Siskin Hospital for Physical Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Dr. James P. Little

10/08/2024

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

May 15, 2024 Session

SISKIN HOSPITAL FOR PHYSICAL REHABILITATION, INC. V.

DR. JAMES P. LITTLE

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Hamilton County

No. 20-0204 Jeffrey M. Atherton, Chancellor1

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No. E2023-01328-COA-R3-CV

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This appeal concerns the trial court’s dismissal of the defendant’s claims for the return of

funds held by the plaintiff hospital as untimely filed. We reverse the dismissal, holding

that the plaintiff was estopped from pleading the statute of limitations as a defense and that

the plaintiff revived the obligation throughout its repeated negotiations with the defendant.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court

Reversed; Case Remanded

JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL SWINEY,

C.J. and THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, joined.

Rebecca M. Little, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellant, Dr. James P. Little.

Joseph R. White, Chattanooga, Tennessee, and Jonathan G. Rose, Washington, D.C., for

the appellee, Siskin Hospital for Physical Rehabilitation, Inc.

OPINION

I. BACKGROUND

In 1989, James P. Little, M.D. was the president and owner of Occupational,

Alternative & Rehabilitation Services (“OARS”). As president of OARS, Dr. Little entered

into an agreement with Siskin Hospital for Physical Rehabilitation, Inc. (“Siskin”) under

which OARS provided staffing and other services to Siskin, including a physician to serve

in a full-time physician capacity as Medical Director. In accordance with the agreement,

Dr. Little was appointed as the Medical Director.

1

Sitting by interchange.

As pertinent to this appeal, Dr. Little paid $7,500 per year from his Medical Director

stipend into what he believed was a Section 457 nonqualified retirement plan, for a total

amount of $37,500 paid between 1991 and 1996. He received audit statements from Siskin

confirming the receipt of these funds.

On July 27, 2000, Siskin invoked the no-fault 180-day notice of termination of Dr.

Little’s 1989 agreement. In December 2000, Dr. Little filed a complaint against Siskin,

alleging contract and tort claims. During the pendency of the litigation, Dr. Little began

contacting Siskin to request the disbursement of his retirement contributions. Through

counsel, Dr. Little demanded payment of the funds contributed, plus interest, by letter dated

October 29, 2002, which provided as follows:

This will confirm our telephone conversation today concerning Dr. Little’s

request for payment from [Siskin] in the amount of $37,500 plus interest.

This is the amount held by [Siskin] pursuant to [the agreement] to establish

a plan under Section 457 of the Internal Revenue Code for Dr. Little’s

benefit.

As you may know, a Section 457 plan permits a tax-exempt organization,

like [Siskin], to establish a deferred compensation arrangement for both

employees and independent contractors. [Siskin] told Dr. Little that it had

created such a plan for him and accepted payments to the plan[.] [Siskin’s]

records confirm such payments were remitted . . . in the amount of $37,500.

When Dr. Little recently contacted [Siskin] about withdrawing the funds

from the plan, he was told for the first time that the plan had never been

created. This statement is contrary to [Siskin’s] prior representations[.]

I’m sure you appreciate the potential adverse tax implications to Dr. Little if

[Siskin] failed to properly establish the 457 plan. Accordingly, Dr. Little’s

request for payment of the amount contributed to the plan, plus interest, but

no damages is very reasonable.

Siskin again confirmed receipt of the funds but advised Dr. Little that his funds were not

put into a Section 457 plan as he believed. However, Dr. Little did not amend his complaint

to include his claim of retirement benefits.2 Instead, Dr. Little sent a letter to then Senator

Bill Frist, advising him of the current litigation and advising him of Siskin’s failure to hold

his funds in a 457 plan. The letter, dated September 20, 2003, provided, in pertinent part,

as follows:

2

His complaint was voluntarily dismissed at a later date.

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Since leaving the hospital, I continue to experience flagrant violations of

ethical and legal standards. On an unrelated topic (retirement funds held by

the hospital), IRS regulations permit withdrawal of Section 457 retirement

funds from an organization at time of departure. Due to financial problems

caused by my loss of privileges several months ago, I requested transfer of

my retirement funds to an individual IRA account . . . . VALIC, the firm

responsible for current retirement funds, acknowledged the contributions, but

intimated that the “hospital had not created a Section 457 plan.”

Furthermore, the VALIC representative indicated that the hospital would

write a check for the exact amount of the contributions (which dated from

the early nineties). However, [Siskin] was unwilling to pay interest [but]

offered no solution for the fact that their actions had profound IRS

implications.

