OSBA v. Dept. of Rev.

No. 29 October 7, 2016 281

IN THE OREGON TAX COURT

REGULAR DIVISION

OREGON SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,

and Marion County Assessor,

Defendants.

(TC 5262)

Plaintiff (taxpayer) appealed from a Magistrate Division decision as to

exemption status of real property it owns in Salem, Oregon. The property at issue

was used as a parking lot for taxpayer’s members that visit Salem for business

and other purposes. Defendant Marion County Assessor (the county) initially

denied taxpayer’s application for exemption on the grounds that taxpayer was

not a school district, a public or municipal corporation, or organized as a corpora-

tion, but during litigation, the county did not continue to maintain that taxpayer

did not qualify as a “corporation” under ORS 307.090, and neither the county

nor Defendant Department of Revenue (the department) disputed that tax-

payer’s property was being used for taxpayer’s corporate purposes. The depart-

ment instead argued that taxpayer did not qualify as a public corporation because

it was not created or authorized by statute and did not possess governmental

powers or responsibilities. The county argued that taxpayer did not qualify as

a public corporation because it only served its members, which are not citizens.

Taxpayer argued that it qualified as a public corporation because it advances

public education in Oregon through assistance to its membership, which is com-

posed entirely of other public corporations. Granting taxpayer’s motion and deny-

ing the department and county’s cross-motions, the court ruled that because it

served a public purpose, was exclusively managed and controlled by public enti-

ties, was impliedly authorized by statute, and was created by public entities with

the limited power and authority necessary to accomplish its purpose, taxpayer

was entitled to an exemption for the subject property.

Oral argument on cross-motions for summary judgment

was held March 21, 2016, in the courtroom of the Oregon

Tax Court, Salem.

James E. Mountain, Jr., Harrang Long Gary Rudnick

PC, Portland, filed the motion and argued the cause for

Plaintiff (taxpayer).

Scott A. Norris, Assistant Marion County Counsel, Salem,

filed the cross-motion and argued the cause for Defendant

Marion County Assessor (the county).

Daniel Paul, Assistant Attorney General, Department

of Justice, Salem, filed the cross-motion and argued

282 OSBA v. Dept. of Rev.

the cause for Defendant Department of Revenue (the

department).

Decision for Plaintiff rendered October 7, 2016.

HENRY C. BREITHAUPT, Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before the court on cross-motions

for summary judgment. Plaintiff Oregon School Boards

Association (OSBA or taxpayer) appeals from a Magistrate

Division decision. The magistrate upheld a denial by

Defendant Marion County Assessor (the county) of taxpayer’s

application for property tax exemption for tax year 2014-15

for “corporate property used or intended for corporate pur-

poses of * * * [a] public * * * corporation[ ] in this state.” See

ORS 307.090(1).1 The county and Defendant Department of

Revenue (the department) have argued separate bases for

denying taxpayer an exemption under ORS 307.090(1).

II. FACTS

Taxpayer is a voluntary, unincorporated association

of 196 public K-12 school districts, 17 public community col-

leges, 19 public education service districts, 87 public charter

schools, and the State Board of Education. All public school

boards in Oregon are eligible for automatic membership in

OSBA upon the payment of dues. The purpose of taxpayer is

to advance public education in Oregon through services and

assistance to its public members.2

1

Unless otherwise noted, the court’s references to the Oregon Revised

Statutes (ORS) are to the 2013 edition.

2

Taxpayer’s specific purposes are listed in its constitution, and are: (1) to

work for the general advancement and improvement of the education of all youth

of the State of Oregon; (2) to gather and disseminate information pertinent to

the successful operation of public schools; (3) to work for the most efficient and

effective organization of public schools of this state—public schools include local

school districts, education service districts and community colleges; (4) to work

for adequate and dependable financial support for the public schools of this state;

(5) to study all legislation which affects the public schools of Oregon and to

support and work for that which appears to be desirable and to keep members

informed thereof to propose and work for the enactment of proper education legis-

lation; (6) to cooperate and work with persons and organizations genuinely inter-

ested in public education; (7) to encourage the establishment and maintenance

of high standards in the conduct and operation of the educational endeavor;

(8) to study and interpret educational programs and to relate them to the needs of

Cite as 22 OTR 281 (2016) 283

Taxpayer is led by a board of directors. Taxpayer

can buy and sell property, enter into contracts, and sue and

be sued in its own name. Taxpayer is funded by member-

ship dues. These funds can only be used to further the pub-

lic purposes of taxpayer and must, upon dissolution of tax-

payer, be distributed to one or more of its public members.

