In re Halttunen

360

Submitted on the briefs May 19, applicant conditionally admitted to practice of

law December 24, 2020

In the Matter of the Application for Admission of:

NEIL PATRICK HALTTUNEN,

Applicant.

(BBX A172051) (SC S067161)

478 P3d 488

Applicant admitted that, from 2009 to 2012, he inappropriately had used

the position of trust and authority that he possessed as a police officer to pursue

romantic and sexual relationships with vulnerable women whom he encountered

while performing his official duties. He also admitted that he was dishonest

with his employer about that conduct during an internal investigation. After his

departure from the police department, applicant underwent therapy, through

which he gained insight into his past behaviors and their impact on others and

developed the tools and support network to maintain a successful reformation.

None of the psychological experts who treated or evaluated applicant believed

that he suffers from the kind of fundamental and pervasive personality challenge

that might prevent a successful rehabilitation of his behavior and character. His

application to the Bar was supported by numerous character references, includ-

ing many members of the Bar. Held: (1) Applicant’s misconduct was not so egre-

gious to preclude applicant from admission to the Bar without considering the

steps that he has taken since 2012 to rehabilitate his character; and (2) applicant

demonstrated genuine self-improvement and rehabilitation since his misconduct

to justify conditional admission to the Bar.

Applicant is conditionally admitted to the practice of law.

On review of the recommendation of the Board of Bar

Examiners.

David J. Elkanich, Holland & Knight LLP, Portland,

filed the briefs for applicant. Also on the briefs was Nellie

Q. Barnard.

Theodore W. Reuter, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel,

Tigard, filed the answering brief on behalf of the Oregon

State Bar. Susan R. Cournoyer, Assistant Disciplinary

Counsel, filed the supplemental brief.

PER CURIAM

Applicant is conditionally admitted to the practice of law.

Cite as 367 Or 360 (2020) 361

PER CURIAM

In this contested lawyer admission proceeding, the

issue is whether applicant Neil Halttunen has proved by clear

and convincing evidence that he possesses the good moral

character necessary for admission to the Oregon State Bar.

A majority of the Board of Bar Examiners (board) issued

an opinion recommending that the court deny admission;

a minority opinion recommended conditional admission.

There is no dispute that, from 2009 to 2012, while working as

a police officer, applicant engaged in inappropriate, unethi-

cal, and dishonest conduct that raises significant questions

about his moral character. Applicant admits that he inap-

propriately used the position of trust and authority that he

possessed as a police officer to pursue romantic and sexual

relationships with vulnerable women whom he encountered

while performing his official duties. He also admits that he

was dishonest with his employer about that conduct during

an internal investigation. Applicant contends, however, that

he has demonstrated sufficient reformation since leaving

the police department to establish his current fitness to

practice law. We are persuaded, and we conditionally admit

applicant to the practice of law in Oregon.

I. INTRODUCTION AND LEGAL STANDARD

To be admitted to practice law in this state, an appli-

cant must prove “by clear and convincing evidence that he or

she is of good moral character and is fit to practice law.” In re

Zielinski, 341 Or 559, 561, 146 P3d 323 (2006) (stating stan-

dard); see ORS 9.220(2)(a) (establishing “good moral char-

acter and fit to practice law” standard); Rule for Admission

of Attorneys (RFA) 9.45(6) (in character review proceeding,

applicant must establish by clear and convincing evidence

the requisite character and fitness to practice law). “Stated

differently, applicant must show that it is ‘highly probable’

that [applicant] has the good moral character and fitness to

practice law.” In re Covington, 334 Or 376, 382, 50 P3d 233

(2002).

An applicant may be unable to establish “good

moral character” if the applicant has engaged in “acts or con-

duct that reflect moral turpitude or * * * [that] would cause

a reasonable person to have substantial doubts about the

362 In re Halttunen

individual’s honesty, fairness and respect for the rights of

others and for the laws of the state and the nation,” if those

acts or conduct are “rationally connected to the applicant’s

fitness to practice law.” ORS 9.220(2)(b); see also In re Carter,

334 Or 388, 394, 49 P3d 792 (2002) (describing the statutory

standard). But it is not impossible for such an applicant to

demonstrate sufficient reformation of character to establish

that he or she presently has the good moral character and

fitness to practice law. See, e.g., id. at 394-95 (when consider-

ing the character of an applicant who had engaged in “mis-

conduct involving moral turpitude,” describing the “crucial

inquiry” as whether the applicant had demonstrated that

his “character has reformed sufficiently in the interim to

permit his admission to the Bar”).

This court has charged the board with investigat-

ing and evaluating an applicant’s character and fitness. See

RFA 2.10(2) (board shall investigate and evaluate moral

character and fitness to practice law of each applicant); RFA

6.05 (board has authority to conduct investigations, convene

evidentiary hearings, and issue subpoenas). The board did

that in this case by reviewing an extensive documentary

record, interviewing applicant, appointing a special investi-

gator, and conducting an evidentiary hearing that included

the examination of 25 witnesses. Although the board has

recommended a disposition, this court reviews the record

de novo to determine whether applicant has shown that he

is a person of good moral character. See ORS 9.536(2); ORS

9.539; Bar Rule of Procedure (BR) 10.6; RFA 9.60(5).

II. THE CHARACTER-REVIEW RECORD

A. Prior Misconduct

After graduating from high school and serving for a

few years in the Army as a military police officer, applicant

moved to Oregon in 1993 to begin a career in law enforce-

ment. He worked first as a corrections officer in Lane County

and then as a police officer in Roseburg, finally taking a job

as a police officer with the Springfield Police Department,

where he worked from 1996 to 2012. During his time at the

Springfield Police Department, applicant was twice married

and divorced.

Cite as 367 Or 360 (2020) 363

Applicant’s pattern of misconduct began in 2009,

while he was still a police officer at the Springfield Police

Department and was married to his second wife. Applicant

first pursued a woman whom he had originally encountered

when he arrested her on a warrant in 2008. He encountered

the woman again in 2009 when investigating a police report

that she had made, and he used the woman’s interest in

the status of that investigation to initiate a personal rela-

tionship. Applicant began calling the woman, texting with

her, and dropping by her house in his patrol car to chat. He

made it known to the woman that he was unhappy in his

marriage and wished to have a relationship with her. Those

contacts ultimately led to a sexual relationship that began

in approximately 2010.

