we disagree for the reasons discussed above. If the

latter, he does not articulate his reasoning, and forfeits this issue too. (Cf.

Badie, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 784-785.) Even if he preserved some

objection to the RMA provisions, his contentions lack force.

First, Hollendorfer argues that by allowing RMAs that permit denial of

race meet applications, the CHRB improperly delegated its authority over

27

race participation to the Racing Associations, in contravention of Section

19440 and Rule 2045. We disagree.

We start with Section 19440, subdivision (a). It states the CHRB “shall

have all powers necessary and proper” to carry out the purposes of the Horse

Racing Law, and sets forth broad responsibilities not only to participants, but

also racehorses and the public.10 Subdivision (b) states it “may delegate to

stewards . . . any of its powers and duties.” But the Horse Racing Law also

allows for RMAs. Section 19613.1 addresses “negotiation and contract”

matters for the trainer and owner organizations. It provides the trainer

organization “shall generally be responsible for negotiating issues relating to

the backstretch, track safety, and the welfare of backstretch employees”; the

owner organization negotiates other identified matters (e.g., purse

agreements); and, otherwise, the CHRB “shall determine which matters . . .

shall be the subject of negotiation and contract” for each organization.

Thus, the Horse Racing Law contemplates the RMAs will address

certain issues, separate and aside from steward delegations under Section

19440—and that the CHRB will decide what additional matters will be the

subject of negotiation. (§ 19613.1.) Consistent with these provisions, the

CHRB contends here that while it has “oversight authority and must approve

each RMA . . . , once approved, it is essentially a private contract,” and RMAs

are “carefully negotiated between the CTT and the racing associations to set

the terms by which racing associations allow trainers to apply to stable

horses at the track.” The CHRB could reasonably conclude that allowing

10 (See subd. (a)(1) [ “[a]dopting rules . . . that protect . . . the health,

safety, welfare, and aftercare of racehorses”], (2) [protection of public],

(3) [“[a]dministration and enforcement of all laws, rules, and regulations

affecting horse racing”], (4) [“[a]djudication of controversies”], (5) [licensing]

& (6) [allocation of racing dates].)

28

RMA provisions addressing race meet entries is consistent with its

fulfillment of its responsibilities under Sections 19440 and 19613.1.

As for Rule 2045, Hollendorfer argues it prohibits RMA provisions

“ ‘which may serve to exclude participation at the meeting by any individual

holding a valid license,’ ” selectively quoting from the rule and omitting key

language. The rule states in relevant part:

“No agreement between the association and the horsemen

shall include provisions which are in conflict with the

Horse Racing Law, the rules of the [CHRB], or usurp the

authority of the [CHRB], including but not limited to: . . .

(4) Provisions which may serve to exclude participation at

the meeting by any individual holding a valid license issued

by the [CHRB]. Nothing herein is deemed an abridgment of

Rules 1485 and 1989 of this division.” (Italics added.)

Rule 1485, subdivision (c) states, “Possession of a license does not

confer any right upon the holder thereof to employment at or participation in

a race meeting or to be within the inclosure.” Further, Rule 1437 states a

racing association “may impose conditions for its race meeting as it may deem

necessary,” provided they “may not conflict” with CHRB rules. (Ibid.

[association “may also impose requirements, qualifications or requisites”].)

Considering these provisions together, as we must, we conclude Rule

2045 imposes no bar on RMA provisions governing race meet participation, so

long as they are otherwise consistent with the Horse Racing Law and CHRB

rules. (Cf. Concerned Communities, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 737 [text is

examined in the “context of the statutory framework as a whole,” including to

“harmonize the various parts of the enactment”].) Indeed, barring such

provisions could essentially mandate participation for licensed horsemen,

obviating Rule 1485(c) in whole and Rule 1437 in part (and render somewhat

superfluous the Rule 1485 reference in Rule 2045). (Cf. People v. Valencia

29

(2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 357 [“ ‘[a] construction making some words surplusage

is to be avoided’ ”].)

Hollendorfer relies on other rules as well, to no avail. For example, he

states that “only” the stewards “were authorized to refuse a race entry,”

citing Rule 1542 and, on reply, that CHRB had “exclusive authority” to accept

entries under Rule 1580. He forfeits the latter issue, and neither rule limits

RMAs regardless. (Rules 1542 [stewards may refuse entry for good cause],

1580 [all entries are under supervision of stewards, and they may refuse

entries].) We note Loehr rejected his reliance on these rules, finding the

RMAs and Stall Applications “give . . . authority to make stall and race entry

decisions.”11

Second, Hollendorfer argues that by rejecting his participation, the

Racing Associations “effectively revok[ed] his license,” which only the CHRB

can do (thus “usurping” CHRB authority). We are not persuaded. As an

initial matter, he remains a licensed horse trainer, and this case involves

specific racing associations and race meets (i.e., 2018-2019 race meet

11 Hollendorfer also invokes Rules 1402 and 1437. Rule 1402 states in

part that CHRB rules “supersede” race conditions, which, if anything,

confirms such conditions can exist. Rule 1437 likewise permits race

conditions, as noted. He further argues elsewhere that an agency cannot

adopt a rule that “ ‘ “exceeds the scope of . . . the enabling statute,” ’ ” but the

rule he focuses on is Rule 1989, which we do not reach. For its part, the

CHRB maintains we should defer to its interpretations. We need not address

that general issue, as Hollendorfer establishes no error by the CHRB here,

and we comment on any concerns with its views as warranted for our

analysis.

30

exclusions by LATC and PRA (owned by Stronach) and DMTC). He cites no

evidence in the record regarding other race meets.12

His theory lacks merit regardless, and Tisher is instructive. There,

harness racers challenged standards imposed by Los Alamitos Racing

Association (LARA) that effectively precluded their entry. (Tisher, supra,

231 Cal.App.3d at pp. 351-352.) Affirming judgment for LARA, the Court of

Appeal acknowledged that only the CHRB can revoke licenses under Section

19440, but disagreed LARA’s restrictions essentially “ ‘invalidated’ their

licenses” or were otherwise illegal. (Tisher, at p. 355.) The court explained:

“[L]icenses ‘[a]re subject to all rules, regulations, and

conditions from time to time prescribed by the board.’