Taxpayer has been the subject of various administrative

rulings regarding its public character.3

The real property at issue is located in Marion

County. It is used as a parking lot for OSBA members that

visit Salem for educational purposes, meetings, lobbying the

legislature, and other purposes. It is owned solely by tax-

payer, and not by taxpayer’s members. The county denied

taxpayer’s application for exemption because OSBA is not

(1) a school district; (2) a “public or municipal corporation;”

or (3) organized as a corporation.

III. ISSUES

The court first notes what is not at issue. Taxpayer

does not argue that it is a school district. The county no

longer maintains that taxpayer does not qualify as a “cor-

poration” under ORS 307.090(1). See Pacific States Marine

Fisheries v. Dept. of Rev. (Pacific States), 346 Or 117, 122-24,

206 P3d 1037 (2009) (holding formal organization as a cor-

poration is not required under ORS 307.090). Further, nei-

ther the county nor the department dispute that taxpayer’s

property is being used for taxpayer’s corporate purposes.

pupils; (9) to promote public understanding of the role of school boards and school

board members in the improvement of education; (10) to conduct, independently

or in cooperation with others, seminars, conferences, courses, and research proj-

ects in the various aspects of education; (11) to endeavor to implement the pol-

icies, beliefs, and resolutions of the association; (12) to do such other things as

the member boards or board of directors may deem appropriate for the accom-

plishment of these and other purposes which tend to improve education; (13) to

provide such direct services to member districts and their board members as may

be appropriate and authorized by the board of directors of the association; and

(14) to enter into such cooperative agreement with member districts for the pool-

ing of resources as may result in the more efficient utilization of district resources

and accrue to their financial advantage. (See Stip Facts at 2-3.)

3

These rulings, however, do not dictate the outcome in this case. The

Supreme Court has cautioned that “opinions characterizing or declining to char-

acterize various entities as public corporations have to be considered in the spe-

cific legal context in which they arose.” Pacific States Marine Fisheries v. Dept. of

Rev., 346 Or 117, 122, 206 P3d 1037 (2009).

284 OSBA v. Dept. of Rev.

Accordingly, the only issue remaining is whether

taxpayer qualifies as a “public * * * corporation[ ] in this

state.” 4 ORS 307.090(1). That issue is composed of two parts:

whether taxpayer qualifies as a “public corporation”; and

whether taxpayer is “in this state.”

IV. ANALYSIS

All real property within this state is subject to

assessment and taxation, unless there is an exception pro-

vided for by law. ORS 307.030(1). Taxpayer seeks exemption

for its real property under ORS 307.090(1). That statute

provides:

“Except as provided by law, all property of the state

and all public or corporate property used or intended for

corporate purposes of the several counties, cities, towns,

school districts, irrigation districts, drainage districts,

ports, water districts, housing authorities, public universi-

ties listed in ORS 352.002 and all other public or municipal

corporations in this state, is exempt from taxation.”

The parties primarily differ as to the meaning and charac-

teristics of the term “public * * * corporation[ ]” for purposes

of ORS 307.090(1).5

Taxpayer argues that it qualifies as a public cor-

poration because it advances public education in Oregon

through assistance to its membership, which is composed

entirely of other public corporations. The department

argues that taxpayer does not qualify as a public corpora-

tion because it was not created or authorized by statute and

does not possess governmental powers or responsibilities.

The county argues that taxpayer does not qualify as a pub-

lic corporation because it only serves its members, which are

not citizens.

As a preliminary matter, this court must address

the Supreme Court’s opinion in Pacific States. Taxpayer

argues that, because the court determined that Pacific

4

ORS 307.090 also provides for an exemption for the property of municipal

corporations. A municipal corporation can be defined as a body corporate and

politic. Eugene McQuillin, 1 The Law of Municipal Corporations § 2:8 (3d ed 1999,

April 2016 Update). Taxpayer does not argue that it is a municipal corporation.

5

The county also makes an argument that taxpayer is not a public corporation

“in this state,” which is addressed later in this decision. See 22 OTR at 292-93.

Cite as 22 OTR 281 (2016) 285

States Marine Fisheries Commission is a public corpora-

tion (with membership composed entirely of public bodies),

taxpayer too must be a public corporation because it is also

composed entirely of public bodies.