Between that 2009 incident and the end of 2012,

applicant pursued numerous other women that he met

in the course of his duties, many of whom had criminal

records. According to applicant, that conduct resulted in

several other sexual relationships and contributed to the

end of his second marriage. In addition, applicant estimated

that there were eight to 12 other women, whom he also met

while performing his official duties, with whom he engaged

in inappropriate sexual communications—usually through

text messages.

The record is not clear as to the manner in which

applicant met and pursued each of those women, but the

circumstances for some are similar to those under which he

met and pursued the first woman. For example, applicant

met one woman when he responded to a car accident and

gave her a ride home. He met her again when he responded

to a disorderly conduct report at her apartment complex and

then showed up at her apartment a week or two later, sup-

posedly to check if she had experienced additional problems

but then shifting the discussion to personal matters. The

two began a relationship over text messages that eventu-

ally became sexual. Applicant met another woman when

he responded to a disorderly person complaint near the bar

where she worked and then met her again when he responded

to a theft that occurred at the bar. After obtaining the wom-

an’s personal information for purposes of completing his

report, applicant called the woman on her personal phone,

364 In re Halttunen

and the two began a relationship that included texting and

conversation—while applicant was on duty—and at least

some sexual contact while he was not on duty.

Although those women described their relationships

with applicant as consensual, applicant has admitted that

he knew at the time the relationships were unethical, and

he has acknowledged that his conduct undermined the cred-

ibility of the police department and reflects poor moral char-

acter. Moreover, the record makes plain that applicant inap-

propriately pursued other women who felt that applicant

was taking advantage of their vulnerability and the power

that he wielded over them as a police officer. For example,

applicant twice attempted to pursue an intimate relation-

ship with women whom he met in the course of arresting

their boyfriend or husband. He called one of the women from

his personal phone less than an hour after advising her that

her boyfriend would be spending the night in jail and pres-

sured her into accepting a ride from him, began caressing

her arm, and suggested that they find a dark place to park.

Both women let applicant know that the contact was unwel-

come, and he did not persist, but the women reported that

they had felt vulnerable to and intimidated by applicant’s

inappropriate contact.

Another woman was the manager of an exotic dance

club that applicant regularly patrolled when he worked in

the evenings. Applicant frequently tried to engage her in

conversation when he saw her in the parking lot. Applicant

texted her on numerous occasions when the woman under-

stood him to be on duty, sending and asking for sexually

suggestive photos as well as sending at least one sexually

explicit video. The woman testified that applicant’s advances

were unwelcome and felt “stalker-ish” but that applicant

was “the man in charge” (as a police officer), so the woman

responded enough “to keep him happy a little bit.”

Applicant’s unwelcome contacts led to a complaint

to the Springfield Police Department in November 2012.

That complaint triggered an internal investigation led by

Sgt. Rappe, who interviewed applicant and several wit-

nesses. Although applicant now admits to all of the inappro-

priate contact described above, he displayed a lack of candor

Cite as 367 Or 360 (2020) 365

during the 2012 investigation. He acknowledged pursuing

or engaging in sexual contact with several women, includ-

ing two of whom the department had not yet been aware, but

he admittedly did not disclose other inappropriate sexual

encounters with women whom he met through his official

duties.

Applicant resigned from the police department

before Rappe completed his investigation, and the depart-

ment closed its investigation. Soon after applicant’s resig-

nation, the Oregon Department of Public Safety Standards

and Training (DPSST), which trains and certifies public

safety officers, opened its own investigation into applicant.

DPSST staff reviewed materials provided by the Springfield

Police Department, concluded that applicant’s conduct vio-

lated the moral fitness standards, and referred the case for

further administrative review to decide whether to revoke

applicant’s DPSST certifications. However, applicant agreed

to bring an end to the inquiry by stipulating that he would

voluntarily relinquish his DPSST certifications and that the

revocation would be permanent, thus precluding applicant

from future work as a public safety officer in Oregon.

Applicant admits all of the above misconduct. The

only allegations that he denies were made by JF, who had

been an exotic dancer at a club in Springfield when appli-

cant arrested her for driving under the influence of intox-

icants (DUII) in 2009. Because JF’s allegations—and

applicant’s denial of them—were critical to the board’s con-

clusion, we discuss those allegations in detail. It is undis-

puted that applicant was dispatched to the club where JF

worked to investigate a report of erratic driving made by a

citizen who followed JF’s car to the club. At the club, appli-

cant first spoke with the bartender, who described JF as

intoxicated when she arrived, and then asked JF to perform

field sobriety tests before arresting her. At the police sta-

tion, JF submitted to a breathalyzer test that revealed a

0.18 blood alcohol content. She claimed—at least later—that

she began drinking only after she had arrived at the club.

JF was not a witness at the hearing, but her state-

ments to other witnesses are part of the record. JF’s con-

cerns about applicant were first reported in detail to the

366 In re Halttunen

Springfield Police Department when Rappe interviewed her

in 2012 in the presence of her attorney.1 JF told Rappe that,

during the 2009 arrest, applicant had been overly friendly

with her at the jail and had insisted that she needed to

remove all of her jewelry in his presence, even after she

explained that her jewelry included a genital piercing. She

explained that she had been “creeped” out by applicant’s

behavior and insisted on the presence of a female deputy

before she removed the piercing.

JF also complained to Rappe that applicant seem-

ingly pursued her after the arrest. JF reported learning

that, shortly after her arrest, applicant had encountered

JF’s older sister at one of his son’s baseball games and had

told the sister that he was keeping an eye on JF and that

she was being a “good girl.” She also reported that applicant

began showing up at the club while he was on duty, mostly

just driving though the parking lot but sometimes walking

inside, and that he appeared to be staring at her or attempt-

ing to talk to her. JF described that attention as continu-

ing even after she started working at a different club. She

explained that applicant’s attention made her feel uneasy

and frightened because “cops are powerful.”