(§ 19460, subd. (b).) One of these regulations is that a

racing association ‘may impose conditions for its race

meeting as it may deem necessary.’ ([Rule] 1437.) Another

is that ‘[p]ossession of a license does not, as such, confer

any right upon the holder thereof to employment at or

participation in a race meeting.’ ([Rule] 1485(c).) In other

words, LARA has the right to impose conditions on the

drivers in its race meetings and plaintiffs have no absolute

right to participate in those race meetings by virtue of the

valid licenses they possess.” (Ibid.)

The Tisher court also concluded LARA’s race conditions “did not infringe on

the board’s sole power to suspend or revoke plaintiffs’ licenses.” (Ibid.)

Thus, Tisher confirms licensees can be subject to race limits, consistent

with our analysis above. (See also Morrison v. California Horse Racing Bd.

(1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 211, 218, 220 [previously convicted owner “could not

12 His claim in his fact section that he previously trained “upwards of

180 horses daily in California,” and now trains around ten, is unsupported by

record citations. He also does not address Loehr’s finding that horses could

be, and were, entered via his assistant trainer, or explain the Los Alamitos

press release, noted above, which indicated they would accept his entries.

31

reasonably rely” on an owner’s license to prevent exclusion, as it is “clearly

within the contemplation of the [CHRB] rules that a licensed owner might

not be permitted”].)

Finally, Hollendorfer contends he was “summarily precluded from

practicing his profession” due to the “quasi-monopoly” of the Racing

Associations, citing Greenberg. He has not established he was so precluded,

and Greenberg does not help him. There, a stable agent was excluded

without explanation, and the track later relied on its status as a property

owner. (Greenberg, supra, 7 Cal.App.3d at p. 978.) The Court of Appeal held,

in part, that he could state claims for interference with contract and

prospective economic advantage, and there addressed the quasi-monopoly

nature of horse racing. (Id. at p. 976.) It did not hold racing associations

cannot impose race meet conditions (and elsewhere held, as noted, that not

every exclusion supported a hearing). (See id. at p. 980; Tisher, supra,

231 Cal.App.3d at p. 360 [“Greenberg does not support [plaintiff’s] claim of

right to utilize their licenses . . . , free of LARA’s restrictions”; noting the

plaintiff there was “singled out and arbitrarily excluded . . . without any

reason” (italics added)].)

On reply, Hollendorfer argues that if the CHRB permits “racing

associations to determine . . . which licensees may . . . participate in race

meets, then there is no need for State/CHRB licensing.” We reject this

hyperbole. It is both consistent with the Horse Racing Law and reasonable

for the CHRB to oversee who can participate in race meets at all, including

through licensing, and to permit other entities and persons to operate

particular components subject to oversight.

32

5. Remaining Arguments

We address two remaining issues. First, Hollendorfer argues that

despite raising various issues in his petition, the trial court’s ruling was

limited to the Section 19573 hearing issue; other issues, which he lists,

continue to have merit; and, because the CHRB’s brief did not address the

trial court’s failure to consider them, we should at least remand for further

proceedings. We see no basis for remand.

Hollendorfer cites no authority requiring the trial court to expressly

address every point in his writ petition. Nor is the CHRB’s discussion, or

lack thereof, dispositive. (Golden Door, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 557,

fn. 48 [lack of response is not a concession].) If he believes other issues reflect

prejudicial error, he must show this, and a list of purportedly unaddressed

points does not suffice. (Hotels Nevada, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 348;

Tiburon Open Space Committee v. County of Marin (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th

700, 771 [rejecting appellant’s “attempt to throw the burden on respondent

and this court to disprove . . . that the [b]oard, and the trial court, acted

without proper support”; “That is not how the appellate process works.”].)

We note he does discuss many of these issues elsewhere, and where he has

properly briefed them, we address them.

Second, Hollendorfer argues the trial court “improperly excluded and

failed to consider . . . evidence establishing bias, conflicts of interest, and

predetermination which . . . supported [his] writ allegations.” He provides no

legal or record support for this point, and we deem it forfeited. (Badie, supra,

67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 784-785; WFG National, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at

p. 894.) He also does not address the court’s finding that he “failed to

demonstrate” any “alleged biases or conflicts of interest” influenced the

33

investigations, or explain how the supposedly excluded evidence could have

altered this ruling or otherwise supported the relief he sought.13

C. Administrative Mandate

The trial court denied Hollendorfer’s administrative mandate claim on

standing grounds. He does not establish reversible error here, either.

1. Additional Facts

a. RMA Provisions

As we shall explain, the administrative proceedings concerned CTT

complaints alleging the Racing Associations violated the RMAs. We describe

Sections 5 and 6 here, and additional provisions as needed post. The “track”

referenced here is the applicable Racing Association. Section 5 states:

“Track may, in its discretion, establish rules, regulations,

and security procedures that may limit or eliminate

Applicant’s ability to participate in racing or training

activities at Track . . . , subject to the agreement of the

CTT. The agreement of CTT shall be a condition precedent

to any execution of a decision by Track to limit or eliminate

Applicant’s ability to participate in racing or training

activities at Track . . . .”

Section 6 bars the Racing Association from discriminating against a trainer

by arbitrarily and capriciously allocating stall space, as noted above. It then

states:

“If any trainer asserts that Track shall have so

discriminated on such ground or grounds, then the trainer

claiming to be so aggrieved may submit his claim to Track

13 Hollendorfer also summarily claims the CHRB failed to immediately

investigate CTT’s complaints due to bias and conflicts of interest, and forfeits

that point too. We note his factual background states his counsel sent a

letter to CHRB counsel alleging bias and there were press accounts, but even

if he discussed these matters in his arguments, they would not support

reversal for the reasons stated.

