In the Int. of: M.F.-O., Appeal of: S.F.

J-S37016-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.F.-O., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA

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APPEAL OF: S.F., MOTHER :

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:

: No. 1510 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered May 15, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at

No(s): CP-51-DP-0002649-2018

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.N.F.-O., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA

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APPEAL OF: S.F., MOTHER :

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: No. 1511 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Decree Entered May 15, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000128-2023

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.F.-O., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA

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APPEAL OF: S.F., MOTHER :

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:

: No. 1512 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered May 15, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at

No(s): CP-51-DP-0002650-2018

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.M.F.-O., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA

J-S37016-24

:

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APPEAL OF: S.F., MOTHER :

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: No. 1513 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Decree Entered May 15, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000129-2023

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.F., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

APPEAL OF: S.F., MOTHER :

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:

:

: No. 1514 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered May 15, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at

No(s): CP-51-DP-0002651-2018

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.J.F., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA

:

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APPEAL OF: S.F., MOTHER :

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:

:

: No. 1515 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Decree Entered May 15, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000130-2023

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA

:

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APPEAL OF: S.F., MOTHER :

:

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J-S37016-24

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: No. 1516 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered May 15, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000673-2022

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.A.C.C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA

:

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APPEAL OF: S.F., MOTHER :

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: No. 1517 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Decree Entered May 15, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000093-2024

BEFORE: BOWES, J., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED OCTOBER 25, 2024

S.F. (Mother) appeals1 from the decrees involuntarily terminating her

parental rights to her three daughters, M.N.F.-O. (born in August 2014),

M.M.F.-O. (born in July 2016), M.J.F. (born in March 2018) (Daughters), 2 and

____________________________________________

1 This Court sua sponte consolidated Mother’s appeals.

2 The trial court also involuntarily terminated the parental rights of M.O.

(Father) to Daughters. Father’s appeals from the termination and

permanency goal change are before this panel and docketed at 1605, 1606,

1607, 1608, 1609, and 1610 EDA 2024.

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son, M.A.C.C. (born in June 2022)3 (collectively, Children or the Children);

and the orders changing the Children’s permanency goals from reunification

to adoption. In addition, Mother’s counsel (Counsel) has filed an Anders4

brief and petition for leave to withdraw from representation. After careful

consideration, we grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the decrees

and orders.

The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history underlying

this appeal:

[The Philadelphia Department of Human Services (DHS)] became

aware of [Daughters] on June 11 th, 2018[,] after receiving a

General Protective Services (“GPS”) report alleging that [Mother]

was using inappropriately harsh discipline on [Daughters]. The

report was investigated and found to be valid. One June 18 th,

2018[,] DHS visited the home of [Mother],5 who denied having

substance abuse and mental health issues, but stated that she

was overwhelmed caring for all of [her Daughters]. On October

10th, 2018, Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) Turning Points

for Children began in-home services. On October 25 th, 2018, CUA

held an initial Single Case Plan (“SCP”) meeting and assigned

[Mother] several goals to complete: (1) comply with random drug

screens, (2) attend [Achieving Reunification Center (ARC)] for

parenting, housing, and employment classes, (3) provide proof of

employment, (4) obtain adequate housing, … and ([5]) participate

in a dual diagnosis treatment program.

____________________________________________

3 The trial court also involuntarily terminated the parental rights of the

unknown father of M.A.C.C. Unknown father has not appealed.

4 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); see also In re S.M.B., 856

A.2d 1235, 1237 (Pa. Super. 2004) (explaining that the Anders procedure for

withdrawal of court-appointed counsel has been extended to appeals involving

termination of parental rights).

5 The record does not disclose whether Father resided with Mother and

Daughters.

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On December 14, 2018, police officers transported

[Daughters] to DHS. DHS obtained Orders of Protective Custody

(“OPCs”) for [Daughters] and removed them from the residence

at which [Mother] and [Daughters] had been residing. At a shelter

care hearing held on December 17 th, 2018, the OPCs were lifted

and the temporary commitments to DHS were ordered to stand.

[Mother] was granted weekly supervised visits with [Daughters].

At an adjudicatory hearing held on January 10 th, 2019, th[e

trial c]ourt discharged the temporary commitment to DHS,

adjudicated [Daughters] dependent …, and fully committed them

to DHS.

