Jones v. Four Corners Rod and Gun Club

100

Argued and submitted March 1, 2019; decision of Court of Appeals reversed as

to plaintiff’s first claim for relief and defendant’s equitable affirmative defenses

and counterclaim for attorney fees, but otherwise affirmed; judgment of circuit

court affirmed in part and reversed in part January 30, 2020

Rich JONES,

Petitioner on Review,

v.

FOUR CORNERS ROD AND GUN CLUB,

an Oregon non-profit corporation,

Respondent on Review.

(CC 13C12103) (CA A157826) (SC S066044)

456 P3d 616

Jones agreed to provide groundskeeping and maintenance services for

Four Corners in exchange for lodging and related benefits. Although Oregon’s

wage laws generally authorize employers to deduct from an employee’s wages

“the fair market value of lodging, meals or other facilities or services furnished

by the employer for the private benefit of the employee,” ORS 653.035(1), Four

Corners did not comply with ORS 652.610(3), which sets out requirements that

employers must follow in order to lawfully withhold wages from an employee.

When Jones sued to recover his unpaid wages, Four Corners admitted liability

for Jones’s unpaid wages and for statutory penalties but asserted an equitable

claim to recover the value of the lodging benefit. The court considered whether

Four Corners could assert the equitable claim, either as an affirmative defense

to plaintiff’s wage claim or as a lawful counterclaim. Held: Four Corners’ viola-

tion of ORS 652.610 prevented it from asserting an affirmative defense to defeat

Jones’s wage claim, but Four Corners was not prevented from asserting an equi-

table counterclaim for the value of the lodging benefit.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed as to plaintiff’s first claim

for relief and defendant’s equitable affirmative defenses and counterclaim for

attorney fees, but it is otherwise affirmed. The judgment of the circuit court is

affirmed in part and reversed in part.

En Banc

On review from the Court of Appeals.*

Conrad E. Yunker, Conrad E. Yunker, P.C., Salem, argued

the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review. Also on

the briefs was David Schuck, Schuck Law, LLC, Vancouver,

Washington.

______________

* On appeal from Marion County Circuit Court, Kip Leonard, Judge. 290 Or

App 811, 418 P3d 765 (2018).

Cite as 366 Or 100 (2020) 101

Brian A. Buchanan, Salem, argued the cause and filed

the brief for respondent on review.

Shenoa Payne, Richardson Wright LLP, Portland, filed

the brief for amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.

FLYNN, J.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed as to

plaintiff’s first claim for relief and defendant’s equitable

affirmative defenses and counterclaim for attorney fees, but

it is otherwise affirmed. The judgment of the circuit court is

affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Nelson, J., dissented and filed an opinion, in which

Nakamoto, J., joined.

102 Jones v. Four Corners Rod and Gun Club

FLYNN, J.

This appeal arises out of plaintiff’s civil action to

recover unpaid wages that defendant unlawfully with-

held after the parties agreed to trade a lodging benefit for

labor. Although Oregon’s wage laws authorize employers

to deduct from an employee’s wages “the fair market value

of lodging, meals or other facilities or services furnished

by the employer for the private benefit of the employee,”

ORS 653.035(1), those laws also prohibit employers from

taking any deduction from wages unless the employer

obtains the employee’s advance written authorization and

keeps a record of the deductions, ORS 652.610(3) (2013).1

Defendant admittedly failed to comply with the require-

ments for deducting the lodging benefit from plaintiff’s

wages.

The issue in this court is whether defendant’s vio-

lation of ORS 652.610(3) prevents defendant from asserting

an equitable claim for the value of the lodging benefit, either

as an affirmative defense to plaintiff’s wage claim or as a

lawful counterclaim. We conclude that defendant’s unlawful

withholding of wages prevents it from asserting the value

of the lodging benefit as an affirmative defense to defeat

plaintiff’s wage claim but does not prevent defendant from

asserting an equitable counterclaim for the value of the

lodging benefit.

I. BACKGROUND

The factual and procedural posture of the case are

set out in detail in the opinion of the Court of Appeals. Jones

v. Four Corners Rod and Gun Club, 290 Or App 811, 418

P3d 765 (2018). We summarize those details that are per-

tinent to the dispute in this court. The dispute arises out

of an agreement that plaintiff would provide maintenance

and groundskeeping labor in exchange for a lodging benefit

1

Unless otherwise specified, all references in this opinion to ORS 652.610

are to the 2013 version of the statute. ORS 652.610 was amended in 2016, and

now requires that employees “voluntarily” authorize the deductions in writing

and that employers also provide the employee a written itemization that doc-

uments, among other things, “the amount and purpose of each deduction.” Or

Laws 2016, ch 115, § 1. Those amendments do not govern this case.

Cite as 366 Or 100 (2020) 103

(lodging at a home located on defendant’s property as well

as utilities and cellular phone service).2 However, defendant

never obtained plaintiff’s written authorization to deduct

the lodging benefit from plaintiff’s wages. The employment

relationship lasted for a period of three years, during which

plaintiff never received a paycheck, paycheck stub, or any

monetary wages and defendant kept no records of the deduc-

tions. Eventually, defendant terminated plaintiff’s employ-

ment and obtained a judgment evicting plaintiff from the

home.

After defendant terminated plaintiff’s employment,

plaintiff brought the present action, in which he asserted

claims for unpaid minimum wages, statutory civil pen-

alties, and statutory attorney fees. See ORS 652.200 (pro-

viding that, with some exceptions, “court shall” award “a

reasonable sum for attorney fees” to a successful plaintiff

in a judgment for unpaid wages); ORS 652.615 (creating

private cause of action for violations of ORS 652.610(3) and

authorizing award to prevailing party of actual damages or

$200, whichever is greater, in addition to costs, disburse-

ments, and reasonable attorney fees). Defendant responded

by admitting most of plaintiff’s allegations, but it asserted

an affirmative defense of “setoff” based on the value of the

lodging benefits.3 Defendant also asserted equitable coun-

terclaims premised on the theory that plaintiff would be

unjustly enriched at defendant’s expense if plaintiff were

allowed to recover wages in addition to the value of the lodg-

ing benefit. Finally, defendant asserted as a counterclaim

that it should be awarded an attorney fee because its affir-

mative defense of setoff prevented plaintiff from recovering

anything on his claim for unpaid wages. See ORS 653.055(4)

(“court may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing

2

The parties’ employment agreement specified:

“For the consideration of the right to occupy and live in the mobile home on

the premises of the CLUB, free of any further charge, CUSTODIAN agrees

to perform the duties as set forth in the job description attached hereto

as EXHIBIT 1 and initialed by an authorized CLUB representative and

CUSTODIAN[.]”

3

Defendant alleged other affirmative defenses, including the right to set off

an amount that it obtained in the judgment evicting plaintiff from the premises.

The trial court’s rulings on those other affirmative defenses are not at issue in

this court.

104 Jones v. Four Corners Rod and Gun Club

party in any action brought by an employee” to recover

unpaid wages).

Pointing to defendant’s violation of ORS 653.610(3),

plaintiff denied that defendant lawfully could recover the

value of the lodging benefit as either a setoff or counterclaim

to plaintiff’s claim for unpaid wages. However, the parties

agreed to submit the few factual disputes to the jury before

resolving the legal disputes. The jury found that plaintiff

had earned a minimum wage of $38,796 during the years he

had worked for defendant; that defendant had provided the

lodging for plaintiff’s “private benefit”; and that the value of

that lodging benefit was $43,403. The parties then submit-

ted legal arguments regarding how those findings should

affect the judgment.

Defendant acknowledged that plaintiff was owed

wages in the amount that the jury found plus prejudgment

interest on the unpaid wages. Defendant also agreed that

it owed a statutory penalty for its unlawful deductions as

well as a penalty for deducting the value of the lodging ben-

efit without following the statutory requirements for such

deductions and that it owed a penalty for its failure to pay

plaintiff wages due upon termination. But defendant con-

tended that the value of its lodging benefit cancelled out the

amount due to plaintiff on his first claim for relief, mak-

ing defendant the prevailing party on that claim and the

party entitled to recover an attorney fee pursuant to ORS

653.055(4). Defendant anchored its right to recover the value

of the lodging benefit in ORS 652.610(5), which provides that

the prohibition on making unauthorized deductions from

wages does not “[d]iminish or enlarge the right of any per-

son to assert and enforce a lawful setoff or counterclaim.”

Plaintiff contended that defendant’s equitable claim

to the value of the lodging benefit was not a “lawful setoff or

counterclaim” because it would effectively nullify plaintiff’s

statutory right to recover wages and penalties. According to

plaintiff, “[d]efendant should not be permitted to advance

arguments of equity to relieve itself of the consequences of

its own unlawful acts.”

