Opinion

Capital One Auto Finance, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev.

  • 22 Or. Tax 326
Court
Oregon Tax Court
Filed
Dec 23, 2016
Status
Published
On the bench
Breithaupt
Cited by
10 cases
Authority
More cited than 60.4%

explaining that “the corporate excise and corporate income tax regimes were intended to operate as one cohesive tax regime” with the corporate income tax only reaching income not already subject to the excise tax

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that “the corporate excise and corporate income tax regimes were intended to operate as one cohesive tax regime” with the corporate income tax only reaching income not already subject to the excise tax
  • holding that the taxpayer, who charged Oregon customers “nearly $150,000,000” and “sent approximately 24,600,000 solicitations to Oregon customers” in each year at issue, had a substantial nexus with Oregon
  • considering taxpayer’s argument citing eight instances in which Oregon acted, or failed to act, in ways that out-of-state banks could have relied on to con- clude that physical presence was required for imposition of income-based taxes; finding no evidence of actual reliance by any taxpayer or industry generally
  • juxtaposing sellers’ collection burden associated with sales- and-use taxes and corporate excise and income taxes that have no such collection burden

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

326 December 23, 2016 No. 35

35

Capital One Auto Finance, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev. 22 OTR

December 23, 2016

IN THE OREGON TAX COURT

REGULAR DIVISION

CAPITAL ONE AUTO FINANCE, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,

Defendant.

(TC 5197)

Plaintiff (taxpayer) initially appealed from a conference decision letter

and notice of deficiency of Defendant Department of Revenue (the department).

Subsequently, taxpayer filed a petition for special designation, which was granted

and the case transferred to the Regular Division of the Tax Court. Taxpayer

argued that it was not subject to taxation in Oregon under either the corporate

excise tax or the corporate income tax laws for the income earned from the lend-

ing or depositing activities of its banks with respect to Oregon customers, arguing

that banks must have a physical presence in Oregon to be subject to taxation, and

taxpayer’s banks did not have such physical presence. Taxpayer also argued that

even if it was subject to taxation under Oregon law, the commerce clause of the

federal constitution prohibited the state from imposing such taxes on the banks

absent some physical presence. The department argued that taxation of income

earned from sources within Oregon is based not on property rights or the phys-

ical presence of a taxpayer, but upon the substantial economic benefit conferred

on a taxpayer in the conduct of its business. Granting the department’s cross-

motion and denying taxpayer’s motion, the court ruled that no physical presence

was required to subject out-of-state companies to the corporate income tax, and

that due to the character, number, and purposefulness of the transactions, the

amount of income earned from lending money to, and collecting fees from, an

extended network of Oregon customers and vendors, and the usage of the debt

enforcement mechanisms and the marketplace provided by Oregon, all led to the

conclusion that taxpayer had significant business activity in Oregon, and that

the income at issue had its point of origin in Oregon, from the Oregon resident

customers and merchants. Therefore, the income of taxpayer’s banks from their

lending activities to Oregon customers was subject to taxation in Oregon.

Oral argument on cross-motions for partial summary

judgment was held April 4, 2016, in the courtroom of the

Oregon Tax Court, Salem.

Gregg D. Barton, Perkins Coie LLP, Seattle, filed the

motion and argued the cause for Plaintiff (taxpayer).

Melisse S. Cunningham, Senior Assistant Attorney

General, Department of Justice, Salem, filed the cross-

motion and argued the cause for Defendant Department of

Revenue (the department).

Cite as 22 OTR 326 (2016) 327

Decision for Defendant rendered December 23, 2016.

HENRY C. BREITHAUPT, Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the court on cross-motions

for partial summary judgment and stipulated facts.1 This

order addresses whether the corporate excise tax or the cor-

porate income tax may be imposed on purely economic activ-

ity in the state without any physical presence by Plaintiff

(taxpayer). See ORS 317.070; ORS 318.020.2 The tax years

at issue are 2006, 2007, and 2008. There are other issues

before the court not addressed in this order.3

II. STIPULATED FACTS

During the tax years at issue, Capital One Financial

Corporation (COFC) was the parent company of an affiliated

group that filed a consolidated federal return. COFC and

its subsidiaries, which were wholly-owned by COFC, were

corporations incorporated, headquartered, and domiciled

outside of Oregon.

One of COFC’s subsidiaries, Capital One Auto

Finance (taxpayer), “was authorized to conduct, and con-

ducted, business in Oregon and other states.” It offered

“automobile and other motor vehicle financing products to

consumers primarily through auto dealerships.”

Taxpayer filed consolidated Oregon excise tax

returns for tax years 2006, 2007, and 2008. The returns

included taxpayer as well as Capital One Bank (COB),4

1

Some facts were stipulated only for the limited purposes of these motions.

2

Unless otherwise stated, the court’s references to the Oregon Revised

Statues (ORS) are to the 2009 edition. This is because tax years 2006, 2007, and

2008 were open to audit or examination and were audited by the department in

2011. Under Oregon Laws 2009, chapter 403, section 8, the 2009 amendments to

ORS 314.280, 314.610, 314.615, 317.010, 317.070, and 317.090 apply prospectively

and to any periods open to audit for the entities listed in amended ORS 314.610(4)

(a) through (i). The entities at issue here are financial institutions as listed in

ORS 314.610(4)(a) through (i).

3

The parties agreed to stay discovery and argument on these issues pending

the outcome of this decision.

4

In 2006 and 2007, COB was a state-chartered credit card bank. In 2008,

COB became a nationally-chartered bank renamed Capital One Bank (USA), N.A.