On January 18th, 2019, [Daughters] began residing in

kinship care with maternal grandmother[ (Grandmother)]. At

subsequent permanency review hearings and revised SCP

meetings, [Mother] attended the hearings but was rated

noncompliant with her SCP objectives.

At a permanency review hearing held on August 5 th, 2020,

th[e trial] court discharged [Daughters’] commitments to DHS and

confirmed custody of [Daughters] with [Mother]. Following that

hearing, [Mother] and [Daughters] began living at Kirkbride

Shelter Center. On October 26, 2020, [Mother] and [Daughters]

began residing at Acts Christian Transitional Services (“ACTS”)

shelter.

On December 28, 2020, DHS learned from ACTS shelter

staff members that ACTS staff members called the Philadelphia

Police Department [] to transport [Daughters] to the home of

[F]ather, [] that [Father] subsequently retrieved [Daughters]

himself, and that [Mother] was unable to function appropriately or

properly care for [Daughters] due to her level of extreme

intoxication at the time. On that same day, DHS requested that

[Father] bring two children to the home of [Grandmother] and her

husband. [Father] complied and DHS found the house to be

appropriate. DHS also learned … that [Father] rented a single

room in a house and thus lacked appropriate space for

[Daughters].

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Trial Court Opinion, 8/8/24, at 2-4 (unpaginated) (footnotes in original

omitted; one footnote added).6

Following a shelter care hearing, the trial court ordered Mother to

undergo a drug screen and assessment, and Daughters were again placed into

kinship care with Grandmother. Order, 12/30/20. The trial court held

permanency review hearings in April, September, and December of 2021;

March, June, and September of 2022; and in January and December of 2023.

Mother did not progress beyond supervised visitation during this period, and

Daughters remained in Grandmother’s care. Additionally, Mother tested

positive for PCP and benzodiazepines in November of 2021, and

benzodiazepines in July of 2022. The trial court found Mother to be largely

noncompliant with her court-ordered goals. See Order, 3/21/22; Order,

9/12/22; Order, 12/19/23.

In the interim, M.A.C.C. was born in June 2022. Shortly after his birth,

DHS filed an application for an OPC, alleging M.A.C.C. was born drug-

dependent. Application for Order of Protective Custody, 7/28/22, at 2

(unpaginated). On July 29, 2022, the trial court transferred M.A.C.C.’s

custody to DHS, and DHS placed M.A.C.C. with maternal cousin (Cousin). See

Order, 7/29/22.

____________________________________________

6 The trial court authored opinions at each docket. The August 8, 2024,

opinions at 1510, 1511, 1512, 1513, 1514, and 1515 EDA 2024 are identical,

and pertain to Daughters. The July 30, 2024, opinions at 1516 and 1517 EDA

2014 are identical, and pertain to M.A.C.C.

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At an adjudicatory hearing held August 26th, 2022,

[M.A.C.C.] was adjudicated dependent based on the present

inability of [Mother] to provide proper parental care and control,

and he was fully committed to DHS. The [trial] court also ordered

[Mother] to go to the Clinical Evaluation Unit (“CEU”) for a [] drug

screen, to have three random drug screens before the next court

date, and that [Mother] be referred to … ARC[] for parenting

education classes and housing assistance. …

At a permanency review [hearing] held on November 14 th,

2022, the court ordered that [M.A.C.C.] remain committed to DHS

and that [Mother] be referred to the CEU for a [] drug screen and

[submit to] three random [drug] screens prior to the next court

date. …

On April 5th, 2023, [Mother] attended a visit with

[Daughters]. At the visit, [Mother] was nodding in and out of

consciousness, her speech was slurred and slow, and she admitted

that she had not been in drug treatment since February 2023.

Subsequent drug screens indicated that [Mother] was positive for

illicit substances. As of November 17, 2023, CUA suspended

[Mother’s] visits with [M.A.C.C.] until the next court hearing due

to her poor attendance and drug relapse. At the time, [Mother]

had only attended three of the last eleven visits offered.

As of February 2nd, 2024, [Mother] has not made any

progress on her SCPs, has not made any progress towards

achieving reunifications vis[-]à[-]vis ARC classes, and [M.A.C.C.]

has been in DHS custody for nearly two years. [M.A.C.C.] has

remained with [Cousin] for the entirety of his placement[,] and

[M.A.C.C.] is well-bonded with [Cousin].

Trial Court Opinion, 7/30/24, at 3-5 (footnotes omitted).

