The opinion
Cite as 2024 Ark. 146
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CV-24-492
Opinion Delivered: October 14, 2024
JENNIFER MCGILL, INDIVIDUALLY
AND ON BEHALF OF THE
ARKANSAS CANVASSING AN ORIGINAL ACTION
COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE; AND
CHEROKEE NATION
ENTERTAINMENT, LLC PETITION DENIED.
PETITIONERS
V.
JOHN THURSTON, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS ARKANSAS
SECRETARY OF STATE
RESPONDENT
LOCAL VOTERS IN CHARGE, A
BALLOT QUESTION COMMITTEE;
AND JIM KNIGHT, INDIVIDUALLY
AND ON BEHALF OF LOCAL
VOTERS IN CHARGE
INTERVENORS
COURTNEY RAE HUDSON, Associate Justice
Petitioners Jennifer McGill, individually and on behalf of the Arkansas Canvassing
Compliance Committee, and Cherokee Nation Entertainment, LLC (CNE), filed this
original action challenging the sufficiency of a proposed constitutional amendment
(Proposed Amendment) regarding the Pope County casino license. The petitioners’
two-count petition alleges that the decision of respondent John Thurston, in his official
capacity as Arkansas Secretary of State (Secretary), to certify the Proposed Amendment was
invalid. In Count I, the petitioners allege that the number of signatures collected is
insufficient once invalid signatures are removed from the Secretary’s count. In Count II, the
petitioners allege that the popular name and ballot title are insufficient. Local Voters in
Charge (LVC), a ballot question committee and sponsor of the Proposed Amendment, and
Jim Knight, individually and on behalf of LVC, moved to intervene in this action. In McGill
v. Thurston, 2024 Ark. 120, at 1 (per curiam), we granted expedited consideration of the
petition and the motion to intervene. We bifurcated the proceedings of Count I and Count
II and set separate briefing schedules. As to Count I, we appointed Special Master Randy
Wright to resolve the factual disputes raised in the petition. This opinion addresses Count
I, the number of valid signatures, while Count II will be addressed separately. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-5. We deny Count I of the
petition.
LVC sponsored an initiative petition for a proposed amendment to Amendment 100
of the Arkansas Constitution to require local voter approval for certain new casino licenses;
repeal authority to issue a casino license in Pope County; and revoke any license issued for
a casino in Pope County, Arkansas. Between April and late June 2024, paid canvassers
circulated this initiative petition throughout Arkansas to obtain sufficient signatures of
registered voters to have the Proposed Amendment placed on the ballot for the November
2024 general election. On July 31, 2024, the Secretary determined that LVC had submitted
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no less than 116,200 signatures, exceeding the required 90,704, and certified the Proposed
Amendment to appear on the November 2024 ballot.
Petitioners now challenge the Secretary’s certification of the Proposed Amendment,
alleging that Arkansas laws governing paid canvassers were violated in the initiative-petition
effort. Petitioners originally argued that LVC (1) unlawfully paid bonuses or otherwise
compensated canvassers based on the number of signatures a canvasser collected; (2) failed
to certify that all canvassers had no disqualifying criminal offenses; (3) used canvassers who
were not qualified as canvassers due to having disqualifying offenses; (4) failed to register as
paid canvassers individuals who solicited signatures while “coaching” canvassers in real time
and thus qualified as paid canvassers in their own right; (5) employed canvassers that were
not Arkansas residents; (6) failed to properly train and instruct canvassers; and (7) otherwise
failed to register and certify numerous paid canvassers.
On August 27–30, 2024, the special master heard evidence on those claims brought
by petitioners in Count I. In his forty-page final report, the special master disagreed with
petitioners’ claim that LVC did not provide the required certifications under section 7-9-
601(b)(3) (Supp. 2023), and he concluded that agents of LVC properly made the required
certifications that no paid canvasser had a disqualifying offense. The special master also
determined that LVC was not in violation of the pay-per-signature ban in section 7-9-
601(g). He found for LVC on its affirmative defense of estoppel, which was based on the
Secretary’s prior acceptance of LVC’s paid-canvasser affidavits. The special master
disqualified 5,966 signatures for incorrect residence addresses on petition-part affidavits. Last,
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the special master found “that any other claims made by the Petitioners should be denied
for lack of proof,” leaving “no less than 110,234 validated signatures.”