JF was interviewed about applicant again in

2017, this time over the phone by another Springfield offi-

cer. JF largely repeated what she had told Rappe,2 but she

also described more extensive misconduct, including that

applicant had visited her club on a daily basis, often try-

ing to talk with her, beginning months prior to her 2009

1

Shortly after her DUII arrest, JF made at least one informal complaint to

another officer about an unwanted contact by applicant following that arrest, and

she reported in later interviews that she had fully described applicant’s arrest

behavior to the lawyer who had represented her on the DUII charge in 2009,

whom she thought had used that information to obtain what she understood to

be a favorable disposition of the charge.

2

The board describes JF as stating in the 2017 interview that, at the time

of her arrest, applicant had taken her to a room at the station “where Applicant

forced her to undress.” But that understanding of the record appears to be incor-

rect. JF did not report in either interview that applicant had forced her to undress

in his presence. To the contrary, she told the interviewer in 2017 that she “did not

recall that she actually removed the jewelry,” and Rappe recorded JF as stating

only that applicant had been “overly pushy” but that “[s]he demanded to have a

female deputy present because she wasn’t going to take [her piercing] out unless

one was present.”

Cite as 367 Or 360 (2020) 367

DUII arrest. First, JF suggested to the interviewing offi-

cer that her DUII arrest had been improper. She claimed

that she had failed the field sobriety tests because appli-

cant had required her to perform the test in the eight-inch

heels that she wore for dancing; further claimed that she

had consumed a significant amount of alcohol after arriving

at the club; and “implied,” according to the interviewer, that

she had not consumed any alcohol prior to driving, although

“she acknowledged her driving may have been poor.” JF also

added in that 2017 interview that applicant had behaved

inappropriately before taking her into the police station, fol-

lowing her arrest. She reported that applicant had picked

her up and sat her on the trunk of his car to let her smoke,

in what the interviewer’s report characterized as an “awk-

ward, sexually-oriented, and inappropriate” maneuver, and

JF reported that applicant had been “attempting to imply

there was some way out of her predicament by favor.”

Applicant denies JF’s allegations of inappropriate

conduct. He contends that he had no contact with JF before

he arrested her in 2009 and that the arrest was entirely

proper. He points out that he was following up on the citizen’s

report of erratic driving and that the bartender at the club

had described JF as intoxicated when she arrived. Applicant

denies the allegation that he required JF to perform field

sobriety tests in heels and emphasizes both that the arrest

report showed that she performed the tests in boots and that

the chief of police had observed the tests after stopping by to

serve as backup. He also pointed to inconsistencies between

JF’s timeline of events and contemporaneous records that

were either automatically time-stamped or not created by

applicant—at least one of which is also noted in the 2017

investigative report. Applicant emphatically denies that he

asked JF to remove a genital piercing in front of him or that

he had any inappropriate contact with her prior to taking

her into the police station.

With respect to the allegation that he pursued JF

after the arrest, applicant testified that he “certainly was driv-

ing through the parking lot [of the club] several times a week,

if not daily” during his patrols—the club was nearly across

the street from the police station—but he denied intention-

ally targeting JF and testified that he could only remember

368 In re Halttunen

two occasions when he interacted with JF after the arrest.

He explained his conversation with JF’s sister at their chil-

dren’s baseball game as an effort to mitigate any awkward-

ness resulting from the fact that he had recently arrested

JF. In his briefing to this court, applicant suggests that JF’s

description of applicant’s conduct in the 2012 interview with

Rappe may have been influenced by a recent charge of felony

resisting arrest in relation to a 2012 DUII. As a defense to

the resisting arrest charge, JF had asserted that her con-

duct was “something of a post-traumatic stress reaction to

the police,” resulting from applicant’s alleged misconduct.

B. Efforts at Reformation

Applicant reports that the months following his res-

ignation were a low point in his life. In August 2013, appli-

cant began psychotherapy with Dr. McDonald. At the time,

applicant felt that he had been treated unfairly because he

believed that others in the police department engaged in

misconduct that went unpunished. But applicant’s therapy

sessions forced him to confront the fact that his life circum-

stances were a result of his own selfish and immature con-

duct. According to Dr. McDonald, applicant “demonstrated

both the willingness and the ability to engage in critical self-

analysis and insight into his behavior and its impact on oth-

ers.” Dr. McDonald saw applicant for about 10 months and

concluded that he “took his therapy seriously and displayed

the courage to examine his choices, thinking patterns, and

behavior.”

Those thinking patterns had included chauvinis-

tic views and objectification of women. As a police officer,

he was known to make crude comments about sex, and he

admits that, at the time, he viewed sex as an opportunity

to prove himself. Further, applicant was unfaithful in both

marriages during his time as a police officer.

Those thinking patterns had also included an

unwillingness to admit vulnerability. Although applicant

initially had found work in law enforcement rewarding, it

took a toll on him emotionally. Specifically, applicant strug-

gled handling his encounters with death while on the job,

which had increased after he began work as a drug recogni-

tion expert and after he began being regularly dispatched to

Cite as 367 Or 360 (2020) 369

fatal car accidents. Despite feeling worn down by the work,

applicant did not seek help while he worked at the depart-

ment, even though mental health services were available to

officers in need, because he did not want to be perceived as

weak.

According to applicant, his own harmful patterns of

thinking were prevalent and promoted at the department.

His therapy following the resignation allowed him to view

his misconduct as a combination of his unhealthy views

about sex and his emotional stress. As he testified during

the hearing, “I was more worried about making myself feel

good and not paying attention to the rules or to their emo-

tions. And so I sought that out to kind of feel good about

myself[.]”

During his treatment with Dr. McDonald, appli-

cant developed new personal and professional goals. He

knew another former officer from the Springfield Police

Department who had started law school and turned his

life around after being similarly worn down by work as a

police officer. Applicant applied to, and was accepted into,

Willamette University College of Law to start in the fall of

2014.

Applicant moved to Salem to begin classes at

Willamette. He did well in law school and developed an

interest in criminal law. He also began dating a woman

whom he would later marry. Following his first year of law

school, applicant worked in the financial fraud section of the

Oregon Department of Justice and, in his second year, began

working as a law student at Vidrio Park & Jarvis, LLC, with

a focus on criminal defense. Applicant volunteered as a men-

tor to new students and won a pro bono award for his work

on behalf of a disabled veteran through the Willamette Law

Pro Bono Honors program. In his third year of law school,

applicant continued to work at Vidrio Park & Jarvis, LLC,

now as a certified law student, which allowed him to repre-

sent indigent clients facing criminal misdemeanor charges.

