The opinion
TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
State of California
ROB BONTA
Attorney General
_______________
:
OPINION :
: No. 24-401
of :
: October 9, 2024
ROB BONTA :
Attorney General :
:
CATHERINE BIDART :
Deputy Attorney General :
The HONORABLE BRIAN DAHLE, MEMBER OF THE STATE SENATE, has
requested an opinion on a question relating to municipal utility districts.
QUESTION PRESENTED AND CONCLUSION
Does Public Utilities Code section 12820 require all members of a municipal
utility district’s “suitable security force” to have the peace officer authority and powers
specified in that statute, including its related requirement to comply with the applicable
standards of the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST)?
No. The peace officer authority and powers and POST-standards compliance
specified in Public Utilities Code section 12820 are required only as to security force
members whom the utility district’s general manager designates as “security officers,”
and whose primary duty is to protect district property and the persons on it. Not every
member of a district’s security force must be designated as a security officer or possess
peace officer powers and authority.
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BACKGROUND
Cities, counties, and certain other entities may form a municipal utility district. 1
The Public Utilities Code authorizes a municipal utility district to provide district
inhabitants with a panoply of services including water, power, garbage, sewer, and
transportation. 2
Public Utilities Code section 12820 is part of the Municipal Utility District Act,
enacted in 1951. 3 Section 12820 was added in 1974 at the request of the East Bay
Municipal Utility District. 4 At the time, the District was opening over 50,000 acres of its
property to public recreation, including a 95-mile trail, and anticipated greater security
needs. To ensure the safety of the public, the District would need—among other things—
armed peace officers to make felony arrests. 5 Section 12820 provides that a “[municipal
utility] district may employ a suitable security force,” and that district employees whom
the district manager designates as “security officers” “shall have” specified peace officer
“authority and powers.” 6 It further provides that such designated “security officers” and
the district “shall” comply with rules of the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and
Training (POST). 7
1
Pub. Util. Code, §§ 11531, 11561, 11504.
2
Pub. Util. Code, § 12801.
3
Pub. Util. Code, § 11501; Stats. 1951, ch. 764, p. 2212, § 11501. This was not the first
law to authorize creation of a municipal utility district. (See East Bay Municipal Utility
Dist. v. Railroad Commission of State of California (1924) 194 Cal. 603, 606 [referring to
municipal utility district law enacted in 1921].)
4
Stats. 1974, ch. 1119, p. 2401, §§ 2 (enacting former Public Utilities Code section
12819) & 4 (reciting security-related urgency for legislation because of East Bay
Municipal Utility District opening property to public recreation). The section remains
substantively the same today. (Stats. 1975, ch. 769, p. 1788, § 2 [renumbering enacted
statute as Public Utilities Code section 12820]; Pub. Util. Code, § 12820.)
5
Digest from Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice file, Assem. Bill No. 3797
(1973-1974 Reg. Sess.), as amended August 12, p. 2.
6
Pub. Util. Code, § 12820, subd. (a). We will refer to the “authority and powers” more
simply as powers.
7
Pub. Util. Code, § 12820. POST is an agency “charged with establishing standards of
physical, mental, and moral fitness for peace officers” and “provides education and
training for peace officers.” (Commission on Peace Officer Standards & Training v.
Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 278, 285 [citing Pen. Code, §§ 13500, 13510, subd. (a),
13503, subd. (e)].)
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ANALYSIS
We are asked to clarify whether section 12820 requires all members of a
municipal utility district’s “suitable security force” to possess peace office powers and
conform to POST training requirements, or whether a district may employ a “suitable
security force” that contains personnel who are not designated as “security officers” and
who have not attained peace officer status or the concomitant responsibilities for POST
compliance. At first glance, “security force” may sound like a synonym or a plural form
of “security officers.” If that were so, the security force would have security officers
only. But as discussed in greater detail below, a careful review of the statutory language,
as well as its purpose and context, reveals that a “suitable security force” may include
personnel other than those designated as “security officers.” And unlike “security
officers,” these other personnel need not have peace officer authority and powers.
In construing Public Utilities Code section 12820, we employ established rules of
statutory interpretation to determine the Legislature’s intent. 8 The starting point is to
consider the statute’s words because they are generally the most reliable indicator of its
intended purpose. 9 We consider the “ordinary meaning” of the relevant words, as well as
“related provisions, terms used in other parts of the statute, and the structure of the
statutory scheme.” 10 If the relevant words are subject to more than one reasonable
interpretation, we then consider extrinsic sources including the statute’s purpose,
legislative history, and public policy. 11
Section 12820 begins by stating that a municipal utility district “may employ a
suitable security force.” 12 The next sentence provides that district employees designated
as “security officers” “shall have” the peace officer powers described in Penal Code
section 830.34(a), which empowers certain “security officers”—those whose primary
duty is protecting property and people—to make arrests and (if the district has so
authorized) to use firearms. 13 Lastly, the statute provides that “[e]very security officer”
8
Prang v. Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Bd. (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1152, 1170.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
Pub. Util. Code, § 12820, subd. (a).