Dr. Little also mentioned that he had been advised that he “may have passed the statute of

limitations related to his retirement account.” He opined that it “seemed odd” because he

would not access his account until he reached retirement age. Senator Frist did not respond.

In December 2013, through counsel, Dr. Little sent a second demand letter. Siskin

responded with a check for $37,500 on December 30, 2013. Dr. Little returned the check.

In July 2014, through counsel, Dr. Little reached out again to determine “the status

of Siskin’s position with respect to issuing payment to Dr. Little the full amount of

principal and interest that he should have received in connection with his contributions to

Siskin’s Section 457 nonqualified retirement plan.” He continued, “To the extent Siskin

failed to ever establish a 457 plan altogether, Dr. Little requests that Siskin issue a check

for the full amount of principal plus interest at a rate of 10% compounded annually from

the date of his first contribution to the present date.”

Siskin responded by letter dated, September 10, 2014, from President and CEO

Carol Sim, who advised that she “would like to resolve this issue in a fair way.” She

continued,

I believe that Siskin Hospital should reimburse Dr. Little his contributions

plus compounded interest that his contributions accrued while intermingled

in the same account as Siskin Hospital’s investments, at the same rate of

return experienced by the Hospital.

To that end, I suggest Siskin Hospital issue a check to Dr. Little for the

principal amount of $37,500 plus $47,135.64 for a total of $82,635.64.

The amount was not agreeable to Dr. Little, who, through counsel, sent a third demand

letter in November 2018. Dr. Little acknowledged that the funds had most likely not been

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placed into a 457 account as promised, resulting in unsavory tax implications for him. He

suggested return of the funds, plus interest commensurate with the rate of return that his

contributions would have achieved if the funds had been invested properly. The parties

continued to exchange letters discussing the return of the funds and the applicable interest

rate. One such letter, dated March 22, 2019, from Siskin to Dr. Little provided as follows:

As previously explained to you by Siskin Hospital, the actual amount of

interest earned on the $37,500 principal amount is calculated by looking to

Siskin Hospital’s investments with Ponder Investment Company. . . . [T]he

actual interest calculation is based on Siskin Hospital’s actual investment

returns with Ponder Investment Company, which is where Dr. Little’s

retirement contributions would have been invested if co-mingled with Siskin

Hospital’s investment portfolio at the time of receipt. This results in an

interest payment of approximately $47,197.28 (i.e., $84,697.28 total when

combined with the $37,500 principal amount). There is simply no basis to

use any other interest rate and it appears that Dr. Little is attempting to rely

on impermissible hindsight in order to argue that a higher interest rate is

required. Please also note that 457 plans are not required to provide

participants with any particular interest rate or with any specific investment

options.

The continued correspondence between the parties culminated in an unsuccessful final

mediation on December 16, 2019.

On March 9, 2020, Siskin filed the instant action in the Chancery Court of Hamilton

County, requesting a declaratory judgment establishing that any breach of contract claim

filed by Dr. Little would be barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Siskin admitted

that it accepted the contributions from Dr. Little and that it remained in possession of the

contributions and interest earned thereon for the past 34 years. However, Siskin asserted

that there was no Section 457 plan in existence for its employees until two years after Dr.

Little’s agreement was terminated. Siskin asserted that Dr. Little was aware of his potential

breach of contract or similar claims as it related to his retirement contributions while

prosecuting his original complaint but failed to include his claims in the ongoing litigation.

On April 9, 2020, Dr. Little responded by filing a motion to dismiss, arguing that

the chancery court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over his deferred compensation

retirement benefits governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act

(“ERISA”). Accordingly, on April 24, 2020, Dr. Little filed an action against Siskin in the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. Dr. Little asserted

several claims under ERISA, along with alternative state law claims for breach of contract,

promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment. Siskin moved to dismiss, arguing that Dr.

Little did not have standing to sue under ERISA because he was not an employee and that

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any applicable statute of limitations had since expired.3 The district court denied the

motion to dismiss, finding that Dr. Little had pled sufficient facts to survive dismissal on

the pleadings. The court deferred ruling on the state law claims and ordered further

discovery on the issue of whether Dr. Little was an employee pursuant to ERISA.

Following a hearing, the district court found that the evidence in the record only

established that Dr. Little “believed” he was paying into a 457 deferred compensation plan

but that he did not establish the actual existence of such a plan. The court noted that ERISA

jurisprudence emphasizes the necessity of a written plan, which was not produced in the

record for the court’s consideration. The court concluded,

There is no doubt that there are claims that need to be resolved with respect

to the money that [Dr. Little] paid to Siskin believing he was contributing to

a 457 plan. Yet there is no ERISA claim that can possibly be resolved in this

Court – there is no plan, no plan administrator, and no administrative record.

