Opinion

Harper v. Washburn

  • 308 Or. App. 244
  • 479 P.3d 1101
Court
Court of Appeals of Oregon
Filed
Dec 30, 2020
Status
Published
On the bench
James
Cited by
6 cases
Authority
More cited than 62.6%

"As we have observed before, the line between permissible inferences and impermissible speculation is 'sometimes faint.'"

How later courts described this case

  • "As we have observed before, the line between permissible inferences and impermissible speculation is 'sometimes faint.'"

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

244

Submitted November 5, reversed and remanded December 30, 2020

BUFORD THOMAS HARPER,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

Susan WASHBURN,

Superintendent,

Eastern Oregon Correctional Institution,

Defendant-Respondent.

Umatilla County Circuit Court

16CV32380; A170892

479 P3d 1101

Petitioner appeals from a judgment denying post-conviction relief for his claim

that trial counsel was ineffective and inadequate for failing to ensure his guilty

plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Petitioner alleges that the post-

conviction court erred in permitting the superintendent to cross-examine peti-

tioner on the differences between his original pro se petition for post-conviction

relief and his later, attorney drafted, amended petition for post-conviction relief.

Petitioner alleges this line of inquiry was irrelevant. The superintendent asserts

that the questioning was permissible as impeachment for bias or self-interest and

imputed petitioner’s credibility. Held: Setting aside the question of whether an

omission in a prior pro se legal document can ever be admissible to impeach an

assertion in a subsequent attorney drafted legal document, the superintendent

failed to establish the relationship between the proffered impeachment evidence

and a fact of consequence as required to establish relevance of impeachment evi-

dence. That evidentiary error was not harmless.

Reversed and remanded.

J. Burdette Pratt, Senior Judge.

Jedediah Peterson and O’Connor Weber LLC filed the

brief for appellant.

Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,

Solicitor General, and Colm Moore, Assistant Attorney

General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Lagesen, Presiding Judge, and James, Judge, and

Haselton, Senior Judge.

JAMES, J.

Reversed and remanded.

Cite as 308 Or App 244 (2020) 245

JAMES, J.

Petitioner appeals from a judgment denying post-

conviction relief for his claim that trial counsel was ineffec-

tive and inadequate for failing to ensure his guilty plea was

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Petitioner alleges that

the post-conviction court erred in permitting the superinten-

dent to cross-examine petitioner on the differences between

his original pro se petition for post-conviction relief and his

later, attorney drafted, amended petition for post-conviction

relief. Petitioner alleges that this line of inquiry was irrele-

vant. The superintendent asserts that the questioning was

permissible as impeachment for bias or self-interest and

imputed petitioner’s credibility. We agree with petitioner,

and, concluding that the evidentiary error is not harmless,

we reverse.

Petitioner and four indicted coconspirators were

each charged with felony murder following a premeditated

and coordinated effort to commit a violent home invasion

robbery in Douglas County. Petitioner and two of his code-

fendants confessed on video. The confessions were corrobo-

rated by independent evidence.

Petitioner was arrested for both a probation viola-

tion and the murder charges. He was incarcerated in the

Douglas County Jail for approximately one year before he

entered his plea and was sentenced. During that year, peti-

tioner was moved between general population, administra-

tive segregation, and isolation, based on his behavior, and

spent approximately one-half of his incarceration in segre-

gation or isolation.

Petitioner’s jail records indicate that, when he was

booked, petitioner mentioned dental pain and head pain,

but his mental status screen was normal. Throughout that

period of his incarceration, jail health records indicate that

petitioner sought mental health services on three occasions,

citing depressed mood, sleep disturbance, panic attacks,

depressed appetite, headaches, anger control issues, and

memory loss. Records also indicate that petitioner said he

had “passed out a few times” and “sees things out of the cor-

ner of his eye.”

246 Harper v. Washburn

The state offered petitioner a global plea deal per-

taining to the three criminal cases he faced at the time:

the murder case, an unrelated companion case based on

petitioner’s possession of a shank in jail, and a probation

violation. On the murder case, the prosecutor offered peti-

tioner a sentence of 25 years incarcerated with the Oregon

Department of Corrections, which petitioner accepted and

pleaded guilty as contemplated. At the plea and sentencing

hearing, the state laid out the factual basis for the charges

against petitioner, and through his attorney, petitioner indi-

cated that he did not contest the state’s recitation of the

facts.

