The opinion
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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-10722
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
DENNIS MCDANIEL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SOUTHERN CORRECTIONAL MEDICINE LLC,
d.b.a. Genesys Health Alliance,
Defendant-Appellee,
DR. PETER WROBEL, et al.,
Defendant.
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2 Opinion of the Court 24-10722
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 5:22-cv-00140-CAR
____________________
Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
A dog bite followed by a nasty infection forced doctors to
amputate Dennis McDaniel’s left hand. Blaming the loss of his
hand on poor medical care during a stint in jail, McDaniel brought
a deliberate-indifference lawsuit against Houston County and the
Houston County sheriff, Cullen Talton. The district court rejected
McDaniel’s claims after a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
After careful consideration of McDaniel’s arguments on appeal, we
agree with the district court and affirm.
I
The story begins with a dog bite, and things get worse from
there. A large dog attacked Dennis McDaniel, leaving him with
serious injuries to his left hand. He had surgery on the hand, but a
few days before a scheduled follow-up appointment, he was ar-
rested and booked into Houston County, Georgia’s jail. Medical
providers at the jail provided some treatment for the hand, which
had developed an infection, but—even though the infection
seemed to be quite serious and was not improving—McDaniel al-
leges that the treatment was far from adequate. It became clear
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24-10722 Opinion of the Court 3
that the hand needed surgery, and two weeks after that the jail re-
leased McDaniel. McDaniel promptly had the surgery, but it failed
to resolve the damage; a few days later his dire condition forced
doctors to amputate his left hand. This civil-rights suit followed.
II
McDaniel’s suit included both federal and state law claims.
The defendants were Houston County, Cullen Talton (Houston
County’s Sheriff), and the company that provided health services
at the jail (along with several of its employees). But only two of
the parties and some of the claims are relevant here: First, McDan-
iel sued Talton, in both his individual and official capacities, for be-
ing deliberately indifferent to McDaniel’s medical needs in viola-
tion of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments (and for Talton’s
role as a supervisor over others who were deliberately indifferent). 1
Second, McDaniel alleged that Houston County was liable for Tal-
ton’s unconstitutional conduct.2
Eventually, the district court dismissed all of McDaniel’s
claims. First, the court granted a motion by the County and Talton
1 McDaniel was a pretrial detainee, and “[t]echnically, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause, not the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment, governs pretrial detainees.” Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510
F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007). This makes no material difference here,
though, because “the standards under the Fourteenth Amendment are identi-
cal to those under the Eighth.” Id.
2 McDaniel pleaded a claim against the county under Georgia law, but the dis-
trict court dismissed that claim, and it is not part of this appeal.
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4 Opinion of the Court 24-10722
for judgment on the pleadings. The court concluded that Talton
had qualified immunity as to the individual capacity federal-law
claims, and that because Talton had acted as an arm of the state of
Georgia, the remaining federal-law claims were barred by Eleventh
Amendment immunity. Later, McDaniel reached a settlement
with the remaining parties and filed stipulations of dismissal for
those parties. McDaniel then appealed the district court’s judg-
ment in favor of Talton and the County, but we dismissed the ap-
peal for lack of jurisdiction. We held that, because the stipulations
of dismissal were not signed by all parties as required by Rule
41(a)(1)(A)(ii), the stipulations were ineffective and, therefore, that
the district court case still had active parties and there was no final
order from which appeal might be taken. McDaniel then sought
and obtained from the district court a judgment and appealed
again. After we issued a jurisdictional question, McDaniel sought
and obtained an amended judgment that more clearly described
the terms underlying the stipulations of dismissal.
In this appeal, McDaniel attempts to revive his federal claims
against Sheriff Talton and Houston County.3
3 We review de novo a district court order granting judgment on the plead-
ings. Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d 1329, 1335 (11th Cir. 2014). Judgment
on the pleadings is proper if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. Although our
review is de novo, we accept all material facts in McDaniel’s pleadings as true
and view them in the light most favorable to him. See id. We review for abuse
of discretion a district court’s denial of leave to amend. Newton v. Duke Energy
Fla., LLC, 895 F.3d 1270, 1275 (11th Cir. 2018).
