Ferment Brewing Co. v. Hood River County Assessor

IN THE OREGON TAX COURT

MAGISTRATE DIVISION

Property Tax

FERMENT BREWING COMPANY, LLC, )

)

Plaintiff, ) TC-MD 220020N

)

v. )

)

HOOD RIVER COUNTY ASSESSOR, )

)

Defendant, )

)

and, )

)

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, )

State of Oregon, )

)

Defendant-Intervenor. ) DECISION

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff appealed Defendant’s partial exemption denial for property identified as

Accounts 21439 and 21440 for the 2019-20 through 2021-22 tax years. Defendant disputed that

it denied Plaintiff’s exemption in part, maintaining that Plaintiff did not apply for an exemption

on all its property, and moved for dismissal either because Plaintiff was not aggrieved or its

appeal was untimely. (See Def’s Mot to Dismiss at 2.) By order entered September 15, 2022,

the court denied Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and allowed Plaintiff’s appeal to proceed. The

order is incorporated herein by reference.

On November 14, 2022, Defendant requested “a formal discovery order” incorporating

the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure (ORCP) regarding discovery and a 120 -day period to

engage in discovery. (Joint Status Report at 1.) Defendant reported that Plaintiff “prefer[red] to

keep things informal” and “prefer[red] the Oregon Tax Court Regular Division Rules [TCRs]

DECISION TC-MD 220020N 1

over the [ORCPs].” (Id.1) The court held a case management conference on December 5, 2022,

during which the court granted the parties’ request for 120 days to engage in discovery; set

another case management conference for April 13, 2023; and granted Defendant’s request to

adopt the Regular Division discovery rules, TCR 36 to 46. The court entered an order on

December 9, 2022, memorializing its ruling.

On March 20, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion to Compel Production of Documents,

(Motion to Compel) including a request for attorney fees. The court held a case management

conference on April 13, 2023, and granted Defendant’s Motion to Compel after Plaintiff stated

that it had no objection to the discovery requests and agreed to produce responsive documents by

April 28, 2023. The court set a hearing on attorney fees for May 23, 2023. The court granted

Plaintiff’s unopposed request for a protective order under TCR 36 C to limit attendees at th e

hearing based on its counsel’s representations that the hearing would concern personal and

medical information. The court’s rulings are memorialized in an order entered April 14, 2023.

Defendant filed its Motion for Attorney Fees, Costs, and Disbursements on April 28,

2023. On the same day, Plaintiff filed its Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice, including a request

that attorney fees be determined “in accordance with the Magistrate Rules.” (Ptf’s Mot to

Dismiss at 1.) Defendant filed its Response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice on

May 9, 2023, stating it did not object to Plaintiff dismissing the appeal with prejudice but

maintaining that this court previously ruled TCR 46 governed discovery-related attorney fees. 2

1

Defendant filed an Amended Joint Status Report on November 15, 2023, but the provisions referenced in

this Decision are the same.

2

In its Response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice, Defendant expressly reserved the right to

seek additional attorney fees pursuant to TCR-MD 21 B. (Def’s Resp at 1.) Defendant did not develop that

argument and the court need not reach it.

DECISION TC-MD 220020N 2

(Def’s Resp at 1.) Oral argument was held by remote means on May 23, 2023. Michael J.

Mangan (Mangan), Oregon attorney, appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. Chris O’Neill (O’Neill),

Oregon attorney, appeared on behalf of Defendant.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The following timeline reflects communications between the parties about discovery:

• December 5, 2022: Defendant emailed Plaintiff about scheduling a site inspection of the

subject property with a video recording. (Decl of O’Neill at 2-3; Ex 5.)

• January 10, 2023: Defendant served its First Request for Production of Documents

(RFP) with a deadline of February 9, 2023. (Decl of O’Neill at 1.)

• February 17, 2023: Defendant emailed Plaintiff’s counsel concerning its overdue

response to the RFP. (Decl of O’Neill at 2; Ex 2.)

• February 21, 2023: Plaintiff’s counsel’s autoreply stated he was “traveling and working

from [his firm’s] East Coast offices during the week of February 20th to February 25th.”

(Decl of O’Neill at 2; Ex 1.) Plaintiff’s counsel separately wrote: “We haven’t been able

to find the original email with the request.” (Id.) Defendant responded by sending

another copy of the RFP by email. (Id.)