In their opening brief, petitioners challenge the special master’s findings only on the
sponsor-certification and pay-per-signature claims, thus abandoning all other claims that the
special master denied for a “lack of proof.” The portions of the record and the special
master’s findings pertinent to these two remaining claims are set forth below.
On March 22, 2024, LVC executed a contract with PCI Consultants, Inc. (PCI), to
gather signatures. Among other things, the contract required (1) that LVC provide each
petition circulator and/or petition circulator manager with approved educational talking
points for use in describing the ballot measure; (2) that PCI obtain a 65 percent validity rate,
including checking signatures against voter files supplied by LVC; and (3) that PCI submit
a weekly report to LVC. The contract also expressly authorized PCI to hire “employees
and/or contract with independent contractors to assist [PCI] in the performance of its duties
under this Agreement.”
LVC committee member Hans Stiritz testified that he understood PCI would hire
whomever it needed to carry out the canvassing. Consequently, PCI entered separate
contracts with three entities: (1) Florida Petition Management (FPM); (2) Cape Campaigns;
and (3) Engage the Voter. FPM hired Phil Dewey to run an office in North Little Rock.
Stephanie Marcynyszyn of Cape Campaigns managed another canvassing office. Berta, or
“Ashley,” Erickson of Engage the Voter managed an office in Northwest Arkansas. Dewey,
Marcynyszyn, and Erickson signed the sponsor affidavits submitted by LVC to register its
paid canvassers. Each affidavit states, “I am providing this affidavit on behalf of and at the
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direction of Local Voters in Charge, a duly formed Arkansas Ballot Question Committee
and Sponsor . . . .”
LVC hired Nicole Gillum, an Arkansas attorney, to provide legal compliance related
to the signature gatherers. Gillum explained at the hearings how LVC operated. She testified
that PCI’s CEO contracted with three LLCs to be “managers on the ground here for this
campaign.” Gillum served as LVC’s usual contact with PCI, and PCI relayed to the
canvassing managers Gillum’s instructions on behalf of LVC. Gillum provided PCI advice
for the managers who were onboarding and training canvassers for LVC, including
instructions on how LVC wanted the work completed. She also provided instructions for
canvasser training, background checks, and submissions to the Secretary’s office on behalf
of LVC. Gillum and others drafted the contractually required fact sheet that the canvassing
managers used. She stated that she spoke with Dana Alpin-Gonzalez of PCI three to four
times a day about background checks, and Gillum cleared canvassers to be registered. Gillum
drafted the sponsor affidavits used by Dewey, Marcynyszyn, and Erickson, and she directed
that they sign them on behalf of LVC. Gillum also checked all sponsor affidavits emailed to
the Secretary’s office to confirm that they were correct.
Gillum, Alpin-Gonzalez of PCI, PCI’s CEO Angelo Paparella, Josh Bridges, the
Secretary’s assistant director of elections, and Leslie Bellamy, Director of Elections for the
Secretary, met on April 12, 2024, before any signatures were collected on behalf of LVC.
At that meeting, Gillum told Bridges and Bellamy that PCI was LVC’s canvassing company
and that Alpin-Gonzales of PCI would be making the sponsor submissions. Afterward,
Bridges accepted all of the sponsor submissions made by Alpin-Gonzales on LVC’s behalf.
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Dewey testified that PCI hired his employer, FPM, to manage the petition drive for
LVC as well as to hire and train canvassers to collect signatures on the petition. Dewey hired
his own set of approximately 250 canvassers. Dewey testified in detail about the training
process that canvassers underwent when they were onboarded and then again when they
were hired after their background checks had cleared. This training included using the fact
sheet that was created by LVC. Dewey also executed the sponsor affidavits at the direction
of Alpin-Gonzalez on behalf of LVC.
Petitioners argued that LVC’s pay-per-signature violations were so systemic that all
signatures collected must be disqualified. In support of that theory, petitioners introduced
videos showing their investigators questioning canvassers about how they were paid. Some
videos purported to show that, in addition to compensating canvassers on an hourly basis,
Dewey gave gift cards to those who collected at least 75–100 signatures in a day. Dewey
admitted that canvassers knew they could be eligible to draw for a prize for several reasons,
including having a “good day” by collecting 100 signatures, but he testified that it “wasn’t
really assigned to a number because somebody could have brought in 150 and then drew
and somebody could have brought in 75 and drew out of it.”
