Viola Bryant v. Sheriff, Saint Lucie County, Florida

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-12334

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

VIOLA BRYANT,

as Personal Representative of the Estate

of Gregory Vaughn Hill, Jr.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

SHERIFF, SAINT LUCIE COUNTY, FLORIDA,

CHRISTOPHER NEWMAN,

an individual,

Defendants-Appellees.

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-12334

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 2:16-cv-14072-AMC

____________________

Before ROSENBAUM, BRASHER, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

On January 14, 2014, Gregory Hill, Jr., was shot and killed in

his home garage by St. Lucie County Sheriff’s Office Deputy Chris-

topher Newman. Viola Bryant, Hill’s mother, brought a lawsuit

on his behalf under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Deputy Newman and

St. Lucie County Sheriff Ken Mascara in his official capacity. A fed-

eral jury in 2018 returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. Bry-

ant appealed, and we reversed and remanded for a new trial. After

a second trial, a jury again returned a verdict in the defendants’ fa-

vor. Bryant moved for a new trial, raising evidentiary and other

objections to the conduct of the trial. The district court denied that

motion, and this appeal followed. After careful review, we affirm.

I.

On the afternoon of January 14, 2014, Deputies Newman

and Edward Lopez arrived to investigate a noise complaint about

Hill’s residence, which was near an elementary school. Newman

knocked on the front door of the house, while Lopez knocked on

the garage door. Hill responded at the garage door, opening the

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door partway before pushing it back down. As the door closed,

Newman fired four shots through the garage door, killing Hill.

The principal factual dispute at trial was whether Hill had a

gun in his hand when he opened the garage door. Both deputies

testified that they saw Hill with a gun in his right hand by his side

as he opened the garage door with his left hand. The deputies tes-

tified that Hill refused orders to drop the gun, and instead raised it

in Lopez’s direction as he started to bring the garage door down.

Newman testified that, in response, he fired four shots through the

garage door in quick succession. An unloaded gun was found in

Hill’s right back pocket.

Hill’s daughter, Destiny, also testified. Destiny’s elementary

school was located directly across the street from Hill’s home. At

the time of the shooting, Destiny was sitting on a bench in front of

the school waiting to be picked up by her uncle. She had a clear

view of the house. She said that when the police came she saw

Hill, who was sitting in a chair inside the garage, stand up and close

the garage. She said Hill was not holding anything in his hands

when he closed the garage door.

In addition, the parties presented expert testimony on vari-

ous aspects of the case, including whether it was possible for Hill

to have placed the gun in his back pocket before becoming incapac-

itated from his gunshot injuries.

II.

In January 2016, Bryant, acting as representative of Hill’s es-

tate, filed a complaint in state court against Deputy Newman and

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Sheriff Mascara. The complaint alleged violations of the Fourth

and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well

as two state-law claims for negligence and a state-law claim for bat-

tery. The defendants removed the case to federal district court in

the Southern District of Florida.

Following a six-day trial in May 2018, the jury determined

that Newman did not violate Hill’s right to be free from excessive

force. The jury also determined that Sheriff Mascara’s negligence

was a legal cause of Hill’s injuries, but that Hill was 99% responsi-

ble for his injuries. The jury awarded one dollar in damages for

funeral expenses and one dollar in damages to each of Hill’s three

minor children. Bryant filed a motion for a new trial, which the

district court denied.

On appeal, we reversed and remanded for a new trial based

on the district court’s admission of evidence of Hill’s probationary

status at the time of the shooting. Bryant v. Mascara, 800 F. App’x

881, 885 (11th Cir. 2020). We held that Hill’s probationary status

was not relevant to the “two central factual disputes at trial,” which

were whether “Hill had a gun in his hand at the time he opened his

garage door and whether it was possible for Hill to place the gun

in his back pocket before he was shot.” Id. at 886. Because Hill’s

“probationary status did not lend credibility to the deputies’ claims

about his behavior prior to the shooting,” we found that the evi-

dence was not relevant to any issue other than Hill’s character. Id.

at 887. We also reasoned that the error was sufficiently prejudicial

to warrant reversal and remand for a new trial. Id.