34

or to CTT for examination, and if CTT shall then believe

the claim to have merit, CTT shall be entitled to present

the merits of the grievance on behalf of such trainer to

Track. If the dispute is not settled, Track and CTT agree

that the matter is to proceed immediately to arbitration

before a hearing officer chosen by mutual consent by Track

and CTT. If Track and CTT cannot agree on a hearing

officer chosen by mutual consent, a hearing officer shall be

appointed by the CHRB.”

b. DMTC Proceedings

On July 12, 2019, one week after DMTC denied Hollendorfer’s stall

application, CTT’s counsel Darrell Vienna filed a letter complaint with the

CHRB alleging DMTC violated Section 5 of the RMA. The complaint cited

Rule 2043 (Adjudication of Controversies Relating to Agreements), which

provides:

“A complaint alleging a violation of any provision of an

agreement between a horsemen’s organization and a racing

association may be filed with the [CHRB] by either of the

contracting entities. The [CHRB] shall immediately

investigate the allegations and may refer . . . the matter for

hearing . . . . The . . . referee may, after hearing the

matters alleged, order compliance with the terms of the

contract if within their authority to do so, or propose to the

Board a decision or other course of action including therein

their recommendations to the Board.”

Hollendorfer and CTT filed their superior court action against DMTC

on July 15, asserting claims for declaratory relief and breach of contract.

When the superior court issued a preliminary injunction, CHRB counsel John

McDonough contacted Vienna to see if the DMTC complaint still required

CHRB attention, and followed up after he did not respond. The CHRB

appointed a hearing officer at some point.

Vienna subsequently notified the hearing officer that CTT and DMTC

settled their dispute and CTT was withdrawing its complaint.

35

c. LATC/PRA Proceedings

Stronach issued its press release stating Hollendorfer was no longer

welcome at its facilities on June 22, 2019. On July 24, CTT counsel Vienna

filed a letter complaint with the CHRB alleging Stronach violated the RMAs

with LATC and PRA. CTT and Hollendorfer filed their lawsuit against PRA

on August 12. On August 13, CHRB counsel McDonough acknowledged

CTT’s administrative complaint.

The CHRB appointed a hearing officer. On September 26, he issued a

briefing sequence order with dates in November and December, and said a

“hearing will be scheduled . . . if . . . deemed necessary.”

The hearing officer issued his proposed decision in February 2020,

stating the dispute was “appropriate for disposition without . . . a hearing.”

He explained the dispute involved interpretation of the RMAs; identified the

documents in evidence, including the RMAs and Stronach press release; and

granted LATC and PRA’s request for judicial notice of orders in the superior

court actions. He found the RMAs spanned December 26, 2018 to December

25, 2019, and appeared identical.

The hearing officer explained CTT alleged the “ ‘unilateral decision . . .

to eliminate [Hollendorfer’s] participation’ ” violated Section 5 of the RMAs.

He stated Rule 2043 governed the matter, and CTT had to prove the RMAs

were violated by a preponderance of the evidence.

The hearing officer then determined any RMA violation was moot,

because the RMAs applied only to the period ending December 25, 2019, had

expired, and were no longer enforceable, so there was no actual controversy

and CTT “improperly seeks redress for ‘past wrongs.’ ” He noted Rule 2043

also requires a controversy, and he could not order compliance with

unenforceable provisions. He also disagreed with CTT that the dispute was a

36

matter of public interest that was likely to recur. He stated it concerned

factual issues particular to the RMAs at issue and whether LATC/PRA had to

obtain CTT’s consent under Section 5, which were not “issues of broad public

interest.” He further stated “any future dispute” would “concern whatever

[RMA] is in place” at the time.

He concluded CTT’s “remedy . . . , as it relates to the [RMAs], is to

pursue a fully matured claim for breach of contract, if such a claim exists,”

and recommended the dispute be dismissed. The CHRB adopted his decision

later that month.

d. Trial Court Ruling

The trial court denied Hollendorfer’s administrative mandate claim due

to lack of standing. The court stated he sought to challenge the CHRB’s

“decision concerning a complaint . . . by [CTT] alleging violations of the 2019

[RMAs],” but such complaint “may only be filed by one of the contracting

entities – that is, the horsemen’s organization (here, CTT) or the racing

association (here, LATC and PRA).” The court summarized the LATC/PRA

administrative proceedings, noting the hearing officer concluded the matter

was moot, and further stated:

“[Hollendorfer] was not a party to this administrative

proceeding. Indeed, in accordance with [CHRB’s] rules, he

could not have properly brought a complaint alleging a

violation of any RMA. ([Rule 2043].) . . . Given that [he] did

not have standing to bring such a complaint before [the

CHRB], it is difficult to imagine how he could have

standing to bring a petition seeking judicial review

thereof.”

The trial court then explained a “writ petition is to be brought by the

‘beneficially interested’ party,” citing Code of Civil Procedure section 1086.

The court determined: “CTT is one of the contracting parties to the RMAs

and would have a beneficial interest in any judicial determination

37

regarding the RMAs. . . . [Hollendorfer] fails to sufficiently demonstrate how

he is a beneficially interested party here.”

The trial court rejected Hollendorfer’s claim that the CHRB’s “position

would eliminate any trainer from seeking judicial review,” stating he cited no

case where a trainer had standing to challenge a CHRB decision under

Rule 2043. The court also rejected his reliance on public policy, stating he

cited “no particular public policy at risk of being undermined.”

2. Additional Law Regarding Administrative Mandate

A petition for writ of administrative mandate “allows for judicial review

of quasi-judicial decisions that are made ‘as the result of a proceeding in

which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be

taken, and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior

tribunal, corporation, board, or officer.’ ([Code Civ. Proc.,] § 1094.5, subd.

(a).)” (Boermeester v. Carry (2023) 15 Cal.5th 72, 85 (Boermeester).)

A “writ must be issued in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy,

and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law,” and “upon the verified

petition of the party beneficially interested.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086;

Carsten v. Psychology Examining Com. (Carsten) (1980) 27 Cal.3d 793, 796

[administrative mandate requires beneficial interest]; San Luis Rey Racing,

Inc. v. California Horse Racing Bd. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 67, 73 (San Luis)

[same, traditional mandate].)

“Judicial review is limited to ‘whether the respondent has proceeded

without, or in excess of, jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and

whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion.’ ([Code Civ. Proc.,]

§ 1094.5, subd. (b).)” (Boermeester, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 85.)

