In re Dependency of E.M.

FILE

THIS OPINION WAS FILED

FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON

OCTOBER 17, 2024

IN CLERK’S OFFICE

SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON SARAH R. PENDLETON

OCTOBER 17, 2024 ACTING SUPREME COURT CLERK

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In re the Dependency of

E.M., J.M., and I.M., No. 103129-7

EN BANC

Filed: October 17, 2024

PER CURIAM—This case concerns the procedures prescribed by statute for

child dependency proceedings. When the Department of Children, Youth, and Families

(DCYF) files a dependency petition, the trial court must hold a “fact-finding hearing,”

which is subject to the rules of evidence. RCW 13.34.110(1). At the fact-finding

hearing, the department has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the

evidence that the child is “dependent,” as defined by statute. Id. If the child is found

dependent, the court “shall hold a disposition hearing” to determine placement,

services, and visitation. RCW 13.34.110(4). In contrast to the fact-finding hearing, the

rules of evidence do not apply at the disposition hearing. ER 1101(c)(3).

In this case, J.M.L., the father of E.M., J.M., and I.M., agreed that his

children were dependent, but he opposed the department’s request that he participate in

NO. 103129-7 PAGE 2

a domestic violence (DV) assessment and any recommended treatment. Following a

disposition hearing, the trial court granted the department’s request for DV services and

J.M.L. appealed, arguing in relevant part that the trial court erred in considering hearsay

evidence offered by the department.

The Court of Appeals agreed that the hearsay statements should have been

excluded pursuant to the rules of evidence, opining that the hearing on DV services was

not actually a disposition hearing but “was, in effect, a continuation of the dependency

fact-finding hearing.” In re Dependency of E.M., No. 84605-1-I, slip op. at 9 (Wash.

Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2024) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov

/opinions/pdf/846051.pdf. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals affirmed in result,

holding that “[t]he findings of fact in the agreed dependency order were alone

sufficient” to support the order for DV services. Id. at 13.

We granted review to clarify that dependency fact-finding hearings and

disposition hearings are separate proceedings, subject to different rules, serving

different purposes. A trial court’s determination of services is part of the disposition

hearing, at which the rules of evidence do not apply. Accordingly, the trial court did not

err in considering hearsay statements at the hearing on DV services in this case. We

affirm the Court of Appeals in result, and we affirm the trial court’s dispositional order

requiring J.M.L. to participate in DV services.

FACTS

Prior to the department’s involvement with J.M.L.’s family, he was arrested

in January 2020 after his children’s mother reported a DV incident to police. J.M.L.

entered a stipulated order of continuance in which the State agreed to dismiss the

charges without prejudice if J.M.L. had no hostile contact with any intimate partner,

family member, or household members and did not violate any criminal laws. But a

NO. 103129-7 PAGE 3

year later, in January 2021, the mother reported to the police that J.M.L. had again

assaulted her in their home.

After the birth of the couple’s third child in late 2021, the department filed a

dependency petition, initially focused on the mother’s alcohol abuse, and the parents

agreed to a shelter care order. The department later filed an amended petition, noting

that J.M.L. had a pending fourth degree assault charge related to a DV assault of the

mother, and that he had entered a stipulated order of continuance in which he agreed to

not have hostile contact with the mother through May 2023.

In May 2022, J.M.L. was arrested following another alleged assault of the

mother. The department moved for the children to be placed out of home with

monitored visitation, arguing in part that they were being exposed to DV. The superior

court entered an agreed order of dependency as to J.M.L., which included agreed, non-

DV facts establishing dependency. Additionally, while the father did not admit to the

alleged DV, he did agree that the court could read specific DV allegations in

determining a basis for dependency:

I do not object to the court reading the following allegations and determining

a basis for dependency therefrom.

….

1. [J.M.L.] has been alleged to commit acts of domestic violence against [the

mother].

i. [J.M.L.] was charged with Assault 4 DV against [the mother] in

January 2020 and May 2022. There is currently an active no contact

order restricting [J.M.L.] from having contact with [the mother].

ii. DCYF received a report that following an argument between the

parents there was broken glass on the floor and the children were

observed running around barefoot.

iii. The social worker has observed injuries on [the mother]’s body,

including a swollen lip, scab above her lip, a cut inside her lip, and

swollen nose, that [the mother] reported were caused by from [J.M.L].

iv. Following a reported DV incident in May 2022, [E.M.] told his

therapist that his father hurt his mother and said “my dad was sitting

on top of her” and “I was scared and sad.” [The mother] also reported

a prior incident where [J.M.L.] strangled her while the children were

home.