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A second jury trial was held over eight days in July 2022.

The jury determined that Deputy Newman did not use excessive

force and that Sheriff Mascara was not liable for negligence. So the

court entered final judgment in favor of the defendants.

Bryant then filed a motion for a new trial, raising many of

the same arguments she presents on appeal. The district court de-

nied the motion, and this appeal followed.

III.

The bulk of Bryant’s briefing is devoted to alleged eviden-

tiary and other trial errors, for which she seeks a new trial. She also

contends that the verdict was against the great weight of the evi-

dence, and that the district court abused its discretion in denying

her post-remand motion to change venue.

We review the district court’s denial of a motion for new

trial for an abuse of discretion. Lambert v. Fulton County, 253 F.3d

588, 595 (11th Cir. 2001). Likewise, we review the district court’s

evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Williams v. Mast Bio-

surgery USA, Inc., 644 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011). In evaluating

whether specific trial errors warrant a new trial, we apply the harm-

less-error standard of Rule 61, Fed. R. Civ. P. Knight through Kerr v.

Miami-Dade County, 856 F.3d 795, 807 (11th Cir. 2017). Under that

standard, evidentiary or other trial errors warrant a new trial “only

where the error has caused substantial prejudice to the affected

party (or, stated somewhat differently, affected the party’s “sub-

stantial rights” or resulted in “substantial injustice”).” Peat, Inc. v.

Vanguard Research, Inc., 378 F.3d 1154, 1162 (11th Cir. 2004).

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Finally, we review the denial of a motion for change of venue for

an abuse of discretion. United States v. Campa, 459 F.3d 1121, 1143

(11th Cir. 2006) (en banc).

IV.

Starting with the alleged trial errors, Bryant contends that

the district court abused its discretion at trial in these seven ways:

(1) permitting Deputy Newman to materially change his testimony

between the two trials; (2) permitting Newman to testify about his

finances; (3) permitting the lead investigator to openly display bias

for the defendants; (4) failing to exclude cumulative expert testi-

mony regarding DNA analysis; (5) permitting evidence of Hill play-

ing poker and having a verbal disagreement seven hours before the

shooting; (6) denying redirect examination of Deputy Lopez; and

(7) permitting the medical examiner to insinuate that Hill had a

drinking problem. She also maintains that (8) the cumulative effect

of these errors deprived her of a fair trial.

A. Newman’s Changed Testimony

Bryant first contends that Deputy Newman “materially

changed his previous testimony” from the 2018 trial, resulting in

substantial prejudice to her case. In particular, she asserts that, dur-

ing the 2022 trial, Newman altered his testimony with respect to

(1) how Hill was standing when he opened the garage door;

(2) Hill’s actions upon opening the door; and (3) the timing of the

shots Newman fired.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a

new trial in relation to this testimony. First, as the court explained,

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Newman’s 2022 trial testimony that Hill was in a “bladed stance”

when he opened the garage door—with his left foot in front of his

right foot—is not inconsistent with his 2018 trial testimony, which

described Hill opening the garage door with his left hand and hold-

ing a gun in his right hand and “hunching to the side.” The court

reasonably concluded that Newman’s new use of the term “bladed

stance” was not a material change in his testimony.

Second, Newman did not testify that Hill opened the garage

door with “guns blazing,” as Bryant suggests. Rather, Newman

was explaining that he was trained not to park in front of doorways,

even though “it was a loud music call, so [he] wasn’t expecting

somebody to come out guns blazing at me or anything like that.”

Aside from that general comment, Newman did not otherwise sug-

gest that Hill had multiple guns or had discharged a gun. Plus, as

the court noted, Bryant did not object to the “guns blazing” com-

ment, and she was able to cross-examine Newman on the issue in-

sofar as the comment could be construed to apply to Hill.

