Norris v. Paulson

In the Iowa Supreme Court

No. 23–0217

Submitted September 11, 2024—Filed October 11, 2024

Bryan Norris,

Appellee,

vs.

Trudy Paulson,

Appellant.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Sarah Crane, judge.

The plaintiff seeks further review of a court of appeals decision reversing

the district court’s denial of summary judgment on constitutional tort claims

premised on the subsequently decided case of Burnett v. Smith. Decision of

Court of Appeals Affirmed in Part and Vacated in Part; District Court

Judgment Affirmed.

Per curiam.

John O. Haraldson, Assistant City Attorney, Des Moines, for appellant.

Robert G. Rehkemper of Gourley, Rehkemper & Lindholm, P.L.C., West

Des Moines, for appellee.

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Per Curiam.

Bryan Norris sued the City of Des Moines and one of its police officers,

Trudy Paulson, after Paulson shot Norris in the arm and the abdomen on

September 12, 2019, during an interaction at a homeless camp along the

Raccoon River. Norris asserted two claims against Paulson: a claim for

unreasonable seizure under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution premised

on excessive force and a common law assault claim. He also asserted an article

I, section 8 claim against the City premised on vicarious liability and failure to

train or supervise Paulson.

The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district

court denied on December 29, 2022. The court identified material issues of fact

concerning whether Paulson’s actions were protected by qualified immunity

under Iowa Code chapter 670 (2022) and whether they were justified, thereby

providing a defense to the common law assault claim. See Iowa Code § 804.8(1)

(2019) (“A peace officer, while making a lawful arrest, is justified in the use of

any force which the peace officer reasonably believes to be necessary to effect the

arrest or to defend any person from bodily harm while making the arrest.”).

Paulson filed an application for interlocutory appeal. She asserted that

Iowa Code § 670.4A(4) (2022), enacted in June 2021 and directing that “[a]ny

decision by the district court denying qualified immunity shall be immediately

appealable,” applied retroactively and entitled her to an interlocutory appeal as

a matter of right. Even without that statutory provision, Paulson argued that the

district court misconstrued the due care protection provided under Iowa Code

§ 670.4(1)(c) (2019), which supported discretionary interlocutory review under

Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.104(1). We granted Paulson’s application on

April 5, 2023, ultimately transferring the appeal to the court of appeals.

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In the meantime, we decided Burnett v. Smith, where we overruled Godfrey

v. State, 898 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 2017), and held that “we no longer recognize a

standalone cause of action for money damages under the Iowa Constitution

unless authorized by the common law, an Iowa statute, or the express terms of

a provision of the Iowa Constitution.” 990 N.W.2d 289, 307 (Iowa 2023). When

she filed her opening brief in the interlocutory appeal, Paulson changed the

issues. Paulson no longer based her interlocutory appeal on qualified immunity.

Instead, she argued that our intervening Burnett decision required vacating the

district court’s denial of summary judgment on Norris’s constitutional claims.

She also challenged the standard the district court applied to her justification

defense for the assault claim.

The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s conclusion that genuine

issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on the common law assault

claim. However, it agreed with Paulson that Burnett precluded Norris’s

constitutional claims, and it reversed and remanded for dismissal of those

counts. We granted Norris’s application for further review.

With respect to Paulson’s appeal of the denial of summary judgment on

Norris’s common law assault claim, on further review we “let the court of appeals

decision stand as the final decision.” Farnsworth v. State, 982 N.W.2d 128, 135

(Iowa 2022) (quoting State v. Fogg, 936 N.W.2d 664, 667 n.1 (Iowa 2019)). We

address only Paulson’s argument that the district court’s denial of her summary

judgment motion on the constitutional claims must be reversed in the wake of

Burnett.

Relying on some of our post-Burnett cases, see, e.g., Venckus v. City of

Iowa City, 990 N.W.2d 800 (Iowa 2023); White v. Harkrider, 990 N.W.2d 647

(Iowa 2023); Carter v. State, No. 21–0909, 2023 WL 3397451 (Iowa May 12, 2023)

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(per curiam), the court of appeals rejected Norris’s argument that error

preservation principles prevented the court from addressing Paulson’s new

argument on appeal premised on Burnett. In each of those cases, the district

court had dismissed the constitutional claims, either on the basis that the

constitutional provision at issue was not self-executing, see Venckus, 990

N.W.2d at 807 (noting that the district court granted summary judgment on

Venckus’s constitutional claims after concluding Godfrey claims were not

“available against municipalities” or their employees and that article I, section 1

was not self-executing); White, 990 N.W.2d at 652 (“The district court held that

article I, sections 1 and 8 were not self-executing and could not support claims

for monetary relief.”), or for failure to state a claim, see Carter, 2023 WL

3397451, at *1. We affirmed those dismissals “[f]or the reasons stated in

Burnett.” Venckus, 990 N.W.2d at 812; see also White, 990 N.W.2d at 652 (same);

Carter, 2023 WL 3397451, at *1 (same).

Unlike those cases, this appeal seeks interlocutory review of the district

court’s denial of Paulson’s request to dismiss the constitutional claims. Further,

the interlocutory review was granted—at least in part—based on Paulson’s

claimed entitlement to a statutory right of appeal from “[a]ny decision by the

district court denying qualified immunity” under Iowa Code § 670.4A(4) (2022).

This case is more like our recent decision in Thorington v. Scott County, where

we held that the automatic interlocutory appeal provision in Iowa Code

§ 670.4A(4) did not apply retroactively to conduct that predated its enactment.

No. 22–1194, 2024 WL 874182, at *1 (Iowa Mar. 1, 2024) (per curiam). As in

Thorington, Paulson was not entitled to this interlocutory appeal as a matter of

right under Iowa Code § 670.4A(4).

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Also as in Thorington, this case will continue in district court, and it is

better to allow that court to decide the course of the constitutional claims in the

first instance. See 2024 WL 874182, at *1 (“[W]e decline to decide (or to direct

the district court how to decide) other requests for relief by the parties in this

appeal that have not been presented to the district court, including the

application of the holding in Burnett.”). Our error preservation rules normally do

not allow us to reverse the district court on an issue not decided by it—

particularly if the issue was not even presented to that court. See Lee v. State,

815 N.W.2d 731, 740 (Iowa 2012) (declining to address an issue on appeal

“because it was not presented to or ruled upon by the district court”); cf. Meier

v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 540 n.1 (Iowa 2002) (“A prevailing party may

support the district court judgment on any ground contained in the record,

provided that the affirmance on that ground does not alter the rights of the

parties established in the judgment.” (emphasis added)); cf. also State v. Maxwell,

743 N.W.2d 185, 192–93 (Iowa 2008) (recognizing our obligation “to affirm an

appeal where any proper basis appears for a trial court’s ruling, even though it

is not one upon which the court based its holding” but explaining we will apply

that rule only to evidentiary issues, not substantive or procedural issues, “if the

parties did not raise the issue in the district court” (quoting Citizens First Nat’l

Bank v. Hoyt, 297 N.W.2d 329, 332 (Iowa 1980) (en banc))).

Paulson presents no other basis on appeal for overruling the district

court’s denial of summary judgment on Norris’s constitutional claims. The

district court’s order denying summary judgment is therefore affirmed.

Decision of Court of Appeals Affirmed in Part and Vacated in Part;

District Court Judgment Affirmed.

This opinion shall not be published.