On April 4, 2023, DHS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate the

parental rights (TPR) of Mother to Children, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). After numerous continuances, the trial

court held a hearing on DHS’s petition on May 15, 2024. Mother did not

attend, but was represented by Counsel. Attorney Jeffrey Bruch, Esquire

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(Attorney Bruch), served as legal counsel and guardian ad litem (GAL) for

Daughters. Attorney Patricia Cochran, Esquire (Attorney Cochran), served as

GAL for M.A.C.C.

DHS presented the testimony of Ty’shee Brown, CUA case manager (Ms.

Brown). Ms. Brown testified that Daughters were currently placed with

Grandmother, and M.A.C.C. was placed with Cousin. N.T., 5/15/24, at 12.

Ms. Brown testified that DHS became involved with the family more than five

years prior due to Mother’s illicit substance abuse (specifically, PCP usage)

and inappropriate housing. See id. at 12-13. Ms. Brown testified that Mother

was ordered to complete drug and alcohol and mental health treatment, and

attend ARC for parenting classes and assistance with housing and

employment. See id. at 15.

Throughout DHS’s involvement with Mother, she never provided

documentation that she successfully completed drug and alcohol or mental

health treatment. See id. at 15-16. In the nine months prior to the TPR

hearing, Mother had not visited Children. See id. at 16-17. Finally, Ms. Brown

confirmed that Mother had made no progress toward her court-ordered goals.

See id. at 18. Following Ms. Brown’s testimony, DHS entered, without

objection, numerous dependency orders and CEU reports into evidence. See

id. at 25-26.

Attorney Bruch next stated Daughters’ positions on the record. See id.

at 31. Attorney Bruch explained that M.N.F.-O. wished to eventually be

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returned to Mother’s care when “[Mother] gets herself back together.” Id.

On M.N.F.-O.’s behalf, Attorney Bruch requested that the trial court not

terminate Mother’s parental rights. See id. at 35.7 As to M.M.F.-O. and

M.J.F., Attorney Bruch indicated that they both desired to remain with

Grandmother, and requested termination of Mother’s parental rights. See id.

at 31, 35. Given M.A.C.C.’s young age, he was unable to articulate a position,

and Attorney Cochran requested termination of Mother’s parental rights on his

behalf. See id. at 35.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered decrees

terminating Mother’s parental rights to Children. Mother timely appealed 8 and

filed contemporaneous Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) statements.

____________________________________________

7 We observe it is not the role of an appellate court to second-guess whether

a conflict exists concerning a child’s legal and best interest. See In re

Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1236 (Pa. 2020) (“[T]he attorney’s view

of the child’s best interests and the child’s preferred outcome likely lie …

between strongly favoring termination and strongly disfavoring termination.

It is not for an appellate court to determine how closely the interest must align

or overlap to negate the existence of a conflict.”).

8 The appeals at 1510, 1512, 1514, and 1516 EDA 2024 are taken from the

May 15, 2024, orders changing Children’s permanency goals from

reunification to adoption. The appeals at 1511, 1513, 1515, and 1517 EDA

2024 are taken from the May 15, 2024, decrees terminating Mother’s parental

rights. Counsel does not address the trial court’s orders changing Children’s

permanency goals to adoption in his brief. Because we conclude that the trial

court did not err in terminating Mother’s parental rights, any challenges to the

trial court’s permanency goal changes are moot. See Interest of D.R.-W.,

227 A.3d 905, 917 (Pa. Super. 2020) (father’s challenge to a child’s goal

change was moot after this Court affirmed the trial court’s termination

decrees).

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On August 20, 2024, Counsel filed a petition to withdraw and Anders

brief in this Court.9 We first address Counsel’s petition to withdraw. See In

re S.M.B., 856 A.2d at 1237 (stating “this Court may not review the merits

of the underlying issues until we address counsel’s request to withdraw”).

To withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel must:

1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after

making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has

determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy

of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and 3) advise the

[appellant] that [] she has the right to retain private counsel or

raise additional arguments that the [appellant] deems worthy of

the court’s attention.

Commonwealth v. Redmond, 273 A.3d 1247, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super.

2013) (en banc)). As to counsel’s duty to inform an appellant of her rights in

light of counsel’s proposed withdrawal, this Court has held that counsel must

“attach to their petition to withdraw a copy of the letter sent to their client

advising him or her of their rights.” Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d

748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005).