• March 2, 2023: Defendant emailed Plaintiff’s counsel noting Plaintiff’s response to the

RFP was three weeks overdue and demanding a response by March 9, 2023, or Defendant

would file a motion to compel. (Decl of O’Neill at 3; Ex 4.)

• March 14, 2023: Having received no response to the RFP, Defendant called Plaintiff’s

counsel to confer before filing a Motion to Compel Production. (Decl of O’Neill at 3.)

Plaintiff’s counsel promised to send the response within one day, but Defendant’s

counsel did not receive a response on March 15, 2023. (Id.)

DECISION TC-MD 220020N 3

• March 20, 2023: Defendant filed its Motion to Compel and supporting declaration. (Decl

of O’Neill at 3.) Defendant sent a request to Plaintiff’s counsel to schedule a site

inspection for April 5 or 6, 2023. (Id.; Ex 6.)

• March 23, 2023: Defendant sent another email to Plaintiff’s counsel about scheduling the

site inspection. (Decl of O’Neill at 3; Ex 7.)

• March 29, 2023: Having received no response, Defendant emailed Plaintiff’s counsel

again about the proposed site inspection dates of April 5 or 6. (Decl of O’Neill at 4; Ex

8.) Plaintiff’s counsel replied that he had “been trying to get a response” for Defendant

and would call the next day. (Id.; Ex 9.) Defendant’s counsel did not receive a call from

Plaintiff’s counsel the next day. (Id.)

• April 4, 2023: Defendant emailed Plaintiff about his failure to respond about the site

inspection date, noting April 5 and 6 were no longer viable dates and proposing a date of

April 11. (Decl of O’Neill at 4; Ex 10.)

• April 6, 2023: Plaintiff’s counsel responded that he could arrange a site inspection on

April 11, 2023, but needed to confirm the time with his client. (Decl of O’Neill at 4; Ex

11 at 1; Ex 12.) Plaintiff’s counsel sent a second email approximately 30 minutes later

apologizing for the delay and stating he had “been out of the office sick.” (Id., Ex 12.)

Plaintiff’s counsel reported still working to confirm the time of the site inspection and

promised to respond shortly. (Id.) That email was the first time Defendant’s counsel

heard Plaintiff’s counsel reference health issues interfering with his ability to comply

with discovery requests. (Id., Ex 12 at 1.)

• April 10, 2023: Having not received Plaintiff’s response regarding the time for the April

11, 2023, site inspection, Defendant sent an email to Plaintiff’s counsel stating Defendant

DECISION TC-MD 220020N 4

could start as late as 2:00 p.m. and asking Plaintiff to confirm. (Decl of O’Neill at 4; Ex

12 at 1.)

• April 11, 2023: Plaintiff’s counsel emailed that Plaintiff would need to reschedule the

inspection to the next week. (Decl of O’Neill at 4; Ex 13.) Defendant objected to the late

notice from Plaintiff, noting that Defendant had “rearranged his schedule and made

arrangements with staff to do the site tour and video recording [that] afternoon.” (Id.)

Defendant proposed a site inspection for April 17 or 20, 2023. (Id.)

• April 11, 2023: Plaintiff’s counsel filed a letter with the court requesting additional time

to respond to the Motion to Compel due to his illness. (Ptf’s Ltr, Apr 11, 2 023.) He had

“not been unable to work with [his] client to gather responsive documents or prepare a

response to the Motion to Compel while ill.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s counsel claimed that his

“office sent [Defendant his] written response to the [RFP] on April 7, 2023.” (Id.)

• April 12, 2023: Defendant emailed Plaintiff’s counsel about the proposed site inspection

dates of April 17 and 20, 2023, and noted that Defendant had not received a response to

its RFP and could not locate Plaintiff’s referenced response sent April 7, 2023. (Decl of

O’Neill at 5; Ex 14.) Defendant asked Plaintiff to forward a copy of Plaintiff’s April 7,

2023, response. (Id.)

• April 13, 2023: At the case management conference, the court granted Defendant’s

Motion to Compel after Plaintiff reported that it had no objection to the discovery

requests and agreed to produce responsive documents by April 28, 2023.