NO. 103129-7 PAGE 4

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 602-03. The court ordered J.M.L. to participate in several agreed

services but reserved its decision as to DV services pending a disposition hearing.

At the disposition hearing, the department submitted a declaration from the

assigned social worker describing a phone call from the mother about the May 2022

assault, as well as the social worker’s observations of injuries on the mother’s face,

reportedly from the assault. The declaration also stated that one of the children, E.M.,

had reported to his therapist that the May 2022 assault was frightening because the

mother was “‘bleeding’” and J.M.L. “‘was sitting on her head.’” Id. at 741. The

department also submitted J.M.L.’s stipulated continuance from his January 2020 arrest

(which included the police report from the assault), the arrest reports from the January

2021 and May 2022 incidents, and notes from E.M.’s therapist.

J.M.L. acknowledged that because it was a disposition hearing, the rules of

evidence did not apply. Nevertheless, he argued that the hearsay evidence submitted by

the department should be given little weight because it was “not, on its face, reliable.”

Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (Oct. 13, 2022) at 15. The court noted that due to the status of

the hearing, it was allowed to consider hearsay evidence and ultimately ruled:

[B]ased on the hearsay evidence that is before me today, I am finding by a

preponderance of the evidence is the applicable standard. But, even if it is

not, I am finding by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that there is a

nexus between the need for this service and the parental deficiency that the

father has, that the children witnessing domestic violence in the household,

and there is a need for a domestic violence evaluation and follow-up

treatment.

Id. at 19. The court then entered an order finding that the children had witnessed DV in

the home and that there was a nexus between J.M.L.’s parental deficiency and the need

for the DV assessment and recommended treatment. CP at 112-13. J.M.L. sought

review in the Court of Appeals, and while review was pending, he completed the DV

NO. 103129-7 PAGE 5

assessment and was granted derivative use immunity, preventing any possible violation

of his Fifth Amendment rights.

The Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed the disposition order.1 However,

the court held that pursuant to the rules of evidence, the hearsay evidence submitted by

the department should have been excluded. Although the rules of evidence do not apply

at disposition hearings, the Court of Appeals opined that the hearing on DV services

was actually part of the fact-finding hearing in this case, reasoning that the only purpose

of a disposition hearing is to address a dependent child’s placement. Nevertheless, the

Court of Appeals held that “[t]he findings of fact in the agreed dependency order were

alone sufficient” to affirm in result. E.M., No. 84605-1-I, slip op. at 13.

As noted, we granted J.M.L.’s motion for discretionary review to clarify the

difference between dependency fact-finding hearings and disposition hearings.

ANALYSIS

J.M.L. contends that the Court of Appeals departed from statute, precedent,

and long-settled practice in holding that services for a parent must be ordered in a

dependency fact-finding hearing instead of a disposition hearing. The department

concedes that the Court of Appeals erroneously characterized the hearing on DV

services as part of the fact-finding hearing in this case. We agree with the parties. When

read together, the dependency statutes show that a determination of court-ordered

services is part of a disposition hearing, not a fact-finding hearing. The rules of evidence

do not apply at disposition hearings. ER 1101(c)(3). Therefore, the trial court properly

considered the department’s hearsay evidence at the disposition hearing on DV services

1

The court determined that the father’s appeal was not moot because his refusal to

participate in the court-ordered treatment could be used against him in future proceedings,

and he sought relief from having to comply with DV treatment recommendations.

NO. 103129-7 PAGE 6

in this case. Nevertheless, we agree with the department that the Court of Appeals

reached the correct result in affirming the superior court’s order for DV services.

To resolve the procedural question presented here, we must read the

dependency statutes as whole. First, when a dependency petition is filed, the trial court

shall hold a fact-finding hearing on the petition and, unless the court

dismisses the petition, shall make written findings of fact, stating the reasons

therefor. The rules of evidence shall apply at the fact-finding hearing …. The

petitioner shall have the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the

evidence that the child is dependent within the meaning of RCW 13.34.030.

RCW 13.34.110(1). This statute does not include services as part of the “fact-finding”

determination. To the contrary, the sole consideration at the fact-finding hearing is

whether “the child is dependent” as defined by statute. The statutory definition of a

“dependent child” does not reference services for the parent. RCW 13.34.030(6).

Next, if it has been proved that a child is dependent, “[i]mmediately after the

entry of the findings of fact, the court shall hold a disposition hearing, unless there is

good cause for continuing the matter for up to fourteen days.” RCW 13.34.110(4).