13
This cross-referenced statute, Penal Code section 830.34, provides in relevant part:
The following persons are peace officers whose authority extends to any
place in the state for the purpose of performing their primary duty or when
making an arrest pursuant to Section 836 as to any public offense with
respect to which there is immediate danger to person or property, or of the
(continued…)
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“shall conform” to POST standards. 14 Does section 12820 allow a district to employ a
“suitable security force” that includes personnel who are not designated as “security
officers,” and who are therefore not required to have peace officer powers and conform to
POST standards?
The first sentence of section 12820 uses “may,” and each successive sentence uses
“shall.” The Public Utilities Code directs that the word “may” is interpreted as
permissive and the word “shall” is interpreted as mandatory, unless the context requires
otherwise. 15 Applicable case law also generally assigns those same meanings to these
words when they are in close proximity to each other, as here. 16 Seeing nothing in the
escape of the perpetrator of that offense . . . . Those peace officers may
carry firearms only if authorized and under terms and conditions specified
by their employing agency.
(a) Persons designated as a security officer by a municipal utility district
pursuant to Section 12820 of the Public Utilities Code, if the primary duty
of the officer is the protection of the properties of the utility district and the
protection of the persons thereon.
(Pen. Code, § 830.34, italics added.) Penal Code section 836, referenced above, sets
forth peace officer powers of arrest. (See Pen. Code, § 836.)
14
In its entirety, Public Utilities Code section 12820 states:
(a) A district may employ a suitable security force. The employees of the
district that are designated by the general manager as security officers shall
have the authority and powers conferred by subdivision (a) of Section
830.34 of the Penal Code upon peace officers. The district shall adhere to
the standards for recruitment and training of peace officers established by
the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training pursuant to Title
4 (commencing with Section 13500) of Part 4 of the Penal Code.
(b) Every security officer employed by a district shall conform to the
standards for peace officers of the Commission on Peace Officer Standards
and Training. Any officer who fails to conform to these standards shall not
continue to have the powers of a security officer.
15
Pub. Util. Code, §§ 5, 14.
16
Tarrant Bell Property, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 538, 542; see also
Andrews v. Metropolitan Transit System (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 597, 605 (“It is a well-
settled principle of statutory construction that the word ‘may’ is ordinarily construed as
permissive, whereas ‘shall’ is ordinarily construed as mandatory, particularly when both
terms are used in the same statute”).
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statutory context or otherwise to indicate a contrary meaning, we therefore apply a
permissive meaning to “may” and a mandatory meaning to “shall.”
Applying a permissive meaning to “may,” section 12820’s opening sentence
means that a district has authorization—but no obligation—to employ a “suitable security
force.” 17 Applying a mandatory meaning to “shall,” the statute provides that any
employees who are designated by the district’s general manager as “security officers” are
required to have peace officer powers, as specified, and POST compliance is required for
such officers.
In other words, a district is authorized to hire a “suitable security force”; and peace
officer powers and POST compliance are required for those employees of the security
force who have the “security officer” designation. But is a district authorized to hire, as
part of its “suitable security force,” other personnel who are not designated as “security
officers”? Put another way, does the statute require that the entirety of the “suitable
security force” be comprised solely of designated “security officers” with associated
peace officer powers? Or does the statute allow the security force to include personnel
without such powers?
First, we observe that the terms “security force” and “security officers” are similar,
but not exactly the same. And when the Legislature uses different terms, as it has here,
they are presumed to have different meanings. 18
Second, section 12820 is revealing by what it does not state. It does not state that
all members of a district’s “suitable security force” shall have peace officer powers with
POST compliance. Instead, it provides that those security force members who are
designated as “security officers” shall have such powers. This strongly suggests that the
statute’s authorization of a “suitable security force” means that a district may determine
for itself which level of security personnel would be best-suited to its needs—and that its
security force may, but is not required to, have designated “security officers” with peace
officer powers. 19
17
Pub. Util. Code, § 12820, subd. (a).
18
Folke v. Pulliam (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th Supp. 18, 27 (“When the Legislature uses
different words as part of the same statutory scheme, courts presume those words have
different meanings”).
19
The terms in the clause “suitable security force” are not defined individually or
together in the statute, nor elsewhere in the codes. Common dictionary meanings of
“suitable” are “adapted to a particular use,” “proper,” and “able” or “qualified.”
(Merriam-Webster online dictionary available at https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/suitable (as of Oct. 7, 2024); see Humane Society of U.S. v.