• April 17, 2023: Defendant emailed Plaintiff’s counsel to inquire about a site inspection

that day or on April 20. (Decl of O’Neill at 5; Ex 15.)

DECISION TC-MD 220020N 5

• April 20, 2023: Plaintiff’s counsel responded to Defendant’s email that Plaintiff was

unavailable for the site inspection that day. (Decl of O’Neill at 5; Ex 17.)

• April 28, 2023: As of the date Defendant filed its Motion for Attorney Fees, it still had

not received any response to its RFP. (Decl of O’Neill at 5.)

Defendant requests attorney fees of $4,057.50 based on $3,307.50 for 18.60 hours of

work between January 6, 2023, and April 25, 2023, and a supplemental award of $750 to cover

fees associated with preparing for and attending oral argument, and preparing any resulting

orders, judgments or money awards. (Decl of O’Neill at 6-7; Ex 16.) O’Neill has practiced law

in Oregon since 1993 and is familiar with the substantive tax law in this case as well as related

procedural rules. (Decl of O’Neill at 5-6.) His billing rate was $175 per hour, which he believed

was below the market average for lawyers with similar experience. (Id.) O’Neill billed $125 per

hour for his paralegal’s work, which he believed was also below market. (Id.)

The court takes notice of the Oregon State Bar’s 2022 Economic Survey (Survey), which

provided the following relevant figures for 2021. 3 The mean and median hourly billing rate for

attorneys in private practice in Eastern Oregon, including Hood River County, was $288.

(Survey at 11, 42.) For attorneys in private practice in Eastern Oregon with 21 to 30 years of

experience, the mean hourly billing rate was $306 and the median was $320. (Id. at 43.) For

attorneys in private practice in Eastern Oregon specializing in tax and estate planning, the mean

hourly billing rate was $288 and the median was $275. (Id. at 45.)

At oral argument on Defendant’s Motion for Attorney Fees, Costs, and Disbursement,

Plaintiff’s counsel abandoned his response based on his medical condition, and he declined to

3

Available at: https://www.osbar.org/surveys_research#economicsurveys

DECISION TC-MD 220020N 6

offer any further explanation. He did not offer an alternative explanation for Plaintiff’s failure to

respond to the RFP or Defendant’s discovery requests. Plaintiff made three arguments in

opposition to the motion: (1) ORS 305.490 refers to the “tax court judge” so the Magistrate

Division lacks authority to award attorney fees; (2) Defendant failed to confer before filing the

Motion to Compel; and (3) any attorney fee award should be limited to the Motion to Compel.

III. ANALYSIS

The issue presented is whether the court should award attorney fees to Defendant under

TCR 46 A(4) because the court granted its Motion to Compel.

The Magistrate Division has its own discovery rule, Tax Court Rule-Magistrate Division

(TCR-MD) 9, which provides that the Regular Division discovery rules TCR 36 to 46 will only

apply when the court so orders. Here, the court entered an order adopting TCR 36 to 46 on

December 9, 2022. TCR 46 A permits a party, “upon reasonable notice to other parties4 and all

persons affected thereby,” to apply for an order compelling discovery in accordance with the

rule. One such basis for a motion to compel is if a party fails to permit inspection as requested

under TCR 43. 5 TCR 46 A(4) allows for the moving party to recover expenses associated with

obtaining the order compelling discovery:

“If the motion is granted, the court may, after opportunity for hearing, require the

party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney

advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable

4

Plaintiff’s second argument against fees on the basis that Defendant’s counsel failed to confer is not well

taken. It is undisputed that Defendant’s counsel called Plaintiff’s counsel on March 14, 2023, to discuss

Defendant’s intent to file a motion to compel. (Decl of O’Neill at 3.) During the call, Plaintiff’s counsel gave

assurance via an unfulfilled promise that he would send Plaintiff’s response on March 15, 2023. (Id.) Although

Plaintiff’s counsel cited case law that the court may order conferral, TCR 46 A requires only notice to the affected

party. Argument about what the court could have ordered is irrelevant at this point.

5

Under TCR 43, a party may request to inspect and copy designated documents or to be permitted entry

upon designated land.

DECISION TC-MD 220020N 7

expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the court

finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or that other

circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.”

