Belton v. Dragoi

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Belton v. Dragoi

DAVID BELTON v. ENDRI DRAGOI ET AL.

(AC 46182)

Bright, C. J., and Clark and Westbrook, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court rendered following

its granting of the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant

police officers. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly

concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to whether

the defendants used excessive force when they arrested him. Held:

The trial court improperly rendered summary judgment for the defendants

with respect to the plaintiff’s battery claim because, after viewing the evi-

dence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party,

this court concluded that genuine issues of material fact existed as to the

force the defendants used during the altercation with the plaintiff and, thus,

the plaintiff was entitled to have a jury review the evidence and determine

whether the force employed by the defendants was justified and reasonable.

The trial court did not err in rendering summary judgment for the defendants

with respect to the plaintiff’s false arrest claim because the undisputed

facts established that there was probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for

interfering with an officer.

Argued April 25—officially released October 8, 2024

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, battery, and

for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the

judicial district of New Haven, where the court, Young,

J., granted the defendants’ motion for summary judg-

ment and rendered judgment thereon, from which the

plaintiff appealed to this court. Reversed in part; fur-

ther proceedings.

Christopher DeMarco, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Alan R. Dembiczak, for the appellees (defendants).

Opinion

BRIGHT, C. J. This case arises out of an incident

between the plaintiff, David Belton, and the defendants,

Endri Dragoi and J. T. Sosik, who are police officers

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Belton v. Dragoi

in the city of New Haven (city). At issue on appeal

is whether the trial court properly rendered summary

judgment for the defendants as to the plaintiff’s claims

that the defendants committed a battery on him and

falsely arrested him. Specifically, the plaintiff claims

that the court improperly concluded (1) with respect

to the alleged battery, that there are no genuine issues

of material fact as to whether the defendants used more

than reasonable force during the altercation and (2)

with respect to the alleged false arrest, that (a) the

defendants were entitled to governmental immunity

because the plaintiff had failed to raise a claim of negli-

gent false arrest and (b) there are no genuine issues of

material fact as to whether the defendants had probable

cause to arrest the plaintiff.1 We agree with the plaintiff’s

first claim but disagree with his other claims. Accord-

ingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, viewed in the light most favor-

able to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party, and proce-

dural history are relevant to our analysis. On July 30,

2019, the plaintiff was standing on the front stoop of the

building at 1343 Chapel Street in New Haven (property),

where he resided with his mother. The defendants, who

were on duty and on patrol, stopped at the property

because they did not recognize the plaintiff as someone

1

The plaintiff also identifies as separate claims that the court’s analysis

of his battery cause of action is inherently contradictory, that the court

relied on General Statutes § 52-557n even though the defendants did not

rely on that statute in their motion for summary judgment, and that, because

his causes of action were ‘‘ambiguous’’ as to whether they were based on

intentional or negligent conduct, the court should have let the jury make that

determination or should have treated the defendants’ motion for summary

judgment as a motion to strike so that the plaintiff could replead in a way

to avoid the defendants’ claims of immunity. We do not view these claims

as separate claims and address them in the context of the claims we have

identified. Furthermore, for sake of clarity, we have addressed the plaintiff’s

claims in a different order from that in which they were briefed by the plain-

tiff.

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Belton v. Dragoi

who resided there. The owner of the property had pro-

vided the New Haven Police Department with a list of

approved tenants to assist the department in identifying

trespassers at the property. The defendants exited their

vehicle and approached the plaintiff. Both defendants

were in uniform and wearing body cameras that

recorded their interaction with the plaintiff. Dragoi

asked the plaintiff if he lived at the property. The plain-

tiff responded by asking Dragoi, ‘‘Why?’’ Dragoi then

asked the plaintiff: ‘‘Do you live here or are you lying?’’

The plaintiff responded that he lived at the property.

Dragoi then instructed the plaintiff to step off the front

stoop, at which time both defendants grabbed the plain-

tiff’s arms to physically remove him from the front

stoop. When the plaintiff asked why they were moving

him, Dragoi told the plaintiff that he had to make sure

that the plaintiff did not have any weapons on him.

Dragoi then conducted a patdown search of the plain-

tiff, with which the plaintiff complied. The plaintiff

asked Dragoi why they were ‘‘fucking with [him],’’ and

Dragoi accused the plaintiff of trespassing on the prop-

erty. After the plaintiff told the defendants that he did

not like people touching him, both defendants, using

both hands, grabbed the plaintiff’s arms and waist and

attempted to forcibly remove him from the front stoop.

The plaintiff asked, ‘‘What’d I do?’’ Dragoi simply

repeated his command that the plaintiff get off the stoop

and instructed him to sit down, while the defendants

continued to struggle with the plaintiff. During this

struggle, the plaintiff raised his voice and told the defen-

dants, ‘‘Don’t fucking touch me.’’ All of this occurred

within two minutes of when the defendants first

encountered the plaintiff.

As the altercation escalated, the plaintiff’s sister,

Devina Belton, arrived and told the defendants that the

plaintiff resided at the property with their mother and

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Belton v. Dragoi

then called her mother, while standing next to the defen-

dants, to get her to come down to verify that the plaintiff

resided at the property. The plaintiff’s sister also yelled

at the plaintiff to comply with the defendants’ orders

to step down from the stoop. Neither the plaintiff nor

the defendants listened to the plaintiff’s sister. Instead,

the altercation between the plaintiff and the defendants

became more physical, and the plaintiff more vigorously

resisted the efforts to move him from the front stoop.