328 Capital One Auto Finance, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev.

Capital One FSB (FSB),5 and Capital One Services, Inc., all

of which were subsidiaries of COFC. In those returns, tax-

payer excluded from the numerator of the sales apportion-

ment factor the gross receipts of COB and FSB (collectively

referred to as “the Banks”).6

The Banks did not obtain authorization to conduct

business in Oregon. The Banks had no real or tangible per-

sonal property, offices, or employees in Oregon. In addition,

at oral argument, Defendant Department of Revenue (the

department) conceded, for purposes of these motions, that

the receivables of the Banks are not located in Oregon.

COB “offered credit card products, other consumer

loans, and deposit products to customers throughout the

United States, including Oregon, and in certain inter-

national markets.” FSB “accepted deposit products and

engaged in consumer and small business lending to custom-

ers in Oregon and other states.” These activities “were all

from [their] offices outside of Oregon.”

The Banks offered their products to Oregon cus-

tomers primarily through direct mail solicitations that orig-

inated from locations outside of Oregon. These solicitations

were designed to be sent to and received by customers and

potential customers in Oregon. The Banks sent approxi-

mately 24,600,000 solicitations to Oregon customers over

the course of 2007 and 2008. The number of solicitations

sent in 2006 is unknown, but it is accepted by both parties

to be materially the same.

The Banks had approximately 536,000 Oregon cus-

tomers in 2007 and approximately 495,000 Oregon custom-

ers in 2008. The number of Oregon customers is not known

for 2006, but it is accepted by both parties to be materi-

ally the same. The Banks sent monthly statements to their

Oregon customers with outstanding credit card balances,

and initiated lawsuits in Oregon in aid of collection against

delinquent accounts in Oregon. The number of lawsuits in

5

On June 30, 2007, Capital One FSB ceased doing business and merged into

Capital One National Association.

6

The motions do not address the propriety of any apportionment of gross

receipts.

Cite as 22 OTR 326 (2016) 329

Oregon initiated by or for the Banks was equal to 2,502 in

2006; 9,824 in 2007; and 9,071 in 2008.

The Banks earned revenue from or related to trans-

actions in which its customers used Capital One-branded

credit cards in Oregon or engaged in other types of con-

sumer lending in Oregon. These transactions included cash

advances from Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs) located

in Oregon but neither owned nor operated by the Banks (or

any related Capital One entity), as well as purchases at ven-

dors in Oregon. The types of fees that the Banks charged

included finance charges, late fees, overlimit fees, annual

membership fees, and interchange fees.7 The amount of fees

charged by the Banks totaled nearly $150,000,000 in each

year for 2007 and 2008. The amount of fees charged by the

Banks in 2006 is unknown, but it is accepted by both parties

to be materially the same.

In 2011, the department audited taxpayer’s corpo-

rate excise returns for tax years 2006, 2007, and 2008. The

department determined that the Banks were subject to the

corporate excise tax by reason of their lending and deposit-

ing activities and issued notices of deficiency. After holding

a conference with taxpayer, the department issued notices of

assessment including tax, penalty, and interest.8

Taxpayer appealed the notices of assessment to this

court.

III. ISSUES

There are two issues before the court. The first

issue is whether the Banks are subject to taxation in

Oregon under either the corporate excise tax or the corpo-

rate income tax by reason of their economic activities with

respect to Oregon customers.9 The second issue is whether

7

An interchange fee is the fee that is charged by the credit card company to

the vendor for purchases made by the customer from a vendor.

8

The amounts stated in the notices of deficiency assessment were based on

adjustments to the sales factor numerator, “along with several unrelated adjust-

ments, including federal RAR adjustments and the addback for other state taxes.”

Taxpayer has since amended its returns for 2007 and 2008 with additional RAR

adjustments, but those returns have not been processed by the department.

9

The court uses the term “economic activities” as a shorthand way to iden-

tify the various lending and depositing activities of the Banks with respect to

330 Capital One Auto Finance, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev.

the economic activities of the Banks created substantial

nexus for purposes of the Commerce Clause of the United

States Constitution so as to permit taxation of the Banks in

Oregon.

IV. ANALYSIS

Taxpayer argues that it is not subject to taxation in

Oregon for the income earned from the lending or deposit-

ing activities of the Banks with respect to Oregon custom-

ers. Although taxpayer makes arguments under state and

federal law, it essentially makes only one challenge to the

tax imposed. That challenge is that the Banks must have

a physical presence in Oregon to be subject to taxation.10

Under Oregon’s “first things first” doctrine, this court exam-

ines first the state law claims before addressing any federal

law claims. Hughes v. State of Oregon, 314 Or 1, 12, 838 P2d

1018 (1992).

A. State Law Claims

1. Determining the tax regimes at issue

A preliminary question that must be addressed

is what tax regimes are at issue. In its motion for partial

summary judgment, taxpayer argued that the corporate

excise tax in ORS chapter 317 does not reach to taxpayers

who have no physical presence in Oregon. The department

responded in two ways. First, it argued that the lending and

depositing activities of the Banks do subject them to the cor-

porate excise tax, regardless of the lack of physical presence

in the state. Second, it argued that, even if the Banks are

not subject to the excise tax, they are subject to the corpo-

rate income tax in ORS chapter 318.

In turn, taxpayer argues that it was not given

proper notice that the department was asserting the cor-

porate income tax as a basis for taxation. See ORS 305.885

(communication of basis for deficiency). However, after the

their Oregon customers when there was, for purposes of these motions, conced-

edly no property, employees, or agents of the Banks in Oregon. The term “eco-

nomic activities” is used to distinguish the facts of this case from one in which a

taxpayer does have property, employees, or agents in Oregon.