Following his conviction, in a pro se petition for

post-conviction relief, petitioner asserted a single claim that

essentially alleged a failure to investigate and interview

witnesses by trial counsel. That pro se petition alleged that

trial counsel

“fail[ed] to question any of my list of witnesses and they

would have testified to facts not presented at trial that

could have severely lessened the alleged crime from mur-

der to manslaughter. Had trial court counsel done so, the

D.A. would not have continued with a murder trial and I

would have proceeded to jury trial and a jury would have

found me not guilty.”

Petitioner also asserted that his trial counsel told him “time

and again that [he] had no hope and should just wait and

see what kind of deal [he] could get from the D.A.”

Petitioner’s appointed attorney subsequently filed

an amended petition for post-conviction relief which sub-

stantially reframed petitioner’s original pro se claim by

asserting that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to

ensure petitioner’s plea was knowing, intelligent, and volun-

tary. In support of that reframed claim, the amended peti-

tion alleged that

“Petitioner was suffering from severe psychiatric symp-

toms, including suicidal depression, insomnia, night ter-

rors, panic attacks, memory loss and inability to eat.

Petitioner’s psychiatric symptoms significantly interfered

with Petitioner’s ability to knowingly, voluntarily, and

intelligently waive his state and federal constitutional

rights in pleading to the underlying criminal offense.”

Cite as 308 Or App 244 (2020) 247

The amended petition alleged that trial counsel

“was objectively unreasonable, under then existing pro-

fessional norms, in failing to comprehend the severity of

Petitioner’s psychiatric symptoms, failing to facilitate appro-

priate treatment, and allowing Petitioner to waive his state

and federal constitutional rights when he was not mentally

capable of a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver.”

The amended petition further alleged that trial

counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate, and appre-

ciate the significance of, petitioner’s substance abuse, and

“post-concussional syndrome,” in determining whether peti-

tioner was capable of knowingly and intelligently entering a

plea. Finally, the amended petition alleged that trial coun-

sel was ineffective in failing to request a competence exam

before advising petitioner to enter a plea.

In support of his claims, among other things, peti-

tioner submitted a declaration asserting that he was “unable to

comprehend the circumstances and consequences” of his guilty

plea. Petitioner stated that he had pleaded guilty because he

was suicidal, significantly impaired by controlled substances,

suffering from post-concussional syndrome, and desperate to

escape his isolation cell at the Douglas County Jail.

At the post-conviction trial, petitioner testified

about the conditions of his confinement at the Douglas

County Jail, including his time in administrative segrega-

tion or an isolation cell. He testified that, while in a segre-

gation cell, he had no interaction with other inmates, little

interaction with correctional officers, and was confined 23.5

hours per day. He further explained that these conditions

made him feel suicidal. He spent his time reading, doing

what “little exercise he could do in the cell,” and talking to

his “pet spider.” He was allowed occasional 10-minute visits

from his family, and, although the correctional officers pro-

vided him some recreational time in a chain-linked rooftop

basketball court, unlike his fellow inmates, the correctional

officers refused to remove his shackles.

On cross-examination, petitioner acknowledged that,

after he pleaded guilty, he learned from his brother, who was

a codefendant in his case, that his brother “got a deal” of 17

years for manslaughter. Petitioner also testified that he filed

248 Harper v. Washburn

his pro se petition because he thought that, if he had gone to

trial, he would have been found “not guilty of murder and

guilty of manslaughter.” The superintendent’s counsel then

asked petitioner about his failure to mention in his pro se

petition anything about his confinement in an isolation cell

or his mental deterioration leading to suicidal thoughts:

“[SUPERINTENDENT’S COUNSEL]: Okay. In that

document, you never referenced anything about being in

an isolation cell, did you?

“[PETITIONER]: No. I didn’t—no, not at all.

“[SUPERINTENDENT’S COUNSEL]: In that first

document, you didn’t mention anything about Lieutenant

Root, did you?

“[PETITIONER]: No.

“[SUPERINTENDENT’S COUNSEL]: In that docu-

ment, you never referenced anything about being suicidal,

correct?