The quoted text of TCR 46 A(4) is identical to ORCP 46 A(4). Although the ORCPs do not

apply in this court, the court may look to them and related case law to interpret the TCRs to the

extent the rules use the same or similar language. Preface to Regular Division Rules.

A. Whether a Magistrate Has Authority to Award Attorney Fees Under TCR 46

Plaintiff’s first argument in opposition to Defendant’s motion for attorney fees is that the

magistrate lacks authority to award attorney fees, noting that ORS 305.490(5) refers to the “tax

court judge” and not a magistrate. 6

Generally, Oregon courts follow the “American rule” and will not award attorney fees

absent authorization by statute or contract. Mattiza v. Foster, 311 Or 1, 4, 803 P2d 723 (1990).

This court has held a similar outlook on awarding attorney fees. See Wihtol I v. Dept. of Rev., 21

OTR 260, 263 (2013)7 (“the court is reluctant to conclude that any division of the court has

authority to make any monetary award unless that award is supported by statutory

authorization.”). Although the court acknowledged in Comcast Corp. V v. Department of

Revenue, 23 OTR 8, 12 n 4 (2018), that TCR 46 does “not independently have the force of

statute,” in that case the court determined it has authority to award attorney fees under TCR 46

because that rule is

“modeled on and materially similar to [ORCP 46] which [does] have the force of

statute. See ORS 1.735 (providing that the Council on Court Procedures shall

6

The court’s references to the Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) are to 2021.

7

The court wrote that it was “reluctant to conclude that any division of the court has authority to make any

monetary award unless that award is supported by statutory authorization. Rules of practice and procedure—the

subject of both ORS 305.425(3) and ORS 305.501(3)—are authorized, but the court is reluctant to conclude that

‘practice and procedure’ includes money awards.” Wihtol, 21 OTR at 263.

DECISION TC-MD 220020N 8

promulgate rules on procedure, which become effective after legislative review).

The court is statutorily directed to promulgate rules of practice and procedure that

‘conform, as far as practical to the rules of equity practice and procedure in this

state.’ ORS 305.425(3). Therefore, the court has statutory authority to enact and

apply TCR * * * 46 with respect to an award of attorney fees.”

Id. In accordance with its authority, the court has awarded attorney fees under TCR 46 A where

taxpayer had no “substantial justification for his opposition to the motion to compel discovery.”

See Parr v. Dept. of Rev., 18 OTR 1 (2004).

Plaintiff argues ORS 305.490(5) allows only “the tax court judge” to award costs,

disbursements, and attorney fees to a prevailing taxpayer in specified property tax cases. 8 This

court considered a similar argument in Wihtol, with respect to the magistrate’s authority to award

costs and disbursements under ORS 305.490(2). 21 OTR at 266-67. The court observed that the

authority to award costs and disbursements predated the addition of the attorney fee provisions in

2001, concluding that those attorney fee provisions in ORS 305.490

“should be read as describing what the Tax Court judge may award, as the statute

says, in addition to costs and disbursements. [They] need not, and in light of the

legislative text and history should not, be read as a barrier to a conclusion as to

the authority of a magistrate under ORS 305.490(2) to award costs and

disbursements—the Magistrate Division being part of ‘the court.’ ”

Wihtol, 21 OTR at 267. Here, the authority to award attorney fees is based upon TCR 46 A,

which is modeled on ORCP 46 A. See also ORS 305.425(3) (authorizing court to promulgate

“rules of practice and procedure * * *, which shall conform, as far as practical to the rules of

equity practice and procedure in this state.”) Nothing in the text of ORS 305.490(5) indicates an

intent to alter or limit the authority to award attorney fees under TCR 46 A.

///

8

ORS 305.490(4) provides a similar authorization in specified income tax cases.

DECISION TC-MD 220020N 9

A broader question is whether and under what circumstances the legislature intended for

magistrates to award attorney fees. As discussed in Lauer v. Grant County Assessor, TC-MD

200253N, 2021 WL 365836 (Or Tax M Div, Feb 3, 2021), aff’d 24 OTR 610 (2021), the

Magistrate Division was created in 1995 and includes certain features that indicate attorney fees

are not typically available. Id. at *2. For instance, that non-attorney representatives are allowed

to appear, and that the magistrate is “not bound by common law or statutory rules of evidence or

by technical or formal rules of procedure * * *.” Id. Witnesses who testified at legislative

hearings opposed availability of attorney fees in all Magistrate Division cases, but acknowledged

fees were appropriate in the case of a frivolous appeal or ungrounded position. Id. at *2-3.