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24-10722 Opinion of the Court 5
III
Before reaching the merits, we must assure ourselves of our
jurisdiction. We generally have jurisdiction to review only “final
decisions.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291; CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City,
235 F.3d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir. 2000). Here, the district court’s order
granting the County and Talton’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings was not a final decision because, at the time of the order,
several other parties remained active in the case. Neither were the
stipulated dismissals final orders because the dismissals were not
“signed by all parties who have appeared,” as required by Rule
41(a)(1)(A)(ii). But the district court’s amended judgment is effec-
tive under Rule 41(a)(2) because the order incorporated in the judg-
ment clearly sets forth the dismissal’s terms, including the specific
parties dismissed and that dismissal is with prejudice. See Sanchez
v. Disc. Rock & Sand, 84 F.4th 1283, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 2023). Also,
although Rule 41(a) generally does not permit “dismissal of a por-
tion of a plaintiff’s lawsuit,” Perry v. Schumacher Grp. of La., 891 F.3d
954, 958 (11th Cir. 2018), here the Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal encom-
passed all claims against the parties with which McDaniel reached
a settlement. So, even though the stipulated dismissals did not in-
clude Talton or the County, the dismissals were still proper be-
cause “Rule 41(a) allows a district court to dismiss all claims against
a particular defendant.” Rosell v. VMSB, LLC, 67 F.4th 1141, 1144 n.2
(11th Cir. 2023).
At last, the district court has disposed of all claims in McDan-
iel’s lawsuit. All claims against Talton and the County have been
dismissed because of the order granting the motion for judgment
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6 Opinion of the Court 24-10722
on the pleadings. And all claims against the remaining defendants
have also been dismissed because the amended judgment is effec-
tive under Rule 41(a)(2). Therefore, the district court’s amended
judgment has ended the litigation on the merits, disposing of all
claims against all parties, leaving nothing for the district court to
do but execute the judgment. See CSX, 235 F.3d at 1327. In other
words, the amended judgment is a final judgment, and we may ex-
ercise jurisdiction.4
IV
A
Qualified immunity has two steps. First, “[a]n official who
asserts entitlement to qualified immunity must first establish that
she or he was acting within the scope of his discretionary author-
ity.” Alcocer v. Mills, 906 F.3d 944, 951 (11th Cir. 2018). Second,
“[o]nce the official makes that showing, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to demonstrate that qualified immunity is inappropriate.”
4 McDaniel’s failure to file a new, third notice of appeal after the district court
entered its amended judgment does not defeat our jurisdiction. Under the
doctrine of cumulative finality, appeals prematurely taken from an interlocu-
tory order are permitted “if (but only if) the interlocutory order would have
been appealable under Rule 54(b) and if final judgment was entered without
filing a new notice of appeal.” Esteva v. UBS Fin. Servs. Inc. (In re Esteva), 60
F.4th 664, 673 (11th Cir. 2023). The district court’s order granting judgment
in favor of Talton and the County could have been certified under Rule 54(b)
because it dismissed all claims against two defendants. And now, thanks to
the amended judgment, the district court has entered a final judgment (and
McDaniel has not filed a new notice of appeal). The cumulative finality doc-
trine, then, applies here.
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24-10722 Opinion of the Court 7
Id. And once the burden shifts, the plaintiff must show both that
the officer violated a constitutional right and that the right was
clearly established. Id. “We may consider in any order whether
the plaintiff has satisfied her burden.” Id.
Talton is entitled to qualified immunity. He asserted that he
was acting within his discretionary duties,5 and McDaniel has not
contested this. We proceed, then, to step two. The district court
did not squarely consider the clearly-established prong, but we
“may affirm on any ground supported by the record, regardless of
whether that ground was relied upon or even considered below.”
Waldman v. Conway, 871 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2017). Here,
McDaniel barely even attempted to show that Talton violated a
clearly established right. McDaniel argues that Talton and the
County’s district-court briefing had “no discussion of the . . . clearly
established” prong and points out that his complaint recited that
Talton “violated clearly established law.” These arguments can’t
salvage McDaniel’s suit. Possible shortcomings in Talton’s briefing
have little relevance: The burden is with the plaintiff to show a
5 In his motion for judgment on the pleadings, Talton wrote that “Sheriff Chat-
man was clearly acting within his discretionary duties.” As best we can tell,
no person known as “Sheriff Chatman” has had any involvement in these pro-
ceedings whatsoever. In context, the sentence seemingly should have claimed
that “Sheriff [Talton] was clearly acting within his discretionary duties.” Given
that context, the fact that the district court appeared to read this sentence as a
claim about Talton’s discretionary authority, and the fact that McDaniel does
not dispute step one of the qualified-immunity analysis, we join the district
court in understanding Talton to have done enough to carry his step-one bur-
den.
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clearly established right. Alcocer, 906 F.3d at 951. True, in this pro-
cedural posture, “we accept as true all material facts alleged in the
non-moving party’s pleading.” Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d
1329, 1335 (11th Cir. 2014). But we accept only facts as true—not
legal conclusions like McDaniel’s “[t]hreadbare recital[],” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), of his obligations under the clearly-
established prong. McDaniel did not carry his burden, and so the
district court appropriately entered judgment on the pleadings in
favor of Sheriff Talton.