“[PETITIONER’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, at this

point I’m going to object. This is—this document has been

replaced by the amended petition. It has no relevance in the

proceeding today.

“THE COURT: Mr. Cervera?

“[SUPERINTENDENT’S COUNSEL]: I think it goes

to impeachment and it goes towards motive for testifying

falsely.

“THE COURT: Overruled. I’ll allow you to proceed.

“[SUPERINTENDENT’S COUNSEL]: In that doc-

ument, [petitioner], you never mentioned anything about

being suicidal, correct?

“[PETITIONER]: No.

“[SUPERINTENDENT’S COUNSEL]: In that docu-

ment, you never mentioned anything about talking to a pet

spider, correct?

“[PETITIONER]: No.”

The court denied relief in a written judgment,

explaining that petitioner had failed to prove that his trial

counsel performed inadequately because the record did not

Cite as 308 Or App 244 (2020) 249

establish that his trial counsel could have or should have

been aware of any mental health issue at the time of peti-

tioner’s guilty plea. The court also made explicit credibility

findings, including a finding that petitioner’s testimony was

not credible:

“I find the Petitioner’s testimony to be not credible. Peti-

tioner’s testimony about his mental conditions is in conflict

with the records of the Douglas County Jail. It is signif-

icant that Petitioner’s original pro se petition makes no

mention of mental health issues or his current claim that

he did not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily enter

his guilty plea.”

Petitioner timely filed a notice of appeal, and, in six

assignments of error, he asserts one combined argument

that the post-conviction court erred when it overruled his

relevance objection. Specifically, he argues that, “[b]ecause a

formal petition had been filed by counsel, the pro se petition

was not operative and therefore irrelevant.” The superinten-

dent responds that that procedural fact does not make the

pro se petition and its contents irrelevant, as distinct from

legally operative. And, the superintendent asserts, under

OEC 401, the objected-to evidence about the contents of peti-

tioner’s pro se petition “is relevant impeachment evidence.”1

1

Petitioner has never objected to the challenged evidence on the ground that

it is not admissible under the specific evidentiary rules governing impeachment

evidence, OEC 607 through 609, or otherwise argued that those rules are not sat-

isfied. His argument has always been that the evidence is not relevant, and OEC

401 and OEC 402 are the only rules of evidence that he has invoked in his briefs

to us. Accordingly, we do not address the applicability of OEC 607 through 609 to

the issue before us, except to note that, when it comes to questions of the admis-

sibility of evidence for impeachment purposes, parties would be well advised to

engage with the specific evidentiary rules governing the topic, both in framing

objections to the evidence and in arguing for its admission.

Evidence that undermines a witness’s credibility comes in many forms, some

more subtle than others. Such evidence may also blur the line between substan-

tive evidence and impeachment evidence. For example, OEC 613 governs the

admission of “[e]xtrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement” of the wit-

ness. But, unlike the other provisions listed, OEC 613 makes no reference to the

purpose of such evidence being to attack the credibility of the witness. As such,

OEC 613 might be conceptualized as distinct from the impeachment sections

explicitly referencing credibility, although conceptually it is clearly related. We

do not foreclose the possibility that other forms of evidence beyond those specified

in OEC 607 through 609 might carry impeachment implications, but neverthe-

less be governed by other sections of the evidence code. We need not explore those

implications here, however, in light of the arguments advanced by the parties.

250 Harper v. Washburn

At trial in this case, the superintendent’s articu-

lated rationale for the admission of the evidence was that it

went to “impeachment” and a “motive for testifying falsely.”

On appeal, the superintendent no longer argues that the

evidence demonstrates that petitioner had a motive to lie in

his testimony about having a mental illness, and we agree

with the tacit acknowledgment that the evidence did not

tend to show a motive to lie. The superintendent’s theory

of relevance is, instead, that it can be inferred from peti-

tioner’s mere omission from the pro se petition of any facts

or claims regarding his mental competence that his later-

asserted claims, and his testimony supporting them, are

fabrications—a theory the superintendent terms “bias and

self-interest” on appeal. Specifically, the superintendent

argues:

“Here, petitioner claimed that he received constitu-

tionally inadequate assistance of trial counsel because, at

the time of his plea agreement, he suffered from serious

mental impairments that prevented him from knowingly

and voluntarily entering his guilty plea. * * * To counter

petitioner’s testimony, defendant pointed to evidence that

petitioner’s pro se petition made no mention of any mental

incapacitation, nor did it suggest that his guilty plea was

not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.