However, as Defendants argue, the court in Pacific

States only determined that the commission at issue

there was a public corporation “in the abstract.” 346 Or

at 122. The court reserved whether “shared characteris-

tics inherent in the specific entities” listed in ORS 307.090

would “place further limits on the types of public corpo-

rations that are entitled to a tax exemption.” Id. at 127.

The court did not delineate the characteristics of a pub-

lic corporation for purposes of ORS 307.090. Accordingly,

this court must first ascertain what those characteris-

tics are, and then determine whether taxpayer has those

characteristics.

A. Defining “Public Corporation” for Purposes of ORS

307.090

There is no textual definition for the term “public

corporation” for purposes of ORS 307.090. Accordingly, this

court must look to the context of ORS 307.090, any relevant

legislative history, and, if helpful, the maxims of statutory

construction.6 State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d

1042 (2009). As to context, the court looks to the statutory

history and case law of ORS 307.090, as well as case law

interpreting the term “public corporation.”

ORS 307.090 traces back to the Deady Code, when

only “counties, cities, villages, towns and school districts”

were exempted from property taxation. General Laws of

Oregon, Civ Code, ch LIII, title I, § 4, p 894 (Deady 1845-

1864). This provision has been amended several times, but

its basic character has remained the same: public entities

are exempt from taxation. Indeed, a predecessor of ORS

307.090 has been described as being “merely declaratory of

the common rule” that public property is not taxable absent

a “clear legislative declaration” of the intention to do so.

Portland v. Multnomah County, 135 Or 469, 471, 296 P 48

(1931) (interpreting Oregon Code, title LXIX, ch 1, § 69-104

6

There is no relevant legislative history.

286 OSBA v. Dept. of Rev.

(1930)). This is because “[i]t would be analogous to tak-

ing money out of one pocket and putting it into another.”

Id. at 472.

The term “public corporation” was not added until

the turn of the twentieth century. The Codes and Statutes

of Oregon, title XXX, ch I, § 3039 (Bellinger & Cotton

1901), amended by Or Laws 1907, ch 268, § 4. At that time,

public corporations were defined as “ ‘those [corporations]

which are exclusively instruments of the public interest.’ ”

Pacific States, 346 Or at 123 (quoting John Bouvier, 1 Law

Dictionary 406 (15th ed 1890)) (alteration in original). The

“original understanding [was] that incorporation of enter-

prises for business purposes [is] something distinct from

incorporation of governmental instrumentalities.” State

ex rel Eckles v. Woolley (Eckles), 302 Or 37, 47, 726 P2d 918

(1986).

Given this historical context, a public corporation is

“a corporation formed for the public’s benefit or for a public

purpose.” Shasta View Irrigation Dist. v. Amoco Chemicals

(Shasta View), 329 Or 151, 157, 986 P2d 536 (1999) (citing

Eckles, 302 Or at 48-49). However, this is not the only char-

acteristic of public corporations.7

Public corporations are also subject to public man-

agement or control. Eckles, 302 Or at 49. In Eckles, the court

determined that the State Accident Insurance Fund was a

public corporation in part because it did not have “the ques-

tionable characteristics of mixed private and governmental

investment or management.” Id. While this court has not

found a case holding that any private interest destroys the

public character of a public corporation, it is evident that

having some amount of private interest raises the question

whether an alleged public corporation is an exclusive instru-

ment of the public interest. That question is not similarly

raised in a public corporation with only public investment

and management.

7

Taxpayer argued that this is the only characteristic of public corporations.

However, as the department notes, nonprofit corporations would satisfy this

test. Neither party disputes that private nonprofit corporations have a separate

exemption available to them and that they do not qualify as public corporations

for purposes of ORS 307.090.

Cite as 22 OTR 281 (2016) 287

Public corporations are also created or authorized by

statute.8 See Mohler et ux. v. Fish Commission, 129 Or 302,

305, 276 P 691 (1929); McClain v. Regents of the University,

124 Or 629, 634, 256 P 412 (1928). In Mohler, the Supreme

Court determined that the fish commission was “a mere

agency of the state in the nature of a quasi-public corpora-

tion created by legislative enactment with certain delegated

powers.” 129 Or at 305 (emphasis in original). In McClain,

the Supreme Court found the Regents of the University to

be “a public corporation, created by legislative enactment for

the special purpose of carrying out the educational policy of

the state.” 124 Or at 634.