10

In other words, the Banks must have some physical presence of property,

employees, or agents in Oregon.

Cite as 22 OTR 326 (2016) 331

notice of deficiency, the department is allowed to assert

alternative grounds under ORS 305.575. The statutory pro-

visions of ORS 305.575 authorize the departure from pre-

viously communicated reasons under ORS 305.885, so long

as certain conditions are met. ORS 305.575 provides that

this court may consider such alternative grounds if they

are raised “before or at the hearing or any rehearing of the

case.” It also provides that the taxpayer is given additional

time to amend or otherwise plead to the alternative grounds

asserted. Taxpayer here did not request such additional

time, and in fact argued in its response to the department’s

motion as to why it thinks that the corporate income tax

does not reach to the activities of the Banks.

This court will consider the imposition of both tax

regimes.

2. Determining the scope of the tax regimes at issue

Oregon’s corporate excise tax is “a tax measured by

or according to net income * * * for the privilege of carry-

ing on or doing business in this state.” ORS 317.010(5). It

is imposed on financial institutions “doing business” in this

state by ORS 317.070. “Doing business” is defined as “any

transaction or transactions in the course of its activities con-

ducted within the state by a national banking association,

or any other corporation * * *.” ORS 317.010(4).

Oregon’s corporate income tax is also a tax measured

by or according to net income. Subject to certain exemp-

tions,11 it is imposed on corporations that have “Oregon

taxable income derived from sources within this state.”

ORS 318.020(1) (emphasis supplied). “Income derived from

sources within this state” is broadly defined, and includes

“income from tangible or intangible property located or

having a situs in this state and income from any activities

carried on in this state, regardless of whether carried on in

intrastate, interstate or foreign commerce.”

ORS 318.020(2). Although ORS 318.020(2) includes exam-

ples of income from sources within Oregon, those examples

11

ORS 318.040 provides that certain corporations are exempt from the cor-

porate income tax.

332 Capital One Auto Finance, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev.

are not exclusive. The term “source” is not defined by statute,

but it is defined as “a point of origin” or “a point of emana-

tion.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 2177 (unabridged

ed 2002). The income at issue in this case has its point of

origin or point of emanation in Oregon, namely, the Oregon

resident customers and merchants.

Despite being contained in separate chapters, the

corporate excise and corporate income tax regimes were

intended to operate as one cohesive tax regime. See Cal-Roof

Wholesale v. Tax Com., 242 Or 435, 441, 444, 410 P2d 233

(1966) (explaining that the corporate income tax “plugged

the loophole” created by the highly formalistic decision,

since abandoned, in Spector Motor Service v. O’Connor, 340

US 602, 71 S Ct 508, 95 L Ed 573 (1951)). Indeed, the corpo-

rate income tax only reaches to income not already subject

to the corporate excise tax, and it taxes such income at the

same tax rate. ORS 318.020(1) (referring to ORS 317.061).

Further, ORS chapter 317 is incorporated in its entirety into

ORS chapter 318, and both taxes are to be “administered as

uniformly as possible.” ORS 318.031.

Taxpayer argues that the Banks are not “doing

business” in Oregon for purposes of the excise tax because

they do not have a physical presence in Oregon, such as prop-

erty, employees, or agents in the state. This court doubts

that there is a physical presence requirement for purposes

of the corporate excise tax.12 However, even if there were

12

There is no physical presence requirement appearing in the definition of

doing business, the definition of the excise tax, or in the imposition of the excise

tax on these corporations. See ORS 317.010(4), (5); ORS 317.070. Moreover, the

Supreme Court has stated that the legislature intended the words “doing busi-

ness” to have their usual meaning, which is “the engaging in activities in the pur-

suit of gain.” Welch Holding Co. v. Galloway, 161 Or 515, 527, 89 P2d 559 (1939);

see also John I. Haas, Inc. v. Tax Com., 227 Or 170, 184, 361 P2d 820 (1961). The

court focused on activities, not presence. It would seem to matter little whether

a taxpayer has a physical presence in the state if that taxpayer is nevertheless

engaged in activities in the pursuit of gain in the state.

In addition, this court has stated that the excise tax reaches to the federal

constitutional limits, which, as will be seen, encompasses business activities con-

ducted within the state without any physical presence of the taxpayer. Ann Sacks

Tile & Stone, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev., 20 OTR 377, 380-81 (2011). That statement was

based in part upon the language contained in ORS 317.018. That statute provides

that the intent of the legislature is

“[t]o make the Oregon corporate excise tax law, insofar as it relates to the

measurement of taxable income, identical to the provisions of the federal

Cite as 22 OTR 326 (2016) 333

such a requirement, the income generated from Oregon cus-

tomers by the Banks from their economic activities directed

to Oregon is subject to the corporate income tax as “income

derived from sources within the state.”

With respect to the corporate income tax, taxpayer

argues that the Banks possessed no property in Oregon, had

no employees or agents in Oregon, conducted no physical

activities in Oregon, and therefore earned no income from

sources in Oregon. See ORS 318.020(2). Taxpayer essen-

tially argues that the reach of ORS chapter 318 is short of

the federal constitutional limits. That argument is counter

to Oregon law.

The Oregon Supreme Court has indicated that

ORS chapter 318 reaches to the federal constitutional limit.

Amer. Refrig. Transit Co. v. Tax Com., 238 Or 340, 346, 395

P2d 127 (1964). This court reaches that conclusion with the

following observations.