The Court does not imply that this is due to some fault of [Dr. Little] or that

he does not have potentially meritorious claims against Siskin related to the

money he contributed and what he was told about those funds. However,

because there is no written plan before the Court, there is nothing for the

Court to enforce. Accordingly, [Dr. Little’s] ERISA claims fail because,

while [Dr. Little] has shown some level of objectionable conduct on Siskin’s

part, he cannot prove the existence of an ERISA plan, an essential element

to his claims.

The court granted judgment in Siskin’s favor and dismissed the ERISA claims with

prejudice. Noting that there was no longer a federal question conferring original

jurisdiction over the action, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction to

consider the state claims and dismissed them without prejudice.

Back in chancery court, Dr. Little filed a counter-complaint against Siskin on

November 21, 2021, asserting a myriad of claims sounding in contract and unjust

enrichment. Dr. Little asserted that Siskin provided audit statements for a 457 plan that

did not exist and fraudulently concealed its noncompliance with federal regulations all

while wrongfully retaining his contributions. Dr. Little claimed that Siskin assured him

that his payments would be returned with interest before ultimately filing the instant action.

Siskin responded with a motion to dismiss on April 4, 2022, requesting a finding

that any claims regarding Dr. Little’s contributions over 20 years ago were time-barred.

The trial court denied the motion, holding that there were genuine issues of material fact

in dispute concerning the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations.

3

The chancery court stayed its proceedings, pending the resolution of Dr. Little’s federal claims.

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The parties proceeded to a bench trial solely on the issue of the running of the statute

of limitations on the claims regarding Dr. Little’s alleged deferred compensation

contributions. Dr. Little testified concerning the history of his payments, receipt of audit

statements, and attempts to recoup his losses from Siskin throughout the years.

Following the hearing, the court dismissed Dr. Little’s breach of contract claims as

untimely filed, finding that the undisputed facts demonstrated that he was put on inquiry

notice that his contributed funds were not being held as promised, that he was not enrolled

as a participant in a Section 457 plan, and that Siskin did not intend to provide him with

457 retirement benefits decades before this action commenced. The court also found that

the unjust enrichment/conversion claims were filed beyond the applicable three-year

statute of limitations. This appeal followed the denial of post-trial motions.

II. ISSUES

Dr. Little raised a myriad of issues that we summarize into the following categories:

(A) Whether the court erred in denying his request to submit the issue of

the running of the statute of limitations to a jury.

(B) Whether the court erred in its dismissal of the claims as untimely.

(C) Whether Dr. Little is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Our review of the trial court’s decision is de novo upon the record, and the trial

court’s factual findings are presumed correct, unless the preponderance of the evidence is

otherwise. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Alexander v. Inman, 974 S.W.2d 689, 692 (Tenn. 1998).

The trial court’s conclusions of law are subject to de novo review, with no presumption of

correctness. S. Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 58 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn.

2001); Ganzevoort v. Russell, 949 S.W.2d 293, 296 (Tenn. 1997).

“In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury, the court shall find the facts

specially and shall state separately its conclusions of law and direct the entry of the

appropriate judgment.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. If the trial court makes the required

findings of fact, appellate courts review the trial court’s factual findings de novo upon the

record, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the

preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Kelly v. Kelly, 445 S.W.3d 685, 692 (Tenn.

2014) (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d)); Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 692

(Tenn. 2013). “Appellate courts will not re-evaluate a trial judge’s assessment of witness

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credibility absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.” Wells v. Tennessee Bd.

of Regents, 9 S.W.3d 779, 783 (Tenn. 1999).

IV. DISCUSSION

A.

As a threshold issue, Dr. Little argues that the court erred by failing to submit the

issue of the running of the statute of limitations to a jury. Tennessee Code Annotated

section 21-1-103 provides as follows:

Either party to a suit in chancery is entitled, upon application, to a jury to try

and determine any material fact in dispute, save in cases involving

complicated accounting, as to such accounting and those elsewhere excepted

by law or by this code, and all the issues of fact in any proper cases, shall be

submitted to one (1) jury.