B
“Eleventh Amendment immunity bars suits brought in fed-
eral court when the State itself is sued [or] when an ‘arm of the
State’ is sued.” Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003)
(en banc). If a defendant is “acting as an ‘arm of the State,’” Elev-
enth Amendment immunity applies, even if the defendant did not
happen to be “labeled a ‘state officer’ or ‘state official.’” Id. We
assess immunity with respect to “the particular function in which
the defendant was engaged when taking the actions out of which
liability is asserted to arise.” Id. Our decision in Manders “estab-
lished a single test to determine when an official or entity acts as an
arm of the state.” Lake v. Skelton, 840 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir.
2016). The test has “four factors: ‘(1) how state law defines the en-
tity; (2) what degree of control the State maintains over the entity;
(3) where the entity derives its funds; and (4) who is responsible for
judgments against the entity.’” Id. (quoting Manders, 338 F.3d at
1309).
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Here, Sheriff Talton acted as an “arm of the State” with re-
spect to his provision of medical care. In Myrick v. Fulton County,
applying the Manders factors, we held that the Fulton County,
Georgia sheriff “acted as an ‘arm of the state’ and is entitled to Elev-
enth Amendment immunity with respect to the particular function
of providing medical care.” 69 F.4th 1277, 1296 (11th Cir. 2023).
Our decision in Myrick did not turn on any particular facts about
the case or about Fulton County; instead, relying on Georgia state
law setting out the relationship between county sheriffs and the
state, we held that the first three Manders factors favored Eleventh
Amendment immunity while the fourth did not “point in either di-
rection.” See id. at 1295–96. Myrick’s reasoning applies with equal
force to the Houston County, Georgia sheriff. Indeed, McDaniel
devotes almost the entirety of his reply brief to arguing that “Myrick
was wrongly decided.” Of course, only “a decision by this court
sitting en banc or by the United States Supreme Court can overrule
a prior panel decision.” United States v. Machado, 804 F.2d 1537,
1543 (11th Cir. 1986). 6 Therefore, the district court correctly re-
jected McDaniel’s official-capacity claim against Sheriff Talton.
Because Sheriff Talton acted as an arm of the state in provid-
ing medical care, it follows that Houston County is also not liable
6 McDaniel does venture that Myrick “does not control” this case. He seems,
though, to offer just one possible ground for distinguishing Myrick: that Hou-
ston County, specifically, receives “no insurance coverage” from the state and
so the fourth Manders factor cuts against immunity. Because the other three
factors still favor immunity, this argument—even if taken for all it’s worth—
does not change the outcome.
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to McDaniel. Local government entities can sometimes be subject
to suit under § 1983. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y.,
436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978). McDaniel, though, recognizes that
“[i]f the sheriff is acting for the state when he provides medical care,
then Monell liability cannot be imputed to the county.” Talton was
acting as an arm of the state with respect to the provision of medi-
cal care. So, just as the district court held, there is no liability for
the county.
C
Last, McDaniel appears to suggest that the district court
should have permitted him to amend his complaint. See Appel-
lant’s Br. at 16–17 (arguing that “it would not have been futile to
allow Mr. McDaniel to further amend once additional facts became
known through discovery”). But McDaniel has never properly
sought to amend his complaint. In his response to the County and
Talton’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, he argued, as he
has on appeal, that it “would not be futile” to allow him to amend
his complaint. Yet “[w]here a request for leave to file an amended
complaint simply is imbedded within an opposition memorandum,
the issue has not been raised properly.” Newton v. Duke Energy Fla.,
LLC, 895 F.3d 1270, 1277 (11th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (ci-
tation and quotation marks omitted). Also, “[a] request for a court
order must be made by motion” and “[t]he motion must be in writ-
ing unless made during a hearing or trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1).
McDaniel has never made any such motion. And “[a] district court
is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua
sponte when the plaintiff, who is represented by counsel, never
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filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the
district court.” Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d
541, 542 (11th Cir. 2002) (en banc). So, because McDaniel did not
actually make a motion to amend his complaint that the district
court could have denied, the district court is under no obligation to
give leave to amend now.
V
For the foregoing reasons, we hold as follows: First, we have
jurisdiction over this appeal. Second, Talton is entitled to qualified
immunity with respect to McDaniel’s individual-capacity claims be-
cause McDaniel failed to carry his burden to show a violation of
clearly established law. Third, Talton acted as an arm of the state
with respect to his provision of medical care; accordingly, McDan-
iel’s official-capacity claims are barred by Eleventh Amendment im-
munity, and his claims against the county fall short. And finally, the
district court had no obligation to grant McDaniel leave to amend
his complaint.
AFFIRMED.