Finally, public corporations have some governmen-

tal power or authority.9 Mohler, 129 Or at 305. Public corpo-

rations are, for purposes of ORS 307.090, either quasi-mu-

nicipal or municipal corporations. See White City Water

System v. Dept. of Rev., 285 Or 255, 258, 590 P2d 724 (1979)

(describing all the entities in ORS 307.090 as either munici-

pal or quasi-municipal corporations). Both can be described

as a “corporation for municipal purposes.” See Cook v. The

Port of Portland, 20 Or 580, 583, 27 P 263 (1891) (generally

equating public corporations with municipal corporations).

In Cook, the Supreme Court determined that the test of a

“corporation for municipal purposes” is whether the corpora-

tion has the “right or power to exercise some of the functions

of government.” 20 Or at 586. The difference between a pub-

lic corporation and a municipal corporation is the amount

of governmental authority possessed. A public corporation

requires only the authority necessary to achieve its purpose.

See Eugene McQuillin, 1 The Law of Municipal Corporations

§ 2:17 (3d ed 1999, April 2016 Update).

Accordingly, there are four characteristics that an

entity must have to be considered a “public” corporation.10

80

The department found this characteristic primarily from an application of

ejusdem generis. However, this court considers resort to that canon of statutory

construction unnecessary given the supporting case law.

90

The department here also found this characteristic primarily from an

application of ejusdem generis. However, this court again considers resort to that

canon of statutory construction unnecessary given the supporting case law.

10

As previously stated, there is no dispute that taxpayer is a corporation for

purposes of ORS 307.090.

288 OSBA v. Dept. of Rev.

First, the entity must be formed for the public’s benefit or

a public purpose. Shasta View, 329 Or at 157. Second, the

entity must be subject to public management or control.

Eckles, 302 Or at 49. Third, the entity must be created or

authorized by statute. Mohler, 129 Or at 305; McClain, 124

Or at 634. Fourth, the entity must possess some govern-

mental power or authority. Mohler, 129 Or at 305; Cook,

20 Or at 586. The question is whether taxpayer has these

characteristics.

B. Applying the Definition of “Public Corporation” to

Taxpayer

1. Taxpayer’s public purpose

Taxpayer has a limited purpose—to advance pub-

lic education through assistance to its public membership.

That purpose, however, is public enough. The Supreme

Court has cautioned against parsing too narrowly the pur-

pose of a public corporation. See Eckles, 302 Or at 49 (“There

is no need to characterize insurance as a more or less ‘pub-

lic’ function than * * * [other areas] that government chooses

to provide * * *.”). Advancing public education is undoubtedly

a public purpose, and taxpayer assists its member public

school boards in fulfilling that public purpose.

The county disputes that this is a valid public pur-

pose because OSBA is directly serving only its membership,

not the public at large. In support of this position, the county

cites Special Districts Association of Oregon v. Washington

County Assessor (SDAO), TC-MD 050661D, WL 167462

(Jan 11, 2006), a Decision from the Magistrate Division of

this court with facts materially indistinguishable from the

present case. There, the SDAO sought tax exemption under

ORS 307.090 because it was a nonprofit mutual benefit corpo-

ration composed of governmental entities. Id. at *2. The court

found that the SDAO did not meet the statutory requirements

because it served its members and not the public. Id. at *7.

Decisions from the Magistrate Division are not

binding on this court. Moreover, the decision in SDAO was

not appealed to this court and has not been considered by

this court until now. Upon review, the decision in SDAO is

not persuasive. The court in SDAO incorrectly interpreted

Cite as 22 OTR 281 (2016) 289

Supreme Court precedent on the characteristics of public

corporations by relying on its own precedent regarding the

characteristics of charitable or scientific organizations. See

id. at *4, 6-7 (citing Rogue Gem v. Josephine County Assessor

(Rogue Gem), 17 OTR-MD 446 (2003)).

In Rogue Gem, the court determined that a mutual

benefit corporation is not a nonprofit corporation “organized

for a public or charitable purpose” because it only serves its

members, not “the community as a whole.” 17 OTR-MD at

454. This conclusion, however, was demanded by the defi-

nitions of a mutual benefit corporation and a public benefit

corporation.