That work included trying eight cases to a jury. The mem-

bers of the firm were impressed with his work and indicated

a desire to hire him to a full-time position when he became

a member of the Bar.

370 In re Halttunen

Applicant knew that, in light of his history with the

Springfield Police Department, his character and fitness to

practice law would be scrutinized by the board. As a result,

when entering his third year of law school, applicant con-

tacted a counselor from the Oregon Attorney Assistance

Program, who recommended that applicant participate in

additional psychotherapy. Applicant followed that recom-

mendation and saw Dr. Miller-Moe from September 2016

through April 2017. According to Dr. Miller-Moe, applicant

had “used the psychotherapy to explore the impact of work

culture and the extraordinary stress related to work in law

enforcement,” and had “developed a variety of tools to main-

tain physical and mental health.” In Dr. Miller-Moe’s opin-

ion, applicant did “not present with any mental or emotional

barriers which would impair his ability to practice within

the ethical guidelines of his chosen profession.”

Applicant submitted his application to the Bar in

March 2017. Applicant then graduated from law school in

May 2017 and passed the July 2017 Bar exam. At about the

same time, he participated in a psychosexual evaluation con-

ducted by Dr. Linn, hoping to establish that he had no per-

sonality traits that posed a risk of repeating his misconduct

while a police officer. Dr. Linn reviewed all of the reports

about applicant from the Springfield Police Department, the

DPSST investigations, and a recording of applicant’s inter-

view with the three-member board panel. Dr. Linn opined

that applicant’s “psychiatric history, attitudes, and psycho-

logical testing do not reflect the existence of a personality

disorder” and rejected a suggestion that applicant suffered

from a “narcissistic personality disorder.” Rather, accord-

ing to Dr. Linn, applicant “appears capable of empathy and

insight into his deficits.”

Dr. Linn’s report described applicant’s sense of

shame and guilt for his misconduct. In the report, applicant

is quoted as acknowledging the power imbalance between

himself and the women he met in the course of his duties:

“ ‘I was working as a police officer and they see me as an

authority figure. I didn’t factor that power differential in or

how they may be perceiving the situation.’ ” When Dr. Linn

asked applicant whether he believes that he had been tak-

ing advantage of the women he met, applicant stated, “ ‘Yes,

Cite as 367 Or 360 (2020) 371

but at the time, I didn’t see it that way. I just saw it as

consensual. With benefit of hindsight [these women] have

been more vulnerable. I should have paused to see that.’ ”

Similarly, applicant stated, “ ‘I thought it was mutual attrac-

tion. I didn’t pause long enough to think that they weren’t

talking to Neil but possibly a police officer.’ ” In his inter-

view with Dr. Linn, applicant acknowledged that there are

also power differentials between a lawyer and client. But he

said, “Having gone through that experience of letting people

down and shaming myself, I looked in the mirror[,] how I

was, and I don’t want to be that person anymore. I don’t view

women or sex in the same way that I used to.”

Dr. Linn concluded that applicant’s prior miscon-

duct “appear[s] related to a complicated variety of environ-

mental factors, untreated trauma, alcohol abuse, marital

stress, and unhealthy messages regarding women and sex-

uality through his experience as a soldier and police officer.”

And Dr. Linn noted that applicant’s various experiences

with counseling and psychotherapy “suggest a well above

average level of commitment to personal growth and relapse

prevention.” Nevertheless, based on applicant’s previous

“pattern of acting-out behavior,” Dr. Linn recommended a

conditional admission for a term, during which applicant

would continue psychotherapy to further “develop relapse

prevention strategies and healthy boundaries in his future

work with potentially vulnerable clients.”

As part of that evaluation, Dr. Linn referred appli-

cant for sessions of professional boundary counseling with

Dr. Shallcross, which applicant attended in 2017. According

to Dr. Shallcross, applicant “had gained tremendous insight

into his behavior,” and his current life circumstances cre-

ated a “much different environment” than that out of which

his misconduct arose. Dr. Shallcross had no concerns about

applicant’s ability to conduct himself “professionally” in the

practice of law.

C. Conduct During Application Process

As described above applicant submitted his applica-

tion to the Bar in March 2017. In the application, he acknowl-

edged that he had resigned from the Springfield Police

Department while under investigation for his relationships

372 In re Halttunen

with women whom he met while on duty. He also acknowl-

edged that, while under investigation by the department,

he had not fully disclosed the extent of those relationships.

He stated, however, that “[t]hese relationships were consen-

sual and they did not affect any enforcement or investiga-

tive decisions I made as part of my duties.” The application

went on to describe the steps that applicant had taken since

leaving the police force to improve himself and avoid similar

conduct in the future, including his therapy and new life

circumstances, and highlighted his work at Vidrio Park &

Jarvis, LLC.

A panel of three board members scheduled an inter-

view with applicant at the end of October 2017. Before the

interview, applicant provided the board with personal and

professional letters of recommendation and documentation

from mental health professionals, attesting to applicant’s fit-

ness to practice law. That included Dr. Linn’s report and let-

ters from Dr. McDonald, Dr. Miller-Moe, and Dr. Shallcross,

all of whom supported applicant’s admission to the Bar.

During the interview, applicant repeated many of

the themes that appeared in Dr. Linn’s report—namely, that

he “didn’t pause to really think about the power dynamic”

between him and the women he met while a police officer;

that he knew that his behavior was wrong at the time, but

rationalized it because it made him feel better; that therapy

helped him reflect on his actions and how they affected oth-

ers, including the women he met and his family; and that he

deeply regretted his conduct.

However, one aspect of applicant’s responses during

the interview caused the board to doubt applicant’s verac-

ity. During the panel interview, applicant was asked

whether he had sexual contact with any other women he

met in the course of his duties beyond those identified in

the reports that were prepared by Rappe during the course

of the Springfield Police Department’s 2012 investigation.

Applicant replied that there were other women with whom

he had had “sexual communications,” but that the reports

identified all the women with whom he had had sexual con-

tact. A few days after the interview, however, applicant sent

an email to the panel acknowledging that he actually had

Cite as 367 Or 360 (2020) 373

had sexual contact with two additional women whom he had

met through his official duties and who were not identified

in Rappe’s reports. Applicant provided the women’s names

and basic details of those encounters.