The trial court agreed with defendant that defen-

dant was entitled to recover the value of the lodging benefit.

Cite as 366 Or 100 (2020) 105

Moreover, because the value of the benefit “more than fully

offset” the wages that the jury found were due to plaintiff,

the court determined that defendant was the prevailing

party on plaintiff’s claim for unpaid minimum wages. As a

result, the court denied an award of attorney fees to plain-

tiff on the claim for unpaid wages and awarded defendant

an attorney fee for prevailing on that claim. Next, the court

ruled for plaintiff on his claims for statutory civil penalties

but declined to award plaintiff attorneys fees for recovering

on those claims.4 The “money award” section of the judg-

ment reflects the court’s conclusion that the net amount due

to plaintiff was “$0” and that defendant was entitled to a

net award for attorney fees of $12,520 and prevailing party

costs in the amount of $1,080.

On appeal, plaintiff assigned error to most of the

trial court’s rulings regarding the judgment. He repeated

his arguments that defendant could not use the value of the

lodging benefit to offset its liability for unpaid minimum

wages, whether as an affirmative defense or counterclaim.

Thus, plaintiff argued, the trial court erred in identifying

defendant as the prevailing party on plaintiff’s wage claim

and in awarding defendant, rather than plaintiff, attorney

fees on that claim. Plaintiff also separately assigned error

to the trial court’s refusal to award plaintiff attorney fees

for prevailing on his claims for statutory civil penalties.

The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded

the judgment with respect to the issue of attorney fees on

plaintiff’s claims for statutory penalties, but it otherwise

affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Jones, 290 Or App 811.

The court first observed that the nature of defendant’s affir-

mative defense was really that of “recoupment” rather than

“setoff,” because “the value of lodging and utilities sought

by defendant arose out of the transaction upon which plain-

tiff’s wage claims were brought.” Id. at 822. The court con-

cluded, however, that labeling the defense “recoupment” did

not affect defendant’s ability to prevail on its affirmative

4

The general judgment specifies that the court awarded plaintiff a statutory

penalty of $2,112 for defendant’s failure to pay wages due on termination, ORS

652.150, and another statutory penalty of $7,200 ($200 per violation) for defen-

dant’s unauthorized deductions of the lodging benefit from plaintiff’s wages, ORS

652.615, but “awarded nothing” on plaintiff’s claim for unpaid minimum wages.

106 Jones v. Four Corners Rod and Gun Club

defense.5 Thus, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial

court that defendant could assert the value of the lodging

benefit as a lawful affirmative defense, which effectively

“zeroed out” plaintiff’s recovery on his first claim and made

defendant the prevailing party entitled to attorney fees on

that claim. Id. at 823 (internal quotation marks omitted).

This court allowed plaintiff’s petition for review, and, as

explained below, we reverse in part the decision of the Court

of Appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Oregon’s Wage Laws as Context for the Dispute in this

Case

Before analyzing the parties’ arguments, we begin

by describing the statutory framework out of which the dis-

pute arises. The starting point is ORS 653.025, which estab-

lishes a general minimum wage requirement for Oregon

workers:

“[F]or each hour of work time that the employee is gainfully

employed, no employer shall employ or agree to employ any

employee at wages computed at a rate lower than [the min-

imum rate set out by statute.]”

Throughout the term of employment, the employer must

pay the wages due on an established pay day, ORS 652.120,

and when the employment terminates—whether through

discharge or mutual agreement—“all wages earned and

unpaid” are “due and payable not later than the end of the

first business day after the discharge or termination,” ORS

652.140(1).

Those general rules are subject to exceptions, one of

which is at issue in this case. The pertinent exception autho-

rizes employers to credit against an employee’s wages “the

fair market value of lodging, meals or other facilities or ser-

vices furnished by the employer for the private benefit of the

5

The Court of Appeals observed that “this appears to be a case where defen-

dant asserted a ‘lawful setoff or counterclaim,’ ” without analyzing the question

in detail, because it did not understand plaintiff to have raised that argument

below (or at least not in a timely manner). Jones, 290 Or App at 819. We disagree

with that assessment of plaintiff’s arguments below, and we, therefore, analyze

the question in detail.

Cite as 366 Or 100 (2020) 107

employee.” ORS 653.035(1); see also OAR 839-020-0025(1)

(providing the same).

The legislature has also specified, however, that

employers may not “withhold, deduct or divert any portion

of an employee’s wages unless: * * * [t]he deductions are

authorized in writing by the employee, are for the employ-

ee’s benefit and are recorded in the employer’s books[.]” ORS

652.610(3)(b). We have emphasized that

“ORS 652.610(3)(b) is unambiguous. An item must fall

within its strictures to be deducted under it—that is, the

employee’s written authorization must be given, and the

deduction must be recorded in the employer’s books and

must be for the ultimate benefit of the employee.”

Taylor v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 329 Or 461, 470, 988 P2d

384 (1999).6

Finally, the legislature has specified that, if an

employer unlawfully withholds wages in violation of ORS

652.610(3) or otherwise fails to pay wages due to the employee,

then the employee may bring a civil action in which the

employee is entitled to recover the amount of unpaid wages,

civil penalties, and a reasonable attorney fee for prevailing

on the claims. See ORS 653.055 (“employer who pays an

employee less than the wages to which the employee is enti-

tled under ORS 653.010 to 653.261 is liable to the employee

affected” for wages plus “civil penalties provided in ORS

652.150”); ORS 652.150 (employee entitled to recover civil

penalty if employer fails to pay wages due to employee when

employment ceases); ORS 652.200 (court “shall” award “a

reasonable sum for attorney fees” in an action to collect

wages, unless “the plaintiff’s attorney unreasonably failed

to give written notice of the wage claim to the employer

before filing the action”); ORS 652.615 (for violations of ORS

652.610(3), employee has private cause of action to recover

6

Although we have not specifically addressed the intersection of ORS

652.610(3) and ORS 653.035(1), the governing regulations make it clear that any

employer wishing to withhold an employee’s wages to cover the value of “meals,

lodging or other facilities or services furnished” provided “for the private ben-

efit of the employee” must do so in compliance with the requirements of ORS

652.610(3)(b) and—in addition—must “maintain and preserve records substan-

tiating the fair market value of furnishing each class of facility.” OAR 839-020-

0025(3), OAR 839-020-0082(1).

108 Jones v. Four Corners Rod and Gun Club

“actual damages or $200, whichever is greater,” plus “court

may award to the prevailing party, in addition to costs and

disbursements, reasonable attorney fees”).

In this case, there is no dispute that defendant

failed to pay plaintiff any wage. The dispute centers on

the significance of two other undisputed facts: (1) defen-

dant withheld wages to cover lodging that it provided for

plaintiff’s “private benefit” and (2) defendant withheld (or

deducted) wages in violation of ORS 652.610(3) because it

neither obtained plaintiff’s written consent nor maintained

the records necessary to lawfully deduct the benefit from

plaintiff’s wages.

According to defendant, the first fact overrides the

second, allowing defendant to defeat plaintiff’s claim for the

unlawfully withheld wages. Defendant highlights the expla-

nation in ORS 652.610(5) that

“[t]his section does not:

“* * * * *

“(c) Diminish or enlarge the right of any person to

assert and enforce a lawful setoff or counterclaim or to

attach, take, reach or apply an employee’s compensation on

due legal process.”

(Emphasis added.) That provision, defendant argues, con-

firms its right to assert the value of the lodging benefit that

it provided to plaintiff as an affirmative defense. Defendant

argues that calling its affirmative defense a “recoupment,”

as the Court of Appeals did, does not undermine the trial

court’s conclusion that defendant is the prevailing party on

plaintiff’s wage claim.

According to plaintiff, the second fact overrides

the first and requires defendant to forfeit the value of the

lodging benefit it provided to plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that

defendant’s affirmative defense sought “recoupment,” as the

Court of Appeals concluded, and that ORS 652.610(5)(c) does

not preserve a right to “recoupment.” He also contends that

it “follows inexorably” that, if a deduction from an employ-

ee’s wages was unlawful, then it is also unlawful to allow

the employer to take the same deduction through a setoff or

counterclaim against the plaintiff’s wage claim.

Cite as 366 Or 100 (2020) 109

B. Resolving the Dispute

Neither party is entirely correct. We conclude that

the legislature intended employers who have taken a deduc-

tion from the employee’s wages in violation of ORS 652.610(3)

to be liable on a civil claim for the unpaid wages, statutory

penalties, and a reasonable attorney fee, even if the employer

provided a benefit that could have justified a lawful deduc-

tion. That legislative intention precludes employers from

asserting the value of the unlawfully deducted benefit as

an affirmative defense to defeat the claim for unpaid wages.