First, this court in American Refrigerator Transit so

stated. Amer. Refrig. Transit Co. v. Commission, 1 OTR 429,

434-35 (1963) (stating that the corporate income tax reaches

“to the full extent permitted by the federal Constitution,”

such that “constitutionality and proper statutory construc-

tion are really one issue, turning upon the application of

constitutional limitations upon state taxation of interstate

commerce”). Second, the Oregon Supreme Court in no way

questioned this court’s conclusion as to the reach of ORS

chapter 318. Indeed, the Supreme Court addressed only

the federal constitutional limit in its opinion reversing this

Internal Revenue Code, as in effect and applicable for the tax year of the

taxpayer, to the end that taxable income of a corporation for Oregon purposes

is the same as it is for federal income tax purposes, subject to Oregon’s juris-

diction to tax, and subject to the additions, subtractions, adjustments and

modifications contained in this chapter.”

ORS 317.018(1) (2011) (emphasis added). ORS 317.018 indicates that the leg-

islature intends both that Oregon taxable income is to be based upon federal

taxable income (with certain additions and subtractions) and that Oregon will

tax all such income over which it has jurisdiction. There being no limitation in

the Oregon constitution limiting the reach of the tax statutes at issue here, the

phrase “subject to Oregon’s jurisdiction to tax” indicates that the legislature

intended to extend the reach of the corporate excise tax to the limits of federal

law. The federal limit is important because, as a sovereign state, Oregon may

exercise its inherent authority to tax however it chooses, unless its jurisdiction to

do so is limited by the federal constitution or valid federal legislation.

334 Capital One Auto Finance, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev.

court. It follows that the Supreme Court implicitly accepted

this court’s conclusion as to the statutory reach of ORS chap-

ter 318.

Taxpayer attempts to distinguish American

Refrigerator Transit because the taxpayer in that case at

least had some tangible property in the state, even if tempo-

rarily and not under the taxpayer’s direct control. However,

the language of the Supreme Court is inescapable. “[N]exus

[to tax] exists whenever the corporation takes advantage

of the economic milieu within the state to realize a profit.”

238 Or at 346. “To establish nexus it is necessary to show

that the taxpayer has, in the conduct of his business, taken

advantage of the economy of the taxing state to produce the

income which is subjected to tax.” Id. at 347. And, because

“constitutionality and proper statutory construction [of the

corporate income tax] are really one issue,” 1 OTR at 435, if

no physical presence is required for purposes of the federal

constitution, then no physical presence is required to subject

out-of-state companies to the corporate income tax.

Here, the department has effectively conceded that

the Banks have no property in Oregon.13 However, taxation

of income earned from sources within the state is based

not on property rights or the physical presence of the tax-

payer, but upon the substantial economic benefit conferred

on a taxpayer in the conduct of its business. Once again,

the Supreme Court’s language is clear that physical pres-

ence is not required under Oregon law. “[A]part from federal

legislation, it would seem to us that income derived from

the sale of goods in Oregon by a nonresident corporation

relying entirely upon radio or television advertising would

be taxable in this state.” 238 Or at 347 (footnotes omitted).

Taxpayers are subject to the corporate income tax based on

their economic activities in the state.

3. Activities of the banks in Oregon

The Banks engaged in numerous activities

with respect to Oregon customers, including marketing,

13

By stipulation, the parties agreed for the limited purposes of these motions

that the Banks had no real or tangible personal property, offices, or employees in

Oregon. During oral argument, the department conceded for the limited purposes

of these motions that the receivables of the Banks are not located in Oregon.

Cite as 22 OTR 326 (2016) 335

solicitation, acquisition, billing and collecting, and retention

of Oregon customers. The Banks directed their activities

to attract and retain customers in Oregon to earn revenue

either directly or indirectly from Oregon customers.

The Banks engaged in marketing and solicited

business in Oregon. The Banks directly and systematically

sent into Oregon approximately 24,600,000 solicitations

between 2007 and 2008. These solicitations were designed

to stimulate demand in Oregon for the lending and credit

capability of the Banks. The Banks supplied this demand

to Oregon by extending credit and lending money to Oregon

customers. The Banks extended credit or lent money to hun-

dreds of thousands of customers in Oregon in 2006, 2007,

and 2008.

The Banks earned money directly from Oregon

customers. The Banks collected fees from hundreds of thou-

sands of customers in Oregon, including finance charges,

late fees, overlimit fees, and annual membership fees. These

fees were the direct or indirect result of transactions entered

into by Oregon customers while using Capital One branded

credit cards and other financing products. These fees were

billed to and paid by customers in Oregon. In addition, in

circumstances where Oregon customers failed to pay, the

Banks used the debt enforcement mechanisms provided by

Oregon, including the courts, thousands of times each year

to collect unpaid debts.

The Banks also earned money indirectly from their

customers through their purchases in Oregon. When cus-

tomers of the Banks purchased goods and services from

Oregon vendors, the Banks earned revenue from inter-

change fees imposed on those transactions. These fees were

the direct result of transactions entered into by Capital One

customers while using Capital One branded credit cards to

pay Oregon vendors.

4. Effect of the activities of the banks

Either the excise tax, the income tax, or both apply

to taxpayer’s income and activities. Taxpayer is subject to

assessment for the income earned by the Banks from their

lending activities to Oregon customers.

336 Capital One Auto Finance, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev.

The Banks did business in Oregon in the years

in question, and a lot of it. They engaged in lending and

other financial activities with respect to their customers in

Oregon in the pursuit of earning income through interest

and fee charges. They were able to do business in Oregon

without a physical presence, but they were still doing busi-

ness in Oregon.