Third, the record does not support Bryant’s claim that New-

man, at the 2022 trial, “slowed down the cadence of the shots” to

help explain how Hill could have placed the gun in his back pocket

before being incapacitated by the gunshots. At the 2018 trial, New-

man testified that he fired four shots in quick succession—agreeing

with plaintiff’s counsel that the shots were “fractions of a second

apart”—“but there was more of a gap between the first and the sec-

ond than the third and fourth.” Likewise, at the 2022 trial, New-

man testified that there was “more of a pause . . . between one and

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two than any of the other shots.” Bryant fails to identify any signif-

icant or material difference with regard to the timing of the shots

Newman fired or the length of any pause. And Bryant had the op-

portunity to question Newman about the cadence of the shots on

cross examination.

On the whole, the district court reasonably concluded that

Newman’s supposedly changed testimony was not material or

prejudicial enough to warrant a new trial. Newman’s 2022 trial

testimony was not clearly inconsistent with his 2018 trial testi-

mony, and, as the court observed, Bryant “had ample opportunity

to question Newman about such inconsistencies on cross examina-

tion.”1

B. Newman’s Testimony About Finances

Staying with Newman’s testimony, Bryant takes issue with

his isolated comments about his financial status. In responding to

a question about how he recognized the Kel-Tec gun Hill was al-

legedly carrying, Newman explained that, not long before the inci-

dent with Hill, he had looked online at potential backup service

weapons, including Kel-Tec guns, which were “less in price,” since

he “didn’t make much money” and “didn’t want to spend two

paychecks on purchasing a handgun.”

1 In her reply brief, Bryant challenges the district court’s refusal to permit her

to read portions of Newman’s testimony from the 2018 trial as part of a rebut-

tal case. But the court denied the request in part because she had ample time

to delve into those matters on cross-examination. Bryant has not shown that

the district court abused its discretion in this regard.

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We agree with Bryant that the comments were improper.

Evidence of a party’s wealth or financial status is generally inadmis-

sible unless relevant to an issue in dispute. See United States v. Brad-

ley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1271 (11th Cir. 2011) (stating that “evidence of

wealth or extravagant spending may be admissible when relevant

to issues in the case”). That Newman “didn’t make much money”

was not relevant to any issue in the case.

Even so, the district court reasonably concluded that these

passing, isolated comments, unsolicited by defense counsel and of-

fered to explain Newman’s familiarity with the gun at issue, were

harmless in the context of the eight-day trial. We see no abuse of

the court’s discretion.

C. Bias of Lead Investigator

Bryant next suggests that Sergeant Edgar LaBeau—the lead

investigator of the shooting for the sheriff’s office—“demonstrated

bias repeatedly” in favor of the defendants at the 2022 trial and

“openly admitted confirmation bias.” She claims that this bias was

not disclosed during the 2018 trial, and would, if known, “have dis-

qualified his testimony prior to trial.”

Bryant fails to identify any legal grounds for excluding

LaBeau’s testimony. During the 2022 trial, LaBeau testified that he

would “defer” to Deputies Lopez and Newman with respect to

what they said they saw during the incident. He later explained

that such deference was based on their statements and information

“learned through the investigation.” To the extent these com-

ments demonstrate bias in favor of the defendants, Bryant, as the

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district court observed, had “ample opportunity to question Ser-

geant LeBeau on cross-examination about any bias [he] may have

had,” which was the “proper remedy for any witness bias, not

wholesale exclusion.” Nothing prevented Bryant from challenging

the thoroughness or integrity of LaBeau’s investigation into the

shooting. The court did not abuse its discretion by denying a new

trial on this ground.

D. Cumulative Expert Testimony

Bryant next contends that the district court abused its discre-

tion by failing to exclude, under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, tes-

timony from multiple expert witnesses regarding DNA evidence.

“[D]ecisions to allow expert witnesses are committed to the

sound discretion of district judges.” Rubinstein v. Yehuda, 38 F.4th

982, 997 (11th Cir. 2022). Because of the powerful and potentially

misleading effect of expert evidence, expert opinions that other-

wise meet the admissibility requirements may still be excluded un-

der Rule 403. United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1263 (11th Cir.

2004) (en banc). “Exclusion under Rule 403 is appropriate if the pro-

bative value of otherwise admissible evidence is substantially out-

weighed by its potential to confuse or mislead the jury, or if the

expert testimony is cumulative or needlessly time consuming.” Id.

