Thuestad v. Police Board of the City of Chicago

2024 IL App (1st) 231909-U

Fourth Division

Filed October 10, 2024

No. 1-23-1909

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent

except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

)

REBECCA THUESTAD,

)

Plaintiff-Appellee, )

) Appeal from the

v. Circuit Court of Cook County

)

THE POLICE BOARD OF THE CITY OF )

No. 2022 CH 06228

CHICAGO and THE SUPERINTENDENT )

OF POLICE FOR THE CITY OF CHICAGO, ) The Honorable Anna H. Demacopoulos,

Defendants ) Judge, presiding.

)

(The Superintendent of Police for the City of

)

Chicago, Defendant-Appellant).

)

JUSTICE OCASIO delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Hoffman and Lyle concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: We reverse the circuit court’s order that reversed the Police Board of the City of

Chicago’s findings and administrative decision to terminate plaintiff’s

employment. The Police Board of the City of Chicago’s finding is affirmed as its

factual findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence and the

decision to terminate plaintiff’s employment was not arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unrelated to the requirements of service.

¶2 Appellant, the Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department (Superintendent), appeals

from the circuit court’s October 6, 2023 order reversing the findings and decision of the Police

Board of the City of Chicago (Board) to discharge Appellee, Rachel Thuestad, from the Chicago

No. 1-23-1909

Police Department and from the circuit court’s October 18, 2023 order granting Thuestad’s motion

to be compensated for lost wages and benefits with interest. For the following reasons, we reverse

the circuit court’s orders and we affirm the decision of the Board.

¶3 BACKGROUND

¶4 On December 8, 2015, at approximately 4:30 p.m., Thuestad and her partner, Officer Juan

Belmontes, stopped a vehicle for not having a City of Chicago sticker and failing to signal. During

the traffic stop, they learned that the driver, Quinton Pipkins, was driving on a suspended license.

Pipkins was handcuffed, placed in the police vehicle, and taken to the 10th District police station.

On the way to the station, Pipkins told the officers he could turn in a gun.

¶5 Upon arriving at the police station, Pipkins was taken to the processing room. After making

multiple phone calls, Pipkins told Thuestad and Officer Belmontes the location of the gun.

Thuestad and Officer Belmontes left to retrieve the gun, while Pipkins remained in the processing

room. The officers retrieved the gun, returned to the police station, and released Pipkins.

¶6 Thuestad wrote the case report for the incident. The report did not mention the traffic stop,

and it listed Pipkins as the “person reporting offense” (changed from all-caps). There was no arrest

report for Pipkins, and he was not issued a citation for driving on a suspended license. The case

report stated:

“In summary R/Os while on a traffic stop spoke with [Pipkins]. During

this conversation, [Pipkins] related to R/Os he observed an unknown male

black place, what [he] believed to be, a handgun near the Pink Line tracks

at the above location. R/Os relocated to the area for further investigation

and located one unloaded KelTec, P40, 40 cal, semi automatic hand gun,

bearing serial number #95334, with black finish and three inch barrel. R/Os

recovered said weapon and made it safe. Gun desk notified @ 1934 hrs

Harro #18947. Weapon inventoried under #13588238.” (Changed from all-

caps.)

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No. 1-23-1909

Additionally, Pipkins’s name was not recorded in the prisoner’s log, and no supervisor was

informed that he was released without charges. A few days later, Pipkins’s uncle, Larry Rogers

went to the station about the gun, which he owned.

¶7 The Bureau of Internal Affairs (BIA) investigated the incident. Thuestad was interviewed

twice by BIA investigators. During interviews with BIA investigators, Thuestad stated that, during

the transport to the station, Pipkins was crying and telling officers about his children and the

Christmas presents he had in his car. During transport and while Pipkins was in the processing

room, Pipkins stated he had seen an individual place a gun in the alley behind his grandmother’s

house. Thuestad stated that she was only present for one phone call in the processing room, in

which Pipkins was making arrangements for a ride home from the police station. Thuestad stated

she spent “[m]aybe a minute or two” with Pipkins in the processing room before she and Officer

Belmontes left to retrieve the gun. She could not remember if she informed her supervisor before

leaving. Thuestad acknowledged speaking to an “unknown male black” one time in the alley, but

she denied knowing he was Rogers or discussing the gun with him. Thuestad also stated she did

not include her conversation with the “unknown male black” in her case report.