However, even if the Banks were not doing busi-

ness in Oregon for purposes of the excise tax, they were,

under any definition, earning income from “sources within

the state” for purposes of the corporate income tax. By

lending money and charging fees to Oregon customers and

vendors, the Banks extracted upwards of $150,000,000 in

fees from Oregon each year in 2007 and 2008.14 Those fees

emanated from Oregon and originated from Oregon custom-

ers and vendors, regardless of the physical presence of the

Banks. Dollars paid to the Banks by their Oregon custom-

ers, whether cardholders or vendors, have their source in

Oregon.

The character, number, and purposefulness of these

transactions; the amount of income earned from lending

money to, and collecting fees from, an extended network of

Oregon customers and vendors; and the usage of the debt

enforcement mechanisms and the marketplace provided by

Oregon all lead to one conclusion. Whether “doing business”

in Oregon for purposes of the Oregon excise tax or earning

income “derived from sources within this state” for purposes

of the Oregon income tax, the Banks directed their activ-

ities to access and extract economic benefits from Oregon

persons. The income of the Banks for their lending activities

to Oregon customers is subject to taxation in Oregon.

B. Federal Law Claims

Because taxpayer is subject to state taxation in

Oregon by reason of the economic activities of the Banks,

the only question that remains for purposes of this order

is whether the economic nexus of the Banks is suffi-

cient for purposes of the Commerce Clause of the federal

14

The amount of fees earned in 2006 is unknown, but it is accepted by the

parties to be materially the same.

Cite as 22 OTR 326 (2016) 337

constitution.15 Taxpayer argues that economic activity alone

is not sufficient to satisfy the substantial nexus requirement

of the Commerce Clause and therefore the Banks do not

have substantial nexus with Oregon.

Without question, “the [Supreme] Court consistently

has indicated that ‘interstate commerce may be made to pay

its way,’ and has moved toward a standard of permissibility

of state taxation based upon its actual effect rather than its

legal terminology.” Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430

US 274, 281, 97 S Ct 1076, 51 L Ed 2d 326 (1977). Moreover,

where a state has “provided benefits and protections” for a

taxpayer’s business activities in the state, the state “is jus-

tified in asking [for] a fair and reasonable return” in the

form of a “nondiscriminatory properly apportioned state cor-

porate tax[ ].” Id. at 287. State taxation is permissible for

purposes of the Commerce Clause if the tax is “applied to an

activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is

fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate

commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by

the State.” Id. at 279. The state must have “a connection to

the activity itself, rather than a connection only to the actor

the State seeks to tax.” Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Tax

Div., 504 US 768, 778, 112 S Ct 2251, 119 L Ed 2d 533 (1992).

The principal case relied upon by taxpayer is Quill

Corporation v. North Dakota, 504 US 298, 112 S Ct 1904, 119

L Ed 2d 91 (1992). In that case, the United States Supreme

Court held that physical presence is required to establish

Commerce Clause substantial nexus where a duty to collect

sales or use taxes is at issue. Id. at 317-19. However, in doing

so, the Court overruled in part its prior decision in National

Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 US

753, 87 S Ct 1389, 18 L Ed 2d 505 (1967). In Bellas Hess, the

Court held that a physical presence was required to satisfy

both the Due Process and Commerce Clauses. For purposes

of the Due Process Clause, the Quill Court held that a cor-

poration that “purposefully avails itself of the benefits of

an economic market in the forum State”—i.e., a corporation

that “purposefully direct[s] its activities” to “residents” of

15

Taxpayer makes no argument that state taxation of solely economic activ-

ity is invalid under the Due Process Clause.

338 Capital One Auto Finance, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev.

the state—may be subjected to taxation in that state with-

out violation of the Due Process Clause. Quill, 504 US at

307-08.

In arguing that physical presence is required for

purposes of the Commerce Clause in respect of the need

to pay income taxes, taxpayer relies upon a questionable

standard of constitutional law. In 2015, Justice Kennedy

called for the legal community to find an appropriate case

for the Court to reexamine its holdings in Quill and Bellas

Hess. Direct Marketing Ass’n v. Brohl, 575 US 1, 135 S Ct

1124, 1135, 191 L Ed 2d 97 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

However, until the Supreme Court overrules or modifies its

holding in Quill, this court is bound by it.

Regardless, nothing in Quill imposes a physical

presence standard for Commerce Clause nexus outside the

realm of collection obligations for sales or use taxes. The

Court noted the “magnitude” of Quill’s contacts with the

state—all without a physical presence—for purposes of the

Due Process nexus standard, id. at 308, but nevertheless

found that physical presence was necessary to impose a sales

or use tax collection obligation. The Court in Quill rested

that opinion on two bases. The first basis is that imposing

sales or use taxes on out-of-state taxpayers with no physical

presence in the state creates an undue burden. The second

basis is that there are settled expectations with respect to

a physical presence standard in the realm of sales or use

taxes.

1. Oregon has not imposed an undue burden on inter-

state commerce

The Commerce Clause nexus requirement is

intended to “limit the reach of state taxing authority so as

to ensure that state taxation does not unduly burden inter-

state commerce.” Quill, 504 US at 313. In its assessment

of the burdens of a sales or use tax collection obligation

on out-of-state taxpayers, the Court was aware that there

were over six thousand sales or use tax jurisdictions. Id. at

313 n 6. In each one of those jurisdictions, a taxpayer could

be charged with both collecting and remitting tax in often

substantially different tax regimes. Id. The Court had pre-

viously stated in Bellas Hess that the “many variations in

Cite as 22 OTR 326 (2016) 339

rates of tax, in allowable exemptions, and in administrative

and recordkeeping requirements could entangle [an out-of-

state vendor] in a virtual welter of complicated obligations.”