Although the standard of review in administrative mandate cases

depends on the nature of the rights involved (Bixby, supra, 4 Cal.3d at

38

pp. 143-144), the central questions here—standing and mootness—are issues

of law that we presumptively review de novo. (San Luis, supra,

15 Cal.App.5th at p. 73 [standing is a “question[ ] of law to which we typically

apply a de novo standard of review”]; Robinson v. U-Haul Co. of California

(2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 304, 319 [“Issues of justiciability, such as mootness, are

generally reviewed de novo.”].)

3. Hollendorfer Forfeits This Claim

In addressing his administrative mandate claim, Hollendorfer

disregards critical principles of appellate review: he must demonstrate

prejudicial error (Hotels Nevada, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 348), under

proper headings (Pizarro, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 179), with adequate

legal and record support (Badie, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 784-785; WFG

National, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 894), and cannot wait until the reply

brief to do so (Raceway, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 178).

When he sought a writ of administrative mandate, CTT had withdrawn

its complaint as to DMTC, and the CHRB had decided the LATC/PRA matter

was moot. Although the trial court’s ruling focused on standing, that did not

relieve Hollendorfer of his burden to show in his opening brief here that the

administrative proceedings were not in fact moot—and, thus, that the

standing ruling harmed him (and that there was effective relief this court

could provide). (See Marshall v. Pasadena Unified School Dist. (2004)

119 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1251 (Marshall) [“a writ will not issue to enforce a

technical, abstract or moot right”].)

Hollendorfer did not meet this obligation. He does not address

mootness as to DMTC until his reply brief, and argues only that the trial

court “did not discuss . . . any settlement” and it “is therefore not applicable

in determining this appeal and has not been waived.” CTT did not just settle

39

with DMTC; it withdrew its complaint. If he wanted to address that

proceeding, he had to do so here. (See In re Marriage of Weiss (1996)

42 Cal.App.4th 106, 119 [law does not allow review of a “ ‘decision . . . from

which an appeal might previously have been taken’ ”].) Further, he does not

explain, even on reply, why the DMTC proceeding is not moot.

As for LATC/PRA, Hollendorfer’s opening brief merely mentioned the

CHRB’s mootness ruling while discussing standing, summarily claiming it

was “inexplicable because, for other reasons, [the CHRB] had extended the

purported lapsed RMA, retroactively . . . .” He supplied no heading,

substantive legal argument or authority, or record cites (and, as we discuss

post, his belated reply argument used inadequate record cites and still

omitted legal authority).

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment as to the administrative

mandate claim. We do not address DMTC further. In the interests of justice,

and because the trial court relied in part on its mandate rulings to address

the Government Code section 815.6 claim, we shall address why his standing

argument and belated mootness argument as to LATC/PRA lack merit.

4. Hollendorfer Does Not Establish Error as to Standing

Hollendorfer argues he was the beneficially interested party, not CTT,

including as a third party beneficiary of the RMA, and the trial court erred in

ruling he lacked standing. We reject these contentions.

a. Additional Law Regarding Standing

“At its core, standing concerns a specific party’s interest in the outcome

of a lawsuit.” (Weatherford v. City of San Rafael (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1241, 1247

(Weatherford).) Code of Civil Procedure section 1086 provides, inter alia, that

a writ of mandate issues to “the party beneficially interested.”

40

“ ‘The requirement that a petitioner be “beneficially interested” has

been generally interpreted to mean that one may obtain the writ only if the

person has some special interest to be served or some particular right to be

preserved or protected over and above the interest held in common with the

public at large.’ ” (Personnel Com. v. Barstow Unified School Dist. (1996)

43 Cal.App.4th 871, 877 (Barstow).) This standard “ ‘is equivalent to the

federal “injury in fact” test, which requires a party to prove . . . it has suffered

“an invasion of a legally protected interest that is [both] ‘(a) concrete and

particularized, and (b) actual or imminent . . . .’ ” ’ ” (People ex rel. Dept. of

Conservation v. El Dorado County (2005) 36 Cal.4th 971, 986; Marshall,

supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 1251 [petitioner “ ‘must show his legal rights are

injuriously affected by the action being challenged’ ”].)

Code of Civil Procedure section 367 “imposes a similar requirement for

civil actions generally”: “ ‘Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the

real party in interest, except as otherwise provided by statute.’ ” (Barstow,

supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 877.) “ ‘Generally, “the person possessing the

right sued upon by reason of the substantive law is the real party in

interest.” ’ ” (Gantman v. United Pacific Ins. Co. (1991) 232 Cal App.3d 1560,

1566.)

Policy considerations also may be pertinent to standing. (Weatherford,

supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1248 [California’s “standing jurisprudence . . . reflects a

sensitivity to broader prudential and separation of powers considerations

elucidating how and when parties should be entitled to seek relief under

particular statutes.”].)

b. Beneficially Interested Party

Hollendorfer argues he was the party whose legal rights were affected

by the administrative proceedings; CTT’s interests were not implicated by his

41

grievances; and the trial court erroneously discounted these facts “because

[he] was not the named party in the underlying complaint and contract.”

These contentions lack merit.

First, Hollendorfer argues that “[a]t all times,” he was the beneficially

interested party and real party in interest. He explains he has a

constitutional right to use his license to practice his profession, echoing his

traditional mandate arguments, and the administrative proceedings solely

concerned “his ability to participate” in race meets. As explained above, his

license did not necessarily entitle him to participate in specific race meets.

(See Tisher, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 355 [plaintiffs had “no absolute right

to participate in . . . race meetings by virtue” of their licenses].) And he does

not establish his participation is what the proceedings were about,

regardless.

Rather, the legal interests at issue were under the RMAs between CTT

and LATC/PRA. CTT’s complaint stated: “The unilateral decision of

[Stronach] to eliminate [Hollendorfer’s] participation in racing and training

at [Stronach] tracks under [Stronach’s] ‘safety and accountability’ procedures

is violative of Section 5” of the RMAs. It continued: “CTT has not agreed to

or consented to [Stronach’s] decision to eliminate Hollendorfer’s

participation . . . . Accordingly, we ask the CHRB to immediately intervene

and order [Stronach] to stay its ongoing exclusion . . . pending . . . a decision

from a CHRB hearing of this matter.” The complaint did not identify

Hollendorfer as the real party in interest. Nor did it “include[ ] a single

remedy” of CHRB intervention to stay the exclusion, as he initially claims.

