Shevtsov v. Dept. of Rev.

No. 5 March 4, 2020 83

IN THE OREGON TAX COURT

REGULAR DIVISION

Alexsandr SHEVTSOV,

Plaintiff,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE

and Clackamas County Assessor,

Defendants.

(TC 5392)

Taxpayer appealed the Magistrate Division’s dismissal of his complaint as

untimely. On a motion to dismiss the complaint in the Regular Division, the court

upheld the magistrate’s dismissal. The magistrate had correctly determined that

taxpayer filed his complaint one day after the regular filing deadline. Taxpayer

argued that the extended filing deadline for certain property containing a “dwell-

ing” applied under ORS 305.288(1)(a), but the court held that the extended filing

deadline did not apply because the property lacked a fixed building or structure.

Submitted on Defendant-Intervenor’s Motion to Dismiss.

Kathleen J. Rastetter, Clackamas County Counsel,

Oregon City, filed the motion for Defendant-Intervenor

Clackamas County Assessor.

Plaintiff Aleksandr Shevtsov filed the response pro se.

Decision for Defendants rendered March 4, 2020.

ROBERT T. MANICKE, Judge.

Plaintiff (taxpayer) appeals from a Magistrate

Division decision dismissing his complaint as untimely.

Defendant-Intervenor (the “Assessor”) has moved to dismiss

the complaint in this division of the court as well, on the

grounds that (1) the magistrate correctly determined that

the complaint in the Magistrate Division was untimely

filed; (2) taxpayer likewise filed his complaint in this divi-

sion untimely; and (3) taxpayer is ineligible for relief from

the filing deadline in either division of the court because his

property is not within the definition of a “dwelling” as that

term is used in ORS 305.288.1

1

References to the Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) are to the 2017 edition.

References to court rules are to those in effect for 2019.

84 Shevtsov v. Dept. of Rev.

The court starts with the Assessor’s second asser-

tion, that the complaint in this division was untimely. The

court finds no evidence supporting the Assessor’s assertion.

The Magistrate Division entered its Decision of Dismissal on

August 5, 2019. ORS 305.501(5)(a) requires any party appeal-

ing a Magistrate Division decision to file a complaint in the

Regular Division “within 60 days after the date of entry of

the [magistrate’s] written decision.” Although, according to

Tax Court Rule (TCR) 9 B(5), “filing” of a paper document

such as taxpayer’s complaint generally occurs when the court

receives the document and “endorses or stamps” it with the

date and time of receipt, ORS 305.418 overrides that rule and

deems a complaint sent by the United States Postal Service

to have been filed on the date shown on the postmark. The

postmark on the envelope containing taxpayer’s complaint in

this division shows that he mailed it on October 4, 2019, the

60th day. Taxpayer’s complaint in this division is timely.

The court agrees with the Assessor, however, that

taxpayer’s complaint in the Magistrate Division was not

timely. Under ORS 305.280(4), taxpayer was required to file

his complaint in the Magistrate Division “within 30 days

after the date of * * * the date of mailing of the order [of a

county board of property tax appeals].” This case involves

two property tax accounts, and thus two such orders. Both

were mailed on March 12, 2019. The 30th day after March

12 was April 11. Taxpayer mailed his complaint to the

Magistrate Division on April 12, 2019, as shown on the post-

mark on the envelope. April 11, 2019, was a Thursday and

was not a holiday. As the magistrate concluded, taxpayer

filed his complaint in the Magistrate Division one day late.2

Finally, the court addresses taxpayer’s claim for

relief from the regular filing deadline in the Magistrate Div-

ision based on subsection (1) of ORS 305.288.3 Subsection (1)

2

Plaintiff asks the court to add three days to the filing deadline because he

mailed his complaint to the court. This argument fails because the rule that adds

three days to the deadline, by its plain terms, “does not apply to the period for

filing a complaint in the Magistrate Division * * *.” Tax Court Rule-Magistrate

Division 3 A(3).

3

A separate provision in the same statute, subsection (3), offers an alter-

native ground for relief from the regular deadlines for a timely appeal: The

court must determine that “good and sufficient cause” exists for the failure to

Cite as 24 OTR 83 (2020) 85

allows a valuation appeal to proceed for the current tax year

and the two preceding years if two conditions are met.4 First,

the property must meet the “dwelling” requirements in ORS

305.288(1)(a). Second, the taxpayer’s requested change in

value must be equal to or greater than 20 percent of the

property’s RMV as shown on the assessment roll, as pro-

vided in ORS 305.288(1)(b).

The “dwelling” requirements are that the property

(1) be “used primarily as a dwelling (or [be] vacant)” and

(2) be “a single-family dwelling, a multifamily dwelling of

not more than four units, a condominium unit, a manufac-

tured structure or a floating home.” ORS 305.288(1)(a). The

property must satisfy both dwelling requirement (1) and

dwelling requirement (2). The Assessor asserts that the

property is “vacant,” referring to staff observations that no

building or structure is on the land. The court observes that

there may be some ambiguity in the term “vacant” as used

in requirement (1). The court need not address the meaning

of “vacant,” however, if the property does not satisfy dwell-

ing requirement (2), to which the court now turns.

Taxpayer does not argue that his property includes

a “condominium unit, a manufactured structure or a float-

ing home.” Therefore, taxpayer’s property satisfies require-

ment (2) only if the property includes a “dwelling,” specifi-

cally a single-family dwelling or a multifamily dwelling of

not more than four units.

file timely. See ORS 305.288(3). Taxpayer has asserted only that the difference

between the property’s actual RMV and the RMV shown on the roll is equal to or

greater than 20 percent; he has not appealed under subsection (3).