386 US at 759-60 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added). The

Court in Quill appears to have adopted this finding. 504 US

at 313 n 6.

Beyond asserting that the corporate excise or

income tax regimes create an undue burden as applied to

the Banks, taxpayer does not seriously advance the argu-

ment. Taxpayer has introduced no evidence of a “welter” of

obligations arising from states requiring an out-of-state

taxpayer to pay a tax based upon net income for the income

earned in the state. Nor does it seem likely that it could.

The department argues—and taxpayer does not appear to

dispute—that the burdens associated with excise or income

tax regimes are much less onerous than sales or use tax

regimes. This court agrees.

Simply put, the record does not support a finding

that there are thousands of income or excise tax regimes

with which a taxpayer must comply. Perhaps more impor-

tantly, with respect to income or excise taxes, there is no

burden of collecting the tax from third parties. The scope

of that burden in the sales or use tax context looms large.

A taxpayer must ensure that the appropriate amount (and

not more or less) is collected from the customer and directed

to the appropriate taxing authority within the appropriate

time. In the case of the collection of sales or use taxes, all

of these obligations must be determined before a taxpayer

makes its first sale into a jurisdiction. Otherwise, the tax-

payer will likely fail in collecting and remitting the appro-

priate sales or use tax.

While collection and remittance of sales or use

taxes is not an undue burden in and of itself, it can become

one if the seller does not reasonably know whether it will

have substantial nexus with the taxing state, or has mini-

mal sales in a number of taxing jurisdictions. No such argu-

ment can be made with respect to Oregon’s corporate excise

or income taxes. Those taxes do not have a requirement of

collection from third parties, and are paid based upon the

income earned in the state as determined at the end of a

340 Capital One Auto Finance, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev.

tax period and not at the beginning. This court concludes

that imposition of the corporate excise and income taxes on

economic activity does not constitute an undue burden on

interstate commerce.

2. There are no “settled expectations” to upset with

respect to income taxes

The other basis for the Quill Court’s physical pres-

ence nexus standard was settled expectations. That basis

was composed of two components. First, the Court consid-

ered the benefit of the “settled expectations” of taxpayers

that result from a bright-line rule. Quill, 504 US at 316. The

rise of, and investment in, the mail-order industry was, at

least arguably, in part related to the bright-line physical

presence standard announced in Bellas Hess. Id.

Second, the Court considered the “settled expec-

tations” resulting from the doctrine of stare decisis, noting

that the physical presence rule in Bellas Hess had “engen-

dered substantial reliance and has become part of the basic

framework of a sizable industry.” Id. at 317. Where industry

had extensively relied on that rule, and Congress had the

power to displace it,16 the Court refused to “renounce the

bright-line test of Bellas Hess.” Id. at 318.

Curiously, taxpayer’s argument regarding set-

tled expectations proceeds under neither the necessity of a

bright-line rule nor the role of stare decisis. Taxpayer has

not argued, or shown, that the rise or prominence of the

financial services industry was dependent on a bright-line

physical presence requirement with respect to income or

excise taxes. Nor has taxpayer argued, or shown, that there

16

As to this point, the Court stated:

“No matter how we evaluate the burdens that use taxes impose on interstate

commerce, Congress remains free to disagree with our conclusions. Indeed,

in recent years Congress has considered legislation that would ‘overrule’

the Bellas Hess rule. Its decision not to take action in this direction may, of

course, have been dictated by respect for our holding in Bellas Hess that the

Due Process Clause prohibits States from imposing such taxes, but today we

have put that problem to rest. Accordingly, Congress is now free to decide

whether, when, and to what extent the States may burden interstate mail-

order concerns with a duty to collect use taxes.”

Quill, 504 US at 318 (citation and footnote omitted).

Cite as 22 OTR 326 (2016) 341

is or was a uniform body of law on this issue upon which it

relied.17

Taxpayer proceeds under what might be termed an

estoppel argument—which is not favored—based on action

(or inaction) by the department and the State of Oregon.18

That action (or inaction) includes: (1) the department previ-

ously audited taxpayer, but did not subject the Banks to the

excise tax; (2) the department indicated in survey responses

that soliciting and issuing credit cards does not create nexus;

(3) the department unsuccessfully petitioned the legislature

to adopt a statutory factor presence nexus statute; (4) the

department advised the legislature that making, purchas-

ing, and holding unsecured and secured debt in Oregon did

not create nexus in Oregon; (5) the department’s internal

policy in 2006 stated that issuing credit cards alone did not

create nexus in Oregon; (6) there was no statute or rule that

clearly stated that economic presence is sufficient; (7) the

department in 2007 said that any rule addressing economic

nexus would be applied prospectively; and (8) the depart-

ment had not previously asserted its taxation authority

against a taxpayer based on economic nexus alone.

According to taxpayer, the department’s pronounce-

ments regarding nexus were “so predominate, [they] took on

the effect of unwritten rules upon which taxpayers relied

as if written.” Taxpayer also argues that any “contrary

interpretation” by the department would be akin to “ad hoc

decision-making in violation of Article I, section 20[,] of the

Oregon Constitution” (Oregon’s privileges and immunities

clause). However, the department’s pronouncements do not

serve as a basis for estoppel.