Specific concerns with attorney fees included increased financial burdens on taxpayers and local

governments; possible pressure on litigants to retain counsel; and the proliferation of marginal

appeals. Id. at *3-4.

The attorney fees under TCR 46 A(4) are a discovery sanction and, in that respect, are

more akin to the case of a groundless appeal than the fees available to a prevailing taxpayer in

the Regular Division. 9 See Citizens’ Utility Board v. Public Utility Commission, 128 Or App

650, 660, 877 P2d 116 (1994) (describing fees “as a sanction for the failure to allow discovery”);

Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London v. TNA NA Manufacturing, 323 Or App 447, 523 P3d

690 (2022) (referring to fee award as “sanction” and upholding award where party’s opposition

to discovery “was not substantially justified”). Discovery disputes occur with some frequency in

9

In a similar context, “the sanction available under ORCP 46 C bears no relationship to whether the party

has prevailed. The rule’s purpose is to reimburse a party for expenses incurred because of the need to prove facts

that were unreasonably denied.” Elliott v. Progressive Halycon Ins. Co., 222 Or App 586, 594, 194 P3d 828 (2008).

DECISION TC-MD 220020N 10

the Magistrate Division and are not confined to frivolous or groundless appeals. 10 However, the

risk that attorney fee awards would proliferate in the Magistrate Division is tempered by TCR-

MD 9 A’s limitation that TCR 46 applies only when so ordered by the magistrate. The court

concludes that magistrates have authority to award attorney fees under TCR 46 as a discovery

sanction.

B. Application of TCR 46 A(4)

The decision whether to award attorney fees under TCR 46 A(4) is within the discretion

of the magistrate. See TNA NA Manufacturing, 323 Or App at 456 (“We review a decision to

sanction a party under ORCP 46 A for abuse of discretion.”). TCR 46 A(4) provides some

guidance on how that discretion should be exercised: attorney fees are not warranted where

opposition to the motion to compel was “substantially justified” or where “other circumstances

make an award of expenses unjust.” In Parr, this court awarded attorney fees under TCR 46

A(4) after the taxpayer failed to respond to the department’s request for production, then claimed

he did not receive the discovery request, which the court did not find credible. 18 OTR at 4.

The court found that “[t]axpayer has attempted to ignore or resist the department and has only

grudgingly responded when seriously pressed.” Id.

The facts presented here are similar to those found in Parr: Plaintiff’s counsel dodged

and ignored multiple requests from Defendant over a period of months. Once Defendant filed its

Motion to Compel, Plaintiff responded that it had no objection to the RFP and agreed to a new

10

The court commonly orders site inspections in property valuation cases and dismisses the complaint

where a plaintiff fails to comply. See, e.g., Willamette Gardens v. Lane County Assessor, TC-MD 150146C, 2015

WL 5946547 (Or Tax M Div, Oct 12, 2015); Urbanowicz v. Multnomah County Assessor, TC-MD 150390N, 2016

WL 720224 (Or Tax M Div, Feb 1, 2016); Salisbury v. Dept. of Rev., 24 OTR 497 (2021) (determining that

magistrate’s dismissal of appeal for failure to allow site inspection was justified).

DECISION TC-MD 220020N 11

deadline to send responsive documents. On April 11, 2023, Plaintiff’s counsel wrote that his

office sent a response to the RFP on April 7, 2023, yet Defendant could not locate any such

response and had not received it as of April 28, 2023. Also on April 11, Plaintiff’s counsel wrote

that he had been unable to comply with Defendant’s earlier discovery requests du e to an illness,

but he failed to offer any testimony or evidence of that illness at the protected hearing held in

May. The court finds the statements made in the April 11, 2023, letter are unsupported and lack

credibility. In sum, Plaintiff has offered nothing to show “substantially justified” opposition to

Defendant’s RFP or Motion to Compel. Similarly, Plaintiff has identified no “other

circumstances” making an award unjust, such as evidence pertaining to its counsel’s illness.