Once a demand for a jury has been made, Rule 38.05 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil

Procedures provides that the demand “may not be withdrawn without the consent of all

parties.” This court has noted that “the statutory right extends only to the determination of

any material facts in dispute and that the court may deny a request for a jury in ‘cases of

such a complicated and intricate nature involving mixed questions of law and fact not

suitable for solution by a jury.”’ Sasser v. Averitt Exp., Inc., 839 S.W.2d 422, 434 (Tenn.

Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Moore v. Mitchell, 205 Tenn. 591, 597, 329 S.W.2d 821, 824

(1959)). Accordingly, the chancery court has discretion in determining whether a bench

trial or submission to the jury is warranted depending on the facts and circumstances of the

case. See generally In re Estate of Thompson, 952 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)

(providing that similar discretion should be afforded to the probate courts).

Here, the record reflects that Dr. Little made his first jury request in his counter-

complaint. Following its dismissal of Siskin’s motion for summary judgment, the trial

court bifurcated the statute of limitations issue and set the matter for a bench trial. This

order is absent from the record. The parties proceeded through the bench trial, after which

Dr. Little requested that the statute of limitations issue be submitted to a jury in his closing

arguments. Siskin asserts on appeal that Dr. Little waived review of the issue when he

failed to object before the court proceeded with the bench trial.

The record before this court is simply unclear as to when and why the court

determined to proceed with the bench trial on the issue of the running of the statute of

limitations when a jury request had been made. Additionally, the Rules of Appellate

Procedure provide that this court is not required to grant relief with respect to an alleged

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error of the trial court if the complaining party “failed to take whatever action was

reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.” Tenn. R. App. P.

36(a). Apart from his second request in his closing argument after the proceedings had

concluded, Dr. Little does not cite to any place in the record where he objected to the

bifurcation of the proceedings and a bench trial on the issue of the statute of limitations.

He cannot now complain that the trial court’s action was erroneous based upon this issue.

See, e.g., Ford v. Ford, No. E2005-01772-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 842890, at *2 (Tenn.

Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2006) (“When a trial court makes an [alleged] error [] an aggrieved party

cannot remain silent, ‘tuck’ the error away in the party’s hip pocket, and then use it on

appeal to his or her advantage.”). Had Dr. Little made such an argument, he, like every

appellant in every case, was tasked with preparing a record for this court’s review that

conveys “a fair, accurate and complete account of what transpired with respect to those

issues that are the bases of appeal.” Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b). This issue is waived.

B.

Dr. Little filed his counter-complaint for breach of contract and additional common

law claims on November 21, 2021. His breach of contract claim was subject to dismissal

if his claim accrued prior to November 21, 2015. See Tennessee Code Annotated section

28-3-109(a)(3) (providing that causes of actions based upon contract must be commenced

within six years after the cause of action accrued). His common law claims are properly

categorized as claims for injuries to personal property that were subject to dismissal if the

claims accrued prior to November 21, 2018. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-105 (providing

that actions for injuries to personal property “shall be commenced within [three] years from

the accruing of the cause of action”).

The discovery rule is applicable in determining when the statute of limitations

expired. Our Supreme Court explained its interpretation of the rule as follows:

[T]he discovery rule does not delay the accrual of a cause of action and the

commencement of the statute of limitations until the plaintiff knows the full

extent of the damages . . . or until the plaintiff knows the specific type of

legal claim it has. The discovery rule is not intended to permit a plaintiff to

delay filing suit until the discovery of all the facts that affect the merits of his

or her claim.

Under the current discovery rule, a cause of action accrues and the statute of

limitations begins to run not only when the plaintiff has actual knowledge of

a claim, but also when the plaintiff has actual knowledge of facts sufficient

to put a reasonable person on notice that he [or she] has suffered an injury as

a result of wrongful conduct. This latter circumstance is variously referred

to as constructive notice or inquiry notice. Quoting the Iowa Supreme Court,

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we have explained that inquiry notice charges a plaintiff with knowledge of

those facts that a reasonable investigation would have disclosed . . . . [O]nce

a plaintiff gains information sufficient to alert a reasonable person of the need

to investigate the injury, the limitation period begins to run.

Redwing v. Cath. Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, 363 S.W.3d 436, 459 (Tenn. 2012)

(internal quotations and footnotes omitted). “It is not required that the plaintiff actually

know that the injury constitutes a breach of the appropriate legal standard in order to

discover that he has a ‘right of action.’” Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d 23, 29 (quoting

Roe v. Jefferson, 875 S.W.2d 653, 658 (Tenn. 1994)). “[T]he plaintiff is deemed to have

discovered the right of action if he is aware of facts sufficient to put a reasonable person

on notice that he has suffered an injury as a result of wrongful conduct.” Id.