“Evidence that petitioner failed to assert in his pro se

petition that he suffered from mental incapacitation at the

time of his guilty plea would allow a factfinder to reason-

ably infer that petitioner’s testimony that he had been suf-

fering from such incapacitation was not credible. * * * [I]t

is reasonable to infer that if petitioner’s mental incapacita-

tion had led him to unknowingly and involuntarily enter a

guilty plea, he would have mentioned that circumstance or

claim when he filed his pro se petition two years later.”

Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law,

which we review for errors of law. State v. Titus, 328 Or 475,

481, 982 P2d 1133 (1999) (evidence is either “relevant or it is

not”). Turning to the merits of that question, under OEC 401,

“relevant evidence” means “evidence having any tendency to

make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the

determination of the action more probable or less probable

than it would be without the evidence.” In terms of evidentiary

Cite as 308 Or App 244 (2020) 251

admissibility, that standard represents a “low bar,” State v.

Davis, 351 Or 35, 48, 261 P3d 1197 (2011), meaning that evi-

dence is relevant so long as it increases or decreases—even

slightly—the probability that a fact will be consequential to

the determination of an action. State v. Barone, 329 Or 210,

238, 986 P2d 5 (1999), cert den, 528 US 1086 (2000).

“Matters which would otherwise be irrelevant may

be offered to show the bias or interest of a witness.” State

v. Dowell, 274 Or 547, 550, 547 P2d 619 (1976); O’Harra v.

Pundt, 210 Or 533, 543, 310 P2d 1110 (1957). To be rele-

vant, evidence introduced to impeach a witness for bias or

interest need only have a mere tendency to show the bias or

interest of the witness. Evidence of bias or interest relates

to the credibility of the witness. It need not be relevant to

another matter of consequence to the determination of the

case. State v. Shelly, 212 Or App 65, 68, 157 P3d 234 (2007).

As Kirkpatrick notes, a wide range of evidence may

show bias:

“Bias may be evidenced by personal, family, romantic,

sexual, or business relationships; by employment or ter-

mination of employment by a party; by statements or

conduct indicating positive or negative feelings of the wit-

ness towards a party; by claims, litigation or settlements

between the witness and a party; by prior fights or quar-

rels; by a party offering to give or a witness offering to

receive a bribe; by payment of compensation of any nature

by the party to the witness; by granting or promising to

grant special advantage or favoritism; by a showing of a

motive to curry favor with a party, such as showing that an

agreement to grant immunity, recommend leniency, drop

another charge or any other concession by a prosecutor or

other law enforcement officer to a witness.”

State v. Brown, 299 Or 143, 150, 699 P2d 1122 (1985) (quot-

ing Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence 263 (1982)).2

2

Although the terms of OEC 609-1 could be read to limit the form of per-

missible impeachment evidence to the “conduct” or “statements” of a witness, the

Supreme Court has held that the rule is not one of limitation: “OEC 609-1 * * *

was never intended to restrict other forms of impeachment for bias or interest.

* * * [F]riendship, family relationship, etc., and interest in the form of amount of

expert witness fees, etc., continue to be viable forms of impeachment even though

no conduct or statement is involved.” State v. Brown, 299 Or 143, 150, 699 P2d

1122 (1985). But the court did not address omissions.

252 Harper v. Washburn

Despite the broad type of impeachment evidence

permissible, it is not readily apparent that the evidence

here qualifies. The superintendent’s appellate theory of

impeachment is that petitioner could be impeached by his

failure to include mental health claims and facts in his prior

petition—in essence, impeachment not through a statement,

but the absence of a statement, or silence. But the superin-

tendent has not supplied us with any authority holding that

silence in a prior legal document is admissible to attack the

credibility of subsequent legal assertions, or testimony in

support of those legal assertions, and it is not clear how evi-

dence taking such a form comports with the requirements of

OEC 608 through 609.3

Regardless, setting aside the question of whether

an omission in a prior legal document can ever be admissi-

ble to impeach an assertion in a subsequent legal document

or testimony supporting the assertion, the superintendent

in this case faces a fatal problem: The original pleading

itself does not give rise to a reasonable inference about peti-

tioner’s credibility, and the state did not lay any additional

foundation about the circumstances of that pleading that

would allow such an inference to be drawn.