ORS 20.075(1) provides additional factors for consideration in determining whether to

award attorney fees where the court has discretion. Those factors are set forth and discussed:

“The conduct of the parties in the transactions or occurrences that gave rise to the

litigation, including any conduct of a party that was reckless, willful, malicious, in bad faith or

illegal.” ORS 20.075(1)(a). For the reasons described above, the court finds that Plaintiff’s

counsel failed to respond in good faith to Defendant’s discovery req uests, necessitating the

Motion to Compel.

“The objective reasonableness of the claims and defenses asserted by the parties.” ORS

20.075(1)(b). Plaintiff identified no basis for its opposition to Defendant’s discovery requests

and, ultimately, stated it had no objection.

“The extent to which an award of an attorney fee in the case would deter others from

asserting good faith claims or defenses in similar cases.” ORS 20.075(1)(c). Plaintiff had no

basis to oppose or resist Defendant’s discovery requests, so an award would not deter parties

with good faith or reasonable opposition to discovery.

DECISION TC-MD 220020N 12

“The extent to which an award of an attorney fee in the case would deter others from

asserting meritless claims and defenses.” ORS 20.075(1)(d). An award in this case would likely

have some deterrent effect on meritless opposition to discovery requests in other cases where the

magistrate has adopted TCR 46.

“The objective reasonableness of the parties and the diligence of the parties and their

attorneys during the proceedings.” ORS 20.075(1)(e). Plaintiff’s counsel’s responses to

Defendant’s discovery requests demonstrated a lack of diligence, including multiple unfulfilled

promises to produce requested discovery.

“The objective reasonableness of the parties and the diligence of the parties in pursuing

settlement of the dispute.” ORS 20.075(1)(f). After failing to receive a response to Defendant’s

RFP, Defendant’s counsel reached out to Plaintiff’s counsel several times in February and March

2023 to give Plaintiff another chance to respond and avoid Defendant’s filing of a motion to

compel. Plaintiff’s counsel demonstrated a lack of diligence to pursue settlement of the dispute

by either failing to respond or responding with an unfulfilled promise to produce the requested

discovery.

“The amount that the court has awarded as a prevailing party fee under ORS 20.190.”

ORS 20.075(1)(g). The prevailing party fee under ORS 20.190 is not typically available in this

court. Johnson v. Dept. of Rev., TC 3802, 1996 WL 622215 (Or Tax, Oct 23, 1996).

“Such other factors as the court may consider appropriate under the circumstances of the

case.” ORS 20.075(1)(h). As an additional factor, the court notes that Plaintiff made statements

to the court that it failed to support with evidence despite the opportunity to do so. Namely, that

a response to the RFP had been sent on April 7, 2023, and that Plaintiff’s counsel had been

unable to respond to discovery requests due to a medical condition . Plaintiff’s counsel

DECISION TC-MD 220020N 13

specifically requested, and the court entered, a protective order to protect such information, but

Plaintiff’s counsel never ultimately offered any such defense.

An award of attorney fees under TCR 46 A(4) is warranted in this case.

C. Reasonable Amount of Attorney Fees Under TCR 46 A(4)

ORS 20.075(2) gives factors to be considered to determine the amount of attorney fees.

Those factors are set forth and discussed as follows:

“The time and labor required in the proceeding, the novelty and difficulty of the

questions involved in the proceeding and the skill needed to properly perform the legal services.”

ORS 20.075(2)(a). Drafting the Motion to Compel and supporting Declaration and preparing for

and participating in oral argument took some time. However, Plaintiff did not object to the

requested discovery, so no significant legal briefing was required. Defendant claimed 18.60

hours, but that amount of time reflects work beyond what was required to obtain the order to

compel. It also includes time spent trying to schedule a site inspection and to obtain documents

from Plaintiff before seeking a court order. 11 Only the entries for March 20, March 21, April 11

(0.3 hours), April 12, and April 13 directly pertain to obtaining the order to compel, for a total of

4.2 hours. (Decl of O’Neill, Ex 16.)

“The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular

employment by the attorney would preclude the attorney from taking other cases.” ORS

20.075(2)(b). The court received no information on this factor.

///

///

11

A site inspection is a reasonable discovery request in many cases involving property tax exemption.

Here, however, Defendant did not include its request for site inspection in its Motion to Compel.