In three of the videos, the alleged canvassers were never identified. In another video,
the alleged canvasser states that her name is “Veronica,” but the final list of LVC’s paid
canvassers who submitted petition parts does not contain a canvasser with that name. In
other videos, the canvasser says they “might” get a gift card if they get 100 or 200 signatures
or be entered into a raffle to win a television. In 14 videos, at most, the canvasser mentions
getting, or being eligible for, $100 for 100 signatures or getting paid $4 or $5 per signature.
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In those same videos, however, at least five of the paid canvassers also state that they are
being paid hourly. Petitioners did not introduce evidence of when a particular canvasser
drew for a prize, who made the offer to pay $100 for 100 signatures, when it was purportedly
made to any of the canvassers, or the number of signatures the canvassers collected because
of the alleged offer. 1
After the hearings concluded, the special master found that “the evidence presented
by all parties mandates the finding that LVC, the sponsor, used as agents others working
under the sponsorship of LVC, to collect signatures to be presented to the Respondent.”
He also found that LVC authorized PCI and the three canvassing managers to act on its
behalf and subject to its control. Regarding the language of Arkansas Code Annotated
section 7-9-601(b)(3), the master found that it does not limit “sponsor” to a ballot question
committee member or state that the certification is nondelegable. He determined that “[i]t
would be impractical to find that the named sponsor, LVC, could not use authorized persons
or entities to do the actual canvassing and managing of the petition question.” The master
therefore found that LVC properly certified to the Secretary that each paid canvasser in the
sponsor’s employ had no disqualifying offenses under Arkansas Code Annotated section 7-
9- 601(b)(3).
The special master also determined that, with regard to the pay-per-signature claim,
[i]t is incumbent upon the master to consider as a whole the credibility of the
facts contained in the above described exhibits and what each exhibit purports
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Petitioners reference intervenor’s exhibit 9 as a means of further showing a violation
of section 7-9-601(g); however, that exhibit was not properly admitted by intervenors at
the hearing and is not in the record before us. Petitioners filed a motion to supplement the
record to include that exhibit, but we deny the motion.
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to prove as to the paid canvassers method of payment. The master took into
account that there were 338 paid canvassers who submitted signatures to the
Respondent for this ballot measure, and the above described exhibits would
at best only be 14 paid canvassers. (There were not totals of signatures
collected of the 14 paid canvassers listed in the videos.) The master does not
find that the Intervenors were in violation of Section 7-9-601(g)(1). It is
further found the Petitioners did not meet their burden of proof of showing
that the Intervenors, in their collection of signatures, conducted such with a
wanton disregard for the provisions of Section 7-9-601(g)(1) that would
require all signatures collected to be disqualified.
Analysis
In original actions, we will accept the special master’s findings of fact unless they are
clearly erroneous. Stilley v. Thurston, 2024 Ark. 124, at 3 (citing Roberts v. Priest, 334 Ark.
503, 975 S.W.2d 850 (1998)). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when, even if there is
evidence to support it, based on the entire evidence, the court is left with the definite and
firm conviction that the special master has made a mistake. Id. Issues of statutory
interpretation are reviewed de novo. Zook v. Martin, 2018 Ark. 306, 558 S.W.3d 385 (citing
State v. Ledwell, 2017 Ark. 252, 526 S.W.3d 1). We construe statutes as they are read, giving
the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. McMillan v.
Live Nation Ent., Inc., 2012 Ark. 166, 401 S.W.3d 473. Statutes are to be construed so that
no word is left void, superfluous, or insignificant, and we give meaning to every word in
the statute, if possible. Williams v. St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr., 2021 Ark. 14, 615 S.W.3d
721. Statutory provisions are construed to make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible
to give effect to every part. Ark. Parole Bd. v. Johnson, 2022 Ark. 209, 654 S.W.3d 820.
I. LVC’s Compliance with Arkansas Code Annotated Section 7-9-601(b)(3)
Petitioners first argue that LVC failed to comply with section 7-9-601(b)(3).
Petitioners contend that LVC could not delegate its certification obligation “to an agent
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outside of the LVC—that is, someone who is not an officer, member, or employee of the
sponsor.” The Secretary also argues that LVC, as the “sponsor,” could not substitute any
other person to make the certification.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 7-9-601(b)(3) provides that “[u]pon submission of
the sponsor’s list of paid canvassers to the Secretary of State, the sponsor shall certify to the
Secretary of State that each paid canvasser in the sponsor’s employ has no disqualifying
offenses in accordance with this section.” Additionally, “sponsor” is defined as “a person
who arranges for the circulation of an initiative or referendum petition or who files an
initiative or referendum petition with the official charged with verifying the signatures.”