Although evidence of bias need only have a mere

tendency to show the bias or interest of the witness, that

3

Inconsistencies are a different story. In Roop v. Parker Northwest Paving

Co., we noted:

“ ‘[W]here a complainant’s pleading is subsequently abandoned or super-

seded, the original pleading is admissible as an evidentiary admission to

refute or impeach the present pleading or testimony of the complainant, sub-

ject to the right of the complainant to explain any inconsistency.’ Swanson

v. Hale, 273 Or 138, 142, 539 P2d 1073 (1975); see also Moore v. Drennan,

269 Or 189, 193, 523 P2d 1250 (1974) (where the statements of fact in the

plaintiff’s prior pleadings were not consistent with the plaintiff’s pleadings

and testimony at trial, the prior pleadings were admissible in evidence and

the plaintiff could introduce evidence to explain them); MacDonald, 133 Or

App at 38-39 (it was error to exclude evidence of the defendant’s original,

and subsequently amended, admission that he did not give the plaintiff anti-

biotics before extracting her tooth; that evidence ‘directly challenged

[the defendant’s] credibility’ on a material fact in issue); Southern Oregon

Production Credit Assn v. Patridge, 71 Or App 53, 56, 691 P2d 135 (1984)

(superseded answer was not a binding judicial admission, but constituted

evidence from which inferences could be drawn); Laird C. Kirkpatrick,

Oregon Evidence § 801.03[4][d], Art VIII-33-34 (4th ed 2002).”

194 Or App 219, 254-55, 94 P3d 885 (2004) (brackets in Roop).

Cite as 308 Or App 244 (2020) 253

tendency must derive from permissible inferences. That is,

even in the case of impeachment evidence, the proponent

must establish the relationship between the proffered evi-

dence (here, the pleading omission) and a fact of consequence

(here, petitioner’s truthfulness about his mental health). See

OEC 401; State v. Valle, 255 Or App 805, 818, 298 P3d 1237

(2013) (“When determining whether a party has established

that evidence is relevant, a trial court’s task is to determine

whether a jury could infer from the evidence the fact that

the proponent is offering it to prove.”). Moreover, as the pro-

ponent of the evidence, the superintendent bore the burden

to “lay a sufficient foundation for the admission.” State v.

Hubbard, 297 Or 789, 796, 688 P2d 1311 (1984).

Here, to establish the relevancy of the proffered

impeachment evidence, the superintendent’s foundational

showing needed to be sufficient to permit a reasonable,

nonspeculative inference that petitioner’s failure to include

a mental health legal claim was purposeful—that is, the

legal claim was omitted from the original pleading because

petitioner did not, in fact, have concerns about his mental

health at the time he filed it. The superintendent sought to

impeach petitioner in two different ways, with two differ-

ent documents—directly, through the absence of a mental

health legal claim in the pro se petition—and indirectly, by

suggesting that the inclusion of mental health legal claims

in the amended petition was a falsity.

That proffered avenue of impeachment rests upon

a faulty assumption about what can be inferred from the

bare fact of the pleading omission in this case. Again, the

superintendent is relying on an omission of a legal claim in

the original pleading, which logically depends on an infer-

ence that petitioner would have known that such a claim

was available, such that the failure to include a mental

health legal claim was somehow telling as to petitioner’s

credibility. The superintendent did not attempt to lay any

factual foundation about petitioner’s knowledge of the avail-

ability and viability of the legal claims permissible. Instead,

the superintendent appears to have relied on an assump-

tion that petitioner would have possessed that legal knowl-

edge to evaluate the adequacy of his counsel’s performance

and to allege a post-conviction claim on that basis. But a

254 Harper v. Washburn

presumptive knowledge of the law is different from actual

knowledge, which is the predicate fact on which the superin-

tendent’s relevancy argument depends. Cf. Gutale v. State of

Oregon, 364 Or 502, 511, 435 P3d 728 (2019) (explaining the

difference between when a ground for relief is known and

when a ground for relief “was reasonably available, despite

not being known,” and clarifying that precedent with regard

to the latter question “did not turn on a presumption that

people know the law” but on whether “the legal basis for the

petitioner’s claim was reasonably available to the petitioner”

(emphasis added)).