Following the panel interview, the board voted to

deny applicant admission to the Bar, and he requested a

formal hearing. At the hearing, applicant again testified

along the same lines as his earlier interviews with Dr. Linn

and the board panel. He added that his time representing

criminal defendants as a certified law student had deepened

his understanding of the vulnerable position of many of the

women whom he had met:

“I represented a lot of clients, including women. And I can

remember having conversations with them, preparing for

their defense. And they were the kind of conversations I

never would have had as a police officer and they were tell-

ing me some of the background that led up to why they

were being represented. And I remember thinking these

are the same kind of issues that the women I had affairs

with were probably experiencing. * * * I did not feel good

about myself when I, when it dawned on me like that.”

He then tied that vulnerability to understanding how his

conduct was an abuse of power:

“I feel like it took advantage of the situation that I was

in because * * * I didn’t stop and think at the time about

what was going on in their lives, what their emotional

needs were, what they were thinking. I was thinking about

myself. And that abused the power because I was in a posi-

tion of trust that they relied on and then I took advantage

of it and wound up in relationships with them.”

One incident following the evidentiary hearing had

a significant influence on the board’s ultimate decision.

The board had left the record open for limited purposes,

which included allowing its special investigator to contact

relevant individuals named in the proceedings and allow-

ing applicant to submit declarations from character ref-

erences who had been unable to testify. Before the record

closed, applicant spoke with a Springfield police officer,

Detective Weaver, who had testified at the hearing for appli-

cant. The two discussed hearing testimony given by Rappe,

374 In re Halttunen

in particular the effort by applicant’s counsel to impeach

Rappe by asking about complaints of sexual and other mis-

conduct against Rappe over the years.3 Rappe maintained

that the only recent complaint was no longer being pursued

against him, and Weaver thought that Rappe’s statement

was inaccurate. Applicant provided Weaver with a video

recording of the hearing, from which Weaver extracted only

Rappe’s testimony and shared it with the Springfield Police

Association, in order to determine whether Rappe had tes-

tified falsely. The police association showed the video clip to

the Springfield chief of police, who advised that Rappe had

accurately described the status of the complaint about his

conduct. The board viewed applicant’s actions as an effort

to retaliate against Rappe by giving the police association

ammunition for an ongoing battle with Rappe.

III. DISCUSSION

Based on that record, a majority of the board rec-

ommended against admission, concluding that applicant

had failed to accept responsibility for his misconduct as a

police officer and lacked candor throughout the application

process. Three dissenting board members, however, recom-

mended conditional admission. They concluded that appli-

cant had accepted responsibility for his actions, that his

misconduct was not the product of a “fundamental, endur-

ing, and pervasive aspect of his personality,” that his char-

acter references demonstrated that he has made significant

behavioral and attitudinal change, and that applicant was

genuine in describing his understanding of, and remorse for,

how his conduct harmed the women he pursued.

As noted above, we review the record de novo to

determine whether applicant has shown that he is a person

of good moral character. See ORS 9.536(2); ORS 9.539; BR

10.6; RFA 9.60(5). There is no doubt that applicant’s conduct

while working as a police officer provides a basis for ques-

tioning whether he possesses the good moral character that

is required to practice law. As applicant acknowledges, his

3

During his hearing testimony, Rappe had disagreed with applicant’s tes-

timony that harmful patterns of thinking were prevalent and promoted at the

department, so evidence that Rappe himself was the subject of misconduct com-

plaints could have undermined that testimony.

Cite as 367 Or 360 (2020) 375

conduct was inappropriate, unethical, and even potentially

criminal.4 There also is no question that applicant’s abuse of

his power and position as a law enforcement officer caused

emotional harm to some of the vulnerable women whom he

pursued. Moreover, applicant admittedly responded dis-

honestly during the 2012 investigation into his misconduct.

The crucial inquiry in this case is whether applicant has

demonstrated that, despite his history, he now possesses

the character and fitness to permit his admission to the

bar because his “character has reformed sufficiently in the

interim.” Carter, 334 Or at 395; id. at 394-95 (so describ-

ing the “crucial inquiry” when considering the character of

applicant who had engaged in “misconduct involving moral

turpitude”).

Applicant urges this court to adopt the recommen-

dation of the board minority and conditionally admit him to

practice law. He argues that he “has completely and totally

overhauled his life” and that he has demonstrated by clear

and convincing evidence that he has been successful in his

efforts at reformation and presently possesses the good

moral character and fitness that is required for admission

to the Bar. He emphasizes in particular that 20 members

of the Bar, including a retired former chief justice of this

court, have attested to his present character and fitness to

practice law. The board, on the other hand, urges this court

to adopt the carefully considered reasoning of the majority

and to deny applicant admission to the Bar, either because

his prior misconduct is so significant that his evidence of

reformation is irrelevant or because petitioner’s words and

conduct throughout the course of the admission process

undermine his evidence of reformation.

As the split decision of the board reflects, this is a

close question. This court has repeatedly emphasized that

“ ‘[r]eformation is a very difficult matter for a petitioner to

prove and for [this court] to judge.’ ” In re Jaffee, 319 Or 172,

177, 874 P2d 1299 (1994) (insertions in original; quoting

In re Bernard Jolles, 235 Or 262, 275, 383 P2d 388 (1963)).

4

There was testimony at the hearing that applicant’s conduct satisfied the

elements of Official Misconduct, which is a Class A misdemeanor. ORS 162.415.

And applicant does not dispute the characterization of his conduct as criminal.

376 In re Halttunen

Nevertheless, “reformation can be proved to this court’s sat-

isfaction, as this court’s past decisions attest.” Id. (emphasis

in original). And we are satisfied in this case that applicant

has demonstrated reformation sufficiently to qualify for con-

ditional admission to the Oregon State Bar.

A. Whether Applicant Should Be Categorically Barred from

Admission

Before turning to the evidence of reformation, we

briefly address the board’s argument that applicant’s con-

duct should categorically bar him from admission, regard-

less of his evidence of reformation. In support of that argu-

ment, the board first urges this court to conclude that the

permanent revocation of applicant’s DPSST certification

is, itself, enough to preclude his admission to the Bar.

As the board points out, DPSST certification—like bar

admission—requires that a person have “moral fitness.”