Ark. Code Ann. § 7-9-101(10) (Repl. 2018). The term “person” is also defined as “any
individual, business, proprietorship, firm, partnership, joint venture, syndicate, business
trust, labor organization, company, corporation, association, committee, or any other
organization or group of persons acting in concert.” Ark. Code Ann. § 7-9-402(11)(A)
(Repl. 2018). Considering the plain language of these statutory definitions, a wide range of
groups or people can qualify as “the sponsor” for purposes of section 7-9-601(b)(3).
Here, LVC contracted with PCI, who in turn contracted with three separate
canvassing companies, to gather signatures in support of the ballot initiative. Together, these
three groups acted in concert to arrange for the circulation of an initiative petition and to
then file the petition with the Secretary. We conclude that under the broad statutory
definition of “sponsor,” found in Ark. Code Ann. §§ 7-9-101(10) and –402(11)(A), Dewey,
Marcynyszyn, and Erickson were eligible to sign the certification. As a result of our
conclusion, we need not address the estoppel argument raised by LVC.
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II. LVC’s compliance with Arkansas Code Annotated section 7-9-601(g)(1).
Petitioners next argue that the special master erred in finding that petitioners did not
carry their burden of establishing violations of the pay-per-signature prohibition in Arkansas
Code Annotated section 7-9-601(g)(1). They cite (1) Dewey’s admission that he paid
canvassers additional money when they had a good day; (2) videos of different canvassers
who mentioned eligibility for a $100 bonus if they collected 100 signatures; and (3) evidence
of gift-card purchases. According to petitioners, these “violations” require a categorical
disqualification of all validated signatures obtained by all paid canvassers in Dewey’s employ.
Petitioners, however, are incorrect.
The pay-per-signature ban is found in section 7-9-601(g), which provides that
(g)(1) It is unlawful for a person to pay or offer to pay a person, or receive
payment or agree to receive payment, on a basis related to the number of
signatures obtained on a statewide initiative petition or statewide referendum
petition.
(2) This subsection does not prohibit compensation for circulating petitions
but only compensation for obtaining signatures when the compensation or
compensation level is impacted by or related to the number of signatures
obtained.
(3) A signature obtained in violation of this subsection is void and shall not be
counted.
(4) A violation under this subsection is a Class A misdemeanor.
The plain language of subdivision (g)(3) requires proof of a causal link between the alleged
violation and the signatures obtained as a result of the alleged violation. There is no
categorical exclusion under section 7-9-601(g). Thus, only the signatures obtained due to
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an impermissible payment or offer to pay are “void and shall not be counted.” Ark. Code
Ann. § 7-9-601(g)(3).
While petitioners produced multiple videos as proof of an unlawful offer to pay under
subdivision (g)(1), they never offered evidence of the total number of signatures collected
by the 14 paid canvassers recorded in the videos. Furthermore, none of those paid canvassers
reported when they were offered $100 for 100 signatures or who made the unlawful offers.
An improper offer without more is not enough to invalidate signatures. See Walther v. FLIS
Enters., Inc., 2018 Ark. 64, at 11, 540 S.W.3d 264, 270 (“We do not interpret language to
render one section dispensable.” (citing Ozark Gas Pipeline Corp., 342 Ark. 591, 29 S.W.3d
730 (2000); Surplusage Canon, Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation
of Legal Texts 174–79 (2012))). Additionally, the special master found that petitioners’ videos
were not credible evidence of violations of subdivision (g)(1), and Dewey’s testimony
supports this finding.
As petitioners have not provided any argument or convincing authority showing that
the special master clearly erred in his rejection of petitioners’ claims, we deny the petition
on Count I.
Petition denied.
Mandate to issue immediately.
David A. Couch; McDaniel Wolff, PLLC, by: Scott P. Richardson, Bart W. Calhoun, and
Brittany D. Webb; Quattlebaum, Grooms & Tull PLLC, by: John E. Tull III, E.B. Chiles IV,
R. Ryan Younger, Meredith M. Causey, and Glenn Larkin, for petitioners.
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Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Jordan Broyles, Sr. Ass’t Att’y Gen., Christine A. Cryer, Sr.
Ass’t Att’y Gen., and Justin Bracher, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for respondent.
Friday, Eldredge & Clark, LLP, by: Elizabeth Robben Murray, Kimberly D. Young,
Kristopher B. Knox, and Kathy McCarroll, for intervenors.
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