Dragoi threatened to handcuff the plaintiff and

attempted to twist the plaintiff’s arm behind his back.

In response, the plaintiff pushed Dragoi away from him.

The defendants then stepped off the front stoop and

Dragoi pointed his Taser gun at the plaintiff and

instructed him several times to get on the ground. When

the plaintiff did not comply and said that he would not

sit down, Dragoi threatened to use the Taser on the

plaintiff. At that point, the plaintiff stepped off the front

stoop toward Dragoi. Before he could sit down, Dragoi

pushed the plaintiff back, and the plaintiff swatted Dra-

goi’s hand away and returned to the front stoop. Dragoi

again instructed the plaintiff to get on the ground and

told him, ‘‘last chance.’’ The plaintiff’s sister also was

yelling at the plaintiff to get on the ground, as she did

not want him to get tasered. The plaintiff then stepped

off the front stoop, in the direction of Dragoi, in a

possible effort to comply with Dragoi’s demand that he

sit down. Before he could do so, Dragoi fired his Taser

at the plaintiff, which hit him.2 The defendants then

grabbed the plaintiff’s arms and tried to put them behind

his back. The plaintiff resisted these efforts and pulled

his arms away. The defendants ordered the plaintiff to

2

‘‘[W]hen a Taser is deployed, it fires two prongs at the targeted person,

which stay connected to the Taser gun by conductive wire. . . . Generally

speaking, the shock from the Taser completely incapacitates the target for

the duration of the cycle. At the end of the cycle, however, the target’s

normal functioning is immediately restored.’’ State v. Osbourne, 138 Conn.

App. 518, 523, 53 A.3d 284, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 937, 56 A.3d 716 (2012).

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Belton v. Dragoi

get on the ground, but he refused to comply. Dragoi

then discharged his pepper spray, which hit Sosik but

not the plaintiff.

Eventually, the plaintiff was handcuffed. He and Dra-

goi then continued to argue about who was responsible

for the altercation. The plaintiff was then placed in the

back of an ambulance and transported to the hospital

to have the Taser prongs removed from his body. Dragoi

thereafter interviewed the plaintiff’s sister, who told

him that the plaintiff had been residing with his mother

at the property for more than one year. She also

described the plaintiff as acting ‘‘crazy’’ during his inter-

action with the defendants. The plaintiff was charged

with disorderly conduct, interfering with a police offi-

cer, and criminal trespass in the third degree. Those

charges later were dismissed.

On March 20, 2020, the plaintiff commenced the

underlying action against the defendants. In the first

count of his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that, ‘‘[a]t

all relevant times, the defendants . . . were duly

appointed members of [the New Haven] Police Depart-

ment, acting under color of state law, and were acting

in their official capacities as police officers for the city.’’

After describing the events of July 30, 2019, the first

count of the complaint concludes by alleging that the

defendants’ actions ‘‘constitute battery upon the plain-

tiff, as a result of which the plaintiff required hospital-

ization and suffered pain and physical injury, and

offended the plaintiff’s personal sense of dignity.’’ In

the second count of his complaint, the plaintiff incorpo-

rated the allegations from the first count and alleged

that his ‘‘arrest was without probable cause that an

offense had been committed.’’ The plaintiff alleged that,

as a result of his arrest, he had to live with the threat

of incarceration until the charges against him were ‘‘dis-

missed without a finding of probable cause having been

made by a judicial authority.’’ The plaintiff concluded

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Belton v. Dragoi

his second count by alleging that, ‘‘[a]s a result of the

defendants’ actions in falsely arresting the plaintiff, the

plaintiff suffered emotional distress.’’ The plaintiff

requested as relief ‘‘money damages,’’ ‘‘punitive dam-

ages’’ and ‘‘such other and further relief as the court

may deem appropriate.’’

In their answer to the first count of the complaint,

the defendants admitted ‘‘the deployment of a Taser

and pepper spray’’ but alleged that doing so was ‘‘in

response to the plaintiff’s noncompliant, physically

aggressive and belligerent behavior.’’ They also denied

that their actions constituted a battery of the plaintiff.

In response to the plaintiff’s allegations in the second

count of the complaint, the defendants denied that their

arrest of the plaintiff was without probable cause. The

defendants also pleaded three special defenses. In their

first special defense, the defendants pleaded that they

were justified in using physical force on the plaintiff

because they reasonably believed such force was neces-

sary to effect the plaintiff’s arrest or to defend them-

selves while attempting to arrest the plaintiff. In their

second special defense, the defendants alleged that any

injuries the plaintiff suffered were caused by his own

negligence in resisting the defendants’ lawful com-

mands. In their third special defense, they alleged that

they were entitled to qualified immunity because at all

relevant times they were acting in the course and scope

of their employment as municipal employees, and their

actions ‘‘were governmental in nature and required the

exercise of judgment and discretion on their part.’’ In

his reply to the defendants’ qualified immunity defense,

the plaintiff admitted that the defendants were acting

in the scope of their employment and that their actions

were governmental in nature and required the exercise

of judgment and discretion. Nevertheless, the plaintiff

denied that the defendants were entitled to qualified

immunity because ‘‘their actions were either malicious,

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Belton v. Dragoi

illegal or constituted wilful misconduct and/or . . .

one or more of the defendants’ actions subjected an

identifiable person to imminent harm.’’