OAR 259-008-0010(6) (2013). The board does not exactly

suggest that the DPSST action reflects a finding that should

give rise to a form of issue preclusion. It could not, because

the DPSST did not revoke applicant’s license based on a

determination that he lacked moral fitness. Instead, DPSST

revoked applicant’s license because he relinquished his

license while an investigation was in progress. OAR 259-

008-0070(9)(k) (2013). Although the board asks this court

to view that relinquishment as equivalent to a “Form B”

resignation of bar membership, which permanently disqual-

ifies the lawyer from being reinstated, BR 9.4, the board

has offered no reason that this court—or applicant in this

court—should be bound by the DPSST’s revocation decision.

Regardless of any similarity between the standards for

DPSST certification and membership in the Oregon State

Bar, this court has an independent obligation to determine

whether an applicant is presently qualified for membership

in the Oregon Bar. See generally In re Sanai, 360 Or 497,

500, 383 P3d 821 (2016) (“[I]n reciprocal discipline cases, we

have an independent obligation to determine an appropriate

sanction based upon this state’s disciplinary rules.”).

The board also argues that applicant’s conduct was

so egregious that it would result in automatic disbarment if

engaged in by a current bar member and, likewise, should

Cite as 367 Or 360 (2020) 377

categorically preclude bar membership when engaged in

prior to an application for Bar membership. The board first

points to RFA 3.10, which provides that “[a]n applicant shall

not be eligible for admission to the Bar after having been

convicted of a crime, the commission of which would have

led to disbarment in all the circumstances present, had

the person been an Oregon attorney at the time of convic-

tion.” That rule does not directly control this case, however,

as the board seemingly recognizes; regardless of whether

applicant’s conduct could have been prosecuted as a crimi-

nal offense, it was not. As a result, applicant has not been

convicted of a crime, and RFA 3.10 does not control.

Nor is an analogy to conduct that might result in

disbarment dispositive in this case. The nature, extent, and

severity of an applicant’s prior misconduct is relevant to

assessing whether the applicant has the good moral char-

acter necessary to practice law. Indeed, “some prior crimi-

nal actions may be so severe that they would disqualify an

applicant from admission.” In re Beers, 339 Or 215, 224, 118

P3d 784 (2005). But the misconduct at issue in this case,

which was confined to a limited period of applicant’s career

as a police officer, is not so egregious that we can assess

applicant’s character without considering the steps that he

has taken since 2012 to rehabilitate his character.

B. Whether Applicant Has Established His Moral Character

We therefore proceed to the question of whether

applicant has sufficiently reformed his character to war-

rant admission to the Bar. When an applicant’s prior con-

duct demonstrates a lack of good moral character, the

“[a]pplicant bears the burden of proving by clear and con-

vincing evidence that he has [reformed his character], and

any significant doubt about an applicant’s character and fit-

ness should be resolved in favor of protecting the public.”

Id. at 225 (internal citation omitted). This court has previ-

ously considered, “as evidence of reformation, character tes-

timony from those who know and have had an opportunity

to observe the applicant, participation in activities that ben-

efit society, and an applicant’s forthright acknowledgment

of the wrongfulness of his or her past actions.” Carter, 334

Or at 395.

378 In re Halttunen

In Carter, this court agreed with the board’s concern

that an applicant who had previously committed theft—“an

act of misconduct involving moral turpitude”—had failed to

prove reformation, in part because he had failed to produce

“any current personal or professional character evidence”

and had failed to follow a psychologist’s recommendations

for addressing “the underlying psychological reasons for

his behavior.” Id. at 393-94. As we emphasized in that case,

the applicant’s claim that his actions since the time of the

theft showed “good moral character” reduced to “remain-

ing crime-free and pursuing his academic goals of, among

other things, completing law school, passing the Oregon

Bar Examination, and pursuing an electrical engineering

degree,” which we concluded was not “any evidence from

which this court could conclude that applicant’s character

has reformed sufficiently to permit his admission to the

Bar.” Id. at 395.

But we reached a different conclusion in Beers. The

applicant in that case had a long history of using and sell-

ing drugs and other associated criminal activity, including

weapons offenses and driving under the influence. During

that period of his life, he had failed to appear for court hear-

ings on multiple occasions, twice provided police officers

with a false name, and once hired someone to impersonate

him at a court-ordered drug treatment program. 339 Or at

217-18. By his mid-twenties, the applicant was a mid-level

drug dealer, buying and selling large quantities of cocaine.

He was arrested, and he served almost three years in prison.

Id. at 218.

While serving that prison sentence, the applicant

“began to turn his life around.” Id. He had “stopped using

drugs, began taking college courses, and dealt with his unre-

solved criminal charges and warrants.” Id. He continued his

college education after his release from prison and quickly

found success in business. By the time that he started law

school, the applicant had been out of prison for four or five

years and was the Director of Operations for a division of

Columbia Sportswear. The applicant had attended law

school at night while working full time and raising three

children with his wife. During law school, the applicant

also had passed the Certified Public Accountant exam, had

Cite as 367 Or 360 (2020) 379

received his accounting license, and had begun serving as

a member of the board of directors of the National Crime

Victims Law Institute. By the time that the applicant grad-

uated from law school and applied for admission to the Bar,

he had been out of prison for eight years and drug-free for

10 years. Id. at 220.

This court concluded that the applicant had suffi-

ciently reformed to warrant admission to the Bar. Id. at 228.

The court first characterized the applicant’s earlier criminal

conduct by noting that it was related to his drug addiction

and that he was no longer addicted to drugs. As the court

explained, “[i]f the condition that gave rise to applicant’s

earlier criminal behavior is in ‘sustained full remission’ and

if applicant truly has turned his life around, what basis is

there for saying that he has not reformed?” Id. at 225.

This court went on to consider the amount of time

that had passed since the applicant’s misconduct, his accep-

tance of responsibility for his misconduct, his success in

“achieving his personal, professional, and educational

goals,” his participation in “activities for the public good,”

and his impressive references, which included many “mem-

bers of the Bar who are aware of applicant’s past and are

sensitive to the board’s considerations,” as well as people

who knew the applicant both before and after he turned his

life around. Id. at 228-29.