17

It could not. For example, in 2006 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West

Virginia held that the physical presence requirement only applied to sales and

use taxes. See Tax Comm’r v. MBNA Am Bank, NA, 640 SE2d 226 (W Va 2006).

The Supreme Court denied certiorari. 551 US 1141 (2007). Taxpayer has state

cases in support of its position too, which were also denied certiorari by the

Supreme Court, but that only exemplifies the lack of clarity or “settled expecta-

tions” in the law.

18

In Johnson v. Tax Commission, the Oregon Supreme Court held that estop-

pel could apply to tax collectors. 248 Or 460, 463, 435 P2d 302 (1967). However,

“[t]he policy of efficient and effective tax collection makes the doctrine of rare

application.” Id. at 463.

342 Capital One Auto Finance, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev.

Estoppel only applies if three elements are satis-

fied. First, there must be “proof positive that the collector

has misinformed the individual taxpayer.” Johnson v. Tax

Commission, 248 Or 460, 463, 435 P2d 302 (1967). Second,

the taxpayer must have a “particularly valid reason for rely-

ing on the misinformation.” Id. at 463-64. Third, it must

be “inequitable to a high degree to compel the taxpayer to

conform to the true requirement.” Id. at 464. These elements

have been generalized in recent years as “(1) misleading

conduct on the part of the department; (2) taxpayer’s good

faith, reasonable reliance on that conduct; and (3) injury to

taxpayer.” Webb v. Dept. of Rev., 18 OTR 381, 383 (2005),

citing Society of St. Vincent DePaul v. Dept. of Rev., 14 OTR

47, 50 (1996).

The record is devoid of evidence that either this tax-

payer or taxpayers generally relied on case law or any of the

statements of the department in entering into or continu-

ing business operations in Oregon. Moreover, any reliance

on such statements is not reasonable given the language

of the Oregon Supreme Court in American Refrigerator

Transit, and the adoption of the department’s substantial

nexus guidelines in Oregon Administrative Rule (OAR)

150-317-0020. This is so even as to the department’s state-

ment, during notice and comment prior to final promulga-

tion, that the substantial nexus rule would only be applied

prospectively.

First, the rule as published was not so limited, and

there was clear Oregon Supreme Court precedent hold-

ing that a rule not so limited applies to any periods open

to examination. U.S. Bancorp v. Dept. of Rev., 337 Or 625,

639, 103 P3d 85 (2004); see OAR 150-305-0014 (formerly

OAR 150-305.100-(B)). Second, even if the rule did not apply

retroactively to open periods, any reliance on department

statements contrary to the broad language in American

Refrigerator Transit cannot be viewed as reasonable. Indeed,

the department stated during notice and comment that it

did not believe it was “extending” Oregon law, but rather

was attempting to provide “clarity” on that law.

Taxpayer’s estoppel claim fails. Even if taxpayer

could show that its employees actually read any of materials

Cite as 22 OTR 326 (2016) 343

upon which it now relies—and nothing in the record sup-

ports that conclusion—such reliance would not have been

reasonable.

Finally, this court notes that what appears to be an

estoppel argument by this taxpayer is not the type of reli-

ance or “settled expectations” discussed in Quill. The Court

in Quill addressed expectations that were settled and led to

initiating or continuing economic contact with a state. There

is nothing in the record that supports any argument that

this taxpayer entered into or continued its business contacts

in Oregon in reliance on any court decision or action of the

department. An appropriate analysis of settled expectations

under Quill does not support restricting the application of

the corporate excise and income tax regimes only to taxpay-

ers with a physical presence in Oregon.

Consideration of the importance of a bright-line

rule, when concerning settled expectations, parallels the

considerations discussed above with respect to undue bur-

dens. For sales and use taxes, a corporation would here

again need to know at the first sale what its obligations are

and whether it would have substantial nexus with the state

such that it would need to collect and remit the tax to the

state. The benefit of a bright-line physical presence rule is

clear.

For excise or income taxes, however, the corporation

can periodically evaluate whether its activities have created

or will create substantial nexus such that it needs to pay tax

based on its income in the state. Notably, there is no collec-

tion of tax from customers that must occur. The burden on

the taxpayer is much less onerous than a sales or use tax.

Accordingly, the benefit of, and need for, a bright-line physi-

cal presence rule is diminished.

Next, as to consideration of the role of stare decisis,

there is no clear Supreme Court precedent with respect to

income or excise taxes that requires a physical presence for

such taxes. This is markedly different from the situation

that existed under Bellas Hess in respect of obligations to

collect sales or use taxes. Indeed, the question in this case

has been litigated across the country by taxpayers and

344 Capital One Auto Finance, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev.

taxing authorities with varying degrees of success on both

sides.19

3. Substantial nexus may be established by sufficient

economic presence

The Court in Quill rejected a physical presence stan-

dard in lieu of an economic nexus standard for purposes of

the Due Process Clause because the Court understood that

“modern commercial life” does not require physical presence

in a state to attract business.20 See 504 US at 308 (stating

“it matters little that such solicitation is accomplished by

a deluge of catalogs rather than a phalanx of drummers”).

If there are sufficient economic contacts with the state, an

out-of-state business “may be made to pay its way.” Complete

Auto Transit, Inc., 430 US at 281.