(continued…)
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The rest of the statute and the broader statutory scheme similarly support this
reading. Section 12820 removes peace officer powers from security officers if they fail
to conform to POST standards. 20 But the statute does not state that such an “officer,”
who had been designated as a “security officer,” can no longer be part of the “security
force.” This all suggests authority to maintain a security force that includes both
“security officers” with concomitant POST qualifications and responsibilities, and
personnel who are not POST-qualified peace officers.
Having considered the words of the statute itself, we now turn to the statute it
cross-references, Penal Code section 830.34. That statute provides that persons
designated as “a security officer” under section 12820 qualify as peace officers if their
“primary duty” is protecting utility district property and people on it. So even where
security force members are designated as “security officers” by a district’s general
manager, such officers only have peace officer powers and authority to the extent that
their primary duty is protecting utility district property and people on it. 21 This further
qualification also supports the inference that some members of a district’s suitable
security force—i.e., those members whose primary duty is not protecting district property
and the persons on it—need not satisfy the peace officer requirements imposed on a
“security officer.”
To resolve any doubt that may remain on the meaning of section 12820, we turn to
its purpose as evidenced by the legislative history. The East Bay Municipal Utility
District requested enactment of the statute because the District was opening large areas of
its property to public recreational use, and sought security powers beyond those it already
had, namely the power to make felony arrests. 22 The legislative record does not reflect an
Superior Court (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1251 [“The dictionary is a proper source to
determine the usual and ordinary meaning of words in a statute”].)
20
Pub. Util. Code, § 12820, subd. (b) (requiring “[e]very security officer employed by a
district” to conform to POST standards for peace officers and providing that “[a]ny
officer” who fails to do so “shall not continue to have the powers of a security officer”).
21
See Pen. Code, § 830.34, subd. (b), ante, fn. 13.
22
See ante, fn. 4. The legislative record reflects the District’s view that it could already
appoint officers with power to make misdemeanor arrests, but not felony ones, under
Penal Code section 836.5. (See “Assembly Criminal Justice” document, submitted by
East Bay Municipal Utility District to Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice
[answering questions in digest for hearing June 13, 1974].) The referenced statute
continues to provide that public officers authorized by ordinance may make misdemeanor
arrests. (Pen. Code, § 836.5, subd. (a); see also Pub. Util. Code, §§ 11909 [“The acts of
the board shall be expressed by motion, resolution, or ordinance”], 11503 [defining
“board” to mean board of directors of municipal utility district].) Although the District
(continued…)
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intent to remove the District’s authority to employ other modes of security (namely, non-
peace-officer personnel) as part of its suitable security force. 23 After all, a district might
wish to maintain a security force to monitor activities and contact law enforcement as
needed. 24 Nothing in the legislative record advocates for, or analyzes the consequences
of, removal of a district’s then-existing authority to hire security personnel who do not
have the requested peace officer powers, as might be expected if the statute had intended
to do so. “It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts cannot read into a law
a provision that does not exist and is not shown to be the intent of the lawmakers.” 25 For
the foregoing reasons, we conclude that a municipal utility district is authorized to
include personnel on its security force who do not have peace officer powers with related
POST responsibilities.
did not raise it then, a separate basis for a district to provide other lesser modes of
security derives from the broad powers of a district’s board, which date back at least to
the 1951 enactment of the Municipal Utility District Law. (See, e.g., Stats. 1951, ch. 764,
pp. 2218-2219, 2229, 2231, enacting Public Utilities Code sections 11883 [designating
district board as legislative body which “determines all questions of policy”], 11884 [“All
matters and things necessary for the proper administration of the affairs of the district
which are not provided for in this division shall be provided for by the board”], 11886
[board determines and creates “positions as are necessary properly to carry on the
functions of the district”], 12721 [authorizing contracts and “stipulations of any nature
whatsoever . . . to employ labor, and to do all acts necessary and convenient for the full
exercise of the powers granted in this division”], 12801 [“[D]istrict . . . may do all things
necessary or convenient to the full exercise of the powers herein granted”]; cf.
Sacramento Municipal Utility Dist. v. Spink (1956) 145 Cal.App.2d 568, 582 [issuing
writ to issue bonds to fund district power project because board determined it was in
public interest, and board’s “determination is conclusive”].)
23
See ante, fns. 4, 22.
24
This comports with input we received from the East Bay Municipal Utility District and
Sacramento Municipal Utility District. (Letter from East Bay Municipal Utility District,
Office of General Counsel, to Deputy Attorney General Catherine Bidart, June 6, 2024,
on file; Letter from Sacramento Municipal Utility District Senior Attorney Randall J.
Hakes to Deputy Attorney General Catherine Bidart, June 17, 2024, on file.)
25
Frazier v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 11.
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