In this case, as in Beers, applicant has demonstrated

a marked degree of self-improvement and rehabilitation

since his misconduct. None of the psychological experts who

evaluated applicant believed that he suffers from the kind

of fundamental and pervasive personality challenge that

might prevent a successful rehabilitation of his behavior

and character. They opined that he has gained insight into

his past behaviors and their impact on others and has devel-

oped the tools and support network to maintain a success-

ful reformation. And, like the applicant in Beers, applicant

has a wide range of references attesting to the fact that he

has fundamentally changed his behaviors and reformed his

character.

First, as the author of the dissenting board recom-

mendation, Dr. Kolbell, emphasized, the record contains no

380 In re Halttunen

evidence that applicant’s behavior between 2009 and 2012

was attributable to a personality disorder, severe psycholog-

ical condition, or other manifestation of an “enduring aspect

of his personality or character.” At the hearing, Dr. Linn

had opined that applicant’s “psychiatric history, attitudes,

and psychological testing do not reflect the existence of a

personality disorder” and that applicant “appears capable of

empathy and insight into his deficits.” Further, in Dr. Miller-

Moe’s opinion, applicant had “developed a variety of tools to

maintain physical and mental health” and did “not present

with any mental or emotional barriers which would impair

his ability to practice within the ethical guidelines of his

chosen profession.” And, according to Dr. Shallcross, appli-

cant “had gained tremendous insight into his behavior,” and

she had no concerns about his ability to conduct himself

“professionally” in the future. Finally, Dr. McDonald, who

treated applicant in 2013-14, reviewed the reports from all

of applicant’s subsequent mental health providers and wrote

a special report for the hearing. In Dr. McDonald’s opinion,

applicant “demonstrated both the willingness and the abil-

ity to engage in critical self-analysis and insight into his

behavior and its impact on others.” Dr. McDonald “enthusi-

astically” added his “voice to those who have expressed con-

fidence in his fitness to practice law.”

The board discounted the significance of those

expert opinions because they did not—indeed they could

not—offer an opinion on applicant’s “moral character.” But

the significance of the expert opinions lies not in their abil-

ity to address the ultimate question; rather, it lies in their

ability to address whether applicant suffers from a person-

ality disorder, psychological condition, or other enduring or

pervasive aspect of his personality that would cast serious

doubt on his ability to evolve and reform his attitudes and

behavior. That is a question that few members of the board

and no members of this court are qualified to assess. And,

without that expert opinion, we would be less persuaded by

the overwhelming endorsement from applicant’s friends,

family, and co-workers regarding the outward evidence that

he has reformed and rehabilitated his character.

Those supporters—a large and varied group—

attest to applicant’s present character and fitness to practice

Cite as 367 Or 360 (2020) 381

law, and all were given complete access to the underlying

records in this case. Those who have known applicant since

before his misconduct, including his first ex-wife, described

the positive changes that they have seen in applicant since

he left law enforcement. Those who met applicant after his

misconduct, including law school classmates, professional

acquaintances and colleagues, and applicant’s current wife,

all insisted that applicant’s past bears no resemblance to

the person that they know today. Not one reference, many of

whom are women, observed the abuse of power, dishonesty,

or objectification of women that applicant demonstrated in

his past misconduct. Applicant testified that the references

not only describe who he is today, but also serve as motiva-

tion for him to live up to the character that the references

describe.

We place particular weight on the references pro-

vided by the attorneys and staff at Vidrio Park & Jarvis,

LLC. They are aware of the ethical and professional

demands on an attorney and have directly observed appli-

cant doing the work of a lawyer as a certified law student,

including interacting with clients and representing them

at trial. Although applicant’s work for the firm appears to

have presented opportunities for him to abuse his position of

power or to exploit those who were less powerful, none of the

hearing witnesses from the firm—whether supervisor, col-

league, or support staff—observed any concerning behavior.

And, despite being aware of applicant’s prior misconduct,

they have supported him throughout the application process

and want him to join the firm as a full attorney.

The board was unpersuaded by the strength of

applicant’s character references, however, because it was not

convinced that applicant had sufficiently accepted responsi-

bility for his misconduct, as illustrated by his characteriz-

ing his victimization of vulnerable women as “consensual”

contacts or mere “boundary violations.” According to the

board, the “record does not demonstrate Applicant’s genuine

remorse, or even understanding, that he used his position to

take advantage of and victimize vulnerable people.”

Although we agree that applicant’s use of the word

“consensual” on his Bar admission application in March 2017

382 In re Halttunen

appears legalistic and is not well chosen in this context, we

are persuaded that the record as a whole, including appli-

cant’s subsequent descriptions of his behavior, demonstrates

that applicant understands and appreciates the harmful

nature of his misconduct. Applicant emphasized numerous

times that he now understands that the power differen-

tial between himself and the women whom he met while a

police officer at times affected their willingness to tolerate

his advances. Applicant repeatedly expressed remorse—the

“tremendous amount of shame and regret” that he feels—

for how his conduct affected others. Admittedly, it can be

difficult to distinguish between empty statements of regret

and true rehabilitation of character. But we do not ques-

tion the genuineness of applicant’s remorse, which appears

to be the result of critical and extensive self-examination

that began when he started psychotherapy not long after

his resignation from the police department. It is significant

to our assessment that Dr. Kolbell—a public member of the

board and trained psychologist—had confidence in the gen-

uineness of applicant’s remorse. Dr. Kolbell was the only

board member to have heard applicant describe his remorse

at both the small panel interview and the character review

hearing, and he authored the minority opinion recommend-

ing admission.

It appears that a primary reason the board ques-

tioned applicant’s reformation was his denial of JF’s hearsay

statements, which the board expressly found to be “credible.”5

We have difficulty placing that much weight on applicant’s

denial, however, when there is so little basis for assessing

the accuracy of the JF allegations.6 Although JF’s lawyer,

who attended her 2012 interview with Rappe, may have

credibly described JF’s recounting as involving “indicia of

5

The final board opinion walks a fine line with respect to the JF allegations.

Although the board cited as evidence of applicant’s lack of candor his denial of

JF’s allegations, which it expressly “credit[ed] as true,” it also noted that “the

Board would still recommend denial of admission even if this event had not

occurred.”