Rather, as he then acknowledges, it sought the stay “ ‘pending . . . a decision

from a CHRB hearing’ ”—which would be on the contractual issue.

42

Thus, the substantive legal issue was not Stronach’s or LATC/PRA’s

ability to deny participation to Hollendorfer (much less his right to enter race

meets generally). The 2018-2019 RMAs permitted them to do so, subject to

certain conditions. The issue was whether they violated those conditions by

denying participation without CTT’s consent.

Second, and in turn, Hollendorfer fails to establish CTT’s interests

were not at issue. Whether Stronach and LATC/PRA complied with the

RMAs was directly relevant to CTT, as the designated representative for all

trainers who applied to participate under them. (§ 19613 [CTT represents

trainers].) This representation is consistent with CTT’s role as a horsemen’s

organization in facilitating orderly race meets. (Rules 2040 [the CHRB

“recognizes the need for . . . trainers to negotiate . . . with racing

associations”; to “fulfill its duties to the public in authorizing the conduct of

an uninterrupted, orderly race meeting,” the CHRB “shall acknowledge

one . . . horsemen’s organization that represents . . . trainers”], 2041

[requiring trainer compliance with RMA].) Nor does Hollendorfer show CTT

was unauthorized to address grievances, as he suggests. (§ 19613.1, subd. (a)

[the CHRB decides on additional matters for negotiation].)

The RMAs confirm CTT’s role in this regard. The recitals state the

parties reached the agreement to “stabilize certain phases of the business” to

“avoid[ ] controversies between them” that might interfere with race meets

“to the detriment of [the] [Racing Associations], CTT, [and trainers],” and to

“provid[e] for an orderly and uniform method of dealing with issues involving

the racetrack, track safety, the backstretch, and the welfare of trainers and

other backstretch personnel . . . .” Section 5 effectuates these aims by

providing guidelines for limits on race meet participation, and CTT had an

interest in enforcing it.

43

Third, Hollendorfer argues “contractual standing between the parties of

a contract” should not be confused with the “standing of a beneficially

interested party,” and the trial court erred by focusing on the former.

Contractual party status can be pertinent to standing, as Hollendorfer

impliedly concedes in arguing he was a third party beneficiary (see post).

(See Jones v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1717, 1722

[“someone who is not a party to the contract has no standing to enforce it”].)

Here, it suffices to reiterate that the administrative proceeding was a

contractual dispute, so the issues are related.

Fourth, CTT’s decision not to pursue mandate relief does not change

our analysis (whether it was for financial reasons or otherwise, see post).

One purpose of standing requirements is to promote finality, by minimizing

challenges to proceedings that participants accepted. (Cf. Cloud v. Northrop

Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 1008, fn. 5 [purpose of “real party

in interest requirement is to ensure that a resulting judgment will impose a

res judicata effect”]; cf. Municipal Court v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th

1126, 1131 [municipal court lacked standing to challenge superior court

decision; the “ ‘premise under which the judiciary operates is straightforward:

if no individual party finds it worth his or her while to champion the cause

and seek judicial review, then review will not occur.’ ”].)14

14 The CHRB asserts Hollendorfer could have intervened in the

administrative proceeding. He disagrees, stating Rule 2043 “limits

participation to the ‘contracting entities,’ ” and also argues he “de facto”

appeared by prompting CTT to file a complaint. Rule 2043 addresses who

“may . . . file[ ]” a complaint, not participation, and de facto intervention

requires “actually participat[ing]” in the litigation. (Vosburg v. County of

Fresno (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 439, 461.) Because there is no indication

Hollendorfer tried to intervene in the CHRB proceedings, we need not resolve

whether he could have, or any ensuing impact on standing.

44

Hollendorfer also argues more broadly that the CHRB’s regulatory

scheme cannot limit his right to judicial review, noting the CHRB requires

the RMAs. He further suggests a licensee should have standing to challenge

an agency proceeding if his job is impacted, as a matter of due process. We

are not persuaded. The CHRB is the entity vested with regulatory authority,

the RMAs are one method by which it carries out its obligations, and “[i]n the

absence of compelling circumstances, [it] should be permitted to carry out its

functions without undue judicial interference.” (Sangster v. California Horse

Racing Bd. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1033, 1039-1040 (Sangster).) As for the

notion that licensees presumptively have standing for judicial review, he cites

no standing case law to support it, and it would raise serious policy

implications for any regulated profession. (See Weatherford, supra, 2 Cal.5th

at p. 1248 [policy is pertinent to standing]; cf. Carsten, supra, 27 Cal.3d at

p. 801 [“the California judiciary is ill-equipped to add to its already heavy

burden the duty of serving as an ombudsman for the plethora of state

administrative agencies and local agencies”].)

Finally, the standing cases cited by Hollendorfer involve actual license

suspension, which this case does not, or are otherwise distinguishable. (See

Medical Board v. Superior Court (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1004-1105

[doctor had standing to challenge license suspension in effect when he filed

his petition]; Rudisill v. California Coastal Com. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1062,

1072 & fn. 4 [reversing anti-SLAPP sanctions against moving parties with

direct interest in property at issue in mandamus proceeding; one could

reasonably conclude a “real party in interest in a mandamus proceeding” is “a

‘person’ against whom a claim is asserted” for anti-SLAPP purposes]; Sonoma

County Nuclear Free Zone ’86 v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 167,

170, 173-175 [ballot proposition dispute; “pro” group had standing to seek

45

writ relief compelling superior court to set aside order requiring clerk to

accept late ballot arguments from “con” group; stating in part that “[w]hen a

county initiative is qualified,” and “cognizable groups are . . . in direct

conflict,” each has a “clear interest” in addressing the other’s arguments].)

c. Third Party Beneficiary

Hollendorfer argues he also has standing as a third party beneficiary of

the RMA. The trial court rejected this argument, and he does not establish

reversible error.

