Opinion

Yarbrough v. Marion County Assessor

Court
Oregon Tax Court
Filed
Jan 26, 2012
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 30.8%

The opinion

IN THE OREGON TAX COURT

MAGISTRATE DIVISION

Property Tax

JACK YARBROUGH, )

)

Plaintiff, ) TC-MD 110323N

)

v. )

)

MARION COUNTY ASSESSOR, )

)

Defendant. ) DECISION

Plaintiff appeals the real market value of property identified as Account M131561

(subject property) for the 2010-11 tax year. A trial was held on November 7, 2011, in the Tax

Courtroom, Salem, Oregon. William L. Ghiorso, Attorney at Law, appeared on behalf of

Plaintiff. Plaintiff testified on his own behalf. Rick Nasset (Nasset), licensed real estate broker,

also testified on behalf of Plaintiff. Scott Norris, Assistant County Counsel, appeared on behalf

of Defendant. Rob Witters (Witters), Senior Residential Appraiser, testified on behalf of

Defendant. Nasset prepared a broker’s price opinion for the subject property. However, the

broker’s price opinion was not timely exchanged under Tax Court Rule-Magistrate Division 10

C and was not received into evidence. Defendant’s Exhibit A was received without objection.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The subject property is a double-wide manufactured home built in 1990 that is 1,063

square-feet with three bedrooms and two bathrooms and is located in Keizer, Oregon.1 (Def’s

Ex A at 1-2.) Nasset testified that he visited the subject property but did not inspect the interior.

He testified that he considered the subject property to be in average condition.

///

1

Plaintiff testified that the subject property is 1,066 square-feet. Nasset and Witters both testified that the

subject property is 1,063 square-feet.

DECISION TC-MD 110323N 1

A. Subject property condition

Plaintiff testified that there was a severe leak caused by the hot water heater that flooded

the subject property with two inches of water and caused water damage to the floors. He

testified that the floors of the subject property have been in disrepair since the flood. Plaintiff

testified that no repairs were made to the subject property between 2009 and 2010. He testified

that the subject property suffers from rot around the siding, trim, and windows. Plaintiff testified

on rebuttal that the subject property’s carpets were dried on the floor using a special vacuum and

dehumidifier. He testified that he put a new roof on the subject property “about a year and a half

or two years ago.” Plaintiff testified that the roof of the subject property was never a problem;

the new roof was provided as repayment for a debt owed to Plaintiff by a roofing company.

Witters stated that, “[a]ccording to the appraiser’s notes within the subject property’s file,

as of January 15, 2008, the carpet and padding had been removed from the home. The skirting

had also been removed and repairs appeared to be under way.” (Def’s Ex A at 12.) “During a

follow up visit, dated July 21, 2008, the appraiser noted damaged gypsum, particle board

subfloor, and the bathroom connected to the main bedroom as being spongy. The same appraiser

then visited the property December 4, 2008. Notes from the visit included tenant occupied, fresh

exterior paint, new roof, and the replacement of the skirting. At that time, the appraiser

determined the condition issues of the [subject property] had been repaired.” (Id.) Witters

testified that the subject property “was considered to be rehabbed and in average condition as of

October 2009. An appraiser reappraised the area September of 2010 and considered the property

[to] be in average condition. No damage was evident.” (Id. at 2.) Witters testified that the

appraiser who visited the subject property in 2009 and 2010 and determined that the water

damage had been repaired was Kara Driskell (Driskell), who was not available to testify at trial.

DECISION TC-MD 110323N 2

He testified that Driskell did not provide notes concerning the interior of the subject property

from her September 2010 visit.

Witters testified that he drove by and viewed the exterior of the subject property in

October 2011. He testified that Defendant does not always receive access to the interiors of

properties and it is necessary to make an educated guess as to condition. Witters testified that he

believed that the carpeting and padding in the subject property were replaced, although he was

not certain. Plaintiff testified in response that insulation was mistaken for carpeting by

Defendant. (See Def’s Ex A at 3.) He testified that the fact that the skirting was removed from

the subject property does not mean that the floors were repaired. Plaintiff testified that the

subject property was washed, not painted as Defendant’s appraiser had reported. He testified

that tenants rented the subject property at the time of the flood in 2008; they received a discount

because the door and deck were “unusable.” Plaintiff testified that the tenants occupying the

subject property in 2008 left due to a change in employment. He testified that the subject

property was rented on January 1, 2010, for about $600 to $650, but was not rented as of the trial

date.

