The opinion
USCA11 Case: 23-13932 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 10/10/2024 Page: 1 of 9
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-13932
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CARLOS MARTINEZ,
a.k.a. Carlos
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cr-00077-LMM-RGV-4
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-13932
____________________
Before JILL PRYOR, BRASHER, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Carlos Martinez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute at least 500 grams of methamphetamine and
was sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment. While his direct ap-
peal was pending, he sought an indicative ruling from the district
court about whether he could withdraw his guilty plea. He argued
that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because the attorney
who represented him at the time of his plea had an actual conflict
of interest. After a limited remand from this Court, the district
court held an evidentiary hearing and determined that the attorney
was not acting under an actual conflict of interest, Martinez’s plea
was knowing and voluntary, and he should not be permitted to
withdraw his plea. Martinez appeals that decision. After careful
consideration, we affirm.
I.
Martinez, along with five other co-defendants, was charged
with one count of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute at
least 500 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing
methamphetamine.1 Initially, all six defendants retained the same
1 Because we write only for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and
proceedings in the case, we include only what is necessary to explain our de-
cision. Additional facts are set forth in our earlier opinions. See United States v.
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23-13932 Opinion of the Court 3
attorneys—Jerome Lee and Stephen Brown-Bennett of the law
firm Taylor, Lee & Associates (“TLA”). Unsurprisingly, the district
court found that there was a conflict of interest in the lawyers’ joint
representation of the co-defendants and disqualified Lee and
Brown-Bennett, along with TLA, from representing any of the de-
fendants.
After TLA was disqualified, attorney Angela Moore-Brown2
entered an appearance to represent Martinez. While represented
by Moore-Brown, Martinez pleaded guilty. The plea agreement in-
cluded an appeal waiver provision that permitted Martinez to ap-
peal his sentence only if the district court imposed a sentence
“above the sentencing guideline range as calculated by the District
Court.” Doc. 192-1 at 15. 3 At the change-of-plea hearing, Martinez
indicated that he had enough time to talk with Moore-Brown and
discuss the case before pleading guilty and that he was satisfied
with her services. He also affirmed that he understood that he had
a right to insist on a not-guilty plea no matter what anyone else told
him. And he stated that no one had threatened, pressured, forced,
or intimidated him to get him to plead guilty. The district court
accepted his guilty plea, finding that it was knowing and voluntary.
Pacheco-Romero, 995 F.3d 948 (11th Cir. 2021); United States v. Pacheco-Romero,
Nos. 20-10965 & 20-10970, 2023 WL 3736877 (May 31, 2023) (unpublished).
2 There is no indication in the record that Brown-Bennett and Moore-Brown
are related.
3 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-13932
At Martinez’s sentencing hearing, the district court calcu-
lated his Sentencing Guidelines range as 360 months’ to life impris-
onment. Ultimately, the district court imposed a sentence of 240
months. After he was sentenced, Martinez filed a notice of appeal
and was appointed new counsel.
Martinez’s appellate counsel uncovered information that
she believed showed that Moore-Brown acted under a conflict of
interest while representing Martinez. While his direct appeal was
pending, Martinez filed a motion in the district court seeking an
indicative ruling about whether the district court would allow him
to withdraw his guilty plea. He argued to the district court that
Moore-Brown had an actual conflict of interest because she “was
operating at the direction of [TLA]” while representing him. Doc.
362 at 9.
In addition to filing a motion for an indicative ruling in the
district court, Martinez filed a motion in our Court seeking a lim-
ited remand to the district court. He again argued that his plea was
not knowing and voluntary because Moore-Brown had a conflict
of interest. He asked us to remand the case so that the district court
could hold an evidentiary hearing on the conflict-of-interest issue.
A panel of this Court ordered a limited remand so that the district
court could resolve the issues raised in Martinez’s motion for an
indicative ruling—that is, whether Moore-Brown had an actual
conflict of interest.
On remand, the district court held a two-day evidentiary
hearing. Several witnesses testified at the hearing, including
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23-13932 Opinion of the Court 5
Moore-Brown; Brown-Bennett; Lee; and Patricia Perez, Martinez’s
wife. Martinez himself did not testify.
Following the evidentiary hearing, the district court denied
Martinez’s request to withdraw his plea. After “observ[ing] the tes-
timony of the defense witnesses and review[ing] the documentary
evidence,” the court was “unpersuaded” that Moore-Brown had an
actual conflict of interest. Doc. 482 at 8–9. Although there was “lit-
tle question” that “the TLA firm’s representation of the defendants
was tainted by a conflict of interest and that the TLA firm contin-
ued to interact with [Martinez] and his wife after the firm was dis-
qualified from the case,” the court concluded that “the evidence
[did] not show that” Moore-Brown’s representation of Martinez
was tainted. Id. at 9.