¶8 Thuestad did acknowledge that she violated Chicago Police Department (CPD) rules by

failing to issue Pipkins a citation for driving on a suspended license and failing to document the

incident in an arrest report. Thuestad denied that her narrative in the case report was false. She

used the term “traffic stop” to describe the entire interaction with Pipkins, from the time the vehicle

was curbed until his release from the police station.

¶9 On January 4, 2021, the Superintendent brought charges before the Police Board against

Thuestad seeking her termination from the CPD for violations of several rules of conduct. The

Superintendent also alleged Thuestad also made false statements to internal affairs investigators.

¶ 10 The Board held a four-day hearing. At the hearing, Thuestad testified she had been a CPD

officer since March 9, 2009. On the night of December 8, 2015, she was on duty working on the

tactical team in the 10th District and she was working with Officer Belmontes. Thuestad and

Officer Belmontes were driving through the district when they conducted a traffic stop. Thuestad

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No. 1-23-1909

testified they stopped the car because it did not have a city sticker and it failed to signal a left turn.

Inside the vehicle, there were three individuals, including Pipkins, who was the driver. During the

traffic stop, Thuestad and Officer Belmontes learned that Pipkins had a suspended driver’s license,

and he was detained. The other occupants of the vehicle were allowed to leave. Pipkins was

handcuffed, placed in the police car, and taken to the 10th District station.

¶ 11 Thuestad testified that, during transport, she advised Pipkins that they were taking him to

the station to run his name for any warrants or investigative alerts. Pipkins was also advised of the

reason for the traffic stop. Thuestad testified that, during transport, Pipkins said that “he knew

where a gun was laid up.” At the station, Pipkins, still in handcuffs, was placed in the processing

room. Thuestad stated she went in and out of the processing room “[a] couple of times.” After

Officer Belmontes provided her information about a gun, Thuestad went into the room to verify

the information with Pipkins. Thuestad stated that, during the conversation, she asked Pipkins if

he saw who placed the gun in the alley, and he said that it was someone who looked like him.

Thuestad testified that she was present in the processing room when Pipkins made a phone call

about getting a ride home from the police station, “not about arranging for a firearm.”

¶ 12 After Pipkins provided Thuestad and Officer Belmontes the location of the gun, they

proceeded to the location. Pipkins remained in the processing room, and Thuestad told another

officer to keep an eye on Pipkins. Thuestad testified that, when she and Officer Belmontes were

looking for the gun, she was approached by a man.

¶ 13 Once the gun was recovered, Thuestad and Officer Belmontes returned to the police station.

Thuestad testified that she returned to the processing room and asked Pipkins if his ride had

arrived. Once he confirmed his ride was there, Thuestad and Officer Belmontes drove Pipkins to

his parked vehicle. Thuestad testified that Pipkins was detained for “about an hour and 30

minutes.”

¶ 14 Thuestad testified she did not make any false statements. Thuestad also maintained she

never lied or tried to conceal the circumstances surrounding the recovery of the gun. Thuestad

testified that she defined the “traffic stop” as taking place from the time Pipkins was initially

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No. 1-23-1909

detained until he was released from the police station. She stated that the “[d]uration of the stop is

until that person is out of your presence.” She also denied knowing that Pipkins made calls to

arrange for the gun. Thuestad testified that she “wasn’t aware of all the phone calls [Pipkins] was

making” and she was only “present for the one where he called for the ride home.”