On June 15, 2022, the defendants moved for summary

judgment on three grounds. First, they argued that,

because the defendants were sued only in their official

capacities, the plaintiff’s causes of action were effec-

tively against the city and the city cannot be held liable

for the intentional torts of its employees. Second, they

argued that the plaintiff’s battery cause of action failed

because the defendants were justified in their use of

force. Third, they argued that the plaintiff’s false arrest

cause of action failed because there was probable cause

for the plaintiff’s arrest. In support of their motion, the

defendants relied on the transcripts of the depositions

of the plaintiff and Devina Belton, the defendants’ affi-

davits, an approved tenant list for the property, and

copies of the video footage from their body cameras

recorded during the altercation.

In response to the defendants’ motion, the plaintiff

argued that his causes of action for battery and false

arrest did not necessarily allege intentional torts. He

noted that his complaint did not allege that the defen-

dants acted intentionally and argued that Connecticut

has recognized that both causes of action can be based

on negligent conduct. He further argued, relying on the

body camera video, that there were genuine issues of

material fact as to whether there was probable cause

for the plaintiff’s arrest and whether the defendants

acted reasonably in using physical force on him.3

The defendants filed a reply to the plaintiff’s objection

in which they argued that, although causes of action

The plaintiff also relied on excerpts from his deposition transcript as

3

evidence that he resided at the property and was not trespassing. Because

we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the

nonmoving party, we assume this fact for purposes of our analysis.

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Belton v. Dragoi

for battery and false arrest can be based on negligent

conduct, the plaintiff’s allegations in his complaint and

the undisputed evidence establish that the plaintiff’s

claims are based on the defendants’ intentional con-

duct. They also reiterated their arguments that the

undisputed facts prove that, even if the plaintiff’s causes

of action are viewed as sounding in negligence, they

fail because the defendants’ use of force during the

altercation was a reasonable response to the plaintiff’s

actions and there was probable cause for his arrest.

They further argued that, if the plaintiff’s causes of

actions sounded in negligence, they were entitled to

discretionary act immunity under General Statutes

§ 52-557n.4

After hearing oral argument from counsel for the

parties, the court issued a memorandum of decision

rendering summary judgment in favor of the defen-

dants. With respect to the plaintiff’s first count, the

court agreed with the plaintiff that the allegations

therein could be read as asserting a claim of negligent

battery because they ‘‘could support a claim that the

[defendants] used more force than reasonably neces-

sary to effectuate a lawful arrest.’’ Nevertheless, the

court concluded that the plaintiff’s battery cause of

action failed as a matter of law because the undisputed

evidence established that the defendants’ use of force

was justified by the plaintiff’s actions in resisting arrest

and not complying with the defendants’ orders.

With respect to the plaintiff’s second count alleging

false arrest, the court concluded that, if the plaintiff

intended to rely on a theory that the false arrest was

negligent, rather than intentional, he needed to specifi-

cally so plead. The court concluded that, because the

4

Although § 52-557n has been amended since the events underlying this

case; see Public Acts 2023, No. 23-83; that amendment has no bearing on

the merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current

revision of the statute.

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Belton v. Dragoi

plaintiff failed to plead that his false arrest was the

result of negligent conduct, the second count must be

read as alleging an intentional tort, as to which the

defendants are entitled to immunity.5 The court further

concluded that the defendants were entitled to sum-

mary judgment on the false arrest count because the

undisputed evidence established that there was proba-

ble cause for the plaintiff’s arrest. The court thus

granted the defendants’ motion and rendered judgment

accordingly. This appeal followed. Additional facts and

procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

We begin with our familiar standard of review. ‘‘The

standards governing our review of a trial court’s deci-

sion to grant a motion for summary judgment are well

established. Practice Book [§ 17-49] provides that sum-

mary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the plead-

ings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. . . . In deciding a motion for summary judg-

ment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . The party

seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing

5

The court stated in its memorandum of decision: ‘‘The plaintiff has not

specifically pleaded a claim of negligent false arrest, as our courts require.

The allegation is one of intentional conduct. Therefore, the defendants are

entitled to immunity under § 52-557n for the claim of battery.’’ (Emphasis

added.) We conclude that the court’s reference to battery in the previous

sentence was a scrivener’s error. The immediately preceding sentences to

the court’s conclusion make clear that the court meant to say that there

was immunity for the claim of false arrest, not for the claim of battery.

This conclusion is buttressed by the court’s statement that the plaintiff had

sufficiently pleaded a claim of negligent battery such that the defendants

had failed to establish as a matter of law that they were entitled to immunity

under § 52-557n (a) (2) on the basis of the allegations of the plaintiff’s

complaint. Our conclusion thus disposes of the plaintiff’s claim on appeal

that the court’s memorandum of decision is inherently contradictory because

it concluded, on the basis of the allegations of the complaint, that the

defendants were and were not entitled to immunity under § 52-557n.

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Belton v. Dragoi

the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts

[that], under applicable principles of substantive law,

entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and

the party opposing such a motion must provide an evi-

dentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a

genuine issue of material fact. . . . A material fact

. . . [is] a fact [that] will make a difference in the result

of the case. . . . Finally, the scope of our review of

the trial court’s decision to grant the [defendants’]

motion[s] for summary judgment is plenary.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Day v. Seblatnigg, 341 Conn.

815, 825, 268 A.3d 595 (2022).