The trial court found that the statute of limitations on the breach of contract claim

expired in 2019, at the latest, which was six years after Siskin’s offer of payment without

interest in December 2013. Dr. Little asserts that the trial court erred in dismissing the

action as untimely when Siskin did not indicate a clear intent to refuse payment until its

filing of the declaratory judgment action on March 9, 2020. He argues that the court failed

to consider relevant tolling doctrines, e.g., equitable estoppel and revival, based upon

Siskin’s repeated assurances that his funds were safely held and would be returned.

Our Supreme Court addressed the doctrine of equitable estoppel in Redwing. The

Court stated, in pertinent part,

In the context of a defense predicated on a statute of limitations, the doctrine

of equitable estoppel tolls the running of the statute of limitations when the

defendant has misled the plaintiff into failing to file suit within the statutory

limitations period. When the doctrine of equitable estoppel is applicable, it

prevents a defendant from asserting what could be an otherwise valid statute

of limitations defense.

The party invoking the doctrine of equitable estoppel has the burden of proof.

Thus, whenever a defendant has made out a prima facie statute of limitations

defense, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant induced him or her

to put off filing suit by identifying specific promises, inducements,

suggestions, representations, assurances, or other similar conduct by the

defendant that the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, would

induce the plaintiff to delay filing suit.

***

Plaintiffs asserting equitable estoppel must have acted diligently in pursuing

their claims both before and after the defendant induced them to refrain from

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filing suit. The statute of limitations is tolled for the period during which the

defendant misled the plaintiff. The plaintiff must demonstrate that suit was

timely filed after the plaintiff knew or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence,

should have known that the conduct giving rise to the equitable estoppel

claim had ceased to be operational.

Redwing, 363 S.W.3d at 460 (citations and footnote omitted). “Similarly, a defendant may

revive a plaintiff’s remedy that had been barred by the running of a statute of limitations

either by expressly promising to pay the debt or by acknowledging the debt and expressing

a willingness to pay it.” Ingram v. Earthman, 993 S.W.2d 611, 633–34 (Tenn. Ct. App.

1988) (internal citations and footnotes omitted). In such cases,

The expression of willingness to pay the debt that must accompany the

acknowledgment of the debt may be implied from the defendant’s words or

acts but . . . the words or acts must amount to a recognition of the continuing

obligation. Persons who successfully establish the revival exception to a

statute of limitations defense must file suit with the applicable limitations

period measured from when the conduct constituting the revival occurred.

Id. at 634.

Here, Dr. Little identified several demands of payment that were met by Siskin’s

acknowledgment of the debt and offers of repayment. In December 2013, Siskin responded

to Dr. Little’s demand for payment with a check in the amount of $37,500. In September

2014, Siskin’s President and CEO advised by letter that she “would like to resolve this

issue in a fair way” and offered payment of the original amount, plus interest, for a total

amount of $82,635.64. Again, in April 2019, Siskin suggested that a fair payment would

consist of “the actual amount of interest earned on the $37,500 principal amount,” for a

new total payment of $84,697.28. These offers occurred before the parties participated in

their last mediation in December 2019. Siskin likewise assured Dr. Little throughout the

pertinent time period that his funds were invested and accruing interest. Dr. Little promptly

filed suit when Siskin filed its declaratory judgment action indicating an intent to refuse

payment altogether on the obligation. Relative to the revival of the debt obligation, Siskin

offered assurances that it would repay the debt with interest as late as April 2019. The only

issue between the parties related to the amount of interest owed on the funds. Accordingly,

we conclude that the trial court erred in determining that Dr. Little’s claims were untimely.

C.

Tennessee follows the American Rule which provides that “litigants pay their own

attorney[ ] fees absent a statute or an agreement providing otherwise.” State v. Brown &

Williamson Tobacco Corp., 18 S.W.3d 186, 194 (Tenn. 2000); accord Taylor v. Fezell,

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158 S.W.3d 352, 359 (Tenn. 2005). Dr. Little does not cite to a statute or agreement in

support of his request for attorney fees on appeal. We also cannot say that the instant

appeal was frivolous. Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122 (providing the reviewing court with

the authority to award attorney fees when it appears that the appeal was frivolous or taken

solely for delay). We respectfully deny the request for attorney fees on appeal.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we reverse the decision of the trial court. The case is

remanded for further proceedings. Costs of the appeal are taxed to the appellee, Siskin

Hospital for Physical Rehabilitation, Inc.

_________________________________

JOHN W. MCCLARTY, JUDGE

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