The opinion
J-A19032-24
2024 PA Super 245
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
BRIAN SANCHEZ :
:
Appellant : No. 1680 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 13, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-01-CR-0000974-2022
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., LANE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: OCTOBER 25, 2024
Brian Sanchez appeals1 from the November 13, 2023 aggregate
judgment of sentence of 6 months’ probation, with 10 days’ house arrest plus
fines and costs, imposed after he was found guilty in a bench trial of two
counts of driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance
(“DUI”).2 After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the relevant factual findings of this case as
follows:
Trooper Jeffrey Allen (hereinafter “Trooper Allen”) is
employed with the Pennsylvania State Police and has
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 This case is related to Appellant’s appeal at No. CP-XX-XXXXXXX-2023 (1694
MDA 2023), wherein he raises similar issues.
2 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(1)(i) and (iii), respectively.
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been a Pennsylvania State Police Trooper for
approximately 3 years.
Trooper Allen graduated from the Pennsylvania State
Police Academy and received training concerning the
Pennsylvania Vehicle Code. Trooper Allen is certified
in Standardized Field Sobriety Tests (SFST) and
Advanced Roadside Impaired Driving Enforcement
(ARIDE).
Trooper Allen has conducted approximately 25 to 50
Vehicle Code investigations for vehicles which had a
loud or modified exhaust system.
On May 6, 2022, at approximately 1:25 a.m., Trooper
Allen and Trooper Dunkin were on routine patrol in
Oxford Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania.
While traveling north on Route 94, Trooper Allen
observed a yellow Acura with a loud exhaust and
further observed the vehicle to have what appeared
to be a modified exhaust system, which enhanced the
noise emanating from the exhaust. Based on Trooper
Allen’s training and experience, he felt the exhaust
system violated the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code.
Trooper Allen stopped the yellow Acura on Hanover
Road in Oxford Township.
[Appellant] was identified as the operator of the
Acura. Trooper Allen advised [Appellant] “the reason,
um, I’m stopping you, okay, okay, did you put exhaust
on here” and [Appellant] responded “yeah.”
Trooper Allen observed that [Appellant’s] eyes were
bloodshot and glassy and smelled a slight odor of
marijuana emanating from the vehicle. [Appellant]
was the sole occupant of the vehicle. As a result of
Trooper Allen’s immediate observations, Trooper Allen
initiated a DUI investigation.
While [Appellant] was seated in his vehicle, Trooper
Allen asked, “all right, how much, how much
marijuana is in the car?", and [Appellant] responded
“uh, none.” Trooper Allen asked, “did you just
smoke...”, and [Appellant] responded “no, I just woke
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up earlier.” Trooper Allen asked, “have you smoked
in the car before?”, and [Appellant] responded “no.”
Trooper Allen subsequently asked “okay, when’s the
last time you have, outside of the car?”, and
[Appellant] responded, “uh, probably like, earlier”.
Trooper Allen asked, “what time was that at?”, and
[Appellant] responded “uh, like 9”. Trooper Allen
asked, “9 p.m.?” and [Appellant] responded “Yeah, I
have a card, a pencil.” Trooper Allen responded “okay,
the reason I’m asking is I can smell a slight, a slight
odor. Are you smoking bud?”. [Appellant] responded
“no, bud no”, Trooper Allen said “dab pen?” and
[Appellant] responded “yeah”.
[Appellant] subsequently consented to a search and
provided Trooper Allen with the dab pen, which
contained suspected THC wax.
Trooper Allen requested [Appellant] exit the vehicle
and administered SFST tests (HGN, walk and turn test
and one leg stand test) and ARIDE tests (modified
Romburg test and lack of convergence test).
[Appellant] showed multiple signs of impairment
during the tests. Trooper Allen placed [Appellant]
under arrest for suspected DUI.
During Trooper Allen’s investigation, [Appellant]
advised he did not have a valid medical marijuana
card.
Trial court opinion, 4/12/23 at 1-3 (numeration omitted).
On October 25, 2022, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial suppression
motion challenging, inter alia, the legality of the traffic stop and the
constitutionality of Sections 3802(d)(1)(i) and (iii) of the DUI statute. The
suppression court conducted hearings on Appellant’s motion on January 23
and February 21, 2023. Following the hearings, the suppression court denied
Appellant’s motion on April 12, 2023. Thereafter, Appellant proceeded to a
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stipulated bench trial on July 10, 2023 and was found guilty of the
aforementioned offenses. As noted, trial court sentenced Appellant to an
aggregate term of 6 months’ probation, with 10 days’ house arrest plus fines
and costs, on November 13, 2023. This timely appeal followed on December
8, 2023.3
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the [trial] court committed an error of
law and/or abused its discretion when it denied
Appellant’s motion to suppress where the
Trooper did not have sufficient facts under the
totality of circumstances to provide a
reasonable suspicion to detain Appellant for a
DUI/drug investigation?