¶ 15 Thuestad further testified that she did not violate any CPD directives because she had the

discretion to not issue Pipkins a citation and not complete an arrest report. Thuestad stated that she

made the decision not to arrest Pipkins during transit to the 10th District after hearing him talk

about “his story and his life and his children and Christmas.” Thuestad testified that she did not

notify the watch commander that Pipkins was in the processing room because Pipkins “was being

detained for preliminary investigation on a traffic stop. He was not in custody. He was not a

prisoner.” Further, she did not submit an arrest report because “[Pipkins] was not under arrest.”

Thuestad also testified that she completed a “traffic statistical study driver information card,” more

commonly known as a blue card, and turned it in. Thuestad stated she turned in the blue card

“[b]ecause this was the card that you do in lieu of writing someone citations.” Thuestad stated she

did not fail to document Pipkins’s detention because “[d]etention was documented on the blue

card.” Thuestad maintained that, since Pipkins was not in custody, she “didn’t need to ask a watch

commander to release him without charging. He wasn’t being charged.”

¶ 16 Officer Belmontes testified that, on the way to the police station, Pipkins blurted out, “I

can get you a gun.” Once they arrived at the police station, Officer Belmontes took Pipkins to the

processing room. He asked Pipkins about the gun he had mentioned during transit. Pipkins told

Officer Belmontes he needed to make a call. Officer Belmontes relayed this information to

Thuestad. Officer Belmontes and Thuestad returned to the processing room and verified the

information. Pipkins used his cell phone to make phone calls about the gun in the presence of both

Officer Belmontes and Thuestad. Officer Belmontes testified that none of the phone calls were

about getting a ride home from the police station. Officer Belmontes testified that “[his]

understanding was that somebody had placed a gun for us to go recover it.”

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No. 1-23-1909

¶ 17 After Pipkins told them the location of the gun, Officer Belmontes and Thuestad left

Pipkins handcuffed in the processing room and proceeded to the location. Officer Belmontes

testified that once they arrived at the location, he went to look for the gun. He saw Thuestad talking

with an individual in the alley. Officer Belmontes testified that, when he asked Thuestad about the

conversation, she told him, “Don’t worry about it. I got it.” Officer Belmontes testified that they

left the location but returned approximately three to four times to look for the gun. Each time they

returned, Thuestad spoke with the same individual in the alley. Once the gun was recovered,

Officer Belmontes and Thuestad returned to the police station. The gun was inventoried, and

Pipkins was released.

¶ 18 Officer Belmontes testified that he did not fill out the case report. He provided Thuestad

with information to incorporate into the police report, but he did not read the report because he

was upset and “didn’t want anything to do with it.”

¶ 19 Rogers testified he is married to Pipkins’s aunt. Rogers stated that Pipkins called him and

told him he “wanted a gun.” Rogers had a gun he purchased from a store, and he had a Firearm

Owner’s Identification Card. Rogers testified that he had more than one conversation with Pipkins

about the gun. Rogers agreed to provide the gun and place it the garbage can in the alley behind

Pipkins’s grandmother’s house. Rogers drove to the agreed location, placed his gun in the alley,

and waited in the backyard for the officers to arrive. Rogers saw a police car arrive with a male

officer and a female officer. Rogers identified the officers as Officer Belmontes and Thuestad.

Rogers testified that he spoke with Thuestad and asked her what they were going to do with the

gun and how long it would take for Pipkins to be released. Rogers testified that Thuestad told him

Pipkins would be let go in about thirty minutes. Rogers saw Thuestad pick up the gun. Rogers

went to the 10th District approximately two days later to report the incident.

¶ 20 Sergeant Rafael Martinez testified that, on December 8, 2015, he reviewed and approved

a case report regarding a gun recovery that was prepared by Thuestad. Sergeant Martinez testified

that he had not been aware that Pipkins was detained in the processing room. He testified that he

never authorized Thuestad to release Pipkins without charges and was not informed about the

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circumstances surrounding the recovery of the gun. Shortly after December 8, 2015, Sergeant

Martinez learned that there was a complaint from a civilian about a handgun.