I

The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly

rendered summary judgment for the defendants on his

battery cause of action because there are genuine issues

of material fact as to whether the defendants’ use of

force was reasonable during the altercation. In

response, the defendants argue that, because the com-

plaint alleges, and the undisputed evidence shows, that

the defendants’ conduct can be viewed only as inten-

tional and not negligent, they are entitled to immunity

under § 52-557n (a) (2). Alternatively, they argue that,

even viewing the plaintiff’s battery count as sounding

in negligence, the court correctly rendered summary

judgment in their favor because the undisputed evi-

dence establishes that their use of force was reasonable.

We begin with the relevant law that was the basis

for the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and

the plaintiff’s response thereto. Section 52-557n (a) (2)

provides: ‘‘Except as otherwise provided by law, a politi-

cal subdivision of the state shall not be liable for dam-

ages to person or property caused by: (A) Acts or omis-

sions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute

criminal conduct, fraud, actual malice or wilful miscon-

duct; or (B) negligent acts or omissions which require

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Belton v. Dragoi

the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official

function of the authority expressly or impliedly granted

by law.’’ ‘‘[O]ur Supreme Court [has] held that the defen-

dant municipality [can] not be liable for intentional torts

committed by its employees under § 52-557n (a) (2) (A).

This court consistently has adhered to that precedent.’’

McCullough v. Rocky Hill, 198 Conn. App. 703, 712,

234 A.3d 1049, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 985, 242 A.3d

480 (2020).

Although the plaintiff did not sue the city in the pres-

ent case, his complaint alleges that, ‘‘[a]t all relevant

times, the defendants . . . were duly appointed mem-

bers of [the New Haven] Police Department, acting

under color of state law, and were acting in their official

capacities as police officers for the city.’’ ‘‘It is well

settled law that an action against a government official

in his or her official capacity is not an action against

the official, but, instead, is one against the official’s

office and, thus, is treated as an action against the entity

itself. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66,

105 S. Ct. 3099, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985) (‘Official-capacity

suits . . . ‘‘generally represent only another way of

pleading an action against an entity of which an officer

is an agent.’’ Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social

Services, 436 U.S. 658 [690 n.55, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L.

Ed. 2d 611 (1978)]. . . . [In general] an official-capacity

suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated

as a suit against the entity. . . . It is not a suit against

the official personally, for the real party in interest is

the entity. Thus, while an award of damages against an

official in his personal capacity can be executed only

against the official’s personal assets, a plaintiff seeking

to recover on a damages judgment in an official-capacity

suit must look to the government entity itself.’ . . .)

. . . .’’ (Citation omitted.) Kelly v. New Haven, 275

Conn. 580, 595, 881 A.2d 978 (2005).

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Belton v. Dragoi

On the basis of the allegations of the plaintiff’s com-

plaint and the legal principles set forth in the preceding

paragraphs, the defendants argued in support of their

motion for summary judgment that, because the defen-

dants were sued for acting in their official capacities,

the plaintiff’s action constitutes an action against the

city itself. Furthermore, they argued that, because bat-

tery and false arrest constitute intentional torts, the city

is immune from liability pursuant to § 52-557n (a) (2).

In response to the defendants’ motion for summary

judgment, the plaintiff did not dispute that he was suing

the defendants in their official capacities.6 Instead, he

argued that his causes of action were not barred by

application of § 52-557n (a) (2) because they alleged

negligent, as opposed to intentional, conduct. In partic-

ular, the plaintiff asserted: ‘‘The defendants argue that

this case cannot be maintained as the plaintiff has

alleged intentional torts against them, but such is not

necessarily the case. The plaintiff’s claims are based

6

Other than a passing reference in his reply to the defendants being

personally liable if their actions constituted wilful misconduct, the plaintiff

did not argue in his appellate briefs that he was suing the defendants other

than in their official capacities. At oral argument before this court, counsel

for the plaintiff for the first time argued that the allegations of his complaint

could be read as alleging claims against the defendants in their individual

capacities. We will not consider an argument raised for the first time in a

reply brief or at oral argument. See Benjamin v. Corasaniti, 341 Conn. 463,

476 n.8, 267 A.3d 108 (2021) (‘‘[i]t is a well established principle that argu-

ments cannot be raised for the first time in a reply brief’’ (internal quotation

marks omitted)); Traylor v. State, 332 Conn. 789, 809 n.17, 213 A.3d 467

(2019) (‘‘[r]aising a claim at oral argument is not . . . a substitute for ade-

quately briefing that claim’’).

Furthermore, such an argument is flatly inconsistent with how the plaintiff

argued the immunity issue in opposition to the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment, wherein he focused on whether his causes of action

sound in negligence or intentional tort and never disputed that, if they sound

only in intentional tort, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment.

In fact, during oral argument before the trial court, when asked by the court

if claims against the defendants ‘‘based on either a reckless or intentional

act . . . would be precluded as to these two defendants,’’ the plaintiff’s

counsel responded: ‘‘Correct.’’