2. Whether the [trial] court committed an error of
law and/or abused its discretion when it
determined that Appellant did not have standing
to challenge Sections 3 802(d)(1)(i) and (iii) of
the DUI statute as being unconstitutional on
their face in violation of the equal protection and
due process guarantees/rights of the
Pennsylvania Constitution?
3. Whether the [trial] court committed an error of
law and/or abused its discretion when it denied
Appellant’s motion to find that Sections
3802(d)(1)(i) and (iii) of the DUI statute are
unconstitutional on their face in violation of the
equal protection guarantees/rights of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, where there was no
evidence of impairment to drive, since those
Sections:
a) Violate equal protection rights by creating
a classification based upon whether a
____________________________________________
3 Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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person is either 1) using a Schedule II/III
lawful/approved controlled substance
(must be proven to have been under the
influence of a drug which impaired their
ability to safely drive the vehicle to be
convicted), or 2) using approved/lawful
medical marijuana (guilty of a DUI if any
amount of marijuana or any metabolite,
active or inactive, is in their blood based
upon that fact alone even if not impaired
at all), without a sufficient constitutional
basis to justify that disparate treatment
under strict scrutiny review where
fundamental Pennsylvania Constitutional
rights (including security/protection of
one’s reputation) are infringed upon and
adversely affected by a
felony/misdemeanor DUI conviction[?]
4. Whether the [trial] court committed an error of
law and/or abused its discretion when it denied
Appellant’s motion to find that Sections
3802(d)(1)(i) and (iii) of the DUI statute are
also independently unconstitutional on their
face in violation of the due process
guarantees/rights of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, where there was no evidence of
impairment to drive, since those Sections:
a) Violate substantive due process rights and
overbreadth protections because their
criminalization of the presence of any
amount of marijuana or its metabolites
(active or inactive) in an individual’s
blood, without requiring proof of any
impairment to drive safely, is arbitrary
and capricious, uses unnecessarily broad
means which punish lawful behavior and
a mere status, results in unjust disparate
treatment of patients approved to use
medical marijuana to treat their medical
conditions (as proof of impairment is
required for patients using other
approved/lawful medications) as well as
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others who are not impaired to drive
safely, bears no relation to keeping unsafe
drivers off the roads, and requires strict
scrutiny review since fundamental
Pennsylvania Constitutional rights
(including security/protection of one’s
reputation) are infringed upon and
adversely affected by a
felony/misdemeanor DUI conviction[?]
Appellant’s brief at 5 (extraneous capitalization omitted).
For the ease of our discussion, we have elected to address Appellant’s
claims in a different order than presented in his appellate brief. To the extent
that Appellant’s claims are interrelated, we will address those issues
concurrently.
I. Standing to Challenge DUI Statute on Constitutional Grounds
We begin by addressing Appellant’s claim that the trial court erred in
concluding that he did not have standing to challenge Sections 3802(d)(1)(i)
and (iii) of the DUI statute on constitutional grounds. Appellant’s brief at 41-
43. Appellant avers that these sections violate his equal protection and
substantiative due process rights under the United States and Pennsylvania
Constitutions and are unconstitutional on their face given the passage of the
Pennsylvania Medical Marijuana Act (“MMA”), 35 P.S. § 10231.101, et seq.
Appellant’s brief at 44-62. We disagree.
Standing is a justiciability concern, implicating a
court’s ability to adjudicate a matter. Accordingly, a
court must resolve justiciability concerns as a
threshold matter before addressing the merits of the
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case. These justiciability doctrines ensure that courts
do not issue inappropriate advisory opinions.
The doctrine of standing stems from the principle that
judicial intervention is appropriate only where the
underlying controversy is real and concrete, rather
than abstract. The touchstone of standing is
protect[ing] against improper plaintiffs. To do so,
courts require a plaintiff to demonstrate he or she has
been aggrieved by the conduct he or she challenges.
To determine whether the plaintiff has been
aggrieved, Pennsylvania courts traditionally
examine whether the plaintiff’s interest in the
outcome of the lawsuit is substantial, direct, and
immediate. A party’s interest is substantial when it
surpasses the interest of all citizens in procuring
obedience to the law; it is direct when the asserted
violation shares a causal connection with the alleged
harm; finally, a party’s interest is immediate when the
causal connection with the alleged harm is neither
remote nor speculative.