¶ 21 Lieutenant Sean Rice testified about the CPD rules and orders at issue in the case. Prior to

his retirement, Lieutenant Rice was the commanding officer of the special investigations at the

BIA. Special Order S04-14-03 mandates that if someone has a suspended license, they will be

issued a citation. Special Order S04-14-05 details the procedure for bringing in someone arrested

for a traffic violation. Per the order, if someone does not have a valid license, they are brought to

the police station. When an arrestee is brought into the station, a supervisor should be notified

immediately. There is a prisoner sign-in log which is used to inform the supervisor that someone

is being held. Lieutenant Rice also testified that Special Order S06-01-01 states that if someone

who is arrested is to be released without charging, a supervisor makes the final decision.

¶ 22 Lieutenant Rice testified that Special Order S04-14-09 requires a blue card be completed

in order to keep statistics on race, location, and time of a traffic stop. Blue cards are not meant to

document detentions or act as a substitute for an arrest report. Instead, blue cards are used to track

statistics on racial profiling. Lieutenant Rice further testified that a traffic stop begins the moment

an officer turns on the lights in an attempt to pull someone over and ends “when the driver is free

to leave or when taken into physical custody.”

¶ 23 Commander Joseph Bird testified that Rule 14 relates to “making a false report, whether

oral or written.” There are two elements required to sustain a Rule 14 violation: (1) willful and (2)

material. Willful means “[t]he officer at the time of making the statement intentionally made a

false statement.” Material means “that it’s crucial to the investigation at hand.” Commander Bird

testified that a Rule 14 violation affects an officer’s ability to carry out the mission of CPD as

“[o]fficers are expected to be trustworthy in the completion of their reports and investigations and

the testimony they provide.” Commander Bird further testified that, since 2008, CPD has

recommended discharge for Rule 14 violations that are sustained.

¶ 24 The Superintendent also introduced pictures of the area the gun was recovered, the call

records for Pipkins and Rogers, the transcripts for Thuestad’s the BIA interviews, and surveillance

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video from the 10th District station on December 8, 2015. The video showed Thuestad entering

and exiting the processing room several times.

¶ 25 Thuestad submitted seven letters of support and called three mitigation witnesses. Cecil

Smith, the current Chief of Police for Sanford, Florida, spent twenty-five years at the Elgin Police

Department. Smith testified he had been a “father figure” to Thuestad ever since she joined the

Elgin Explorer Program at age fourteen. Smith testified that he had no concerns as to Officers

Thuestad’s integrity and that she served as an example for young people. He also testified that

Thuestad was someone the Chicago Police Department could depend on “to do what’s right.”

¶ 26 Donna Dowd, a former Commanding Officer of the Alternate Response Section at the CPD,

testified that Thuestad worked under her command from late 2015 until 2019. Dowd selected

Thuestad to be a part of her immediate staff. Dowd testified that she picked people who had

integrity and were trustworthy. Dowd stated that Thuestad’s actions and character in the role

reinforced that she had made the right decision. Dowd testified there was a “difference between

misconduct and mistake”, and that Thuestad was a valuable asset that would be a loss to the

Department if discharged.

¶ 27 Nicolas Garcia, a detective in the Violent Crimes Division, testified that he previously

worked with Thuestad. Detective Garcia testified Thuestad was “a very well-rounded officer.” She

was courageous, and she put herself second to everyone. In his opinion, Thuestad’s integrity was

“a hundred percent,” and “above and beyond the integrity of the whole department.”

¶ 28 Thuestad also presented evidence of her complimentary history, which included 89 awards.

She also had no sustained complaints on her disciplinary history.

¶ 29 On May 26, 2022, the Board issued its findings and decision. The Board found Thuestad

guilty of four of the five charges. The Board found Thuestad guilty of charge 1 for violating four

CPD rules, including Rule 14, as “the narrative provided by [Thuestad] in the Original Case

Incident Report [did] not accurately reflect the events that occurred” and “contain[ed] materially

false statements and omissions.” Specifically, the Board found that Thuestad’s narrative gave “the

false impression that there was one continuous uninterrupted event whereby after making the

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traffic stop, [Thuestad] and Officer Belmontes went to the designated location and retrieved a gun.”