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Belton v. Dragoi

on two causes of action, battery and false arrest, neither

of which allege[s] that the defendants acted intention-

ally.’’7 As support for his argument, the plaintiff relied

on cases in which our Supreme Court had recognized

negligence based causes of action of battery and

false arrest.8

In their reply to the plaintiff’s objection, the defen-

dants argued that the allegations of the complaint and

undisputed evidence established that there was nothing

accidental about the defendants’ conduct that would

support causes of action for negligent battery or false

arrest. They argued that the only reasonable interpreta-

tion of the complaint and undisputed facts is that the

plaintiff’s causes of action are based on intentional con-

duct. In support of their arguments, the defendants

pointed to the plaintiff’s prayer for relief that sought

punitive damages, which are available only for inten-

tional, and not negligent, conduct. Alternatively, the

defendants argued that, if the plaintiff’s battery and

false arrest claims sound in negligence, the defendants

are entitled to governmental discretionary act immunity

under § 52-557n.9 Finally, the defendants reiterated their

7

At oral argument before the trial court, counsel for the plaintiff refused

to commit as to whether his causes of action sounded in negligence or

intentional tort. After acknowledging that he ‘‘would be precluded’’ from

asserting a reckless or intentional tort claim against the defendants and

being confronted with the inconsistency of seeking punitive damages in a

claim for negligence, counsel for the plaintiff stated: ‘‘I don’t claim it’s an

action in negligence. . . . I’m not saying whether or not this [is] an action

in negligence or an intentional tort.’’ He then asserted, without citing any

authority, that § 52-557n (a) (2) only provides immunity for intentional torts

involving malicious or criminal conduct. He similarly stated that § 52-557n

does not preclude all claims against the city for an intentional tort before

concluding this part of the argument by stating: ‘‘[R]ight now, the complaint

doesn’t specify whether or not this is a negligence action or an intentional

tort action, or a reckless, or wanton and wilful action.’’

8

See, e.g., Markey v. Santangelo, 195 Conn. 76, 78, 485 A.2d 1305 (1985);

Sansone v. Bechtel, 180 Conn. 96, 99, 429 A.2d 820 (1980).

9

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that ‘‘[t]he court inappropriately consid-

ered the defense of [governmental] immunity, which was raised for the

first time in the defendants’ reply memorandum.’’ This claim warrants little

discussion. The defendants only raised their governmental discretionary act

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Belton v. Dragoi

arguments that the undisputed facts established that

they had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff and that

their use of force was reasonable.

Before addressing each of the plaintiff’s causes of

action, the court framed the parties’ positions regarding

the defendants’ claim of immunity: ‘‘The defendants

assert that they are entitled to immunity for what they

claim are intentional torts alleged by the plaintiff. The

plaintiff argues that he has not alleged intentional torts.

Rather, he has alleged negligence claims of battery and

false arrest.’’10

immunity defense in response to the plaintiff’s claim, asserted for the first

time in his objection to the motion for summary judgment, that his causes

of action could sound in negligence. When ruling on the defendants’ motion

for summary judgment, the trial court did not address the defendants’ discre-

tionary act immunity argument. Instead, the court resolved the defendants’

motion on the basis of whether the plaintiff’s causes of action sounded in

negligence or intentional tort, whether there were genuine issues of material

fact as to the reasonableness of the force used by the defendants, and

whether there was probable cause for the plaintiff’s arrest. The defendants

also have not raised discretionary act immunity as an alternative ground

for affirmance in this appeal and acknowledge that the issue was never

addressed by the trial court. Thus, the plaintiff’s claim is of no moment.

10

In his appellate briefs, the plaintiff claims that the court’s characteriza-

tion of his complaint as alleging negligent battery and false arrest is incorrect.

He claims that his complaint is ‘‘ambiguous’’ as to whether the causes of

actions asserted sound in intentional tort or negligence and that ‘‘it should

be for the jury to determine whether the defendants’ actions were negligent

or intentional.’’ He further claims that, in light of the ambiguity over the

nature of his claims, the court should have treated the defendants’ motion

for summary judgment as a motion to strike so that he could replead his

claims if necessary. Both claims are without merit.

First, the plaintiff did not dispute the underlying premises of the defen-

dants’ motion for summary judgment. Because the plaintiff was suing the

defendants in their official capacities, he was effectively suing the city, and

because the city cannot be held liable for the intentional torts of its employ-

ees, the court construed the plaintiff’s argument as asserting that his claims

sounded in negligence because otherwise they would be barred by applica-

tion of § 52-557n (a) (2). Furthermore, the construction of the pleadings is

a legal question for the court, not a factual question to be left for the jury.

See Brusby v. Metropolitan District, 160 Conn. App. 638, 667, 127 A.3d 257

(2015) (‘‘[c]onstruction of pleadings is a question of law’’ (internal quotation

marks omitted)). Thus, the court properly considered whether the complaint

could be read as asserting negligence causes of action to avoid the defen-

dants’ immunity argument.

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After concluding that battery and false arrest can be

based on either intentional or negligent conduct, the

court considered whether the plaintiff’s allegations of

battery could be read as sounding in negligence. The

court summarized the plaintiff’s battery allegations: ‘‘(1)

the defendants approached the plaintiff outside of an

apartment building and accused him of trespassing; (2)

the plaintiff told the defendants that he was not tres-

passing and that he lived in the building; (3) the defen-

dants asked for identification; (4) the plaintiff told the

[defendants] his identification was in the apartment;

(5) the defendants grabbed and tased the plaintiff and

attempted to pepper spray him; and (6) the defendants

handcuffed the plaintiff.’’ After noting that these allega-

tions were supported by the plaintiff’s deposition testi-

mony, the court concluded: ‘‘Viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff, these allegations

could support a claim that the [defendants] used more

force than reasonably necessary to effectuate a lawful

arrest. . . . The defendants have not provided evi-

dence to support their claim that there are no genuine

issues of material fact as to whether they are entitled

to summary judgment under the immunity provided

in § 52-557n (a) (2) as to the battery claim.’’ (Citation

omitted.)