In Goonewardene v. ADP, LLC (2019) 6 Cal.5th 817 (Goonewardene),

the California Supreme Court set forth a three-part test to assess if a non-

party is a third party beneficiary of a contract. (Id. at p. 821.) The elements

are: “(1) whether the third party would in fact benefit from the contract, . . .

(2) whether a motivating purpose of the contracting parties was to provide a

benefit to the third party, and (3) whether permitting a third party to bring

its own breach of contract action against a contracting party is consistent

with the objectives of the contract and the reasonable expectations of the

contracting parties.” (Id. at p. 830.) “All three elements must be satisfied to

permit the third party action to go forward.” (Ibid.)

Section 24(h) of the RMAs is titled “No Third Party Beneficiaries,” and

states that, except as to indemnification, “[T]he provisions of this [RMA] are

not intended to be for the benefit of, or enforceable by, any party other than

Track or CTT. Except for Track and CTT, no party shall have any right to

rely upon or enforce any of the terms and provisions of this [RMA] . . . .” The

trial court ruled Hollendorfer was not a third party beneficiary, but rather an

incidental beneficiary of the RMA. It noted he did “not point[ ] to any

provision . . . that recognize[d] him as an intended third-party beneficiary,”

and his reliance on the RMA’s “stated general purpose” was insufficient.

46

On appeal, Hollendorfer does not address the third Goonewardene

element, and cannot establish reversible error. (Goonewardene, supra,

6 Cal.5th at p. 830 [“[a]ll three elements must be satisfied . . . .”].) He does

not persuade us the court erred, regardless.

The RMA expressly states there are no third party beneficiaries.

Hollendorfer identifies no RMA language showing that benefitting individual

trainers remained a motivating purpose of the parties. (Goonewardene,

supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 830; compare Prouty v. Gores Technology Group (2004)

121 Cal.App.4th 1225 [where company sale contract stated buyer would

retain seller’s employees or pay severance benefits, employees were third

party beneficiaries, despite contract saying it was not intended to benefit

third parties] with LaBarbera v. Security National Ins. Co. (2022)

86 Cal.App.5th 1329, 1345 [“indemnitee defense clause” did “not directly

benefit” homeowner, unlike in Prouty; the “ ‘intent . . . was to benefit

[defendant] and [contractor], with [homeowner] as an incidental

beneficiary”].)

Rather, Hollendorfer argues that “[b]y virtue of controlling statutes and

regulation, the agreements were not for the specific benefit of CTT, but

rather for the collective benefit of individual horse trainers it represent[s],”

citing Sections 19401, subdivisions (a) and (e), Sections 19613 to 19613.3, and

Rule 2040. He also asserts, inter alia, that Rule 2044 requires RMAs be

posted at tracks, supposedly showing the CHRB views trainers as

beneficiaries, and the RMAs have provisions that benefit him as a trainer.

These points lack merit. Section 19613.3 was repealed; the remaining cited

sections and rules that address RMAs reflect they have broad purposes (and

none mention benefits to individuals); and beyond that, we already rejected

his argument that the RMAs were for the benefit of trainers as individuals.

47

The fact that he may view certain specific parts as helpful to him does not

establish a different purpose. (Cf. Martinez v. Socoma Cos. (1974) 11 Cal.3d

394, 401 [residents who received job training under government contracts,

but not jobs, were not third party beneficiaries; although they were “among

those . . . intended to benefit” from contracts, the “benefits of such programs

are provided . . . as a means of accomplishing a larger public purpose”].)

Additionally, if we did reach the third element, we would conclude

Hollendorfer could not show that letting him pursue disputes under the RMA

(including ones CTT elected not to pursue) is “consistent with the objectives

of the contract and the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties.”

(Goonewardene, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 830.) To the contrary, allowing actions

by individual trainers could undermine the benefits of a single, negotiated

agreement—impeding the role of RMAs in the regulatory scheme, and

frustrating the expectations of the contracting parties.

5. Hollendorfer Does Not Establish Error as to Mootness

Hollendorfer argues the LATC/PRA administrative proceeding was not

moot because the CHRB extended the RMAs.15 We are not persuaded.

“A case becomes moot when a court ruling can have no practical impact

or cannot provide the parties with effective relief.” (Simi Corp. v. Garamendi

(2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1503.) The “pivotal question in determining if a

case is moot is therefore whether the court can grant the plaintiff any

15 He does not address the CHRB’s finding that the matter was not of

broad interest or likely to recur, and forfeits any challenge to it. (Badie,

supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 784-785.) We also do not reach his claim that

there was an “unreasonable delay” between the complaint and the

“conveniently timed” hearing decision. If he is making a legal point, he has

supplied no analysis or authority, and it is forfeited too.

48

effectual relief.” (Wilson & Wilson v. City Council of Redwood City (2011)

191 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1574.)

Courts have held that actions based on contracts are rendered moot by

their expiration or completion. (See Daily Journal Corp. v. County of Los

Angeles (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1557 (Daily Journal) [case moot where

contract had expired, and court could not award it to disappointed bidder];

Giles v. Horn (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 206, 212, 227-228 [challenge to county

contracts was moot where contracts had been performed and expired].)

Here, the CHRB hearing officer found the LATC/PRA matter was moot,

because the RMAs applied only to the period ending December 25, 2019, had

expired, and were no longer enforceable. Section 1 of the RMAs states: “Race

Meet. Except as otherwise provided herein, the provisions of this [RMA]

shall be applicable only to the thoroughbred race meetings conducted by

Track under license from the CHRB for the period commencing December 26,

2018 through December 25, 2019 (the ‘Term’).” Section 24(a) is titled

“Modifications,” and states in pertinent part:

“This [RMA] constitutes the entire agreement between the

Parties hereto and supersedes any and all other

agreements, understandings, negotiations, or discussions,

either oral or in writing, express, or implied, between the

Parties hereto . . . . It is expressly understood and agreed

that this Agreement may not be altered, amended,

modified, or otherwise changed in any respect or particular

whatsoever except by a writing duly executed by an

authorized representative of each Party.”