The narrative omitted that Pipkins was detained at the police station and that he made phone calls

in the processing room to make arrangements for the gun. The Board stated that Thuestad

“intended to conceal all the circumstances of Mr. Pipkins detainment.” The Board found

Thuestad’s explanation “not credible.” The Board found Thuestad guilty of charge 2, finding she

violated CPD rules when she released Pipkins from custody and did not issue a citation without

notifying her supervisor. The Board did not find Thuestad’s testimony credible, and it noted that

Thuestad “released Mr. Pipkins without charging him or giving him a citation because he

successfully made arrangements for [Thuestad] to retrieve a gun.” The Board found Thuestad

guilty of charge 4, finding she did not notify her supervisor she had detained Pipkins at the police

station. Finally, the Board found Thuestad guilty of charge 5, finding she provided false statements

to BIA investigators. Specifically, the Board found: “Her statements to BIA were materially false

and she knew they were false. They were made to further cover-up the fact that Mr. Pipkins was

making arrangements for a gun to place at a designated location where she could retrieve it.”

¶ 30 In assessing the penalty, the Board considered Thuestad’s mitigation evidence, which

consisted of letters of support and testimony from witnesses, as well as her complimentary history

and no sustained complaints on her disciplinary history. The Board found that the mitigation

evidence “[did] not outweigh the seriousness of the misconduct in this case.” Her conduct, it

explained, was “incompatible with continued services as a police officer and warrant[ed] her

discharge from the Chicago Police Department. Specially, the Board determined:

“[Thuestad] abused her authority as a police officer and knowingly and

intentionally falsified an official police report as part of a scheme to recover

a gun under false pretenses. Such conduct by [Thuestad] is antithetical to

that expected and required of a police officer, who at all times has a duty to

act with honesty and intregrity, not falsify a report and give a false

impression as to the circumstances leading to a gun recovery. [Thuestad]

also attempted to cover up her misconduct by making an intentional

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No. 1-23-1909

materially false statement during her interview with Bureau of Internal

Affairs.

[Thuestad’s] actions and dishonesty relate directly to her public duties

as a police officer and render her unfit to hold that office. Her treatment of

Mr. Pipkins brought discredit upon the Chicago Police Department, thereby

undermining public confidence in the judgment of its officers and the

Department’s mission. Effective law enforcement depends upon a high

degree of cooperation between the police department and the public it

serves. Conduct such as [Thuestad’s] erodes the public’s trust of and

confidence in police officers, thereby impeding the department’s efforts to

achieve the important goal of reducing crime. In addition, trustworthiness,

reliability, good judgment, and integrity are all material qualifications for

any job, particularly one as a police officer. The duties of a police officer

include making arrests and testifying in court, and a police officer’s

credibility is at issue in both the prosecution of crimes and in the Police

Department’s defense of civil lawsuits. A public finding that a police officer

falsified an official report and knowingly made a false official statement to

BIA is detrimental to the officer’s credibility as a witness and, as such, is a

serious liability to the Department. [Citation.]

The Board finds that [Thuestad’s] conduct is sufficiently serious to

constitute a substantial shortcoming that renders her continuance in her

office detrimental to the discipline and efficiency of the service of the

Chicago Police Department and is something that the law recognizes as

good cause for her to no longer occupy her office.”

The Board unanimously ordered Thuestad discharged for cause.

¶ 31 On June 28, 2022, Thuestad filed a complaint for administrative review. Thuestad argued

that the Board’s findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence and its decision to

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discharge her from duty was arbitrary and capricious. On October 6, 2023, the circuit court

reversed the findings and decision of the Board and ordered that Thuestad be reinstated. On

October 18, 2023, the circuit court modified the October 6 order to include an award of backpay,

and it denied the Superintendent’s motion for a stay pending appeal.

¶ 32 The Superintendent appealed. At his request, and over Thuestad’s objection, we stayed the

circuit court’s judgment pending a decision on appeal.