B. Subject property valuation

Nasset testified that he completed a broker’s price opinion for the subject property based

on data that he collected from the regional multiple listing service using the parameters of

location, size, and age. He testified that he did not find any properties smaller than the subject

property that were not also much older. Nasset testified that prices for manufactured dwellings

ranged from $2,000 to $40,000. He testified that he sought to bracket the subject property with

respect to size and age. Based on those sales and listings, he testified that he determined an “as-

is value” of $13,000 for the subject property “as of the time [he] did this report.” Nasset testified

DECISION TC-MD 110323N 3

that he determined a two to three percent decline in the market and, factoring in that market

decline, he concluded a value of $14,500 for the subject property as of January 1, 2010. Nasset

testified that manufactured dwellings not affixed to land depreciate faster than those that are

affixed to land; he likened them to cars. Nasset testified that the market for manufactured

dwellings has declined but not as severely as the market for “stick homes.” Plaintiff testified that

there is no market for manufactured dwellings more than 20 years old, noting that many

manufactured home parks have restrictions with respect to the age of properties in the park.

Witters testified that he identified five comparable sales of manufactured homes, four of

which were sales of homes situated in parks “with no land associated with them.” (See Def’s Ex

A at 5-7, 8.) He testified that sales of manufactured homes in parks are most comparable to the

subject property because land is not included in the sale price, nor are costs associated with

transporting and setting up the homes. Witters testified that he adjusted for market conditions by

0.5 percent “per month change in value.” (See id. at 8.) He testified that comparable sales 1 and

4 were adjusted for less than average conditions, size differences, and number of bedrooms. (See

id. at 5, 6, 8.) Witters testified that comparable sale 2 was adjusted for the cost of having to

move the property from one site to another, as well as time, condition, and size. (See id. at 5, 8.)

Witters testified that he determined a value range of $17,167 to $25,824 for the subject property

as of January 1, 2010, noting that the 2010-11 real market value of the subject property is at the

low end. (Id. at 9.) He testified that some adjustment to the value of the subject property as of

January 1, 2010, would be necessary if the property were still affected by water damage.

The 2010-11 real market value determined by Defendant and sustained by the board of

property tax appeals is $17,920. (Ptf’s Compl at 2.) The 2010-11 maximum assessed value of

the subject property is $22,710. (Id.) Plaintiff requests that the 2010-11 real market value be

DECISION TC-MD 110323N 4

reduced to $13,600, the 2009-10 real market value of the subject property,2 based on the

condition of the subject property. (Id. at 1.) Defendant requests that the 2010-11 real market

value be sustained. (Def’s Answer at 1.)

II. ANALYSIS

The issue before the court is the real market value of the subject property for the 2010-11

tax year. “Real market value is the standard used throughout the ad valorem statutes except for

special assessments.” Richardson v. Clackamas County Assessor (Richardson), TC-MD No

020869D, WL 21263620 at *2 (Mar 26, 2003) (citing Gangle v. Dept. of Rev., 13 OTR 343, 345

(1995)). Real market value is defined in ORS 308.205(1), which states:

“Real market value of all property, real and personal, means the amount in cash

that could reasonably be expected to be paid by an informed buyer to an informed

seller, each acting without compulsion in an arm’s length transaction occurring as

of the assessment date for the tax year.”3

The assessment date for the 2010-11 tax year was January 1, 2010. ORS 308.007; ORS 308.210.

“Real market value in all cases shall be determined by methods and procedures in

accordance with rules adopted by the Department of Revenue[.]” ORS 308.205(2). There are

three methods of valuation that are used to determine real market value: (1) the cost approach,

(2) the sales comparison approach, and (3) the income approach. Allen v. Dept of Rev., 17 OTR

248, 252 (2003). All three approaches must be considered, although all three approaches may

not be applicable to the valuation of the subject property. OAR 150-308.205-(A)(2)(a). The

approach of valuation to be used is a question of fact to be determined on the record. Pacific

Power & Light Co. v. Dept. of Rev., 286 Or 529, 533 (1979). Both parties considered the sales

comparison approach to be applicable. OAR 150-308.205-(A)(2)(c) states, in pertinent part:

2

Nasset testified that the 2009-10 roll real market value of the subject property was $13,620.