Additionally, an Anders brief must:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with

citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that

counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth

counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state

counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.

Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling

____________________________________________

9 Mother did not file a response.

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case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion

that the appeal is frivolous.

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009).

Here, Counsel states that he conducted a conscientious examination of

the record, and concludes that Mother’s appeal is “wholly frivolous[.]” Anders

Brief at 20. Counsel avers that he mailed Mother a letter explaining her rights,

and has attached a copy of the letter to the petition to withdraw and Anders

brief. See id., Exhibit A; Petition to Withdraw, 8/20/24, Exhibit A. Counsel’s

letter complies with the law, as it informs Mother that she may retain new

counsel or proceed pro se and raise any additional claims she deems worthy

of attention. See id.; see also Redmond, 273 A.3d at 1252.

In addition, Counsel’s Anders brief summarizes the facts and

procedural history, identifies issues which could arguably support Mother’s

appeal, and details Counsel’s assessment of why the issues are frivolous, with

citations to the record and relevant legal authority. As Counsel has complied

with Anders, we review the issues presented in the Anders brief. We also

“conduct an independent review of the record to discern if there are any

additional, non-frivolous issues overlooked by counsel.” Commonwealth v.

Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2015); see also Commonwealth

v. Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 272 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc) (describing our

duty as a “simple review of the record to ascertain if there appears … to be

arguably meritorious issues that counsel, intentionally or not, missed or

misstated”).

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Counsel identifies the following issues:

1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it

involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights where such

determination was not supported by clear and convincing evidence

under the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §[ ]2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and

(8)[?]

2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it

involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights without giving

primary consideration to the effect that the termination would

have on the developmental, physical and emotional needs of the

Children as required by [Section] 2511(b)[?]

3. Whether the trial court erred because the evidence was

overwhelming and undisputed that Mother demonstrated a

genuine interest and sincere, persistent, and unrelenting effort to

maintain a parent-child relationship with her Children[?]

4. Whether Mother was unable to attend the termination hearing

due to no fault of her own[?]

Anders Brief at 6 (some capitalization modified). 10

We review the termination of parental rights for an abuse of discretion.

See In the Int. of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1104 (Pa. 2023). This standard

requires appellate courts to

accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the

trial court if they are supported by the record. If the factual

findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the

trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. As has

been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely

because the reviewing court might have reached a different

conclusion. Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of

discretion only upon demonstration of manifest

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.

____________________________________________

10 DHS did not file a brief.

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As [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court] discussed in [In re:]

R.J.T., [9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010)], there are clear reasons

for applying an abuse of discretion standard of review…. [U]nlike

trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make fact-

specific determinations on a cold record, where trial judges are

observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often

presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and

parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts

could support an opposite result, as is often the case in

dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist

the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own

credibility determinations and judgment; instead, we must defer

to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by

the record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of

an error of law or an abuse of discretion.

In re Adoption of S.P., 74 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (some citations

omitted).

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis:

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for

termination delineated in [Section] 2511(a). Only if the court

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of

the analysis pursuant to [Section] 2511(b): determination of the

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child

of permanently severing any such bond.

Matter of Adoption of L.C.J.W., 311 A.3d 41, 48 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation

omitted). “The standard of ‘clear and convincing’ evidence is defined as

testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the

trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of

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the precise facts in issue.” In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1004

(Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc) (citation omitted). Finally, this Court need only

agree with the trial court as to “any one subsection of [Section] 2511(a), in

addition to [Section] 2511(b), in order to affirm the termination of parental

rights.” Int. of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 830 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted).

Instantly, we examine Mother’s challenge pursuant to Section

2511(a)(1), which provides:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least

six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition

either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing

parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform

parental duties.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1).

To satisfy Section 2511(a)(1), the petitioner “must produce clear and

convincing evidence of conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to

the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to

relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform parental

duties.” See In re Adoption of B.G.S., 245 A.3d 700, 706-07 (Pa. Super.

2021) (citation omitted); see also In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 708

A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998) (“Section 2511[(a)(1)] does not require that the parent

demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child

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and refusal or failure to perform parental duties.” (citation omitted; emphasis

in original)).

We have explained that in applying Section 2511(a)(1),

[t]he court should consider the entire background of the case and

not simply … mechanically apply the six-month statutory

provision. The court must examine the individual circumstances

of each case and consider all explanations offered by the parent

facing termination of h[er] parental rights, to determine if the

evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly

warrants the involuntary termination.