(citations omitted).

The relevant background is this. In 2014, during the inves-

tigation into the shooting, the Indian River Crime Lab (“Crime

Lab”) issued a report that determined that Hill could not be ex-

cluded as a potential match for the DNA found on the Kel-Tec

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handgun in Hill’s back pocket. At the 2022 trial, the defense called

Earl Ritzline, who worked at the Crime Lab in 2014, to testify about

the Crime Lab report. For her part, Bryant retained an expert, Su-

zanna Ryan, who conducted independent DNA testing in 2021 and

cast doubt on the results of the Crime Lab report. As a rebuttal

expert witness to Ryan, the defendants called Meghan Clement,

who testified about differences between Ryan’s report and the

Crime Lab report and stated that she agreed with the conclusions

of the Crime Lab report. The district court permitted Clement’s

testimony, over Bryant’s objection, because it found that her testi-

mony was not cumulative or duplicative of Ritzline’s.

The district court did not abuse its discretion. As the court

observed in its order denying Bryant’s motion for new trial, the

bulk of Clement’s testimony “pertained to explaining the differ-

ences between Ms. Ryan’s Report and the 2014 Indian River Crime

Laboratory Report, in particular the methods and results of both

reports, and Mr. Ritzline did not testify at all regarding these top-

ics.” Despite some overlap between the testimony, the court rea-

sonably concluded that the probative value of Clement’s testimony

was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice and was not

needlessly cumulative. See Fed. R. Evid. 403; Frazier, 387 F.3d at

1263.

On appeal, Bryant also challenges the admission of testi-

mony from another expert, William Allan. The defendants repre-

sent, and Bryant does not dispute, that Allan was retained to rebut

testimony by another of Bryant’s experts, Christopher Robinson,

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on the issue of whether DNA evidence could show that Hill had

handled the gun. But while Bryant’s pretrial motion in limine

sought exclusion of testimony from both Allan and Clements, the

district court denied that motion without prejudice to being re-

newed at trial, and Bryant neither objected to Allan’s testimony at

trial nor sought a new trial based on that testimony. Because Bry-

ant did not properly raise this issue before the district court, we

review for plain error, at most. See Ledford v. Peeples, 657 F.3d 1222,

1258 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[E]xcept when we invoke the ‘plain error

doctrine,’ which rarely applies in civil cases, we do not consider ar-

guments raised for the first time on appeal.”). And we see no indi-

cation that there is an “exceptional circumstance” to warrant relief

under the plain-error standard. Burch v. P.J. Cheese, Inc., 861 F.3d

1338, 1351 n.22 (11th Cir. 2017).

E. Evidence of Gambling and Altercation

Bryant maintains that the district court erred by permitting

evidence that Hill was involved in an altercation while playing

poker on the morning of the shooting. The testimony came from

Andrew Brown, Hill’s cousin and friend, who was with Hill for

most of the day before the shooting and described his observations

of Hill’s conduct that day on cross-examination by defense counsel.

The district court denied Bryant’s pretrial motion to exclude

such evidence, reasoning that evidence of the altercation with the

other poker player went directly to Hill’s state of mind when the

shooting took place and thus was probative on the issue as to

whether Hill was holding a gun when he opened the garage door.

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Still, the court cautioned the defendants not to “emphasize gam-

bling or otherwise impute any wrongdoing toward Mr. Hill on ac-

count of gambling.”

“The district court retains wide discretion in determining

the relevance of evidence produced at trial.” Kropilak v. 21st Century

Ins. Co., 806 F.3d 1062, 1067 (11th Cir. 2015). Relevant evidence

has a “tendency to make a fact” that is of consequence in determin-

ing the action “more or less probable than it would be without the

evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. The court may exclude relevant ev-

idence if its probative value is “substantially outweighed” by unfair

prejudice or confusion of the issues, among other concerns. Fed.

R. Evid. 403. Because “the district court is uniquely situated to

make nuanced judgments on questions that require the careful bal-

ancing of fact-specific concepts like probativeness and prejudice, . .