The RMAs list CTT and the respective Racing Associations as the parties.

The hearing officer could impliedly and properly consider these

provisions together to find the RMAs had expired. (See Coral Farms, L.P. v.

Mahony (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 719, 727 [“A contract is read as a whole, ‘so as

to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to

49

interpret the other.’ ”].) Section 1 limits RMA applicability to the designated

term, absent modification under Section 24(a)—which can only occur in a

“writing duly executed by an authorized representative” of a party. The

CHRB argues, and Hollendorfer does not dispute, that “[n]either side

presented a written agreement modifying the RMA to extend its effective

dates.” The hearing officer could then conclude CTT’s complaint regarding

the RMAs was moot (Daily Journal, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1557), and

the CHRB could properly adopt his finding.

Hollendorfer does not establish otherwise. After summarily claiming in

his opening brief standing arguments that the RMAs were extended, he

argues on reply that the CHRB “had continually extended the very same

2018/2019 RMAs as a condition of licensure for all subsequent race meets up

to and including through the summer of 2022.” He further argues the RMAs

were “therefore . . . operative for all other CHRB purposes.” He cites no

RMA language or legal authority for these arguments, and the points he does

offer lack merit.

First, he states the continuation of the RMAs during the relevant

timeframe is “clearly reflected in the CHRB’s Meeting transcripts,” citing

without elaboration twelve ranges of record cites covering over 300 pages

(from nearly 2000 pages of meeting transcripts). He also states, without

record or legal citations, that this “extension of the RMAs was an official act”

of the CHRB, and it should be estopped from selective enforcement.

This is not adequate for appellate review. (Cf. Stop Syar Expansion v.

County of Napa (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 444, 459 [“list of string cites to the

administrative record without explanation” was insufficient]; Billauer v.

Escobar-Eck (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 953, 969 [rejecting appellant’s claim that

“the search warrant speaks for itself” in support of a factual assertion, which

50

essentially asked the court to “ascertain the relevant portions” and use them

to verify the assertion; “It is not our function to scour the record and make

[appellant’s] arguments for him.”].)

Second, Hollendorfer asserts the CHRB “does not dispute the RMAs

were continually extended . . . .” (Underscore omitted.) The CHRB stated in

its respondent’s brief that “the RMA’s terms did not extend past its stated

expiration date” and it was “not modified to extend its scope.” (Boldface &

capitalization omitted.) By waiting until his reply brief to identify the CHRB

meetings as the basis for his extension argument, he deprived the CHRB of a

meaningful opportunity to respond. (Groundwater Cases, supra,

154 Cal.App.4th at p. 693.) We note the CHRB did object to his reliance on

these transcripts in the trial court.

Even assuming the CHRB permitted or required LATC/PRA to

continue operating under the 2018-2019 RMAs, Hollendorfer does not

establish they remained enforceable agreements for purposes of providing the

relief sought in CTT’s administrative complaint—the key issue for mootness.

(Cf. County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. County of Kern (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th

1544, 1557, 1628-1629 [rejecting argument that claim regarding expired

waste handling contract was “not moot unless that contract [could not] be

renewed or extended”; “mere prospect” that contract “or a similar contract

might become operative . . . does not create an actual, present controversy”];

Vallejo Police Officers Assn. v. City of Vallejo (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 601, 612-

613 [“Like other contracts, MOU’s ordinarily cover distinct periods of time”;

party “asserting that contract rights . . . survive the contract term” must

overcome contrary presumption].)16

16 We have a final observation here. A writ issues when there is a

beneficial interest and no “plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the

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D. Request for Witness Testimony

Hollendorfer asserts the trial court erred by denying his request for live

witness testimony. He does not establish any prejudicial abuse of discretion.

1. Additional Facts

Prior to the hearing on his petition, Hollendorfer filed a Request To

Introduce Oral Testimony by CTT executive director Alan Balch. He argued

the testimony was necessary to refute the CHRB’s argument that CTT would

have standing, not him. He stated Balch would testify that CTT was

required under the RMAs to “bring [his] grievance to the racing association

and then the CHRB on [his] behalf.” He further stated Balch also would

testify CTT is “organized as a mutual benefit corporation, and . . . lacks the

financial resources to pursue litigation on behalf of its members.” The CHRB

filed objections, which do not appear to be in the record.

On October 7, the trial court issued its tentative ruling denying

Hollendorfer’s petitions. The court noted it received the CHRB’s “objections

to [the] request to introduce oral testimony,” though it “did not receive” the

request, and ruled, “In any event, the court will not permit oral testimony at

the hearing.” In its order denying the petitions, the court stated it “denied

[the] request to introduce oral testimony at hearing.” It appeared to be

confirming its prior ruling, as it did not address the request at the hearing.

2. Additional Law

Under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1306(a), evidence at a “law and

motion hearing must be by declaration or request for judicial notice without

ordinary course of law.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1086; Polanski v. Superior Court

(2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 507, 552-553.) Hollendorfer does not explain why the

now-settled superior court actions that he and/or CTT filed against the

Racing Associations were inadequate. Indeed, the CHRB hearing officer said

a breach of contract action was CTT’s remedy to challenge the RMA.

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testimony or cross-examination, unless the court orders otherwise for good

cause shown.” (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1103(a)(2) [“ ‘[l]aw and

motion’ ” includes writ of mandate proceedings].) Thus, a trial court “has the

discretion to decide a writ petition on declarations and other documents as

opposed to oral testimony.” (DiRaffael v. California Army National Guard

(2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 692, 717-718 (DiRaffael), accord, American Federation

of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Metropolitan Water Dist. (2005)

126 Cal.App.4th 247, 263 [trial court has “ ‘broad discretion’ ” to decide writ

of mandate proceeding on documents].)

“ ‘A trial court’s exercise of discretion in admitting or excluding

evidence is reviewable for abuse [citation] and will not be disturbed except on

a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious,

or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of

justice.’ ” (Christ v. Schwartz (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 440, 446-447; DiRaffael,

supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 718 [appellant had to show a “ ‘ “reasonable

probability that in the absence of the [purported] error, a result more

favorable to the appealing party would have been reached.” ’ ”].)