In re Adoption of A.C., 162 A.3d 1123, 1129 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations

and paragraph break omitted). However, the General Assembly’s emphasis

on the six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition indicates

the timeframe is the “most critical period for evaluation” of a parent’s conduct.

In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 592 (Pa. 2021).

Regarding the definition of “parental duties,” our Supreme Court has

explained:

Our courts long have interpreted parental duties in relation to the

needs of a child, such as love, protection, guidance and support.

Parental duties are carried out through affirmative actions that

develop and maintain the parent-child relationship. The roster of

such positive actions undoubtedly includes communication and

association. The performance of parental duties requires that a

parent exert [herself] to take and maintain a place of importance

in a child’s life. Fortitude is required, as a parent must act with

“reasonable firmness” to overcome obstacles that stand in

the way of preserving a parent-child relationship and may

not wait for a more suitable time to perform parental

responsibilities.

Id. (citations, some quotation marks, and brackets omitted; emphasis

added).

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Instantly,

Mother alleges that the termination of [her] parental rights to

[Children] was not the disposition best suited to the safety,

protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of [Children].

[Mother] claims to have fulfilled all of her [court-ordered]

objectives. She also claims to have a strong bond [with Children].

Anders Brief at 21.

Contrary to Mother’s position, the trial court determined Mother’s

conduct during Daughters’ placement with DHS evidenced her refusal to

perform her parental duties:

[T]his [c]ourt found clear and convincing evidence that [Mother]

demonstrated a settled purpose of relinquishing [her] parental

claim to [Daughters] and failed to perform parental duties for at

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the

termination petition …. Prior to filing the termination petition,

[Daughters had] been in foster care or DHS care since 2020.

Testimony from [Ms. Brown established] that the reason

[Daughters] were initially adjudicated dependent and placed in

foster care, [M]other’s drug abuse, is still an ongoing issue.

Specifically, [M]other continues to abuse PCP and has not

presented any evidence that she is in a drug treatment program

or has completed a drug treatment program. Testimony from [Ms.

Brown] was that it would not be in the best interests of

[Daughters] to be returned to [Mother’s] care because of

[Mother’s] ongoing drug abuse.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/8/24, at 6-7 (unpaginated) (footnotes omitted).

Concerning M.A.C.C., the trial court opined:

[I]t is the failure or refusal of [Mother] to perform parental

duties which justifies terminating her parental rights. This case

initially [arose] because [Mother] was using inappropriately harsh

discipline with [Daughters,] and [because Mother] is addicted and

abusing alcohol and illegal drugs. [Mother] was given SCPs to

demonstrate that she is able to raise [M.A.C.C.] properly.

Testimony from [Ms. Brown] showed that, in the time following

[M.A.C.C.’s] birth, [Mother] had not completed any of her SCPs,

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including drug and/or alcohol counseling. Nor had [Mother]

completed the court-ordered mental health [treatment] program.

Furthermore, [M.A.C.C.] has been in the care of [Cousin] since

[M.A.C.C.’s] birth in 2022[,] and testimony from [Ms. Brown was]

that [M.A.C.C.] is well[ ]bonded to [Cousin].

Trial Court Opinion, 7/30/24, at 7-8 (footnotes omitted).

The trial court’s findings are supported by the record, and free of legal

error. Our review discloses that, since early 2021, Mother has not progressed

beyond supervised visitation with Children, and Mother had not visited

Children in the nine months prior to the TPR hearing. See N.T., 5/15/24, at

16-17. Further, Mother wholly failed to comply with her court-ordered drug

and alcohol and mental health goals. See id. at 18. Thus, we discern no

error in the trial court’s determination that DHS proved by clear and

convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was

warranted under Section 2511(a)(1), where Mother failed to perform parental

duties for at least six months prior to DHS’s filing of the TPR petitions. See

S.P., 47 A.3d at 827 (“an appellate court must … defer to the trial judges so

long as the factual findings are supported by the record and the court’s legal

conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion.”).

Mother’s challenge to termination of her parental rights to Children, under

Section 2511(a), is without merit.11

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11 Because we agree with the trial court that DHS met its burden with respect

to Section 2511(a)(1), we need not address Mother’s arguments concerning

Section 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8). See Int. of M.E., 283 A.3d at 830.

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We consider Mother’s second and third issues together. Mother

challenges termination under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). Anders Brief at 27.