But we also conclude that an employer’s violation of ORS

652.610(3) does not require the employer to forfeit the right

to bring an equitable counterclaim under the circumstances

of this case.

1. The distinction between defendant’s affirmative

defense and counterclaim

We begin by explaining why this case is not as sim-

ple as plaintiff’s proposition that, if the value of a benefit was

deducted from wages unlawfully then “it follows inexorably”

that the employer cannot assert the value of the benefit

either as an affirmative defense or counterclaim. Although

plaintiff contends that the legislature has made defendant’s

affirmative defense and counterclaim equally “unlawful,”

his argument fails to recognize a distinction between affir-

mative defenses and counterclaims that is particularly sig-

nificant in this case. An affirmative defense can cause the

plaintiff to lose on the asserted claim, as defendant’s affir-

mative defense did here. See Rogue River Management Co.

v. Shaw, 243 Or 54, 60, 411 P2d 440 (1966) (explaining that

“[r]ecoupment and set-off may be available as defenses for

the purpose of liquidating the whole or part of plaintiff’s

claim”); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 509 (10th ed 2014)

(defining “affirmative defense” as “[a] defendant’s assertion

of facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat the plain-

tiff’s or prosecution’s claim, even if all the allegations in the

complaint are true”). And when the claim is one for unpaid

wages, a successful affirmative defense not only defeats the

claim but also shifts the parties’ obligations with respect

to attorney fees and other relief, such as penalties and

110 Jones v. Four Corners Rod and Gun Club

prejudgment interest, that may be available to the party

who prevails on the claim.

By contrast, a counterclaim is an independent cause

of action against the plaintiff. See Rogue River Management,

243 Or at 60 (explaining that a “cognizable counterclaim

must plead facts giving the defendant an independent cause

of action against plaintiff”). A defendant’s success on a coun-

terclaim might affect the net money award in the judgment,

but it does not cause the plaintiff to lose on the asserted

claim. And success on a counterclaim does not shift the par-

ties’ obligations with respect to attorney fees and other relief

afforded to the prevailing party on any particular claim

because the legislature has specified that entitlement to an

award of attorney fees is to be made on a claim-by-claim

basis, rather than on a “net judgment” basis, ORS 20.077(2).7

This case illustrates how significant those distinc-

tions can become. Although defendant’s affirmative defense

and counterclaim pled alternative ways to obtain the same

basic relief—reducing plaintiff’s wage recovery by the

value of the lodging benefit—obtaining that relief through

an affirmative defense produced a qualitatively different

outcome for the case. By allowing defendant to assert the

value of the lodging as a successful affirmative defense, the

trial court and the Court of Appeals made defendant the

prevailing party on plaintiff’s wage claim, which allowed

defendant—and not plaintiff—to recover attorney fees on

7

ORS 20.077(2) provides:

“For the purposes of making an award of attorney fees on a claim, the

prevailing party is the party who receives a favorable judgment or arbitra-

tion award on the claim. If more than one claim is made in an action or suit

for which an award of attorney fees is either authorized or required, the court

or arbitrator shall:

“(a) Identify each party that prevails on a claim for which attorney fees

could be awarded;

“(b) Decide whether to award attorney fees on claims for which the court

or arbitrator is authorized to award attorney fees, and the amount of the

award;

“(c) Decide the amount of the award of attorney fees on claims for which

the court or arbitrator is required to award attorney fees; and

“(d) Enter a judgment that complies with the requirements of ORS

18.038 and 18.042.”

Cite as 366 Or 100 (2020) 111

the wage claim. See ORS 20.077(2). Had defendant, instead,

obtained the same equitable relief through its counterclaim,

plaintiff would still be the prevailing party on the wage

claim, and the party entitled to recover attorney fees. As

we will explain, the disparate effect on plaintiff’s ability to

prevail on plaintiff’s claim for unpaid wages contributes to

our conclusion that the trial court erred in allowing defen-

dant to prevail on its affirmative defense but did not err in

allowing defendant to prevail on its counterclaim.

2. Defendant’s affirmative defense based on the lodging

benefit

We turn first to defendant’s affirmative defense.

Plaintiff argues that the purpose of ORS 652.610(3) is to

protect employees from abusive wage-withholding practices

and that the legislature’s enforcement mechanism is mean-

ingless if an employer can escape liability for unlawfully

withholding wages by claiming a credit for the amount of

the unlawful deduction. Plaintiff’s argument is persuasive.

As we have explained above, the restrictions imposed

by ORS 652.610(3) prevent employers from withholding

wages—even to recover a legitimate debt—unless the

employer complies with the requirements of written consent

and recordkeeping. When an employer violates that statute,

the legislature has specified that the employee may bring

a civil action and recover the unpaid wages, plus statutory

penalties, plus a reasonable attorney fee for prevailing on the

claims. ORS 653.055 (describing liability for unpaid wages);

ORS 652.150 (describing penalty for failure to pay wages at

termination); ORS 652.200 (describing right to attorney fees

in action to collect wages); ORS 652.615 (describing private

cause of action for violations of ORS 652.610(3)).

We have long emphasized that the penalty provi-

sions of the wage statutes serve to “protect employees from

unscrupulous or careless employers who fail to pay wages

when due” and “to spur an employer to the payment of

wages when they are due.” State ex rel Nilsen v. Cushing,

253 Or 262, 269, 453 P2d 945 (1969); Nordling v. Johnston,

205 Or 315, 326, 283 P2d 994 (1955). Yet, as this case illus-

trates, those statutory protections are rendered largely

112 Jones v. Four Corners Rod and Gun Club

meaningless if an employer who has unlawfully withheld

wages to cover a debt can use the same debt to avoid lia-

bility when the employee brings a claim to recover for the

unlawfully withheld wages.

Moreover, in another statutory provision, the legis-

lature has expressly prevented that kind of end-run around

the requirements of Oregon’s wage laws. ORS 652.360(1)

specifies that employers

“may not by special contract or any other means exempt

the employer from any provision of or liability or penalty

imposed by ORS 652.310 to 652.414 or any statute relating

to the payment of wages, [unless the Bureau of Labor and

Industries approves the arrangement in writing].”

(Emphasis added.) We have previously analyzed the phrase

“any statute relating to the payment of wages” and con-

cluded that, “under ORS 652.360, the agreements signed

by [the employee] cannot exempt [the employer] from liabil-

ity or any penalty imposed [for the employer’s] violations of

ORS 652.150 and ORS 652.610.” Taylor, 329 Or at 467, 469

(footnote omitted).

The defendant in Taylor sought to avoid liability on

a claim for unlawfully withheld wages by arguing that the

plaintiff had signed a form agreeing that he would not con-

sider the defendant his employer, which would have made

the withholding restrictions of ORS 652.610 inapplicable

to the defendant. Id. at 468-69. We held that ORS 652.360

precluded that defense because ORS 652.610 was a “stat-

ute relating to the payment of wages.” Id. at 469. Although

defendant, here, does not contend that the lodging agree-

ment exempted it from an initial obligation to pay plaintiff’s

wages, by using the value of lodging to affirmatively defeat

the claim for unpaid wages, defendant would avoid liabil-

ity for the consequences of its unlawful withholding, which

include plaintiff’s need to hire an attorney to bring this

action to recover the unpaid wages. That result effectively

negates the prohibition that the legislature has prescribed

in ORS 652.360 and the remedial framework that the leg-

islature has established for violations of ORS 652.610(3) in

particular.

Cite as 366 Or 100 (2020) 113

Defendant’s only meaningful response to those

strong indications of the legislature’s intention is its argu-

ment that ORS 652.610(5)—the “lawful setoff or counter-

claim” provision—demonstrates a legislative intention

to permit the kind of affirmative defense that defendant

asserted here, a proposition with which plaintiff disagrees.

To resolve the parties’ dispute regarding the meaning of

ORS 652.610(5), we apply our established methodology to

determine the legislature’s intended meaning. See State v.

Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009). Under that

methodology, we give primary consideration to the text and

context of the pertinent statutes. Id. at 171.

As set out above, ORS 652.610(3) specifies condi-

tions that an employer must meet in order to lawfully “with-

hold, deduct or divert any portion of an employee’s wages,”

but ORS 652.610(5) specifies that the section does not

“[d]iminish or enlarge the right of any person to assert and

enforce a lawful setoff or counterclaim.” (Emphasis added.)

That disputed provision was added to ORS 652.610 in 1977,

see Oregon Laws 1977, chapter 618, section 2, but its history

goes back much farther. Wording identical to the quoted

provision appeared in former ORS 652.410 and dated to the

original adoption of that statute in 1933. Or Laws 1933,

ch 279, § 8.8

Neither the term “lawful” nor the term “setoff” is

defined for purposes of ORS 652.610(5), but both have estab-

lished meanings that have remained unchanged since the

legislature first adopted the provision. We have observed

that the “ordinary meaning of the word ‘lawful’ ” is cap-

tured by the definition “ ‘conformable to law : allowed or per-

mitted by law : enforceable in a court of law * * *.’ ” State v.