3

All references to the Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) and to the Oregon Administrative Rules (OAR) are

to 2009.

DECISION TC-MD 110323N 5

“In utilizing the sales comparison approach only actual market transactions of

property comparable to the subject, or adjusted to be comparable, will be used.

All transactions utilized in the sales comparison approach must be verified to

ensure they reflect arms-length market transactions.”

“The court looks for arm’s-length sale transactions of property similar in size, quality, age and

location * * * in order to determine the [real market value]” of the subject property. Richardson,

WL 21263620 at *3.

Plaintiff has the burden of proof and must establish his case by a preponderance of the

evidence. ORS 305.427. A “[p]reponderance of the evidence means the greater weight of

evidence, the more convincing evidence.” Feves v. Dept. of Revenue, 4 OTR 302, 312 (1971).

“[I]t is not enough for a taxpayer to criticize a county’s position. Taxpayers must provide

competent evidence of the [real market value] of their property.” Poddar v. Dept. of Rev.

(Poddar), 18 OTR 324, 332 (2005) (citing Woods v. Dept. of Rev., 16 OTR 56, 59 (2002)). “[I]f

the evidence is inconclusive or unpersuasive, the taxpayer will have failed to meet his burden of

proof.” Reed v. Dept. of Rev., 310 Or 260, 265, 798 P2d 235 (1990). “[T]he court has

jurisdiction to determine the real market value or correct valuation on the basis of the evidence

before the court, without regard to the values pleaded by the parties.” ORS 305.412.

Nasset testified that, according to his regional multiple listing service research, prices for

manufactured dwellings ranged from $2,000 to $40,000. He determined an “as-is value” of

$13,000 for the subject property, revising that value to $14,500 as of January 1, 2010. Nasset’s

broker’s price opinion was not provided to the court or to Defendant and, consequently, the court

has no way to evaluate the sales relied upon by Nasset or his adjustments, if any. Accordingly,

Nasset’s opinion of the subject property value as of January 1, 2010, is given very little weight.

Plaintiff’s other evidence in support of his requested real market value of $13,600 is Plaintiff’s

testimony that the water damage that occurred in 2008 has not yet been repaired. Plaintiff’s

DECISION TC-MD 110323N 6

theory is that the 2009-10 real market value of the subject property accurately reflects the

condition of the property at that time and, because the condition has not improved, the 2010-11

real market value should be the same. “It has long been held in Oregon tax cases that each tax

year stands alone; thus, each tax year is its own cause of action.” Safley v. Jackson County

Assessor and Dept. of Rev., TC-MD No 091206C at 8 (Dec 2, 2010), citing U.S. Bancorp v.

Dept. of Rev., 15 OTR 13, 15 (1999). Plaintiff’s requested real market value of $13,600 requires

the court to assume, first, that 2009-10 roll real market was correct and, second, that the 2009-10

roll real market value is indicative of the 2010-11 real market value. The 2009-10 tax year is not

at issue in this appeal and the court cannot base the 2010-11 real market value on Plaintiff’s

assumptions.

The court finds that Plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the

2010-11 real market value of the subject property was $13,600. Defendant presented persuasive

evidence in support of the 2010-11 roll real market value of $17,920.

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

///

DECISION TC-MD 110323N 7

III. CONCLUSION

After careful consideration of the testimony and evidence presented, the court finds that

the 2010-11 real market value of the subject property identified as account M131561 was

$17,920. Now, therefore,

IT IS THE DECISION OF THIS COURT that Plaintiff’s appeal is denied.

Dated this day of January 2012.

ALLISON R. BOOMER

MAGISTRATE PRO TEMPORE

If you want to appeal this Decision, file a Complaint in the Regular Division of

the Oregon Tax Court, by mailing to: 1163 State Street, Salem, OR 97301-2563;

or by hand delivery to: Fourth Floor, 1241 State Street, Salem, OR.

Your Complaint must be submitted within 60 days after the date of the Decision

or this Decision becomes final and cannot be changed.

This document was signed by Magistrate Pro Tempore Allison R. Boomer on

January 26, 2012. The Court filed and entered this document on January 26,

2012.

DECISION TC-MD 110323N 8

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.