¶ 33 ANALYSIS

¶ 34 On appeal, we review the administrative agency’s decision and not the decision of the

circuit court. Krocka v. Police Board of the City of Chicago, 327 Ill. App. 3d 36, 46 (2001). When

reviewing the Board’s decision regarding discharge we utilize a two-step analysis. Id. First, we

must determine whether the Board’s findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id.

Second, we must determine whether the Board’s findings of fact provide a sufficient basis for its

decision of discharge. Id. Accordingly, “ ‘the agency’s decision as to cause will not be reversed

unless it is arbitrary, unreasonable, or unrelated to the requirements of service.’ ” Id. (quoting

Department of Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities v. Civil Service Comm’n, 85 Ill. 2d,

547, 552 (1981)).

¶ 35 I. The Board’s Factual Findings

¶ 36 The Board’s findings and conclusions on questions of fact must “be held to be prima facie

true and correct” on review. 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2020). When examining its factual

determinations, we do not reweigh the evidence nor do we substitute our own judgment for that of

the Board. Orsa v. Police Board of the City of Chicago, 2016 IL App (1st) 121709, ¶ 17; see

Gounaris v. City of Chicago, 321 Ill. App. 3d 487, 490 (2001) (“Because the weight of the evidence

and the credibility of witnesses are uniquely within the province of the administrative agency, there

need only be some competent evidence in the record to support its finding.”). Our role “is limited

to ascertaining whether such findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence.”

Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Election Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200, 210 (2008). The

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Board’s decision regarding the factual findings is only contrary to the manifest weight of the

evidence “if, after reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the agency, we conclude that

no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the agency’s decision and an opposite conclusion

is clearly evident.” Daniels v. Police Board of the City of Chicago, 338 Ill. App. 3d 851, 858 (2003).

We

¶ 37 Here, after reviewing the record, we conclude that the Board’s factual findings were

supported by the record and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Board’s

first finding was that Thuestad violated CPD rules, including Rule 14, when she submitted a report

that “[did] not accurately reflect the events the occurred, and that it contain[ed] materially false

statements and omissions.” Thuestad admitted she wrote the report. The report’s narrative stated

that, during a traffic stop, Pipkins told officers he “observed an unknown male black place, what

[he] believed to be, a handgun near the pink line tracks.” Based on the record, all conversations

regarding the gun and its retrieval occurred after the traffic stop had ended. Pipkins initially told

officers that he knew where a “gun was laid up” during transport to the police station. Testimony

from Officer Belmontes and Rogers confirmed that there were steps taken to recover the gun.

Officer Belmontes testified that there were several phone calls made in the presence of both him

and Thuestad regarding the gun. The record shows that the gun was recovered after Pipkins made

phone calls arrange for the gun to be placed behind his grandmother’s house. Rogers placed the

gun in the location and waited for officers to arrive. Further, Rogers testified that he spoke with

Thuestad in the alley about the gun and Pipkins’s release. Rogers was able to identify her and

Officer Belmontes in a photo array.

¶ 38 The Board found that Thuestad’s testimony about the duration of the traffic stop was not

credible and that “[t]he traffic stop made by [Thuestad] ended when Mr. Pipkins was handcuffed,

placed in the police vehicle, and taken to the police station where he was not free to leave.”

However, Thuestad argues that Pipkins was never under arrest, and therefore he was never “placed

in physical custody.” According to Thuestad, the term “traffic stop” encompasses the time period

starting from when officers curbed the vehicle and ending when Pipkins was released from the

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police. As explained by Lieutenant Rice, per CPD order, a traffic stop ends when the individual is

taken into custody. The report omits the fact that Pipkins was taken into custody and remained at

the police station for approximately an hour and half before he was released.

¶ 39 Next, the Board found that Thuestad violated CPD rules when she decided not to issue a

citation or arrest Pipkins and released him without her supervisor’s approval. As explained during

the hearing, Thuestad did not have the discretion to release Pipkins without notifying her

supervisor. Lieutenant Rice identified several general and special orders providing that, for the

offense of driving on a suspended license, an officer must either arrest the driver or issue a citation.