Ausmus, 336 Or 493, 503-04, 85 P3d 864 (2003) (quoting

8

Former ORS 652.410 (1975), repealed by Or Laws 1977, ch 618, § 2, provided:

“ORS 652.310 to 652.400 [(relating to enforcement of wage claims)] do not

affect the right of any employer under lawful contract to retain part of the

compensation of any employe [sic] for the purpose of affording such employe

[sic] insurance, or hospital, sick or other similar relief. Nor shall those stat-

utes diminish or enlarge the right of any person to assert and enforce a lawful

set-off or counterclaim or to attach, take, reach or apply an employe’s [sic] com-

pensation on due legal process.”

(Emphasis added.)

114 Jones v. Four Corners Rod and Gun Club

Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1279 (unabridged ed

1993). In Ausmus, although examining a different statute,

we explained that “this court generally gives words of com-

mon usage their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning,”

and we accordingly concluded that the legislature intended

the quoted “dictionary definition to serve as the meaning of

the word ‘lawful.’ ” Id. at 504. The same dictionary defini-

tion has been in force since before 1933. See Webster’s New

International Dictionary 1222 (2d ed 1921) (lawful means

“[c]onformable to law; allowed or permitted by law”); State v.

Eastep, 361 Or 746, 751 n 2, 399 P3d 979 (2017) (explaining

that “any version of Webster’s Third—regardless of its copy-

right date—provides a relevant source of ordinary mean-

ing for statutes enacted any time after 1961”). And, as in

Ausmus, we conclude that the legislature intended the ordi-

nary meaning of the word “lawful” to serve as the mean-

ing of the word in the provision that is now part of ORS

652.610(5).

The term “setoff” also has a longstanding estab-

lished legal meaning, of which we presume the legislature

was aware at the time it adopted the law.9 See Joshi v.

Providence Health System, 342 Or 152, 158, 149 P3d 1164

(2006) (explaining our assumption “that, in using the term

‘caused,’ the legislature intended to incorporate the legal

meaning of that term that this court has developed in its

cases”). This court has long defined a “setoff” as “a money

demand by the defendant against the plaintiff” for “a debt

independent of and unconnected with the cause of action set

forth in the complaint.” Krausse v. Greenfield, 61 Or 502,

507, 123 P 392 (1912) (emphasis added); see also Korlann v.

E-Z Pay Plan, 247 Or 170, 176, 428 P2d 172 (1967) (“Setoff is

usually allowed where, through a course of separate trans-

actions, two parties become indebted to each other.”).

9

There is no traditional legislative history available to inform our under-

standing of what the legislature intended when it adopted the phrase “diminish

or enlarge the right of any person to assert and enforce a lawful set-off or coun-

terclaim” because legislative records concerning the history of state laws passed

prior to 1935 were destroyed in the 1935 fire that burned down the state capitol.

Or Laws 1933, ch 279, § 8 (adopting text quoted above); State v. Rainoldi, 351 Or

486, 499, 268 P3d 568 (2011) (noting lack of legislative history for statute passed

prior to 1935 because applicable records “literally went up in smoke with the

burning of the state capitol in 1935”).

Cite as 366 Or 100 (2020) 115

This court has highlighted the “unconnected”

nature of a claim for “setoff” by repeatedly distinguish-

ing the claim of “setoff” from a claim for “recoupment.” For

example, in Jewell v. Compton, 277 Or 93, 97, 559 P2d 874

(1977), we emphasized that “recoupment seeks the reduc-

tion of a claim because of an offsetting claim arising out

of exactly the same transaction,” which justifies “treating it

differently than a set-off which seeks a reduction because of

an offsetting claim arising out of a totally unrelated trans-

action.” (Internal quotation omitted.) See also Krausse, 61

Or at 507 (“recoupment * * * is confined to matters arising

out of, and connected with, the transaction or contract upon

which the suit was brought” (internal quotation omitted)).

Similarly, we explained in Rogue River Management that

“recoupment,” a term of French origin, “means the ‘cutting

back’ of the plaintiff’s claim by the defendant,” and it “is con-

fined to matters arising out of and connected with the trans-

action upon which the action is brought.” 243 Or at 58-59. It

differs from a defense of “set-off” in that a setoff “is a ‘money

demand by the defendant against the plaintiff arising upon

contract and constituting a debt independent of and uncon-

nected with the cause of action set forth in the complaint.’ ”

Id. at 59 (quoting Thomas W. Waterman, A Treatise on the

Law of Set-Off, Recoupment, and Counter Claim § 9 (2d ed

1872) (emphasis in Rogue River Management)).

Thus, we agree with the Court of Appeals that defen-

dant’s affirmative defense was one of “recoupment,” not “law-

ful setoff.” The defense sought to reduce (to zero) plaintiff’s

claim for unpaid wages based on the same debt that was the

object of the unlawful wage deductions upon which the suit

was brought. As we held in Rogue River Management, the

defendant, “by alleging overcharges arising out of the trans-

actions on which the complaint was based, pleaded every-

thing necessary for recoupment.” 243 Or at 61.10

10

An illustrative contrast is found in a second claim of “setoff” that defen-

dant asserted. As set out in the decision of the Court of Appeals, “[d]efendant also

asserted that any relief granted to plaintiff should be set off by $1,478, repre-

senting money owed to defendant from plaintiff pursuant” to the judgment that

defendant obtained in the eviction action against plaintiff. Jones, 290 Or App

at 814. That debt is “independent of and unconnected with the” wage claim, see

Krausse, 61 Or at 507, and plaintiff has not challenged defendant’s right to a

“lawful setoff” in the amount of the eviction judgment.

116 Jones v. Four Corners Rod and Gun Club

Unlike the Court of Appeals, however, we conclude

that correctly identifying the nature of the affirmative

defense as a “recoupment” of the same debt that defendant

unlawfully deducted from plaintiff’s wages demonstrates

that the trial court erred in allowing defendant to prevail on

its affirmative defense. An examination of the statutory text

and context persuades us that the legislature did not intend

to allow employers to assert an affirmative defense of recoup-

ment to defeat a claim for unlawfully deducted wages. The

first indication of that intent is the text of ORS 652.610(5)

itself. Although “recoupment” has been a legal concept dis-

tinct from “setoff” throughout the twentieth century, ORS

652.610(5) refers only to “setoff,” not to “recoupment.” We pre-

sume that the legislature was aware of the distinct legal doc-

trine of “recoupment” when it specified that the restrictions

on wage deductions do not affect a “lawful setoff or counter-

claim,” and that it intentionally omitted “recoupment” from

that provision. See Joshi, 342 Or at 158 (assuming that “leg-

islature intended to incorporate the legal meaning” of term

“that this court has developed in its cases”); ORS 174.010

(court’s role in construing statutes is “not to insert what has

been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted”).

The broader context of the legislature’s prescribed

consequences for violations of ORS 652.610(3) reveals that

there was good reason for the legislature to intentionally

omit a reference to “recoupment.” As we have explained, the

term “recoupment” applies to an employer’s effort to reduce

its liability for having taken a wage deduction in violation

of ORS 652.610(3) by asserting a credit for the same amount

that it unlawfully deducted from the employee’s wages. See,

e.g., Rogue River Management, 243 Or at 61. We also have

explained why allowing defendant to raise “recoupment” of

the lodging benefit as an affirmative defense would effectively

negate the remedial framework that the legislature has pre-

scribed to protect employees from the kind of unauthorized

wage deductions that defendant took here.11 See ORS 652.200,

ORS 652.615.

11

It could be argued that an affirmative defense of “setoff” would equally

negate the legislature’s remedial framework, and that the reference to “lawful

setoff” in ORS 652.610(5) preserves only the right to seek setoff as a counter-

claim, but we are not called upon to address that question. We address only the

affirmative defense of “recoupment.”

Cite as 366 Or 100 (2020) 117

Thus, we reject the conclusion of the Court of

Appeals that ORS 652.610(3) authorized defendant’s affir-

mative defense of “recoupment” to defeat plaintiff’s claim for

the unpaid wages. See, e.g., State v. Clemente-Perez, 357 Or

745, 755, 359 P3d 232 (2015) (reciting “general rule” that

we “assume that the legislature did not intend any portion

of its enactments to be meaningless”); State v. Cloutier, 351

Or 68, 104, 261 P3d 1234 (2011) (declining to construe one

statute in a way that would render another meaningless).