4

ORS 305.288(1) provides:

“The tax court shall order a change or correction applicable to a separate

assessment of property to the assessment and tax roll for the current tax year

or for either of the two tax years immediately preceding the current tax year,

or for any or all of those tax years, if all of the following conditions exist:

“(a) For the tax year to which the change or correction is applicable, the

property was or is used primarily as a dwelling (or is vacant) and was and is

a single-family dwelling, a multifamily dwelling of not more than four units,

a condominium unit, a manufactured structure or a floating home.

“(b) The change or correction requested is a change in value for the prop-

erty for the tax year and it is asserted in the request and determined by the

tax court that the difference between the real market value of the property

for the tax year and the real market value on the assessment and tax roll for

the tax year is equal to or greater than 20 percent.”

86 Shevtsov v. Dept. of Rev.

The legislature has not defined “dwelling” for pur-

poses of ORS 305.288. The court therefore analyzes the

term using the Oregon Supreme Court’s template in State v.

Gaines, 346 Or 160, 206 P3d 1042 (2009) (prescribing analysis

of statutory text, context and, where appropriate, legislative

history). The court turns first to the dictionary definition

of “dwelling” to determine the plain meaning of the term.

See Comcast Corp. v. Dept. of Rev., 356 Or 282, 295-96, 337

P3d 768 (2014) (seeking plain meaning in dictionary defini-

tion). The “dwelling” requirements first appeared relatively

recently, in a 1991 predecessor to ORS 305.288.5 Webster’s

defines “dwelling” as “a building or construction used for res-

idence.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 706 (unabridged

ed 2002). The American Heritage Dictionary defines the term

more broadly as “[a] place to live in; an abode.” American

Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 558 (5th ed 2011).

As between the two possibilities, the statutory con-

text confirms that the legislature intended the term “dwell-

ing” to refer to a fixed building or structure. First, the intro-

ductory portion of ORS 305.288(1) makes clear that the relief

is available only for a “separate assessment of property.”

This phrase refers to a “parcel” of property consisting of

land together with “buildings, structures and improvements

thereon.” See ORS 308.215(1)(a)(E), (F); Gray, 23 OTR at 233.

A “parcel,” however, does not include personal property (gen-

erally, moveable items such as vehicles), because the assessor

must record personal property on the roll pursuant to a dif-

ferent set of criteria. See ORS 308.215(1)(b). By referring to a

“separate assessment of property,” the legislature indicated

its intent that the 20-percent difference in value be measured

by the value of all real property comprising the parcel.6

5

As explained in Gray v. Dept. of Rev., 23 OTR 220, 245 (2018):

“In 1991, the legislature moved the provisions governing retrospective

correction of residential property from ORS 306.115 to a new provision cod-

ified as ORS 306.116. Or Laws 1991, ch 459, §§ 32, 32a. This change also

removed the gross error provisions from ORS 306.115, thereby limiting the

availability of gross error relief to residential properties under new ORS

306.116 (1991).”

(Emphasis in original.)

6

Where the legislature intended to afford the benefit of ORS 305.288(1) to an

item of personal property, it did so specifically, by naming manufactured struc-

tures and floating homes. See ORS 308.875 (manufactured structure classified as

personal property unless owned by the same person owning the land on which it

Cite as 24 OTR 83 (2020) 87

Second, in the same bill in which the legislature

first adopted the predecessor to ORS 305.288(1), the legis-

lature amended several other property tax statutes contain-

ing the word “dwelling.” See Or Laws 1991, ch 459. In each

of those statutes, the legislature used the term “dwelling”

consistently with the meaning of a fixed building or struc-

ture. See, e.g., ORS 307.169 (1991) (amended by Or Laws

1991, ch 459, § 46) (exemption for fallout shelters “located

in structures used as dwellings”); ORS 308.229(4)(b) (1991)

(amended by Or Laws 1991, ch 459, § 95) (separately listing

“dwelling,” “other structures,” and “land” in defining “home-

site” for purposes of forestland special assessment); ORS

308.377(3) (1991) (amended by Or Laws 1991, ch 459, § 121)

(similar for farm use special assessment); see also ORS

308.372(3)(a)(A) (1991) (amended by Or Laws 1991, ch 459,

§ 117a) (referring to land “under dwellings” for purposes of

farm use special assessment); see generally Gray, 23 OTR at

251-52. Neither party has identified any relevant legislative

history. Accordingly, the court concludes that the property

must include a building or structure in order to satisfy the

“dwelling” requirement (2).

The Assessor filed a declaration of an appraisal man-

ager employed in the Assessor’s office, who testified that he

inspected the property and found no signs of a structure on

the property. Taxpayer filed a response repeating his general

assertion that “the property is residential,” but he did not

address or refute the Assessor’s evidence that no structure

is on the property. The magistrate’s decision states that tax-

payer asserted before the magistrate that he lives in a van

on the property. Even if that is the case, the lack of a struc-

ture prevents the property from qualifying as a “dwelling”

within the meaning of requirement (2) in ORS 305.288(1)(a).

The court therefore grants the Assessor’s motion

and orders this case dismissed as having been untimely

filed in the Magistrate Division. Now, therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant-Intervenor’s

motion to dismiss is granted.

sits); Sherman v. Dept. of Rev., 17 OTR 132, 133 (2003) (floating home is personal

property pursuant to ORS 308.190(2)(c)).