Additionally, an arresting officer cannot release someone without first notifying their supervisor.

¶ 40 Additionally, Thuestad’s own testimony established she disobeyed CPD directives when

she did not document Pipkins’s arrest and released him without charges. She admitted that she did

not issue any citations to Pipkins or complete an arrest report. Thuestad also admitted that she did

not notify her supervisor that she was releasing Pipkins without charges. Further, Sergeant

Martinez testified that he was not notified that Pipkins was in custody in the processing room and

that Thuestad did not consult with him prior to releasing Pipkins without charges. The only

documentation of Pipkins being detained was the blue card, which, based on Lieutenant Rice’s

testimony, is not a substitute for an arrest report.

¶ 41 Finally, the Board found that Thuestad violated CPD rules when she provided statements

to the BIA that were “materially false and she knew they were false.” In her statement to the BIA,

Thuestad maintained that the “traffic stop” spanned the entire encounter with Pipkins from the

time his car was stopped until his release from the police station. Thuestad stated that she was only

present for one phone call, which Pipkins made to arrange for a ride from the police station. As

previously noted, however, other evidence showed that Thuestad was present when Pipkins was

making calls arranging for a gun to be placed in the alley.

¶ 42 The evidence supported the Board’s factual findings. Accordingly, based on our review of

the record, we find it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence for the Board to

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determine that Thuestad violated CPD rules and regulations regarding the conduct of police

officers.

¶ 43 II. Exclusion of Evidence

¶ 44 Thuestad argues that the Board’s finding of guilt on charges 1 and 5 should be overturned

because the Hearing Officer erroneously excluded from evidence General Order G8-01-01 (eff.

May 4, 2018), which, she asserts, prohibits charging violations of Rule 14 if the officer was not

given the chance to review relevant videos during the BIA’s investigation. She contends that this

exclusion “denied Thuestad her right to develop [a] challenge to any Rule 14 charge.” The

Superintendent argues Thuestad waived this argument as she did not raise it before the Board. We

agree.

¶ 45 “It is quite established that if an argument, issue, or defense is not presented in an

administrative hearing, it is procedurally defaulted and may not be raised for the first time before

the circuit court on administrative review.” Cinkus, 228 Ill. 2d at 212-13. “This rule prevents unfair

surprise and it allows the administrative agent to have the opportunity to construe rules and statutes

which most directly concern the agency’s position.” Skale v. Illinois Department of Public Aid,

165 Ill. 3d 776, 780 (1987). Our review of the record shows that Thuestad did not make this

argument during proceedings before the Board and is raising the issue for the first time on

administrative review. Accordingly, she procedurally defaulted this issue, and we decline to

address it.

¶ 46 III. Cause for Discharge

¶ 47 Next, we consider whether the Board’s findings of fact provide a sufficient basis for its

decision that cause for discharge existed. Krocka, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 46. A police officer may not

be discharged without cause. 65 ILCS 10-1-18(a) (West 2022). “Cause” has been defined as

“ ‘some substantial shortcoming which renders the employee’s continuance in office in some way

detrimental to the discipline and efficiency of the service and which the law and sound public

opinion recognize as good cause for his no longer holding the position.’ ” Kappel v. Police Board

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of the City of Chicago, 220 Ill. App. 3d 580, 589 (1991) (quoting Department of Mental Health,

85 Ill. 2d at 551). As the Board is in the best position to determine the effects of an officer’s conduct

on the department, we give “heavy deference” to its determination of cause. Orsa, 2016 IL App

(1st) 121709, ¶ 60. Additionally, “we may not consider whether we would have imposed a more

lenient disciplinary sentence.” Krocka, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 48 (citing Wilson v. Board of Fire &

Police Commissioners of the City of Markham, 205 Ill. App. 3d 984, 992 (1990)). Our “[r]eview

is limited to a determination of whether the Board acted unreasonably or arbitrarily by selecting a

type of discipline that was inappropriate or unrelated to the needs of the service.” Id. (citing Wilson,

205 Ill. App. 3d at 992).

¶ 48 “Trustworthiness, reliability, good judgment, and integrity are all material qualifications

for any job, particularly one as a police officer.” Village of Oak Lawn v. Human Rights Comm’n,

133 Ill. App. 3d 221, 224 (1985). Further, “as the guardians of our laws, police officers are expected

to act with integrity, honesty, and trustworthiness.” Sinderman v. Civil Service Comm’n, 275 Ill.