We conclude that the legislature did intend that, when an

employee brings a claim for wages that are due because they

were withheld in violation of ORS 652.610(3), the remedial

framework would “diminish” an employer’s ability to assert

“recoupment” as an affirmative defense. Employer’s alleged

right to “offset” the value of the lodging benefit was not a law-

ful affirmative defense to plaintiff’s claim for unpaid wages.

Accordingly, the trial court and Court of Appeals erred in

identifying defendant as the prevailing party on plaintiff’s

first claim and in granting defendant’s counterclaim for

“prevailing party” attorney fees under ORS 653.055.

3. Defendant’s counterclaim based on the lodging

benefit

As we have explained above, to the extent that

defendant believed it had a contract to withhold plaintiff’s

wages without a written authorization and recordkeeping,

that contract was unlawful. We agree with the dissent that

such a contract is contrary to public policy and unenforce-

able. See 366 Or at 133-34 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (quoting

Trinity v. Apex Directional Drilling LLC, 363 Or 257, 261,

434 P3d 20 (2018)). According to plaintiff, that conclusion

should dispose of defendant’s equitable counterclaim to

the same extent that it disposed of defendant’s affirmative

defense. The premise of plaintiff’s argument is that allowing

defendant to prevail on its counterclaim would be equivalent

to allowing defendant to prevail on its affirmative defense

against the wage claim. But the two are not equivalent.

Allowing defendant to assert recoupment as an

affirmative defense to plaintiff’s wage claim would effec-

tively negate the statutory consequences that the legisla-

ture has prescribed for withholding wages in violation of

118 Jones v. Four Corners Rod and Gun Club

ORS 652.610(3). Moreover, we have concluded that ORS

652.610(5) does not preserve any right to assert “recoup-

ment” as an affirmative defense. But allowing defendant to

assert recoupment as a counterclaim does not alter plain-

tiff’s status as prevailing party on his claims for unpaid

wages, penalties, and attorney fees. And ORS 652.610(5)

does preserve a right to assert a counterclaim, as long as the

counterclaim is “lawful.” Under the circumstances of this

case, we conclude that defendant asserted a lawful counter-

claim. We reach that conclusion for two reasons.

a. Defendant established a prima facie case for

equitable relief.

First, defendant’s counterclaim for relief in quantum

meruit generally meets the requirements for a lawful quan-

tum meruit claim (or counterclaim). As we have explained,

we understand the legislature to have given the term “law-

ful” in ORS 652.610(5) its “plain, natural, and ordinary

meaning” of “[c]onformable to law” or “allowed or permit-

ted by law.” See Webster’s New International Dictionary 1222

(2d ed 1921). In general, the law allows a defendant to join

“as many counterclaims, both legal and equitable, as that

defendant may have against a plaintiff.” ORCP 22 A(1).

Also in general, defendant’s counterclaim for quan-

tum meruit is the kind of equitable recovery that Oregon

law allows. In re Klemp, 363 Or 62, 418 P3d 733 (2018). We

emphasized in Klemp that claims in quantum meruit can

proceed on two distinct theories. Id. at 75. Under one theory

of quantum meruit, “which retains a contractual character,”

a promise to pay for services is “implied in fact.” Id. Under

the other theory of quantum meruit, an obligation to pay is

“implied in law” because the court imposes an “obligation

to pay a reasonable price on a party who has requested and

received the services of another, ‘as necessary to prevent

unjust enrichment.’ ”12 Id. (citing and quoting Restatement

(Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 31 comment e

12

We have cautioned that “the question of when enrichment is unjust does

not turn on whether one has been unjustly enriched in some abstract sense of

moral judgment,” but on whether the enrichment is unjustified by legal stan-

dards. Larisa’s Home Care, LLC v. Nichols-Shields, 362 Or 115, 126, 404 P3d 912

(2017).

Cite as 366 Or 100 (2020) 119

(2011)). The cited comment from the Restatement explains

that a claim pleading the latter theory of quantum mer-

uit states “a claim in restitution rather than contract” and

“usually asserts that the defendant is obligated to pay a rea-

sonable price for specified services rendered.” Restatement

§ 31 comment e.

It is the latter, equitable theory of quantum mer-

uit that is raised by the counterclaim in this case. We have

applied the equitable doctrine of quantum meruit to permit

recovery under circumstances comparable to those that

form the basis for defendant’s counterclaim here—where

one party conferred a benefit on another but was unable to

enforce an express agreement regarding payment because of

a failure of proof or other obstacles to enforcing the express

agreement.

In Kolve v. Maid Rite Shops, Inc., 282 Or 89, 92, 577

P2d 502 (1978), for example, the plaintiffs were unable to

prove that they had an enforceable contract with the defen-

dants regarding rent for the plaintiffs’ restaurant premises,

and the trial court granted relief in quantum meruit for the

reasonable rental value. In affirming that award, we empha-

sized that the defendants admittedly occupied the premises

and that “[i]t could hardly come as any surprise to defen-

dants, if they were successful in sustaining their denial of

a specific agreement as to the amount of the rental, that

the court might make an award based upon the reasonable

value of their use of the premises.” 282 Or at 92.

In Baker v. The First National Bank, 206 Or 434,

439, 293 P2d 742 (1956), we similarly emphasized the appro-

priate role of equitable recovery in quantum meruit when

a party is unable to enforce an express agreement to be

compensated for having provided a nongratuitous benefit.

In Baker, we affirmed an award in quantum meruit to a

plaintiff who had brought suit to recover the value of lodg-

ing and household services that she had provided to a dece-

dent before his death. Id. at 436. We described the plaintiff’s

quantum meruit claim as alleging “that there was an under-

standing that the plaintiff’s services were not gratuitous,

but that she was to be compensated.” Id. at 438. The plain-

tiff had offered evidence of writings signed by the deceased,

120 Jones v. Four Corners Rod and Gun Club

“providing that the plaintiff should share in his estate,” but

the writings were not in a form to be enforceable as wills

of the deceased. Id. at 439. This court explained that we

had previously “adopted a rule of law recognized in many

jurisdictions” that under those circumstances, “ ‘the person

who performed the services may recover by action in quan-

tum meruit against the recipient’s estate.’ ” Id. (quoting In re

Estate of T.A. Stoll, 188 Or 682, 696, 217 P2d 595 (1950)).

As the present case reaches this court, there is no

dispute that defendant furnished a valuable lodging bene-

fit to plaintiff; no dispute that plaintiff understood he was

expected to provide something of value to compensate defen-

dant for the lodging benefit; no dispute that market value

of the lodging benefit exceeded the amount that plaintiff

earned through minimum wages; and no dispute that, absent

equitable relief, plaintiff will have received the value of the

lodging benefit without providing anything of value to defen-

dant. As a general proposition, then, the established facts

appear to satisfy Oregon’s prima facie requirements for relief

in quantum meruit. Although it would not have been enough

for defendant to show only that plaintiff received a benefit

without compensation to defendant, we are persuaded that

our cases recognize that landlords generally have an equita-

ble interest in restitution for providing a lodging benefit to

a tenant who is aware that the benefit is not being provided

gratuitously. We agree with plaintiff and the dissent, how-

ever, that the restitution claim, nevertheless, might be dis-

qualified if we were to determine that defendant’s conduct in

the transaction was inequitable. See 366 Or at 130 (Nelson,

J., dissenting) (quoting Restatement § 63).13

b. Defendant’s counterclaim is “lawful.”

Plaintiff and amicus insist that defendant cannot

obtain equitable relief for providing the lodging benefit

because defendant violated the law in deducting the benefit

from plaintiff’s wages. But we are not persuaded. Amicus

relies on Hammond v. Oregon Etc. R. Co., 98 Or 1, 20, 193

13

Restatement § 63 provides that:

“Recovery in restitution to which an innocent claimant would be entitled

may be limited or denied because of the claimant’s inequitable conduct in the

transaction that is the source of the asserted liability.”

Cite as 366 Or 100 (2020) 121

P 457 (1920), in which this court endorsed the general rule

that courts will not enforce any rights arising from an “ille-

gal contract” when the parties are “in equal fault” but “will

afford relief where equity requires it,” if one party is “more

innocent.” Id. at 15, 19, 20. The rule and exception described

in Hammond are captured by section 32 of the Restatement

(Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (2011). As per-

tinent, that section provides:

“A person who renders performance under an agreement

that is illegal or otherwise unenforceable for reasons of

public policy may obtain restitution from the recipient * * *:

“* * * * *

“(2) * * * as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment,

if the allowance of restitution will not defeat or frustrate

the policy of the underlying prohibition. There is no unjust

enrichment if the claimant receives the counter perfor-

mance specified by the parties’ unenforceable agreement.

“(3) Restitution will be denied, notwithstanding the

enrichment of the defendant at the claimant’s expense, if

a claim under subsection (2) is foreclosed by the claimant’s

inequitable conduct (§ 63).”