Under ORS 65.001(24) (2003), a mutual benefit cor-

poration is a corporation that “does not come within the defi-

nition of public benefit or religious corporation.” Id. Under

ORS 65.001(31) (2003), a public benefit corporation is a cor-

poration that is “organized for a public or charitable pur-

pose.” Id. Because a mutual benefit corporation is defined as

something that is not a public benefit corporation, the Rogue

Gem court appropriately determined that a mutual benefit

corporation is not a corporation that is organized for a public

or charitable purpose. Id.

The court in SDAO relied upon Rogue Gem to impute

a requirement that a public corporation cannot be created to

serve only its membership that is composed of other pub-

lic corporations. It concluded its analysis essentially on this

requirement alone: “Because Plaintiff’s activities serve or

benefit its members rather than the public, the court con-

cludes that Plaintiff is not a public corporation.” Id. at *7.

However, there is no such requirement.

What distinguishes Rogue Gem from this case

(and hence SDAO) is that the mutual benefit corporation

in Rogue Gem was composed of individuals—not govern-

mental entities—and the exemption was one for charitable

corporations, not an exemption for governmental entities.11

11

Taxpayer is not organized as a mutual benefit corporation. However, that

would be a distinction without a practical difference. See Eckles, 302 Or at 46

(declining the invitation to “revive the scholastic debate between nominalism and

realism”). Taxpayer serves its membership, and thus is similar to a mutual benefit

corporation—with the important fact that all of its members are public entities.

290 OSBA v. Dept. of Rev.

17 OTR-MD at 448. There is a significant difference between

private individuals or entities creating mutual benefit corpo-

rations to serve themselves and public corporations creating

mutual benefit corporations to assist in the administration

of their governmental functions. It is for this reason that the

court in SDAO erred by relying upon Rogue Gem to inter-

pret the public purpose requirement as applied to public

corporations.

The court finds that advancing public education

in Oregon is for the public’s benefit or is a public purpose.

Once that is established, it is inappropriate to engage in

too fine an analysis of whether the purpose is more or less

public than another accepted purpose. Eckles, 302 Or at 49.

Taxpayer’s purpose is a public purpose.

2. Taxpayer’s public management or control

Taxpayer is subject to public management or con-

trol. Its members, which are all public corporations, have

the sole power to vote in the board of directors for OSBA.

Taxpayer is also exclusively funded by the public. Its mem-

bers, which are all public corporations, provide taxpayer

funds through the payment of dues. In addition, if taxpayer

is dissolved, its public funds are returned to its members,

which are all public corporations.

The county argues that taxpayer is not subject to

public control because it is not subject to control directly by

the citizenry. The county draws that requirement from the

Supreme Court’s opinion in Cook, 20 Or at 583. There, the

court described a public corporation as “a corporation cre-

ated for public or governmental purposes * * * whose mem-

bers are citizens, not stockholders.” Id.

Whether composition of member-citizens ever

was a requirement, it is no longer a part of Oregon law.

The Supreme Court directly referenced the Cook member-

citizen test in its conclusion in Eckles. See 302 Or at 49. In

Eckles, the court noted that the State Accident Insurance

Fund (SAIF) was not composed of members who are citi-

zens. Id. Yet, because SAIF was exclusively managed and

funded by government—with no private stockholders—the

court determined that SAIF was a public corporation. Id.

Cite as 22 OTR 281 (2016) 291

Much like SAIF, taxpayer does not have members

who are also citizens. But, taxpayer, like SAIF, is exclusively

managed and funded by government. In fact, taxpayer does

not have any private owners or members. Rather, taxpayer

has a membership that is exclusively composed of public cor-

porations, which govern taxpayer’s activities through their

representatives. Taxpayer is subject exclusively to public

management and control.

3. Created or authorized by statute

Although the department argued in its motion for

summary judgment that taxpayer was not created or autho-

rized by statute, it appears that the department conceded

this point in its response to taxpayer’s motion for summary

judgment, and abandoned it in its reply. (See Def’s Cross-Mot

for Summ J at 4 (“Plaintiff was not created by any specific

statute, law, or constitutional provision. Rather, plaintiff

is an association created by an agreement entered into by

the governing bodies of Oregon public schools.”); Def’s Resp

at 3 (“Thus, ORS 332.105(2) permits school districts to form

associations such as plaintiff. However, * * * [i]n order to

be a public corporation, plaintiff must also possess govern-

mental powers * * *.”); Def’s Reply at 1-4 (no mention of tax-

payer’s creation or authorization by law).)