3. Analysis

Hollendorfer does not address in his briefing here what he wanted

Balch to testify about, much less prejudice from its absence, and thus cannot

establish reversible error. We see no grounds for reversal regardless.

Hollendorfer’s sole argument is that the trial court “indicated that it

did not review [his] application and denied it,” meaning it “failed to consider”

his reasons. Although it is unclear why the court did not receive his request,

it did receive the CHRB’s objections, and given it issued a ruling, we infer it

viewed the objections as a sufficient basis to consider and rule on the request.

(Evid. Code, § 664 [“It is presumed that official duty has been regularly

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performed.”]; Hotels Nevada, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 348 [order is

presumed correct].) He establishes no abuse of discretion.

Nor do we see how Hollendorfer could have achieved a better result

with the proposed testimony from Balch. (DiRaffael, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th

at p. 718.) The testimony about RMA grievance procedures was unnecessary,

as this contractual language was neither ambiguous, nor in dispute. As for

the testimony about CTT’s limited financial resources to pursue litigation, he

cites no legal authority that this is relevant to standing (nor does he address

the fact that CTT agreed in the RMA to handle grievances and preclude third

party beneficiaries). His general concern on reply that the CHRB imposes

this duty on CTT without respect to financial ability also lacks force. It is for

the CHRB, not this court, to balance the burdens of the regulatory scheme.

(Cf. Sangster, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1039-1040.)

E. Government Code Section 815.6

Finally, Hollendorfer does not show the trial court erred by granting

judgment on the pleadings on his Government Code section 815.6 claim.

1. Additional Facts

Hollendorfer’s cause of action for a violation of Government Code

section 815.6 relied on similar allegations as his writ of mandate claims. He

alleged, in substance, that the CHRB failed to discharge mandatory duties by

improperly denying him a hearing, and by letting the Racing Associations

deny his race meet entries under RMAs in violation of CHRB rules and his

constitutional rights as a licensee.

In January 2023, the CHRB filed an opposed motion for judgment on

the pleadings on the Government Code section 815.6 claim, arguing in part

that the claim was mooted by the trial court’s denial of the writ petition.

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In June 2023, the trial court granted the motion without leave to

amend. The court agreed the claim was moot to the extent it rested on the

same theories as Hollendorfer’s mandate claims, for the same reasons (i.e., no

duty to have a hearing, and no standing). The court further determined that,

to the extent Hollendorfer’s Government Code claim was not moot, he failed

to “adequately allege the existence of any statutory mandatory duty owed by

[the CHRB] sufficient to serve as a basis for liability pursuant to Government

Code section 815.6.”

2. Additional Legal Principles

“Under the Government Claims Act . . . governmental tort liability

must be based on statute.” (B.H. v. County of San Bernardino (2015)

62 Cal.4th 168, 179 (B.H.).) Government Code section 815.6 “provides a

statutory exception to the general rule of public entity immunity . . . .” (B.H.,

at p. 179.) It states: “ ‘Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty

imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a

particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind

proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public

entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the

duty.’ ”

Thus, Government Code section 815.6 has “three elements that must be

satisfied to impose public entity liability: (1) a mandatory duty was imposed

on the public entity by an enactment; (2) the enactment was designed to

protect against the particular kind of injury allegedly suffered; and (3) the

breach of the mandatory statutory duty proximately caused the injury.”

(B.H., supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 179.)

“ ‘A motion for judgment on the pleadings, like a general demurrer,

tests the allegations of the [operative pleading], supplemented by any matter

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of which the trial court takes judicial notice, to determine whether [the party]

has stated a cause of action.’ ” (Angelucci v. Century Supper Club (2007)

41 Cal.4th 160, 166.) “In an appeal from a motion granting judgment on the

pleadings, we accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint and review the

legal issues de novo.” (Ibid.) “We review the disposition, not the court’s

reasons for that disposition.” (Ellerbee v. County of Los Angeles (2010)

187 Cal.App.4th 1206, 1214 (Ellerbee).)17

3. Analysis

Hollendorfer argues the trial court erred in granting judgment on the

pleadings, because he had standing for his administrative mandate claim (so

that aspect of his Government Code claim was not moot) and the CHRB owed

him a mandatory duty under section 19573.

These are essentially the same arguments Hollendorfer made for his

mandate claims, and we have rejected them. He identifies no reason to

warrant a different resolution in the context of Government Code section

815.6. For standing, he incorporates his arguments “by reference . . . .” For

section 19573, he argues in pertinent part that the CHRB is “obligated by law

to follow applicable statutes and regulations,” its motion was “premised upon

its interpretation of [section] 19573,” and we should conclude that “pursuant

to [section] 19573 and its regulations,” the CHRB “owed [him] a mandatory

duty.” But, as discussed above, the CHRB had no duty to provide him with a

hearing after the Racing Associations denied participation pursuant to the

RMAs. Thus, he does not show either issue supports reversal here

17 Although “review of a judgment on the pleadings ordinarily includes a

second step . . . whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying leave

to amend,” we “need not reach that issue” because, inter alia, Hollendorfer

“has not asked this court to grant leave to amend.” (Tak Chun Gaming

Promotion Co. Limited v. Long (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1032, fn. 3.)

56

(regardless of whether the trial court properly determined the issues were

moot in light of its writ denial). (Ellerbee, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 1213.)

Further, Hollendorfer does not establish he could satisfy the other two

elements of a Government Code section 815.6 claim. He does not address

how the statutes and regulations cited in his petition were “designed to

protect against the particular kind of injury” at issue. (See B.H., supra,

62 Cal.4th at p. 179.) Although he does summarily assert that the CHRB’s

“failure to immediately ‘hold the hearing’ caused [him] significant damages,”

he does not explain how this supports proximate cause for purposes of section

815.6. And, as noted, he has not asked for leave to amend, nor does he

explain how he could meet his burden to do so.

IV. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The California Horse Racing Board is

entitled to its costs on appeal.

KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

CASTILLO, J.

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