DECISION TC-MD 220020N 14

“The fee customarily charged in the locality f or similar legal services.” ORS

20.075(2)(c). O’Neill’s hourly billing rate is below the median and mean rates for attorneys in

Hood River County, for attorneys with 21 to 30 years’ experience, and for attorneys specializing

in tax law.

“The amount involved in the controversy and the results obtained.” ORS 20.075(2)(d).

The precise amount in controversy is unclear from Plaintiff’s Complaint. The court found a

difference of $1,830,220 between the value of property claimed as exempt by Plaintiff for the

2019-20 tax year and the value of property exempted by Defendant. Ferment Brewing Company,

LLC v. Hood River County Assessor, TC-MD 220020N (Or Tax M Div, Sept 15, 2022). Because

Plaintiff dismissed this appeal, the value of exempt property for the 2019-20 through 2021-22 tax

years remains unchanged.

“The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case.” ORS

20.075(2)(e). The court received no information on this factor.

“The nature and length of the attorney’s professional relationship with the client.” ORS

20.075(2)(f). The court received no information on this factor.

“The experience, reputation and ability of the attorney performing the services.” ORS

20.075(2)(g). O’Neill has significant experience practicing law in Oregon.

“Whether the fee of the attorney is fixed or contingent.” ORS 20.075(2)(h). The court

received no information on this factor.

“Whether the attorney performed the services on a pro bono basis or the award of

attorney fees otherwise promotes access to justice.” ORS 20.075(2)(i). The court received no

information on this factor.

DECISION TC-MD 220020N 15

These factors notwithstanding, the amount of attorney fees and expenses to be awarded is

discretionary with the trial court. Smo v. Black, 95 Or App 588, 592, 770 P2d 925 (1989).

The court finds reasonable attorney fees of $735 to obtain the order to compel. That is

based on 4.2 hours of work at O’Neill’s billing rate of $175 per hour. In addition to work

performed to obtain the order, and despite Plaintiff’s argument that the fees should be limited to

the Motion to Compel, Defendant is entitled to “fees on fees” associated with obtaining the

attorney fee award. See Lauer, 2021 WL 365836 at *4.12 O’Neill’s billing statement reveals 6.2

hours spent to prepare the motion for attorney fees and supporting declaration. (Decl of O’Neill

at Ex 16 (April 19 (2.5 hours), April 20 (0.6 hours), April 25 (3.1 hours).) An additional amount

of $1,085 is allowed. Finally, Defendant requests an estimated $750 for fees associated with

preparing for and attending oral argument, and preparing any resulting orders, judgments or

money awards. The court finds that three hours of work is reasonable for an oral argument that

was scheduled for one hour, but in fact took less time, along with an hour to prepare the

judgment and money award necessary to effectuate the decision of the court, for an additional

$750 based on O’Neill’s billing rate. In total, the court awards Defendant $2,570 in attorney fees

under TCR 46 A(4).

IV. CONCLUSION

Upon careful consideration, the court concludes that a magistrate has authority to award

attorney fees as a sanction under TCR 46 A(4) where the magistrate has adopted that rule . The

court awards Defendant attorney fees of $2,570 under TCR 46 A(4). Now, therefore,

12

The court has previously found fee awards may include so called “fees on fees” attributable to the

process of requesting reimbursement for fees are includable in an award. See Hoggard v. Dept. of Rev., 23 OTR

543, 550 (2019) (citing Seneca Sustainable Energy, LLC III v. Dept. of Rev., 23 OTR 22, 56 (2018)).

DECISION TC-MD 220020N 16

IT IS THE DECISION OF THIS COURT that Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss with

Prejudice is granted. Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER DECIDED that Defendant is awarded attorney fees of $2,570 under

TCR 46 A(4). Counsel for Defendant shall submit an appropriate form of judgment.

Dated this ____ day of December 2023.

ALLISON R. BOOMER

PRESIDING MAGISTRATE

If you want to appeal this Decision, file a complaint in the Regular Division of

the Oregon Tax Court, by mailing to: 1163 State Street, Salem, OR 97301-2563;

or by hand delivery to: Fourth Floor, 1241 State Street, Salem, OR.

Your complaint must be submitted within 60 days after the date of this Decision

or this Decision cannot be changed. TCR-MD 19 B.

This document was signed by Magistrate Allison R. Boomer. and entered on

December 27, 2023.

DECISION TC-MD 220020N 17