This apparent concession is well taken. Taxpayer

was created pursuant to the implied authority granted by

the legislature under ORS 332.105(2). That statute provides:

“The district school board may participate in the activ-

ities of and may become members of associations of school

boards. When provided for in an approved school district

budget, the board may pay from school districts funds

annual dues to such association.”

The court fails to see how such an association,

which is to be funded by the public school districts, would

be created if not by or for the future membership composed

of public school boards. Indeed, the legislature contem-

plated that there may be many such associations because

it refers to associations in the plural in ORS 332.105(2).

Absent some legislative history to the contrary (and the

court is not aware of any) the court considers the mention

of associations of school boards in ORS 332.105(2), and the

292 OSBA v. Dept. of Rev.

statutory approval of the public school boards to expend

public funds to be members of such associations, to be an

implied authorization for public school boards to create

such associations.

4. Possessing governmental authority or power

The department argues that taxpayer cannot be a

public corporation because its public members have not del-

egated any of their governmental authority to taxpayer. Yet,

a public corporation requires only the authority necessary to

achieve its purpose. See 1 McQuillin Mun Corp § 2:17.

Taxpayer’s purpose is to provide assistance to its

public members, and advocacy on their behalf. It has been

entrusted with public funds to conduct that purpose. Those

public funds, and the limitations placed upon those funds

by taxpayer’s constitution, represent the scope of taxpayer’s

power and authority. Taxpayer does not need governmental

authority beyond that which is necessary to accomplish its

limited purpose. That is sufficient for it to qualify as a pub-

lic corporation.

5. Taxpayer is a “public corporation” for purposes of

ORS 307.090

The court concludes that taxpayer has the char-

acteristics of a “public corporation” for purposes of ORS

307.090. This interpretation and application of “public cor-

poration” comports with the policy of ORS 307.090 and the

common-law rule that public property is not taxable. If the

exemption requested by taxpayer for the subject property

was denied, the dues of the member public corporations

would bear the economic burden of that tax. The result

would be one of “taking money out of one pocket and putting

it into another.” Portland v. Multnomah County, 135 Or at

472.

C. Taxpayer is “In This State” for Purposes of ORS 307.090

Although the department limits its arguments to

taxpayer’s character as a public corporation, the county also

argues that taxpayer is not a public corporation “in this state”

as that term was defined by the court in Pacific States. See

346 Or at 125-27. The county argues that taxpayer does not

Cite as 22 OTR 281 (2016) 293

serve a geographic area within the state because it serves

its members, not defined geographic areas. This argument

is not persuasive.

First, whatever area taxpayer serves, that area

is certainly within, if not coextensive with the borders of,

Oregon. None of its members are outside the state, as was

the case in Pacific States. Id. at 127 (“[Pacific Fisheries] rep-

resents and serves a multistate area. The interests and geo-

graphic area served by Pacific Fisheries are regional, and

Pacific Fisheries cannot be considered to be confined geo-

graphically within the State of Oregon.”). Taxpayer’s ser-

vices are contained exclusively in Oregon, making it a public

corporation “in this state.”

Second, it does not matter whether taxpayer serves

precisely designated areas in the state.12 The Supreme

Court expressly stated that some public corporations “may

not have distinct geographic boundaries in the same way

that a city, county, school district, or municipal corporation

does.” Id. at 126. It is perfectly acceptable to have a more

vague geographical presence, so long as those areas are

“primarily within the state.” Id.

Because taxpayer is a public corporation created

under Oregon law operating within Oregon, it is the type

of public corporation entitled to an exemption under ORS

307.090.

V. CONCLUSION

Taxpayer qualifies as a public corporation because

it serves a public purpose, is exclusively managed and con-

trolled by public entities, was impliedly authorized by stat-

ute, and was created by public entities with the limited

power and authority necessary to accomplish its purpose.

Taxpayer is within this state because it serves its members,

which all operate within this state. Taxpayer is entitled to

an exemption for the subject property under ORS 307.090.

Now, therefore,

12

Of course, most, if not all, of its members serve precisely designated areas.

Assistance by taxpayer to such members is service to precisely designated areas.

294 OSBA v. Dept. of Rev.

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for sum-

mary judgment is granted; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’

cross-motions for summary judgment are denied.