Firearm Owners Against Crime v. Papenfuse, 261 A.3d 467, 481 (Pa.
2021) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).
Our review of the record in this matter establishes that Appellant cannot
demonstrate that he is an “aggrieved party” under Section 3802(d)(1), as his
interest in the outcome of his constitutional challenge is neither direct or
immediate. Appellant’s argument stems from the DUI statute’s alleged
infringement on the rights of medical marijuana users provided for by the
MMA, which went into effect May 17, 2016. However, at the time of the instant
traffic stop, May 6, 2022, Appellant did not possess a medical marijuana card
permitting him to use marijuana under the MMA. The record further reflects
that Appellant did not consume medical marijuana prior to this traffic stop.
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Accordingly, we discern no error on the part trial court in concluding that
Appellant lacked standing to challenge Sections 3802(d)(1)(i) and (iii) of the
DUI statute on constitutional grounds. See trial court opinion, 4/12/23 at 14-
15.
In light of our determination that the trial court did not error in
concluding that Appellant lacked standing to challenge Sections 3802(d)(1)(i)
and (iii), we need not address the merit of Appellant’s underlying
constitutional claims. In any event, even if Appellant did possess standing,
his claims would nonetheless fail. This Court has long recognized that “[t]he
constitutional validity of duly enacted legislation is presumed[,]” and “[a]
statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably, and
plainly violates the Constitution[.]” Commonwealth v. Crawford, 24 A.3d
396, 400 (Pa.Super. 2011) (citations omitted).
A panel of this Court recently addressed these identical issues in
Commonwealth v. Smith, 320 A.3d 674 (Pa.Super. 2024), which was
decided on July 23, 2024. Therein, the Smith Court held that the DUI
statutory scheme at Sections 3802(d)(1)(i) and (iii) did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause, id. at 686-688; Section 3802(d)(1) of the DUI statute did
not violate the substantive due process rights of MMA patients, id. at 688-
690; and Section 3802(d)(1), both on its face and independently as applied
to Appellant, did not violate procedural due process guarantees and rights.
Id. at 690-691.
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Moreover, it defies logic to suggest that the fact that medical marijuana
is now legal for qualified individuals in this Commonwealth somehow renders
our DUI statute, which makes it unlawful to drive or operate a vehicle with a
Schedule 1 Controlled Substance like marijuana in the blood, suddenly
unconstitutional.
II. Denial of Suppression Motion
Appellant next argues that the suppression court erred in denying his
suppression motion because Trooper Allen did not possess reasonable
suspicion to detain him for a DUI investigation following the otherwise lawful
stop of his vehicle for a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code (“MVC”).4
Appellant’s brief at 15-40.
Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a denial of a
suppression motion is well settled.
[Our] standard of review in addressing a challenge to
the denial of a suppression motion is limited to
determining whether the suppression court’s factual
findings are supported by the record and whether the
legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.
Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the
suppression court, we may consider only the evidence
of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence
for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read
in the context of the record as a whole. Where the
suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
the record, [the appellate court is] bound by [those]
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4 The record reflects that Appellant does not challenge the validity of Trooper
Allen’s initial traffic stop of his vehicle for a suspected violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 4523, Exhaust systems, mufflers and noise control, of the MVC.
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findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal
conclusions are erroneous.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526 (Pa.Super. 2015) (citation
omitted; brackets in original), appeal denied, 135 A.3d 584 (Pa. 2016).
“Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee an individual’s
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.” Commonwealth v.
Bostick, 958 A.2d 543, 550 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted), appeal denied, 987 A.2d 158 (Pa. 2009). “To secure the
right of citizens to be free from such intrusions, courts in Pennsylvania require
law enforcement officers to demonstrate ascending levels of suspicion to
justify their interactions with citizens to the extent those interactions
compromise individual liberty.” Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196,
1201 (Pa.Super. 2002) (citation omitted).
This court has recognized three types of interactions between members
of the public and the police:
The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request
for information) which need not be supported by any
level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to
stop or to respond. The second, an “investigative
detention” must be supported by a reasonable
suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period
of detention, but does not involve such coercive
conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of
an arrest. Finally, an arrest or “custodial detention”
must be supported by probable cause.
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Commonwealth v. Way, 238 A.3d 515, 518 (Pa.Super. 2020) (citation
omitted). Thus, pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, a person may not be
lawfully seized, either by means of an investigative detention or a custodial
detention, unless the police possess the requisite level of suspicion.
Here, the crux of Appellant’s claim is that Trooper Allen “did not have
sufficient facts under the totality of circumstances to provide a reasonable
suspicion to detain him for a [DUI] investigation” and that Trooper Allen’s
continued interaction with Appellant transitioned the traffic stop into an
unlawful investigative detention. Appellant’s brief at 15-21.