. we are loathe to disturb the sound exercise of its discretion in

these areas.” United States v. Troya, 733 F.3d 1125, 1131 (11th Cir.

2013) (quotation marks omitted).

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by per-

mitting testimony about Hill’s conduct earlier in the day before the

shooting. As we previously noted, “[t]he two central factual dis-

putes at trial were whether Mr. Hill had a gun in his hand at the

time he opened his garage door and whether it was possible for Hill

to place the gun in his back pocket before he was shot.” Bryant, 800

F. App’x at 886.

Bryant maintains that the evidence had no relevance to these

disputed matters because none of these facts about Hill’s conduct

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earlier in the day were known to Deputies Lopez or Newman. But

as we recognized in Bryant’s prior appeal, evidence unknown to the

officers may be relevant if it “lend[s] credibility to the deputies’

claims about [Hill’s] behavior prior to the shooting.” Id. at 886–87;

see Est. of Escobedo v. Martin, 702 F.3d 388, 400 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[E]vi-

dence unknown to officers at the time force was used is also admis-

sible to add credibility to an officer’s claim that a suspect acted in

the manner described by the officer.”); Boyd v. City & Cnty. of San

Francisco, 576 F.3d 938, 948–49 (9th Cir. 2009) (“In a case . . .where

what the officer perceived just prior to the use of force is in dispute,

evidence that may support one version of events over another is

relevant and admissible.”).

And here, evidence as to Hill’s conduct and activities on the

day of the shooting, in particular that he had argued and become

highly intoxicated, was probative of disputed matters, including his

state of mind at the time he encountered the officers, the likelihood

that he had a gun in his hand when responding to the garage door,

and his compliance with officer commands. This evidence lent

credibility to the deputies’ claims about Hill’s behavior just before

the shooting. See Turner v. White, 980 F.2d 1180, 1183 (8th Cir. 1992)

(affirming the admission of evidence of the plaintiff’s alcohol con-

sumption in an excessive force case because it was relevant to the

“circumstances of the situation that confronted [the officer]”).

While evidence of gambling was not directly relevant to

those same matters, it was part of the narrative of Hill’s conduct

leading up to the shooting. Accordingly, it was reasonable for the

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court to permit mention of gambling, in part to give context for

the altercation and Hill’s intoxication, while at the same time di-

recting the defense not to emphasize gambling or to use it against

Hill. Cf. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 189 (1997) (explain-

ing that courts should seek to preserve “the natural sequence of

narrative evidence”); Troya, 733 F.3d at 1131 (permitting admission

of “intrinsic evidence” in a criminal case where it “forms an inte-

gral and natural part of an account”). While Bryant claims that the

defendants violated the court’s conditions, she does not cite any

supporting record evidence, and the district court rejected that as-

sertion in denying her motion for a new trial.

F. Redirect of Deputy Lopez

Bryant claims that the district court improperly limited the

scope of her examination of Deputy Lopez. We disagree. Trial

judges retain “wide latitude to impose reasonable limits” on wit-

ness examination based on concerns about confusion of the issues

or repetitive interrogation, among other things. United States v. Clo-

taire, 963 F.3d 1288, 1296 (11th Cir. 2020); see Fed. R. Evid. 611(a)

(stating that “[t]he court should exercise reasonable control over

the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evi-

dence” so as to “avoid wasting time,” among other things).

Here, the district court did not abuse its wide discretion to

control the examination of witnesses. The court denied Bryant’s

counsel the opportunity to ask “one question” following re-cross

examination of Deputy Lopez. In other words, Bryant had ample

opportunity to effectively examine the witness during her case-in-

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chief and on redirect. The court simply denied a second redirect,

apparently to rehash matters already covered. Accordingly, the

court did not abuse its wide discretion in these matters.

G. Medical Examiner Testimony

Bryant takes issue with defense counsel’s questioning of the

medical examiner who performed the autopsy of Hill, contending

that counsel sought to portray Hill unfairly as a “bad man with a

drinking problem.”