App. 3d 917, 928 (1995). It has been recognized that

“ ‘[a] police officer's credibility is inevitably an issue in the prosecution of

crimes and in the Chicago police department’s defense of civil lawsuits. A

public finding that an officer had lied on previous occasions is detrimental

to the officer’s credibility as a witness and as such may be a serious liability

to the department.’ ” Taylor v. Police Board of the City of Chicago, 2011 IL

App (1st) 101156, ¶ 51 (quoting Rodriguez v. Weis, 408 Ill. App. 3d 663,

671 (2011)).

¶ 49 Here, the Board considered Thuestad’s mitigation evidence, which included letters of

support, a complimentary history, awards, and lack of sustained complaints on her disciplinary

record. The Board found that this mitigation evidence “[did] not outweigh the seriousness of the

misconduct in this case.” Further, the Board found that Thuestad’s “misconduct [was] incompatible

with continued service as a police officer and warrant[ed] her discharge from the Chicago Police

Department.” The Board noted that Thuestad “abused her authority as a police officer and

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knowingly and intentionally falsified an official police report as part of a scheme to recover a gun

under false pretenses.” The Board found Thuestad’s conduct to be “antithetical to that expected

and required of a police officer, who at all times has a duty to act with honesty and integrity.” The

Board also found that Thuestad’s conduct was “sufficiently serious to constitute a substantial

shortcoming that renders her continuance in office detrimental to the discipline and efficiency of

the Chicago Police Department and is something that the law recognizes as good cause for her to

no longer occupy her office.”

¶ 50 The Board found that Thuestad violated Rule 14, which prohibits CPD officers from

making false reports, whether written or oral. “An officer’s violation of a single rule has long been

held to be a sufficient basis for termination.” Siwek, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 738 (collecting case). Courts

have recognized that cause for discharge exists where a police officer has filed a false report or

lied to his employer. See Sindermann, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 928-29; Nelmark v. Board of Fire &

Police Commissioners of the City of DeKalb, 159, Ill. App. 3d 751, 759 (1987). Yet, Thuestad

argues the Board’s decision “was clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, and unjust even if she had been

guilty of any of the charges.” Thuestad argues that the finding for cause is arbitrary and

unreasonable compared to the discipline imposed on Officer Belmontes and Sergeant Martinez.

However, “the fact that different individuals have been disciplined differently is not a basis for

concluding that an agency’s disciplinary decision is unreasonable; such conclusions are

appropriate when individuals receive different discipline in a single, identical, ‘completely related’

case.” Siwek, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 738 (quoting Launius v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners

of the City of Des Plaines, 151 Ill. 2d 419, 441-42 (1992)). While Officer Belmontes and Sergeant

Martinez were involved in the same incident, they cooperated with BIA investigators and did not

provide false statements. Thuestad not only authored a false police report, she provided false

statements to the BIA investigators. We are unpersuaded by Thuestad’s assertion that the Board’s

decision was arbitrary or unreasonable as “cause for discharge can be found regardless of whether

other employees have been disciplined differently.” Launius, 151 Ill. 2d at 442.

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¶ 51 Therefore, we conclude that the Board’s finding of cause for discharge was not arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unrelated to the requirements of Thuestad’s service as a police officer.

¶ 52 CONCLUSION

¶ 53 For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the decision of the circuit court and reinstate

the Board’s decision discharging Thuestad from her position as a Chicago police officer.

¶ 54 Circuit court judgment reversed.

¶ 55 Board decision affirmed.

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