Nevertheless, the court ultimately held that the defen-

dants were entitled to summary judgment on the plain-

tiff’s battery cause of action because the force they

Second, the plaintiff never suggested to the trial court that it should

treat the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as a motion to strike.

Furthermore, when the court asked counsel for the plaintiff whether his

causes of action sounded in negligence or intentional tort, counsel refused

to answer. See footnote 7 of this opinion. Counsel also did not request an

opportunity to amend his complaint either in response to the defendants’

motion for summary judgment or in response to the court’s inquiries. Instead,

he argued that ‘‘we can revise the pleadings up until, you know, jury delibera-

tions begin.’’ The court then pointed out to counsel that such revisions

could be done only with leave of the court, which counsel acknowledged.

Nevertheless, counsel still did not request such leave to clarify the nature

of the plaintiff’s causes of action. Under these circumstances, the court

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used in their altercation with the plaintiff was justified

and not excessive. In reaching this conclusion, the court

relied on General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 53a-22,11

which sets forth certain defenses from criminal liability

in connection with the use of force in making an arrest

or preventing escape, and provides in relevant part: ‘‘(b)

. . . [A] peace officer . . . is justified in using physical

force upon another person when and to the extent that

he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to:

(1) Effect an arrest or prevent the escape from custody

of a person whom he or she reasonably believes to have

committed an offense, unless he or she knows that the

arrest or custody is unauthorized; or (2) defend himself

or herself or a third person from the use or imminent

use of physical force while effecting or attempting to

effect an arrest or while preventing or attempting to

prevent an escape.’’ The court agreed with the defen-

dants’ argument that, because the plaintiff was resisting

arrest, they were justified, pursuant to § 53a-22 (b), in

using the force they did to subdue the plaintiff and,

therefore, cannot have committed a battery on the plain-

tiff.

On appeal, the plaintiff argues that whether the force

the defendants used was justified or excessive is a genu-

ine issue of material fact that is for the jury to decide.

The defendants argue that there is no factual dispute

as to what occurred during the altercation, as it was

all captured on the defendants’ body cameras. According

to the defendants, the undisputed evidence establishes

that their use of force was objectively reasonable.12

had no obligation sua sponte to treat the defendants’ motion for summary

judgment as a motion to strike.

11

Hereinafter, unless otherwise indicated, all references to § 53a-22 are

to the 2019 revision of the statute.

12

In their appellee brief, the defendants reiterate their argument that the

plaintiff’s causes of actions should be viewed as asserting only intentional

tort claims, as to which the city, as the real party in interest, is immune.

Nevertheless, the defendants have not argued that the trial court erred in

rejecting their claim of intentional act immunity under § 52-557n because

it construed the plaintiff’s battery claim as sounding in negligence. They

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Belton v. Dragoi

Although we agree that, given the video evidence,

there is no factual dispute as to the actions the defen-

dants took during the altercation with the plaintiff, the

question of whether their actions were justified is one

also did not raise this argument as an alternative ground for affirmance. In

any event, we agree with the trial court that the plaintiff’s battery count

can be read as asserting a negligence cause of action.

Our Supreme Court has recognized repeatedly the tort of negligent battery.

See, e.g., Markey v. Santangelo, 195 Conn. 76, 78, 485 A.2d 1305 (1985) (‘‘[i]n

this state an actionable assault and battery may be one committed wilfully

or voluntarily, and therefore intentionally; one done under circumstances

showing a reckless disregard of consequences; or one committed negli-

gently’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Sansone v. Bechtel, 180 Conn.

96, 99, 429 A.2d 820 (1980) (‘‘We have long adhered to the rule that an

unintentional trespass to the person, or assault and battery, if it be the

direct and immediate consequence of a force exerted by the defendant

wantonly, or imposed without the exercise by him of due care, would make

him liable for the resulting injury. . . . This principle has been applied to

the case of an unintended injury incident to disciplinary action taken by a

teacher.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)); Krause v.

Bridgeport Hospital, 169 Conn. 1, 9, 362 A.2d 802 (1975) (‘‘[a]rguably, an

intentional or negligent extension of physical contact beyond that consented

to or needed properly to position a patient on an x-ray table and which

results in injury may present an actionable battery’’); Russo v. Porga, 141

Conn. 706, 708–709, 109 A.2d 585 (1954) (‘‘An actionable assault and battery

may be one committed wilfully or voluntarily, and therefore intentionally,

or one done under circumstances showing a reckless disregard of conse-

quences. It may also be one committed negligently.’’).

Although the court has never expounded on the elements of negligent

battery or explained whether or how a defendant who intentionally initiates

contact with a plaintiff may be liable for negligent battery, our Supreme

Court’s decision in Brown v. Robishaw, 282 Conn. 628, 922 A.2d 1086 (2007),

is instructive. In Brown, our Supreme Court addressed whether a defendant,

in a case in which he was charged with negligently striking the plaintiff,

was entitled to have the jury charged on his special defense of self-defense.

Id., 629. The plaintiff argued that self-defense was not a proper defense to

a negligence cause of action. Id., 636. The trial court agreed. See id., 632.

Following a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant appealed, arguing that

the court erred in not instructing the jury on his claim of self-defense. Id.