The district court found that after Moore-Brown entered an
appearance, she alone represented Martinez. The court credited
her testimony that “Martinez—and not TLA—was her client” and
that “the decisions that she made in the case were made in collab-
oration with . . . Martinez and no one else.” Id. at 11. The court
acknowledged that while representing Martinez, Moore-Brown
did not spend a great deal of time with him. But the court explained
that she nevertheless functioned as his attorney and worked to pro-
tect his interests including by “explor[ing] the possibility of cooper-
ation with [her client], albeit unsuccessfully”; addressing issues re-
lated to “Martinez’s role in the criminal enterprise”; and success-
fully negotiating a plea agreement in which the government agreed
to recommend a sentence “substantially below the guidelines.” Id.
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6 Opinion of the Court 23-13932
The court considered whether TLA’s conflict of interest ex-
tended to Moore-Brown because the money used to pay Martinez’s
legal fees came from TLA. The court rejected this argument and
instead credited Moore-Brown’s testimony that “she understood
that the funds came from . . . Martinez and his wife and that they
had authorized TLA to give those funds to her as the attorney re-
placing TLA.” Id. at 10.
Based on its conclusion that Moore-Brown had no actual
conflict of interest, the court denied Martinez’s request to with-
draw his guilty plea. This is Martinez’s appeal.
II.
We review a district court’s denial of a request to withdraw
a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Brehm,
442 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2006). “A district court abuses its dis-
cretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper
procedures in making the determination, or makes findings of fact
that are clearly erroneous.” United States v. Khan, 794 F.3d 1288,
1293 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). For a find-
ing to be clearly erroneous, we must be “left with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States
v. Almedina, 686 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation
marks omitted). When faced with conflicting testimony, we typi-
cally defer to the district court’s credibility determinations because
the district court “personally observes the testimony and is thus in
a better position than the reviewing court to assess the credibility
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23-13932 Opinion of the Court 7
of witnesses.” United States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th
Cir. 2002).
III.
A defendant’s guilty plea “is constitutionally valid only to
the extent it is voluntary and intelligent.” Bousley v. United States,
523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). When
a defendant challenges his plea as not knowing and voluntary be-
cause the attorney who represented him at the time of the plea had
a conflict of interest, he must show, among other things, that his
attorney had an actual conflict of interest. Pegg v. United States,
253 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001).
Martinez argues that Moore-Brown had an actual conflict of
interest because the money used to pay her fee originated from
funds that a third party originally paid to TLA. He suggests that
because a third party paid Moore-Brown, she had divided loyalties
and would have sought to protect the third party’s interests over
his.
As an initial matter, we have recognized that “the payment
of legal fees by a third party does not automatically rise to the level
of a conflict of interest.” United States v. Tobon-Hernandez, 845 F.2d
277, 281 (11th Cir. 1988). And we agree with the district court that
Martinez failed to show that the payment here created a conflict.
Martinez’s argument that Moore-Brown had a conflict depends on
the premise that she knew that the money paid to her originated
from a third party. But the district court’s factual findings establish
the opposite. The district court found credible Moore-Brown’s
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8 Opinion of the Court 23-13932
testimony that she “understood that the funds came from . . . Mar-
tinez and his wife and that they had authorized TLA to give those
funds to her as the attorney replacing TLA.” Doc. 482 at 10. And
we defer to the district court’s credibility determinations. See
Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d at 749. Because Moore-Brown understood
that the money for her fee originally came from Martinez and his
wife and that TLA sent her the money at their direction, she had
no divided loyalty and no conflict of interest.
Martinez also argues that Moore-Brown had a conflict of in-
terest because TLA attorneys were directing her actions while she
represented him. According to Martinez, Moore-Brown was “no
more than a front” for TLA’s attorneys who continued, in effect,
to represent him. Reply Br. 2. But the district court’s factual find-
ings established otherwise. The court expressly found that Moore-
Brown, in fact, took over the case after TLA was disqualified, re-
jecting Martinez’s argument that she was a puppet for TLA. In-
deed, it expressly credited Moore-Brown’s testimony that she
made decisions in the case in collaboration with Martinez only. Be-
cause the district court’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous,
we conclude that Moore-Brown had no conflict of interest. 4
4 Martinez suggests that even if Moore-Brown had no conflict, his plea was not
knowing and voluntary because his decision to plead guilty was the result of
advice that he received from TLA attorneys in meetings after the firm was
disqualified. But even assuming Martinez could prove that he was relying on
advice from TLA when he decided to plead guilty, we have recognized that a
defendant who was represented by counsel may not attack his plea because he
“followed the advice of someone other than attorney representing [him] in the
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23-13932 Opinion of the Court 9
Because Moore-Brown did not have an actual conflict of in-
terest, the district court did not err when it denied Martinez’s re-
quest to withdraw his plea. 5
AFFIRMED.
matter at hand.” United States v. Pinto, 838 F.2d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir. 1988) (re-
jecting argument that defendant’s guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary
when he was represented by criminal defense counsel at time of plea but de-
cided to plead guilty based on flawed legal advice he received from a civil at-
torney who represented him in another matter).
5 The government argues that we may affirm on the alternative ground that,
even if Moore-Brown had an actual conflict of interest, Federal Rule of Crim-
inal Procedure 11 would not have authorized the district court to allow Mar-
tinez to withdraw his guilty plea in the unique procedural posture of this case.
Because we conclude that the district court did not err in concluding that
Moore-Brown had no conflict of interest, we do not address the government’s
alternative argument.