It is well settled in this Commonwealth that,
[a] police officer may detain an individual in order to
conduct an investigation if that officer reasonably
suspects that the individual is engaging in criminal
conduct. This standard, less stringent than probable
cause, is commonly known as reasonable suspicion.
In order to determine whether the police officer had
reasonable suspicion, the totality of the circumstances
must be considered. In making this determination,
we must give due weight ... to the specific reasonable
inferences [the police officer] is entitled to draw from
the facts in light of his experience. Also, the totality
of the circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to
an examination of only those facts that clearly indicate
criminal conduct. Rather, even a combination of
innocent facts, when taken together, may warrant
further investigation by the police officer.
Commonwealth v. Rogers, 849 A.2d 1185, 1189 (Pa. 2004).
In Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), the United
States Supreme Court examined the permissible scope of an officer’s
investigation during a traffic stop. The Rodriguez Court reasoned:
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A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police
investigation of that violation. A relatively brief
encounter, a routine traffic stop is more analogous to
a so-called Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)] stop
... than to a formal arrest. Like a Terry stop, the
tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop
context is determined by the seizure’s mission — to
address the traffic violation that warranted the stop
and attend to related safety concerns. Because
addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it
may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate
th[at] purpose. Authority for the seizure thus ends
when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are — or
reasonably should have been — completed.
Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Rodriguez Court recognized that police officers may conduct
certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop, provided they
“not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion
ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.” Id. at 372.
Likewise, in Rogers, our Supreme Court held that a trooper had
reasonable suspicion to continue to detain a defendant beyond the initial traffic
stop, where the defendant, inter alia, was extremely nervous and shaking;
gave vague answers to the trooper’s questions; and his vehicle contained
supplies which the trooper knew from experience were used in the packaging
and distribution of narcotics. Rogers, 849 A.2d at 1189–1190. The Rogers
Court acknowledged that although there could be innocent explanations for
these circumstances, “reasonable suspicion does not require that the activity
in question must be unquestionably criminal before an officer may investigate
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further[, but rather] requires a suspicion of criminal conduct that is reasonable
based upon the facts of the matter.” Id. at 1190 (emphasis omitted).
Similarly, our review of the totality of the circumstances in the instant
matter supports the conclusion that Trooper Allen possessed reasonable
suspicion to extend the traffic stop to investigate whether Appellant was
engaged in criminal activity, namely suspected DUI.
The record reflects that in the early morning hours of May 6, 2022,
Tropper Allen was on routine patrol in Adams Country, Pennsylvania when he
stopped Appellant’s vehicle for a suspected violation of Sections 4523(a), (b)
and (d) of the MVC, due to its loud and modified exhaust system. Notes of
testimony, 2/21/23 at 8-10; see also 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4523. During the course
of Trooper Allen’s investigation of the traffic violation that warranted the initial
stop, he smelled marijuana emanating from Appellant’s vehicle and observed
that Appellant’s eyes were bloodshot and glassy. Notes of testimony, 2/21/23
at 11. Trooper Allen further testified that Appellant acknowledged using
marijuana at 9 p.m. earlier that evening and presented him with a “dab pen”
that contained suspected THC wax. Id. at 12. Thereafter, Trooper Allen asked
Appellant to exit his vehicle so that he could conduct field sobriety tests. Id.
at 12-13.
Trooper Allen further testified that he has been employed by the
Pennsylvania State Police for approximately three years, has had training on
how to conduct DUI investigations, and is certified in Standardized Field
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Sobriety Tests (SFST) and Advance Roadside Impaired Driving Enforcement
(ARIDE). Id. at 8. Trooper Allen noted that Appellant’s performance on the
SFST and ARIDE tests indicated multiple signs of impairment. Id. at 13-14.
Additionally, MVR footage from Trooper Allen’s patrol vehicle was submitted
into evidence to corroborate his testimony. Id. at 15.
It is well settled in this Commonwealth that that Trooper Allen was
warranted to use information gathered during his initial traffic stop to justify
a second investigatory detention. See Rogers, 849 A.2d at 1190. We find
that Trooper Allen’s initial interaction with Appellant seamlessly transitioned
into a second, investigative detention whereby Trooper Allen sought to ask
additional questions of Appellant on account of his reasonable suspicion
Appellant was driving under the influence of marijuana.
Based on the foregoing facts of record, we discern no error on the part
of the suppression court in denying Appellant’s suppression motion.
Accordingly, we affirm the November 13, 2023 judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/25/2024
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