Our Supreme Court agreed with the defendant. Id., 633. In doing so, the

court explained: ‘‘The facts of this case involve the intersection between

negligent and intentional torts. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had

handled him negligently. In reality, however, the plaintiff claims that the

defendant committed the intentional tort of assault, and that the defendant’s

response to the plaintiff’s behavior . . . was unreasonable, and therefore,

unjustified. It is undisputed that the defendant intentionally threw or

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on which reasonable minds may differ and therefore

must be resolved at trial. See Amendola v. Geremia,

21 Conn. App. 35, 37, 571 A.2d 131 (‘‘A conclusion of

negligence or freedom from negligence is ordinarily one

of fact. . . . The trier must determine whether, in his

own opinion, the defendant’s actions meet the stan-

dards of conduct for one of reasonable prudence. . . .

Issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of

summary adjudication but should be resolved by trial

in the ordinary manner.’’ (Citations omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 215 Conn. 803,

574 A.2d 217 (1990).

We find instructive the decision of the United States

District Court for the District of Connecticut in Mehaylo

v. Loris, Docket No. 3:19-CV-2002 (VAB), 2022 WL

17082169 (D. Conn. November 18, 2022), aff’d, Docket

Nos. 22-3162 (L) and 22-3163 (Con), 2024 WL 618761

pushed the plaintiff down the stairs of the house. Therefore, for negligence

still to be an issue, the question of whether the defendant’s intentional

conduct was unjustified remains paramount. Indeed, the plaintiff himself

notes that negligence ‘remains a viable cause of action even in instances

when self-defense is claimed: if a party who feels threatened reacts unreason-

ably he remains liable in negligence.’ Thus, the self-defense analysis incorpo-

rates negligence principles, as the plaintiff correctly points out that a party

who overreacts to a perceived threat may be held liable in negligence if

his actions are unreasonable in light of the circumstances. . . . In order

to determine if the party unreasonably overreacted so that he may be held

liable for negligence, however, the fact finder first would have to be pre-

sented with the party’s claim of self-defense. The jury in the present case

was not provided with the opportunity to accept or to reject that defense.’’

(Citation omitted; emphasis added; footnote omitted.) Id., 637–39.

In the present case, the defendants, although not explicitly arguing self-

defense, argue that their intentional use of force was a justified response

to the plaintiff’s actions. Although there can be little question that the

defendants acted intentionally when using force against the plaintiff, if the

defendants acted unreasonably and overreacted to the plaintiff’s perceived

threat, they, like the defendant in Brown, may be held liable for acting

negligently. On the other hand, if the defendants’ use of force in response

to the perceived threat was not just unreasonably excessive, but also was

intended by the defendants to be excessive relative to the threat that they

perceived, the city would be immune from liability under § 52-557n (a)

(2) (A).

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Belton v. Dragoi

(2d Cir. February 14, 2024), on which the trial court

relied in the present case to conclude that there were

no genuine issues of material fact that the defendants’

use of force was justified. In Mehaylo, the plaintiff sued

the defendants, Officers Loris and Dominguez of the

Shelton Police Department and Officer DeAngelo of the

Derby Police Department, alleging excessive force in

violation of the fourth amendment to the United States

constitution and state law assault and battery in connec-

tion with her arrest. Id., *1. Her arrest occurred at her

home after she left the scene of a motor vehicle accident

in which she was involved. Id., *1–3. The court

described the events of the arrest: ‘‘[The plaintiff] stated

that once she knew it was the police that she knew she

had to open the door. . . . She asked the officers out-

side her front door why they were at her house and

answered questions about her involvement in the earlier

car accident through the closed wood front door, which

required her to raise her voice. . . . [The plaintiff]

agreed to open the wood front door as long as she

could speak to the officers with the screen storm door

between them. . . .

‘‘Once [the plaintiff] opened the front wood door,

Officer DeAngelo opened the screen storm door,

reached into [the plaintiff’s] home, and grabbed [her]

right arm to pull her out of her home and onto the front

porch. . . . Once on the porch, Officer DeAngelo

pushed [the plaintiff] against the wall to secure her with

her arms behind her back. . . .

‘‘Officer Loris then grabbed [the plaintiff’s] left arm,

and Officer Dominguez came to assist by holding [her]

left arm while Officer Loris handcuffed her. . . . The

three officers picked [the plaintiff] up and brought her

from the front porch to a police car parked on the

street. . . .

‘‘While Officer Loris attempted to grab [the plaintiff’s]

legs so they could pick her up, she kicked backwards,

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and her foot made contact with Officer Loris’ groin.

. . .

‘‘Once the officers reached the police car, still car-

rying [the plaintiff], they threw her into the back of the

car on her stomach with her hands handcuffed behind

her back and her head hit the center console. . . .

‘‘[The plaintiff] was charged with two counts of

[a]ssault [of] a [p]ublic [s]afety [o]fficer and one count

of [i]nterfering with a [p]olice [o]fficer.’’ (Citations omit-

ted.) Id., *2–3.

The defendants in Mehaylo moved for summary judg-

ment, arguing, with respect to the plaintiff’s excessive

force claim, that their use of force was objectively rea-

sonable and, with respect to the plaintiff’s state law

assault and battery claim, that ‘‘their use of force was

justified.’’ Id., *5. The District Court first addressed the

defendants’ argument that their use of force was objec-

tively reasonable as a matter of law. Id., *5–9. In doing

so, the court applied the legal test for such claims first

set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Graham

v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L.