Id. According to amicus, the rule demonstrates that defen-

dant’s conduct in unlawfully withholding the lodging benefit

from plaintiff’s wages precludes defendant from asserting a

“lawful” equitable counterclaim for the value of the lodging

benefit.

The argument, however, overlooks a key limita-

tion on the rule described in Hammond and in the quoted

Restatement section: both make clear that the rule denying

equitable relief from an “illegal contract” unless the party

is “more innocent” is a rule that applies when the contract,

itself, is illegal in its object or purpose. See Johnson Lbr.

Corp. v. Leonard et al., 192 Or 639, 651-52, 232 P2d 804,

adh’d to on reh’g, 192 Or 639, 236 P2d 926 (1951) (citing with

approval rule that “a party to an illegal contract, made so by

a prohibition of law, cannot obtain relief in law or in equity

* * * to have his illegal objects carried out; nor can he set up a

case in which he must necessarily disclose an illegal purpose

as the groundwork of his claim” (emphases added) (inter-

nal quotation marks and citations omitted)). For example,

122 Jones v. Four Corners Rod and Gun Club

the illegal agreement at issue in Hammond was a railroad’s

sale of land that was expressly prohibited by an 1869 act of

Congress—a sale to purchasers who were not “actual set-

tlers” and for a price greater than “two dollars and fifty cents

per acre.” 98 Or at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Restatement highlights an important equitable

distinction between transactions that have an illegal object

or purpose, like that in Hammond, and transactions that

are unlawful because of the way that they implement an

object or purpose that is otherwise lawful. As the comments

to section 32 explain, “a transaction that the law condemns

under any and all circumstances, such as an agreement to

commit a crime” has a different status in equity than “a

transaction that is intrinsically unobjectionable, but that

fails in some respect to comply with applicable regulatory

requirements,” such as “the formation of a contract (other-

wise legitimate) on terms that vary from those required by

law.” Restatement § 32 comment e. For the latter category of

cases, the comment explains that restitution is available,

“unless the court concludes that the allowance of restitu-

tion would defeat the policy of the regulation in question.

That conclusion is an appropriate inference only when judi-

cial respect for the regulatory scheme reasonably requires

forfeiture as a penalty for noncompliance.”

Id.

The Restatement advises that “[t]he decision whether

or not to employ forfeiture as a tool of regulatory enforcement

parallels the decision to be made” under the rule set out in

section 31 of the Restatement. Restatement § 32 comment e.

We explained in Klemp that section 31 of the Restatement

addresses “restitution to a performing party whose claim for

payment cannot be enforced on the basis of the other parties’

promise to pay because of the indefiniteness of the other par-

ties’ promise or a failure to satisfy an extrinsic requirement

of enforceability.” 363 Or at 74 n 12.14 We are persuaded that

14

That rule, set out in section 31 of the Restatement, provides, in pertinent

part:

“(1) A person who renders performance under an agreement that cannot

be enforced against the recipient by reason of

“* * * * *

Cite as 366 Or 100 (2020) 123

the distinction the Restatement draws—between a trans-

action “that the law condemns under any and all circum-

stances” and one that is “intrinsically unobjectionable” but

fails to comply with legally required terms—is consistent

with this court’s equitable jurisprudence. See, e.g., Baker,

206 Or at 436-39.

We are also persuaded that the parties’ agreement

in this case fits within the latter category because it sought

a result that was “intrinsically unobjectionable” under the

facts of this case. The legislature has expressly authorized

employers to “deduct from the minimum wage to be paid

employees under [certain statutes], the fair market value

of lodging, meals or other facilities or services furnished

by the employer for the private benefit of the employee.”

ORS 653.035. That is, in effect, the result that defendant

sought to accomplish, given the jury’s findings that defen-

dant furnished plaintiff with a “private benefit” and that

the fair market value of that benefit exceeded the amount

that plaintiff was entitled to in wages. But the legislature

has imposed specific requirements for accomplishing that

result in a lawful manner, and defendant failed to comply

with those requirements. ORS 652.610(3). Under the cir-

cumstances, we conclude that the parties’ agreement was

unenforceable because defendant failed to comply with

legally required terms for withholding wages; as the dis-

sent describes it, the illegality was “defendant’s failure to

follow the statutes regulating wage deductions for employ-

ees.” 366 Or at 134 (Nelson, J., dissenting). But that agree-

ment to provide lodging in lieu of paying wages of the same

value was “intrinsically unobjectionable” because it sought

a result that defendant could have accomplished legally

under ORS 653.035.15 Under the rule of equity described

above, restitution is generally available in these circum-

stances unless “judicial respect for the regulatory scheme

“(b) the failure to satisfy an extrinsic requirement of enforceability such

as the Statute of Frauds, has a claim in restitution against the recipient as

necessary to prevent unjust enrichment.”

Restatement § 31.

15

Plaintiff has never suggested that he was unwilling to provide written

consent for the deductions or that defendant’s failure to keep the records required

by ORS 652.610(3) was motivated by an improper purpose.

124 Jones v. Four Corners Rod and Gun Club

reasonably requires forfeiture as a penalty for noncompli-

ance.” Restatement § 32 comment e.

We are not persuaded that “judicial respect for the

regulatory scheme reasonably requires” defendant to forfeit

the value of the deducted benefit as part of the penalty for

defendant’s failure to comply with ORS 652.610(3), with one

important caveat. The jury here found that the fair market

value of the lodging benefit exceeded the minimum wage

owed to plaintiff by approximately $131 per month, but

there is no evidence that plaintiff expected to incur a finan-

cial obligation to defendant beyond the value of his mini-

mum wages. We agree with the dissent that defendant’s

failure to follow the statutes regulating wage deductions

denied plaintiff notice that his wages were falling short of

the value of his lodging benefit and denied him the opportu-

nity to make an informed choice about incurring that short-

fall. 366 Or at 132 (Nelson, J., dissenting). As the reporter

of the Restatement cautions, “restitution is properly denied if

the possibility of a recovery for benefits conferred would con-

stitute an unacceptable incentive to engage in the prohib-

ited transaction.” Restatement § 31 comment e. Thus, to the

extent that defendant sought to recover an amount for the

lodging benefit in excess of the amount for which he under-

stood defendant to expect compensation, that is a harm that

the regulatory scheme addresses and recovery beyond what

equity permits.

To the extent that defendant seeks restitution solely

for the value that plaintiff’s wages could have supplied,

however, nothing in our decision should create an incen-

tive for future employers to ignore the requirements of ORS

652.610(3) when deducting the value of a “private benefit”

from an employee’s wages. On the contrary, our decision

confirms that employers who fail to comply with the require-

ments of ORS 652.610(3) will be liable to the employee for

the full amount of unpaid wages plus interest, for the statu-

tory penalties, and for reasonable attorney fees.

We emphasize that plaintiff has identified no basis

for declaring defendant’s conduct to be inequitable apart

from the legislature’s decision to prohibit employers from

implementing a wages-for-lodging credit in this manner.

Cite as 366 Or 100 (2020) 125

We are sympathetic to the dissent’s view that employer’s

violation is significant. See 366 Or at 128-29 (Nelson, J.,

dissenting). The requirements of ORS 652.610(3) and the

legislature’s statutory enforcement mechanism serve “to

protect employees from unscrupulous or careless employ-

ers” who might otherwise deny employees the right to pay-

ment of their earned wages on a timely basis. See Nilsen,

253 Or at 269. But like other acts that statutes identify as

unlawful, we look to the legislature for guidance regarding

the appropriate consequences for the unlawful conduct. The

legislature has specified in detail the consequences for an

employer that fails to comply with the requirements of ORS

652.610(3) when it deducts wages to cover “lodging, meals

or other facilities or services” that have been provided for

the employee’s private benefit, and those consequences do

not include forfeiture of the “fair market value” of the ben-

efit. ORS 653.035. Allowing defendant to recover the value

of the lodging benefit through a claim in equity does not

exempt employer from any form of liability or penalty that

the legislature has chosen to impose as a consequence for

employer’s unlawful conduct, and we conclude that it is

not appropriate to supplement those “penalties expressly

announced by statute or regulation with a judge-made rule

of forfeiture.” See Restatement § 32 comment e.

In refusing to add forfeiture to the list of conse-

quences that the legislature has specified for defendant’s

noncompliance with ORS 652.610(3), we are mindful of

another caution offered in the Restatement, that “[f]orfeiture

as a judge-created sanction is particularly to be avoided

when it exacts a penalty disproportionate to the infraction,

transferred as a private windfall to a party who has suffered

no injury.” Restatement § 32 comment e. The legislature has

allowed employers to recover the value of the kind of “pri-

vate benefit” conferred here, and the legislature has cho-

sen a proportionate penalty when an employer attempts to

recover that value without complying with ORS 652.610(3).

