The opinion
No. 557 August 7, 2024 299
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
ROXANNE MARTIN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
Nichole BROWN,
Superintendent,
Coffee Creek Correctional Institution,
Defendant-Respondent.
Washington County Circuit Court
20CV41775; A179629
Patricia A. Sullivan, Judge.
Submitted July 3, 2024.
Jedediah Peterson and O’Connor Weber, LLC, filed the
brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Erin K. Galli, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Egan, Presiding Judge, Hellman, Judge, and
Walters, Senior Judge.
HELLMAN, J.
Affirmed.
300 Martin v. Brown
HELLMAN, J.
Petitioner appeals from a judgment that denied her
petition for post-conviction relief. In her sole assignment of
error, petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred
when it denied relief on her claim that trial counsel pro-
vided inadequate and ineffective assistance of counsel when
he failed to advise her of a possible ground for a motion to
suppress her statements to police. For the reasons below, we
affirm.
We review the post-conviction court’s decision for
legal error. Green v. Franke, 357 Or 301, 312, 350 P3d 188
(2015). “A post-conviction court’s findings of historical fact
are binding on this court if there is evidence in the record to
support them.” Id.
The relevant facts are as follows. Petitioner shot her
husband, killing him. Petitioner was charged with murder
but, after a settlement conference, pleaded guilty to first-
degree manslaughter. Thereafter, she sought post-conviction
relief, arguing that her trial counsel provided inadequate
and ineffective representation when he failed to advise her of
the possibility of filing a motion to suppress the statements
that she had made to police officers during her first inter-
view.1 Specifically, petitioner argued that she was so intox-
icated during that initial interview that she did not know-
ingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive her Miranda rights.
Petitioner further argued that she was prejudiced by counsel’s
failure to advise her of the possibility of filing a such a motion.
The post-conviction court denied relief, finding that
trial counsel was credible and that
“Trial Counsel discussed the possibility of filing a motion
to suppress her statements * * * with Petitioner and made
a reasonable strategic decision not to proceed based on
Trial Counsel’s assessment [of] the motion based on [the]
demeanor of Petitioner during the interview and her
1
Petitioner’s opening brief argues, in part, that counsel’s failure to file a
meritorious motion to suppress petitioner’s statements amounted to inadequate
and ineffective assistance of counsel. Those arguments are unpreserved, and we
do not address them. As petitioner made clear in both her trial memorandum and
her oral arguments to the post-conviction court, her claim was focused solely on
the allegation that counsel failed to advise her of the possibility of filing a motion
to suppress her statements.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 334 Or App 299 (2024) 301
recollection of and statements about the interview in a sec-
ond interview when she was not intoxicated.”
The post-conviction court further found that “Petitioner
directed Trial Counsel to pursue negotiations to get the
best result possible” and that “Counsel followed her direc-
tions and did not act unreasonably in doing so.” The post-
conviction court entered judgment denying relief. This
appeal followed.
A petitioner claiming inadequate assistance of coun-
sel under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution
has the burden “to show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
facts demonstrating that trial counsel failed to exercise rea-
sonable professional skill and judgment and that petitioner
suffered prejudice as a result.” Trujillo v. Maass, 312 Or 431,
435, 822 P2d 703 (1991). Under the federal standard, a peti-
tioner is required to “show that counsel’s representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that as a
result, petitioner was prejudiced. Strickland v. Washington,
466 US 668, 687, 104 S Ct 2052, 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). As
the Oregon Supreme Court has recognized, those standards
are “functionally equivalent.” Montez v. Czerniak, 355 Or 1,
6-7, 322 P3d 487 (2014).
Here, the post-conviction court’s findings of fact
are dispositive of petitioner’s claim. The post-conviction
court found that counsel “discussed the possibility of filing
a motion to suppress her statements” with petitioner. The
record supports that finding. As a result, the post-conviction
court did not err when it denied petitioner’s claim that her
attorney provided constitutionally inadequate or ineffective
assistance of counsel when he failed to advise her of a possi-
ble ground for a motion to suppress her statements.
Affirmed.