6

We note that the state’s denial of a professional license on the basis of hear-

say allegations can raise due process concerns. See Cole/Dinsmore v. DMV, 336

Or 565, 588, 87 P3d 1120 (2004) (“[W]hen important governmental decisions are

based on determinations of fact, due process usually requires an opportunity

to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.”). But we resolve this case on

subconstitutional grounds.

Cite as 367 Or 360 (2020) 383

believability”—as the board emphasized—JF did not testify

at the hearing. As a result, she was not available to explain

the inconsistencies within the allegations themselves or to

clarify how closely her perception of events—particularly

years later—aligned with the actual events. Finally, JF’s

extremely serious suggestion that applicant falsely arrested

her by manipulating her failure of the field sobriety test and

then delayed taking her into the station so that he could

engage in sexually oriented and inappropriate conversation

“to imply there was some way out of her predicament by

favor” is contrary to the documentary record of the arrest.

Under the circumstances, applicant’s continuing denial of

JF’s hearsay allegations does not cause us to question his

reformation or candor.

The board’s view that applicant lacked credibility

with regard to JF’s allegations seemingly influenced its view

of two other incidents to which it pointed as evidence that

applicant lacks candor, a view that we do not share. First,

the board highlighted the fact that applicant later corrected

a statement that he made during his panel interview. As

noted above, applicant initially told the interview panel that

Rappe’s reports, although incomplete in some respects, con-

tained the complete list of the women with whom applicant

had engaged in sexual contact after meeting them in the

course of official duties. A few days later, applicant volun-

tarily corrected that statement and supplied the names of

two additional women that he had not disclosed to Rappe.

In light of all the circumstances, we are inclined to view

applicant’s statement during the interview as an inadver-

tent error that he promptly took steps to correct, which has

little effect on the overall analysis.

The board also reasoned that applicant lacks can-

dor because the board did not find credible applicant’s

explanation for sharing Rappe’s hearing testimony with

Weaver—namely, that applicant was investigating potential

impeachment evidence against Rappe. The board points out

that, at the time when applicant shared the video of Rappe’s

testimony with Weaver, the record remained open only for

limited purposes, which did not include additional impeach-

ment evidence. The board suggests that applicant was more

likely seeking retaliation against Rappe for his testimony.

384 In re Halttunen

We do not share the board’s skepticism. The board retained

the discretion to open the record to other relevant evidence.

In fact, the board further opened the record to investigate

applicant’s conduct in sharing Rappe’s testimony with

Weaver. It is not implausible that, if Weaver had been able

to confirm his suspicion about Rappe’s veracity, the board

might have admitted that additional impeachment evi-

dence. And, if Weaver’s suspicion about Rappe’s veracity had

proved accurate, that might have supplied impeachment

evidence.

Thus, we are persuaded by the uniform opinion of

the psychiatric experts that applicant’s past misconduct was

not the product of a personality disorder or other enduring

psychological condition—in other words, that reformation is

possible. And we are persuaded by applicant’s many and var-

ied character witnesses that he has accomplished the kind

of transformation of attitudes, mental health, and behavior

that make him an applicant who presently possesses the

good moral character and fitness to become a member of the

Oregon State Bar. Ultimately, although the board’s skepti-

cism of reformation is understandable, we accept the sincer-

ity of applicant’s statement to Dr. Linn:

“Having gone through that experience of letting people

down and shaming myself, I looked in the mirror[,] how

I was, and I don’t want to be that person anymore. I don’t

view women or sex in the same way that I used to.”

And we are persuaded that applicant presently possesses

the good moral character and fitness to practice law.

Although we are convinced that applicant has genu-

inely reformed and has demonstrated that he presently pos-

sesses the good moral character necessary for admission to

the Oregon State Bar, we appreciate that applicant is not

asking that we admit him without conditions. Applicant

has managed to reform his destructive attitudes toward

women and has developed an awareness of the harm that

his abuses of power caused, but the public needs assurance

that applicant will be able to maintain those new patterns

of thinking and adhere to appropriate behavior through the

occupational stress that he will undoubtedly encounter as a

new lawyer. As suggested by Dr. Linn, those concerns can

Cite as 367 Or 360 (2020) 385

and should be addressed through a conditional admission.

Applicant is therefore subject to the following terms of con-

ditional admission:

1. The period of conditional admission shall con-

tinue for 48 months from the date of applicant’s

admission.

2. Within 30 days of the date of admission, appli-

cant shall establish an ongoing relationship with a

mental health treatment provider with experience

addressing boundary violations and power differ-

entials. For a period of at least two years, applicant

shall have at least monthly counseling sessions

with that treatment provider, at his own cost, that

are at least one hour in length and include support-

ive counseling focusing on boundary violations,

power differentials, and relapse prevention strat-

egies. After two years, applicant shall follow the

recommendation of the treatment provider with

respect to the need for any further counseling.

3. During the period of applicant’s conditional admis-

sion, he shall be monitored for compliance by the

Oregon State Bar’s State Lawyers Assistance

Committee (SLAC) and shall agree to the terms

that SLAC considers to be appropriate for appli-

cant’s monitoring agreement.

4. Applicant shall submit to SLAC an annual report

from his mental health treatment provider for each

of the first two years of admission and thereafter to

the extent that the provider recommends ongoing

treatment. The report shall summarize applicant’s

progress with respect to boundary violations, power

differentials and relapse prevention strategies, and

it shall specify the provider’s recommendations for

future counseling.

5. Applicant shall refrain from pursuing a sexual or

romantic relationship with any current or former

client.

6. SLAC shall submit quarterly reports to Disciplinary

Counsel of the Oregon State Bar, confirming that

386 In re Halttunen

applicant has complied with all conditions of his

admission. The first of these reports shall be due

90 days after the date of applicant’s admission.

7. In the event applicant fails to comply with any

term or condition of this opinion, or Disciplinary

Counsel has reason to believe that applicant has

failed to comply with the conditions set out in this

opinion in any regard, Disciplinary Counsel may

petition this court to revoke the conditional admis-

sion in accordance with procedures set out in BR

6.2(d).

8. If applicant complies with all terms and conditions

set out in this opinion, the term of his conditional

admission shall expire 48 months from the date

of admission, and he shall be admitted to practice

unconditionally thereafter without further order of

this court.

Applicant is conditionally admitted to the practice

of law.