Moreover, nothing in the foundational record estab-

lished by the superintendent elevates that assumption—

that petitioner knew, or reasonably should have known,

the gamut of legal claims available—to the level of reason-

able inference, as opposed to mere speculation. As we have

observed before, the line between permissible inferences and

impermissible speculation is “sometimes faint.” Hutchinson

and Hutchinson, 187 Or App 733, 741, 69 P3d 815 (2003).

However, ultimately, reasonable inferences are permissible;

speculation and guesswork are not. State v. Bivins, 191 Or

App 460, 467, 83 P3d 379 (2004); Lemons et al v. Holland

et al, 205 Or 163, 192, 284 P2d 1041 (1955) (holding same).

The speculative nature of the superintendent’s

assumption is underscored by the post-conviction statutory

scheme, in which petitioners are granted counsel and given

an opportunity to amend claims that may have been omit-

ted from an original petition. That scheme belies the super-

intendent’s broad assumption that all petitioners should be

held to know all available claims at the time of the origi-

nal petition. And there is nothing in the record to suggest

that petitioner, in particular, knew or should have known

the contours of a knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently

made plea agreement, such that it could be inferred that he

naturally would have included the mental health claim if

he actually had mental health problems.4 And without the

4

In ordinary civil litigation, particularly where a party is represented

by counsel, the absence of a claim in an initial complaint might lead to a non-

speculative inference that a party may have at least considered but did not ini-

tially include a claim that was later amended to the complaint. We do not face that

circumstance or need to resolve that issue. Here, in contrast, the superintendent

Cite as 308 Or App 244 (2020) 255

predicate inference that petitioner knew the legal basis for

such a claim, it is purely speculative to infer that the initial

omission of allegations about mental health bore any rela-

tionship to petitioner’s credibility. Accord State v. Ogden, 39

Or 195, 205-06, 65 P 449 (1901) (“If the questions so objected

to were intended to lay the foundation to impeach the wit-

ness, they are insufficient for that purpose, because they

do not purport to state any testimony given by her at the

defendant’s preliminary examination. * * * [F]or the further

reason that the omission to detail the facts on the prior occa-

sion with greater particularity is not inconsistent with the

testimony given by her at the trial. Nor can such omission be

regarded as a discrepancy in her testimony, unless it clearly

appears that her attention was specially attracted and she

was asked to testify concerning the very facts embraced in the

questions propounded at the trial.” (Emphasis added.)).

Finally, we address harm. We will not reverse

based on evidentiary error unless that error affected the

substantial rights of the parties. “Evidentiary error is not

presumed prejudicial, and the burden is on [the party] who

appeals * * * to show that a court’s error affected a substan-

tial right.” State v. Kayfes, 213 Or App 543, 555, 162 P3d

308, rev den, 343 Or 690 (2007); State v. Ambriz-Arguello,

285 Or App 583, 589, 397 P3d 547, rev den, 362 Or 39 (2017)

(holding same). When analyzing whether an error is harm-

less, we consider whether there is little likelihood that the

particular error would have affected the verdict. State v.

Davis, 336 Or 19, 32, 77 P3d 1111 (2003).

Here, we cannot conclude that there is little likeli-

hood that the error affected the verdict. In announcing its

verdict, the trial court made specific reference to petition-

er’s omissions, noting that was “significant that Petitioner’s

original pro se petition makes no mention of mental health

issues or his current claim that he did not knowingly, intel-

ligently and voluntarily enter his guilty plea.” We take

relies on a number of faulty and speculative assumptions that an incarcerated,

pro se petitioner would have been initially aware of the availability of a mental-

health legal claim about the adequacy of his counsel that was later amended to

the petition only when petitioner was represented by an attorney. The necessary

chain of inferences is too speculative even under the low bar for the admission of

relevant impeachment evidence.

256 Harper v. Washburn

the trial court on its word that this evidence was signifi-

cant in its determination on whether to grant or deny post-

conviction relief.

Reversed and remanded.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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