The legislature has not made forfeiture a part of the propor-

tionate penalty, and we decline to impose a rule of forfeiture

as an additional judge-created penalty.

Thus, we generally agree with defendant that the

trial court did not err in allowing defendant to prevail on

126 Jones v. Four Corners Rod and Gun Club

its counterclaims for the value of the “private benefit” that

it provided. But we disagree in one respect. The judgment

specifies that defendant has a “valid offset” in the amount

of $43,403—the “value” of the lodging benefit that defen-

dant provided to plaintiff but in excess of the value for which

plaintiff expected to compensate defendant through his

minimum wages. Under those circumstances, the equitable

recoupment to which defendant is entitled for the value of

the lodging benefit is limited to the value of the wages to

which the jury found plaintiff is entitled for his labor.

We emphasize that our conclusion that defendant

can prevail on its equitable counterclaim does not alter our

conclusions that the trial court erred in awarding defen-

dant attorney fees and erred in failing to identify plaintiff

as the prevailing party on his first claim for relief and to

award plaintiff attorney fees on that claim. Rather, in a

wage action with both claims and counterclaims, the trial

court must separately calculate all of the wages, penalties,

interest, and attorney fees due on the plaintiff’s claims,

and all amounts due to the defendant on the counterclaims.

ORS 20.077(2). Only then is it appropriate to compare the

two recoveries and identify the party to whom a net money

award is due. The case is remanded to the trial court for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including

to enter a judgment in favor of plaintiff on his first claim

for relief, including his request for attorney fees; to deny

defendant’s counterclaim for attorney fees; and to address

the remaining attorney fee issues as directed by the Court

of Appeals.16

The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed as

to plaintiff’s first claim for relief and defendant’s equitable

affirmative defenses and counterclaim for attorney fees, but

16

In the Court of Appeals, plaintiff also challenged the trial court’s rul-

ing on his third claim for relief, which sought a penalty under ORS 652.615 for

the unlawful deductions from wages. See Jones, 290 Or App at 820. The Court

of Appeals held that the trial court was not required to base the penalty on

“actual damages” because it concluded that plaintiff suffered no actual dam-

ages on his claim for unpaid wages. Id. The parties have offered no argument

regarding whether our determination that plaintiff prevailed on his wage claim

affects the ruling on plaintiff’s penalty claim, and we decline to address that

question.

Cite as 366 Or 100 (2020) 127

it is otherwise affirmed. The judgment of the circuit court is

affirmed in part and reversed in part.

NELSON, J., dissenting.

The majority concludes that defendant’s violation of

ORS 652.610(3) by unlawfully withholding plaintiff’s wages

prevented defendant from asserting the value of the lodging

benefit as an affirmative defense to defeat plaintiff’s wage

claim. I agree with that conclusion. 366 Or at 102. At the

same time, however, the majority also has concluded that

defendant’s unlawful withholding of wages in violation of

ORS 652.610(3) did not prevent defendant from prevailing

on a counterclaim for the value of the lodging benefit. Id.

I disagree with that proposition and therefore respectfully

dissent.

The point at which the majority and I part company

concerns the notion that denying equitable relief on an ille-

gal contract is applicable only “when the contract, itself, is

illegal in its object or purpose.” 366 Or at 121. According

to the majority, although the parties’ agreement was unen-

forceable because defendant failed to comply with the legally

required terms for withholding wages, the agreement was

nevertheless “intrinsically unobjectionable” because it

sought an otherwise legal result, 366 Or at 123, a fact that,

in the majority’s view, now validates the equitable recov-

ery sought by defendant. As section 32 of the Restatement

(Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (2011) makes

clear, however, that rule holds true only to the extent that

an “allowance of restitution will not defeat or frustrate the

policy of the underlying prohibition.” In my view, allow-

ing defendant in this case to prevail on its counterclaim—

which arises directly from defendant’s wholesale violation

of Oregon’s wage deduction statutes—will indeed frustrate

Oregon’s wage policies by allowing important wage-earner

safeguards to be co-opted to the often-contrary purposes of

errant wage-payers.

As a threshold matter, it is worth noting that,

although the majority has extensively cited the Restatement

(Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (2011), it

has nevertheless omitted discussion of important limiting

128 Jones v. Four Corners Rod and Gun Club

principles that apply to that area of law. Among those prin-

ciples is this:

“The fact that a recipient has obtained a benefit without

paying for it does not of itself establish that the recipient

has been unjustly enriched.”

Restatement § 2 (1). In that regard, the Restatement clarifies

that “[t]o be the subject of a claim in restitution, the benefit

conferred must be something in which the claimant has a

legally protected interest, and it must be acquired or retained

in a manner that the law regards as unjustified.” Id. at com-

ment b (emphasis added). As I explain in greater detail

below, because defendant failed to adhere to the require-

ments for (1) lawfully paying plaintiff a minimum wage and

(2) lawfully deducting plaintiff’s housing expense from that

minimum wage, I believe that defendant was precluded from

claiming a legally protected interest in, and restitution of,

that deduction for the housing expense following plaintiff’s

justifiably initiated wage action against defendant.

Plaintiff has argued, in part, that the salary deduc-

tions relied on by defendant as the basis for its counter-

claims were themselves prohibited as unlawful under ORS

652.610. I agree. The statutes and rules controlling wage

deductions in Oregon demonstrate that, while deductions

for food, lodging, and other services can, indeed, serve as

credits against an employee’s minimum wage, they can only

function as such when the mandatory requirements of ORS

652.610(3)(b) have been met. To recap briefly, that statute

requires that such deductions be (1) voluntarily authorized

in writing by the employee, (2) furnished for the employee’s

benefit, and (3) recorded in the employer’s books. Indeed,

OAR 839-020-0025(5)(d) specifically provides that the fair

market value of employer-furnished meals, lodging, facili-

ties, and services can be deducted from an employee’s min-

imum wage only when, together with other requirements,

“[t]he meals, lodging, or other facilities and services are pro-

vided in a lawful manner.” Here, by admitting its failure

to follow the wage deduction tenets otherwise required by

Oregon law, defendant also tacitly admitted to unlawfully

providing plaintiff with lodging to the extent that the value

of that lodging was expected to be deducted from plaintiff’s

minimum wage.

Cite as 366 Or 100 (2020) 129

The unlawfulness of that wage deduction finds

further support in the fact that violations of ORS 652.610

are subject to criminal penalties as well as private causes

of action. See ORS 652.990(8) (“Violation of ORS 652.610 or

652.620 is a Class D violation.”). Viewed from that perspec-

tive, defendant’s failure to adhere to the requirements of

ORS 652.610 amounted to something more than simply a

record-keeping misstep; it constituted a per se illegal act not

unlike those set out in the Oregon Criminal Code.

That observation is particularly apt here, given

that the only basis for the wage deduction in this case—i.e.,

the parties’ employment contract—is no longer recognized

for that purpose under Oregon law. There was, to be sure,

a time when Oregon law expressly permitted employment

contracts to authorize deductions from an employee’s wage.

In that regard, former ORS 652.610(3)(d) (1979) allowed

employers to deduct sums from their employees’ wages if

“[t]he deduction is pursuant to an individual employment

contract with the employer[.]” In 1981, however, the legisla-

ture removed that subsection from the provisions governing

wage deductions, while at the same time amending former

ORS 652.610(3)(b) (1979) to predicate employee wage deduc-

tions on written employee authorizations. See Or Laws 1981,

ch 594, § 5 (amending statute). Those amendments under-

score a clear legislative intent to no longer recognize the

validity of employee wage deductions that are based solely

on the terms of an employment contract. In this case, the

parties’ employment contract provided the only support for

the lodging-for-labor wage deductions that underpinned

defendant’s recovery below. Because that contract was not a

lawful ground for such deductions, it is not incorrect to view

the deductions at issue here as similarly unlawful.

That perspective, in turn, leads me to conclude that

allowing defendant a recovery based on such deductions

would be improper, given that those deductions were unlaw-

ful insofar as they were unauthorized by, and contrary to,

the public policy informing Oregon’s wage and hour stat-

utes. On review, defendant—having conceded that it owed

plaintiff unpaid minimum wages and statutory penalties—

nevertheless contended that, without the favorable trial

court judgment it received below, plaintiff would reap the

130 Jones v. Four Corners Rod and Gun Club

benefit of his minimum wage award and free rent at defen-

dant’s expense. The majority’s position appears to be that

such an outcome is outweighed by the specter of an inequi-

table windfall in plaintiff’s favor.

Under section 63 of the Restatement (Third) of

Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, a claimant’s own

improper conduct may preclude restitution. That section

provides:

“Recovery in restitution to which an innocent claimant

would be entitled may be limited or denied because of the

claimant’s inequitable conduct in the transaction that is

the source of the asserted liability.”