Mother argues the trial court erred because “a bond exists between [Mother]

and [C]hildren.” Id. Mother further argues that she “demonstrated a genuine

interest and sincere, persistent, and unrelenting effort to maintain a parent-

child relationship with [C]hildren.” Id. at 6.

When the trial court finds grounds for termination under Section

2511(a), it must separately consider a child’s needs and welfare:

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the

control of the parent. ….

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

“Notably, courts should consider the matter from the child’s perspective,

placing [their] developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare

above concerns for the parent.” K.T., 296 A.3d at 1105. Courts must also

“discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention

to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond.” Id. (citation

omitted). However, “the parental bond is but one part of the overall

subsection (b) analysis.” Id. at 1113.

The Section 2511(b) inquiry must also include consideration

of other important factors such as: the child’s need for

permanency and length of time in foster care …; whether the child

is in a preadoptive home and bonded with foster parents; and

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whether the foster home meets the child’s developmental,

physical, and emotional needs, including intangible needs of love,

comfort, security, safety, and stability.

Id. (footnote and citations omitted).

Instantly, as to Daughters, the trial court found credible Ms. Brown’s

testimony that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Daughters’ best

interest due to Mother’s ongoing drug abuse. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/8/24,

at 7 (unpaginated). In its opinion concerning M.A.C.C., the trial court

elaborated on why it concluded termination of Mother’s parental rights was in

M.A.C.C.’s best interest:

[T]estimony from [Ms. Brown established] that [M.A.C.C.] and

[Mother] do not have a bonded relationship. [M.A.C.C.] has been

in the custody of [Cousin] since his birth in 2022…. [Cousin]

provides [M.A.C.C.] with love, comfort, stability, and security at

her home and she and [M.A.C.C.] have bonded. Further

unrebutted testimony from [Ms. Brown] was that there would be

no irreparable harm done to [M.A.C.C.] or [Daughters] if

[Mother’s] parental rights were terminated.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/30/24, at 11 (footnotes omitted).

The trial court’s reasoning is supported by the record and free of legal

error. At the TPR hearing, Ms. Brown testified that Children are bonded with

their respective caregivers. See N.T., 5/15/24, at 21, 23. Ms. Brown further

testified that Daughters’ primary bond was with Grandmother. See id. at 21-

24. The trial court acted within its discretion when it credited Ms. Brown’s

testimony. See S.P., 74 A.3d 817, 826-27; see also L.C.J.W., 311 A.3d at

48 (“It is the province of the [trial] court to assess credibility and resolve any

conflicts in the evidence, and in doing so it is free to believe all, part, or none

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of the evidence presented.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).

Accordingly, Mother’s second and third issues entitle her to no relief.

Finally, Mother contends she was absent from the TPR hearing through

“no fault of her own.”12 Anders Brief at 6.

“Due process requires nothing more than adequate notice, an

opportunity to be heard, and the chance to defendant oneself in an impartial

tribunal having jurisdiction over the matter.” In re Adoption of K.M.D., 261

A.3d 1055, 1059 (Pa. Super. 2021). The Adoption Act governs the notice

requirement in a termination proceeding:

§ 2513. Hearing

***

(b) Notice.--At least ten days’ notice shall be given to the parent

… whose rights are to be terminated, by personal service or by

registered mail to … [her] last known address or by such other

means as the court may require. …

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2513(b).

Instantly, Mother does not dispute that she received adequate notice;

rather, she maintains that she was unable to attend the TPR hearing through

“no fault of her own.” Anders Brief at 6; see also N.T., 5/15/24, at 10-11

(the trial court accepting DHS counsel’s representation that Mother received

notice in person at the previously scheduled TPR hearing). Notwithstanding

____________________________________________

12 Mother does not identify any allegation of trial court error. At best, Mother

appears to challenge a lack of due process.

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Mother’s absence, we observe that she had the benefit of Counsel at the TPR

hearing, who adequately represented her interests. Thus, Mother was

afforded due process, and her final claim merits no relief.

Finally, our independent examination of the record indicates that there

are no other non-frivolous claims that Mother can raise. See Flowers, 113

A.3d at 1250. We agree with Counsel’s assessment that Mother’s appeal is

frivolous, and grant Counsel permission to withdraw from his representation

of Mother.

Application to withdraw granted. Decrees and orders affirmed.

Date: 10/25/2024

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