The only two reasons the Quill Court gave for

departing from its Due Process economic nexus analysis to

impose a physical presence standard for Commerce Clause

nexus for the collection of sales or use taxes were consid-

erations of undue burden and settled expectations. As dis-

cussed, neither of these bases require or even suggest that

courts should adopt a physical presence requirement under

the Commerce Clause for taxes imposed upon or measured

by net income. There are no special circumstances—such as

a collection requirement or six thousand tax jurisdictions—

that would run counter to the conclusion that a state can

exact a reasonable tribute for the economic marketplace it

has helped maintain in Oregon. As the Supreme Court has

repeatedly recognized, “the State’s power to tax an individ-

ual’s or corporation’s activities is justified by the ‘protection,

19

Compare those cases cited by taxpayer in support, Scioto Ins. Co. v. Okla.

Tax Comm., 279 P3d 782 (Okla 2012); Rylander v. Bandag Licensing Corp., 18

SW3d 296 (Tex App 2000); J.C. Penney Nat’l Bank v. Johnson, 19 SW3d 831 (Tenn

Ct App 1999), with those cases cited by the department in support, Capital One

Bank v. Comm’n of Revenue, 899 NE2d 76 (Mass 2009); Geoffrey, Inc v. Comm’r of

Rev, 899 NE2d 87 (Mass 2009); MBNA Am Bank, NA & Affiliates v. Indiana Dept.

of State Revenue, 895 NE2d 140 (Ind Tax 2008); Bridges v. Geoffrey, Inc., 984 So

2d 115 (La App 2008); MBNA Am Bank, NA, 640 SE2d 226. Recently, the Ohio

Supreme Court held that physical presence is not required under the Commerce

Clause to subject an out-of-state taxpayer to a business privilege tax. Crutchfield

Corp. v. Testa, 88 NE3d 900 (Ohio Nov 17, 2016) (Slip Op No. 2016-Ohio-7760) WL

6775765.

20

The Banks here are a case in point.

Cite as 22 OTR 326 (2016) 345

opportunities and benefits’ the State confers on those activi-

ties.”21 Allied-Signal, Inc., 504 US at 778 (quoting Wisconsin

v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 US 435, 444 (1940)).

4. The banks have substantial nexus in Oregon

The court must now consider whether the economic

presence of the Banks in Oregon rises to the level of sub-

stantial nexus.

Substantial nexus is a requirement designed to

“limit[ ] state burdens on interstate commerce.” Quill, 504

US at 313. There must be, outside any connection with cus-

tomers via common carriers, more than a “ ‘slightest pres-

ence’ ” to satisfy the nexus requirement. Id. at 315 n 8 (citing

Nat’l Geographic Soc. v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430

US 551, 556 (1977)).

The activities of the Banks created substantial eco-

nomic nexus in Oregon. The Banks repeatedly extended

credit, loaned money, pursued collection, and earned reve-

nue in Oregon. This is not a case of a taxpayer having only

a “slightest presence” in Oregon. Quill, 504 US at 315 n 8.

There was extensive contact in the state of Oregon by the

Banks.

The Banks sent approximately 24,600,000 solicita-

tions into Oregon between 2007 and 2008 for the purpose

of obtaining and retaining customers.22 In part because

of those solicitations, the Banks had 536,000 Oregon cus-

tomers in 2007 and 495,000 Oregon customers in 2008.23

To those customers, the Banks engaged in a variety of

types of consumer lending or depositing activities. From

those lending or depositing activities, the Banks charged

nearly $150,000,000 in fees in each year for 2007 and

21

Recall, however, that the power to tax is not without limit. A tax must also

be fairly apportioned, nondiscriminatory, and “fairly related to the services pro-

vided by the State.” Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 430 US at 279; see Stonebridge

Life Ins. Co. I v. Dept. of Rev., 18 OTR 423 (2006) (holding that the imposition of

the insurance excise tax was unconstitutional as to apportionment).

22

The number of solicitations sent in 2006 is unknown, but it is accepted by

the parties to be materially the same.

23

The number of Oregon customers in 2006 is unknown, but it is accepted by

the parties to be materially the same.

346 Capital One Auto Finance, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev.

2008.24 To collect amounts due, the Banks routinely sent

statements to their Oregon customers with their current

balances. When Oregon customers failed to pay the fees or

balances due, the Banks initiated collection lawsuits against

them in Oregon. The number of collection lawsuits initiated

by or for the Banks was 2,502 in 2006, 9,824 in 2007, and

9,071 in 2008. The Banks had more than a mere “slightest

presence” in Oregon.

If the Banks were unable to lend money to or accept

deposits from Oregon customers, they could not charge fees.

And even if they could charge such fees, the Banks would not

be as successful in their business if they could not resort to

debt enforcement mechanisms to collect these fees. Oregon

has created a marketplace and business atmosphere, an “eco-

nomic mileu” in the terms of American Refrigerator Transit,

which makes consumer lending possible and profitable. The

Banks have taken advantage of that “economic mileu”—the

“protection, opportunities and benefits” afforded by Oregon.

Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 US at 444. They “may be

made to pay [their] way.” Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 430

US at 281 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Banks

had substantial nexus with Oregon in 2006, 2007, and 2008.

V. CONCLUSION

The corporate excise tax and corporate income tax

regimes operate as one cohesive tax scheme. Between the

two taxes, Oregon taxes the income from economic activities

in Oregon. Taxpayer earned income from economic activi-

ties in Oregon. Such taxation is permissible without violat-

ing the Commerce Clause if there is also substantial nexus

with the taxpayer. Substantial nexus can be established by

economic presence alone. Taxpayer’s significant economic

activities in Oregon established substantial nexus with

Oregon. Now, therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for partial

summary judgment is denied; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s

motion for partial summary judgment is granted.

24

The amount of fees earned in 2006 is unknown, but it is accepted by the

parties to be materially the same.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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