Following the disposition hearing, RCW 13.34.130 provides that the court must enter

an order of disposition that either maintains the child in their home with “services to

assist the parents in maintaining the child in the home” or removes the child from their

home to an “out-of-home placement.” RCW 13.34.130(1)(a), (6). Where the child is

removed from their home, RCW 13.34.130 specifies placement preferences for the

child based on various considerations.

Here, the Court of Appeals purported to “clarify the distinction between a

dependency fact-finding hearing and a disposition hearing” by reading RCW 13.34.130

in isolation, holding that the sole purpose of a disposition hearing is “to determine the

placement of the children.” E.M., No. 84605-1-I, slip op. at 7-8. Based on this

NO. 103129-7 PAGE 7

interpretation, the court concluded that the hearing on DV services in this case “was, in

effect, a continuation of the dependency fact-finding hearing and the rules of such a

hearing applied,” including the rules of evidence. Id. at 9-10. However, this analysis

fails to read the dependency statutes as a whole.

As noted above, the plain language of RCW 13.34.110(1) provides that the

purpose of a fact-finding hearing is to determine whether the child is dependent.

“‘[O]nce intervention into the family’s life is authorized by the establishment of

dependency, the court can require a parent to participate in a service when the

circumstances in the record support the particular service.’” In re Dependency of

W.W.S., 14 Wn. App. 2d 342, 363, 469 P.3d 1190 (2020) (emphasis omitted) (quoting

court papers). In other words, the issue of services is relevant only if the court first

determines that the child is, in fact, dependent. Thus, the issue of services cannot be

confined to the initial dependency fact-finding hearing, as the Court of Appeals held.

Moreover, the Court of Appeals’ analysis does not account for the statutory

provisions governing stipulated and agreed orders in dependency proceedings, which

are directly relevant here. Parents may enter stipulated or agreed orders as to

“dependency,” or “disposition,” or both, “subject to approval by the court.” RCW

13.34.110(3)(a), (b). Agreed orders of dependency and disposition may be considered

“at the same time,” if the parent agrees to both. RCW 13.34.110(3)(a). However, the

statute clearly contemplates such orders may be considered separately, providing that

if a parent agrees to an order of dependency, the court must establish on the record that

the parent understands their “responsibility to participate in remedial services as

provided in any disposition order.” RCW 13.34.110(3)(c)(i) (emphasis added).

NO. 103129-7 PAGE 8

Thus, a parent may agree that their child is dependent but disagree as to the

disposition of the case. That is what occurred here; J.M.L. entered an agreed order of

dependency, but he disputed the appropriate disposition as pertaining to DV-related

services. Before deciding whether to order such services, the trial court was required to

“receive and review a social study” from the department, which must “include all social

files and may also include facts relating to the child’s cultural heritage.” RCW

13.34.110(3)(b), .120(1). Importantly, this “social study” cannot be considered “in

connection with the fact-finding hearing or prior to factual determination, except as

otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence.” RCW 13.34.110(3)(b) (emphasis

added). Instead, the purpose of the “social study and proposed service plan” is “[t]o aid

the court in its decision on disposition.” RCW 13.34.120(1) (emphasis added); see also

In re Dependency of M.R., 166 Wn. App. 504, 520 n.2, 270 P.3d 607 (2012) (“RCW

13.34.120 addresses entry of a disposition order following the establishment of a

dependency.”).

Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals’ interpretation, the dependency

statutes as a whole clearly contemplate remedial services for the parent as part of the

disposition hearing. The Court of Appeals decision is also contrary to published case

law holding that a trial court “may order services to facilitate parent-child reunification”

only after “‘intervention into the family’s life is authorized by the establishment of

dependency.’” In re Dependency of D.C.-M., 162 Wn. App. 149, 158, 253 P.3d 112

(2011); W.W.S., 14 Wn. App. 2d at 363 (quoting court papers); see also In re

Dependency of Z.A., 29 Wn. App. 2d 167, 197, 540 P.3d 173 (2023), rev’d in part on

other grounds, 3 Wn.3d 530, 553 P.3d 1117 (2024).

NO. 103129-7 PAGE 9

Here, the hearing on DV services was part of the disposition hearing, not a

fact-finding hearing. Because it was a disposition hearing, the rules of evidence did not

apply, and the trial court properly considered hearsay evidence submitted by the

department. This hearsay evidence, along with other evidence in the record, supports

the trial court’s finding that there is a nexus between J.M.L.’s need for DV services and

his parenting deficiencies. Therefore, J.M.L. has not shown that the trial court abused

its discretion.

CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the determination of services was

an extension of the dependency fact-finding hearing. We clarify that the determination

of services is part of the disposition hearing. Nonetheless, we affirm in result and we

affirm the trial court’s order requiring J.M.L. to participate in DV services.