At the 2022 trial, the medical examiner testified that Hill’s

blood-alcohol content was tested after the shooting and deter-

mined to be well above .3, which indicates severe intoxication. De-

fense counsel asked if the examiner saw any signs of chronic alco-

hol use, such as cirrhosis. She said no and explained that, depend-

ing on the person, cirrhosis can take decades to develop. Defense

counsel then asked, “So the fact that you did not observe any signs

of that disease process does not mean that Mr. Hill was not a per-

son with a serious or significant drinking problem?” The examiner

replied, “That’s correct.” Bryant did not object to this line of ques-

tioning.

Earlier in the trial, Bryant’s counsel had asked her own ex-

pert witness whether the toxicology or autopsy reports “reveal[ed]

any evidence of cirrhosis or alcohol related deterioration inter-

nally?” Counsel also questioned the expert about other potential

causes of death, such as “any type of fatal or terminal condition,”

such as cancer. The expert responded that he did not see any evi-

dence of those conditions.

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The district court reasoned that, by soliciting testimony

from her expert that Hill had not developed cirrhosis, Bryant

“opened the door to defense counsel rebutting that testimony by

questioning the medical examiner as to how long cirrhosis of the

liver takes to develop.”

This Circuit recognizes the doctrine of “curative admissibil-

ity,” or “opening the door,” which allows “the opposing party to

offer otherwise inadmissible evidence” to rebut unfair prejudice

created “when a party offers inadmissible evidence.” Bearint ex rel.

Bearint v. Dorell Juvenile Grp., Inc., 389 F.3d 1339, 1349 (11th Cir.

2004). Any inadmissible evidence offered in rebuttal must “corre-

spond to the unfair prejudice created,” and must be weighed by the

trial court under Rule 403. Id.

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by deny-

ing a new trial on this issue. Although Bryant has established error,

she has not shown that the error resulted in substantial prejudice.

For starters, we agree with Bryant that defense counsel ex-

ceeded the scope of permissible rebuttal. While the district court

reasonably permitted limited inquiry as to the development of cir-

rhosis in rebuttal of expert testimony solicited by Bryant’s counsel,

defense counsel went further, suggesting the possibility that Hill

had a “serious or significant drinking problem.” But Hill’s history

of alcohol abuse, or alcohol-related disease process, was not rele-

vant to any issue before the jury except his cause of death. Those

matters are not probative of the essential facts in dispute, which

were whether Hill “had a gun in his hand at the time he opened his

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18 Opinion of the Court 23-12334

garage door and whether it was possible for Hill to place the gun

in his back pocket before he was shot.” Bryant, 800 F. App’x at 886.

Rather, defense counsel’s question could be construed to suggest

an inadmissible character purpose that did not “correspond to the

unfair prejudice created” by testimony that Hill had not developed

cirrhosis. See Bearint, 389 F.3d at 1349.

But Bryant did not object at the time, and she has not estab-

lished that defense counsel’s question to the medical examiner had

such a substantial influence on the case as to warrant a new trial.

Bryant does not dispute that Hill’s intoxication on the day in ques-

tion was relevant to issues in dispute. And clear and largely undis-

puted evidence showed that Hill was highly intoxicated at the time

of the shooting. In addition, Bryant makes no claim that defense

counsel otherwise focused on Hill’s history of alcohol abuse. See

Peat, 378 F.3d at 1162 (“We also consider whether counsel inten-

tionally elicited the evidence, whether counsel focused on the evi-

dence during the trial, and whether any cautionary or limiting in-

structions were given.”). Viewing the remark in the context of the

trial as a whole, we do not believe the single, isolated comment by

defense counsel, though improper, was “of a nature to impair calm

and dispassionate consideration by the jury.” Knight, 856 F.3d at

817.

H. Cumulative Error

Even if no individual error on its own warrants a new trial,

the cumulative-error doctrine recognizes that “an aggregation of

non-reversible errors (i.e., plain errors failing to necessitate reversal

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23-12334 Opinion of the Court 19

and harmless errors) can yield a denial of the constitutional right to

a fair trial, which calls for reversal.” Morris v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.,

677 F.3d 1117, 1132 (11th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted).

But here, we cannot say that the two errors Bryant has estab-

lished—Newman’s improper comment about his finances and de-

fense counsel’s suggestion that Hill had a serious drinking prob-

lem—together yielded a denial of Bryant’s right to a fair trial. See

McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 552 (1984)

(“A litigant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one, for there

are no perfect trials.”) (cleaned up).