The principle animating that statement is “one of judicial

forbearance, and its concern is with the disqualification of

the claimant.” Id., comment a. “The idea is that a person

who engages in inequitable conduct may forfeit the right to

a judicial determination of what ‘equity and good conscience’

require of the other party to the transaction.” Id. Thus, as

explained in comment c of the Restatement, section 63 was

added and is separate from section 32, on which the major-

ity relies, because “equitable disqualification” under section

63 “will potentially block other restitution claims as well.”

In other words, the “potential reach of equitable disqual-

ification is thus broader than a mere refusal to enforce or

relieve against illegal transactions.” Id.

I, for one, am happy to weigh the equities arising

from defendant’s unlawful wage deductions against the clear

requirements of the wage and hour statutes. The stated pol-

icy goals underlying Oregon’s wage and hour statutes have

long been simple ones: facilitate wage earners’ prompt col-

lection of wages owed them and protect them from employ-

ers who might leverage a position of economic superiority to

forestall the collection of those wages. This court acknowl-

edged as much over 50 years ago in State ex rel Nilsen v. Ore.

Motor Ass’n., 248 Or 133, 138, 432 P2d 512 (1967), when it

observed that the

“policy of [ORS 652.310 through 652.410] is to aid an

employe [sic] in the prompt collection of compensation due

him and to discourage an employer from using a position of

Cite as 366 Or 100 (2020) 131

economic superiority as a lever to dissuade an employe [sic]

from promptly collecting his agreed compensation.”

(Emphasis added.) See also Lamy v. Jack Jarvis & Company,

Inc., 281 Or 307, 313, 574 P2d 1107 (1978) (noting that in

typical employee/employer relationship marked by disparity

in economic power between the parties, central purpose of

wage and hour statutes was to assure prompt payment of

wages).

And in furthering a level playing field between

employers and employees in matters concerning wage claims,

Oregon’s wage and hour provisions maintain a unique

primacy vis-à-vis workplace contracts that might contra-

vene those protections. That is so because ORS 652.360(1)

expressly renders those statutes superior to any contrary

means that an employer might apply to remove itself from

the ambit and effect of the wage and hour provisions:

“An employer may not by special contract or any other

means exempt the employer from any provision of or liabil-

ity or penalty imposed by ORS 652.310 to 652.414 or any

statute relating to the payment of wages, except insofar as

the Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor and Industries in

writing approves a special contract or other arrangement

between the employer and one or more of the employer’s

employees.”

(Emphasis added.) This court has held that that statutory

proscription preventing employers from exempting them-

selves from “any provision” relating to the payment of wages

encompasses, among other things, contract terms that are

contrary to those wage provisions. See Taylor v. Werner

Enterprises, Inc., 329 Or 461, 468-69, 980 P2d 384 (1999)

(holding that, under ORS 652.360, where parent company

hired long-haul truck driver and wage statutes defined

“employer” as one so engaging an employee, the fact that

the employment contract expressly identified parent com-

pany’s wholly owned subsidiary as truck driver’s employer

did not exempt parent company from liability for wage claim

violation).

The rule articulated in ORS 652.360(1) and exem-

plified in Taylor is applicable here. Although defendant

was free to enter into an agreement with plaintiff to trade

132 Jones v. Four Corners Rod and Gun Club

its lodging as consideration for plaintiff’s labor, defendant

was not free to do so under a contract that ignored virtu-

ally every minimum wage and wage deduction requirement

put in place by the legislature to protect wage earners like

plaintiff from harm at an employer’s hand. And in this mat-

ter, the harm to plaintiff was something more than simply

defendant’s failure to keep proper records. At trial, the jury

determined that the minimum wage owed plaintiff for the

36 months he worked for defendant was $38,642, while the

fair market rental value of the trailer defendant had sup-

plied plaintiff over the same period was $43,403. The result-

ing difference of $4,731 calculates to approximately a net

loss of $131 that plaintiff would have owed each month for

the privilege of being defendant’s employee were it not for

the good offices of the majority on review. Nothing in the

record, however, suggests that plaintiff was ever informed of

that formulation prior to, or during, his term of employment.

Had defendant followed the law governing wage deductions

in Oregon, however, plaintiff would have immediately been

put on notice regarding the actual wage calculus being

applied to his situation when he signed a written authori-

zation for his wage deductions. And if not at that time, then

certainly at his first scheduled payday, when defendant was

required to facilitate a full settlement with plaintiff for any

sum plaintiff may have owed his employer from the preced-

ing pay period. See OAR 839-020-0025(4) (so stating).

Had those procedures been followed as the law

required, plaintiff would have had the option of either

(1) knowingly remaining in defendant’s employ under terms

that were clear and clearly acceptable to him, (2) renegoti-

ating his employment contract, or (3) quitting his job, all of

which would have been preferable to having the true cost of

his employment kept from him. While the majority has prop-

erly spared plaintiff from the sub rosa accrual of a $4,731

obligation to defendant in this case, there is no guarantee

that similarly situated plaintiffs will fare as well in future

cases, particularly ones in which the agreed-upon terms of

employment are different, ambiguous, or nonexistent.

Because Oregon’s wage and hour statutes were

enacted to protect wage earners from employers who might

use their positions of economic superiority to hinder the

Cite as 366 Or 100 (2020) 133

payment of such wages, those statutes represent sound pub-

lic policy geared toward remediating inequities arising from

that power disparity. As such, those statutes are subject to

the “ancient maxim that remedial statutes are to be con-

strued liberally to effectuate the purposes for which they

were created.” Halperin v. Pitts, 352 Or 482, 495, 287 P3d

1069 (2012). See also Sunshine Dairy v. Peterson et al., 183

Or 305, 317, 193 P2d 543 (1948) (“A remedial statute should

receive liberal construction so as to afford all the relief

within the power of the court which the language of the act

indicates that the legislature intended to grant.”); Stanley

v. Smith, 15 Or 505, 510, 16 P 174 (1887) (remedial statutes

“are to be liberally construed and applied for the purpose of

giving full effect to the legislative intent”). In wage-related

matters such as this one, that means, if nothing else, that

“the offending party should not be allowed to take advantage

of its own wrong in order to escape liability.” Turney v. J. H.

Tillman Co., 112 Or 122, 130, 228 P 933 (1924). Although the

majority decision in this case ensures that employer will not

entirely escape liability, it also enables employer to leverage

its own wage violations to obtain a recovery that Oregon’s

wage policies clearly preclude.

As a result, in situations like this—where an

employer has unlawfully deducted the cost of employer-

supplied food or lodging from an employee’s wage and then

counterclaimed in a subsequent wage action to recover sums

arising from those unlawful deductions—I submit that

employer’s counterclaims should give way to the clear pub-

lic policy concerns ensconced in Oregon’s wage claim stat-

utes. In that regard, it is important to emphasize that this

is not a case in which an employer substantially complied

with Oregon’s wage deduction requirements save for some

de minimis shortcoming: Here, defendant failed to follow

any of the statutory wage deduction provisions enacted to

protect plaintiff.

This court’s case law makes clear that “Oregon does

not enforce contracts that are unconscionable or otherwise

violate public policy[.]” Trinity v. Apex Directional Drilling

LLC, 363 Or 257, 261, 434 P3d 20 (2018). In determining

whether an agreement is illegal because it is contrary to

public policy, the test is “the evil tendency of the contract and

134 Jones v. Four Corners Rod and Gun Club

not its actual injury to the public in a particular instance.”

Bagley v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc., 356 Or 543, 552, 340 P3d 27

(2014). Here, the “evil tendency” arising out of defendant’s

failure to follow the statutes regulating wage deductions for

employees was at least two-fold. First, it served to conceal

from plaintiff the true cost of his employment with defen-

dant until it was too late to amend the terms giving rise to

those costs. And second, the effect of allowing the counter-

claim as “lawful” permits defendant to use its admittedly

unlawful actions to recover what Oregon’s wage laws other-

wise prohibited. As a matter of public policy, such outcomes

are matters that this court should take steps to repudiate,

not ratify.

At the end of the day, the equitable nature of defen-

dant’s counterclaims should not be allowed to override the

overarching purpose of this state’s wage and hour provi-

sions. As a public policy matter, it is well within the pur-

view of this court to excuse the performance of a contractual

obligation that is contrary to the public interest. Wright v.

Schutt Const. Co., 262 Or 619, 621, 500 P2d 1045 (1972). We

should do so here regarding the contractual obligation that,

according to the majority, now subjugates plaintiff’s recov-

ery to defendant’s counterclaim. Because we do not, how-

ever, I respectfully dissent.

Nakamoto, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.