V.

In addition to granting relief based on trial errors, “[a] trial

judge may grant a motion for a new trial if [s]he believes the verdict

rendered by the jury to be contrary to the great weight of the evi-

dence.” Watts v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 307, 310–

31 (11th Cir. 1988). “Because it is critical that a judge does not

merely substitute [her] judgment for that of the jury, new trials

should not be granted on evidentiary grounds unless, at a mini-

mum, the verdict is against the great—not merely the greater—

weight of the evidence.” Lipphardt v. Durango Steakhouse of Brandon,

Inc., 267 F.3d 1183, 1186 (11th Cir. 2001).

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by deny-

ing a new trial based on the weight of the evidence. In the prior

appeal from the 2018 trial, based on substantially similar testimony

and evidence, we stated that we “cannot say the jury delivered a

verdict against the great weight of the evidence.” Bryant, 800 F.

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20 Opinion of the Court 23-12334

App’x at 888. As we noted, “[o]nly three witnesses testified to hav-

ing seen the shooting of Mr. Hill,” and the two deputies testified

consistently that they saw a gun in Hill’s hand when he encoun-

tered the officers at the garage door. Id.

While the parties presented additional expert testimony at

the 2022 trial, the record does not support Bryant’s claim that the

medical experts essentially agreed that it was impossible for Hill to

put the gun in his back pocket after being shot. Rather, as the dis-

trict court explained, “both medical experts testified that Mr. Hill

would have been able to place the gun in his back pocket prior to

being shot in the head.” Particularly in light of the judge’s

“firsthand experience of the witnesses, their demeanor, and the

context of the trial,” Rabun v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 678 F.2d 1053,

1060 (11th Cir. 1982), the district court did not abuse its discretion

in concluding that the jury verdict was not contrary to the great

weight of the evidence, see Lipphardt, 267 F.3d at 1186.

VI.

Finally, Bryant contends that the district court abused its dis-

cretion by denying her motion to change venue. Motions to trans-

fer a civil case are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1404, which permits the

court to transfer any civil action “to any other district or division

where it might have been brought or to any district or division to

which all parties have consented” if such transfer is “in the interest

of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Factors relevant to that inquiry

include the convenience of parties and witnesses, the “locus of op-

erative facts,” and other concerns related to “trial efficiency and the

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23-12334 Opinion of the Court 21

interests of justice, based on the totality of the circumstances.” Ma-

nuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132, 1135 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005).

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by deny-

ing a change in venue. Bryant’s concerns on appeal do not relate

to party or witness convenience, the location of the underlying

events, or the court’s ability to administer the trial more generally.

Rather, her sole contention is that the jury pool may have been

prejudiced against her due to connections with, or potential fear of,

the St. Lucie County Sheriff’s Office. But as the court noted, the

jury was drawn not only from St. Lucie County, but also four other

counties. And the transcript for the 2022 trial does not reveal that

any jurors who were seated had connections to the St. Lucie

County Sheriff’s Office. 2 Bryant has not shown that the district

court abused its discretion by denying a change in venue after re-

mand from the first trial.

VII.

In sum, Bryant has not established that the district court re-

versibly erred or that she is otherwise entitled to a new trial on her

2 Bryant asserts that “[t]wenty of the forty-two jurors on the panel had worked

in law enforcement or had close family members who were in law enforce-

ment,” and that “[a] majority of these worked with or for the St. Lucie County

Sheriff’s Office or the neighboring police force of Fort Pierce police depart-

ment.” Bryant fails to support those claims with citations to the record. But

in any case, even assuming they are true, they do not contradict the district

court’s finding that no juror who was seated and rendered a verdict had connec-

tions to the St. Lucie County Sheriff’s Office.

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22 Opinion of the Court 23-12334

claims against Deputy Newman and Sheriff Mascara. We therefore

affirm the judgment in favor of the defendants.

AFFIRMED.