Ed. 2d 443 (1989). Mehaylo v. Loris, supra, 2022 WL

17082169, *6–7. ‘‘Determining whether the force used

to effect a particular seizure is reasonable under the

[f]ourth [a]mendment requires a careful balancing of

the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s

[f]ourth [a]mendment interests against the countervail-

ing governmental interests at stake. . . . [The United

States Supreme Court’s] [f]ourth [a]mendment jurispru-

dence has long recognized that the right to make an

arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it

the right to use some degree of physical coercion or

threat thereof to effect it. . . . Because [t]he test of

reasonableness under the [f]ourth [a]mendment is not

capable of precise definition or mechanical application

. . . however, its proper application requires careful

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Belton v. Dragoi

attention to the facts and circumstances of each particu-

lar case, including the severity of the crime at issue,

whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the

safety of the officers or others, and whether he is

actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest

by flight. . . .

‘‘The reasonableness of a particular use of force must

be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer

on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hind-

sight. . . . With respect to a claim of excessive force

. . . [n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem

unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers . . .

violates the [f]ourth [a]mendment. The calculus of rea-

sonableness must embody allowance for the fact that

police officers are often forced to make split-second

judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain,

and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that

is necessary in a particular situation.

‘‘As in other [f]ourth [a]mendment contexts, however,

the reasonableness inquiry in an excessive force case

is an objective one: the question is whether the officers’

actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts

and circumstances confronting them, without regard to

their underlying intent or motivation.’’ (Citations omit-

ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Graham v. Con-

nor, supra, 490 U.S. 396–97.

The District Court in Mehaylo concluded that there

were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the

force the defendants used was reasonable, given that

the crime the defendants were investigating was a mis-

demeanor, it was questionable whether the plaintiff

posed a threat to the defendants, and a reasonable fact

finder could conclude that the plaintiff would not have

resisted arrest had the defendants not first grabbed the

plaintiff. Mehaylo v. Loris, supra, 2022 WL 17082169,

*6–7.

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With respect to the plaintiff’s assault and battery

claim, the District Court first noted, as did the trial

court in the present case, that, ‘‘[i]f . . . the officer’s

actions are justified [under § 53a-22 (b)], he is not liable

in tort for assault or battery.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., *11. The court nonetheless held that,

because it had concluded that there were genuine issues

of material fact regarding whether the defendants’ use

of force was reasonable, those issues also precluded

summary judgment as to the state law assault and bat-

tery claim. Id. Essentially, the court equated the test

for reasonableness under the fourth amendment for

excessive use of force claims with the test for whether

the use of force was justified under the state law assault

and battery claim. See id. The United States Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment

of the District Court in an unpublished opinion. Mehaylo

v. Loris, Docket Nos. 22-3162 (L) and 22-3163 (Con),

2024 WL 618761, *2 (2d Cir. February 14, 2024).

In the present case, the defendants do not argue that

there is any distinction between the fourth amend-

ment’s reasonableness inquiry for excessive use of force

and whether their conduct was justified for purposes

of a state law battery claim. In fact, they acknowledge

in their appellee brief that the essential elements of a

fourth amendment excessive use of force claim and a

state assault and battery claim are nearly identical. See

Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 94–95 (2d Cir. 1991). They

also argue that applying the excessive use of force anal-

ysis to their conduct in this case leads to the conclusion

that their conduct was objectively reasonable and justi-

fied as a matter of law. We are not persuaded.

Having conducted a plenary review of the evidence

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmov-

ing party, we conclude that genuine issues of material

fact similar to those in Mehaylo exist as to the force

the defendants used during the altercation with the

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Belton v. Dragoi

plaintiff. First, criminal trespass in the third degree, the

crime the defendants were investigating and with which

the plaintiff was charged, is a class C misdemeanor

punishable by a term of imprisonment not to exceed

three months. See General Statutes §§ 53a-36 and 53a-

109. Thus, as in Mehaylo, the defendants were investi-

gating the commission of a possible misdemeanor. Sec-

ond, the defendants’ decision to approach the plaintiff

was not prompted by any specific complaint about the

plaintiff. Instead, the defendants confronted him

because they did not recognize him as a tenant of the

building. In light of these circumstances, a reasonable

jury could conclude that, at the time that the defendants

approached the plaintiff and initiated physical contact

by grabbing his arms, the plaintiff did not pose any

threat to their safety or the safety of anyone else. Such

a conclusion would be supported by the fact that the

plaintiff consented to a patdown search when requested

by Dragoi. Finally, we cannot conclude, as a matter of

law, that the force employed by the defendants during

the course of the arrest was reasonable. Indeed, a jury

could reasonably conclude that the defendants unjusti-

fiably escalated the conflict with the plaintiff by

attempting to forcibly twist his arms behind his back

without provocation, causing the plaintiff to push them

away or that the defendants acted unreasonably in

attempting to physically remove the plaintiff from the

front stoop after the arrival of his sister, who told the

defendants that the plaintiff lived at the property with

their mother. Similarly, viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable jury could

conclude that the plaintiff was attempting to comply

with Dragoi’s commands that he step down from the

stoop and sit on the ground when Dragoi pushed him

back and then fired a Taser at him. The plaintiff is

entitled to have a jury review the evidence and deter-

mine whether the defendants’ use of force was justified

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Belton v. Dragoi

and reasonable. Consequently, the court improperly

rendered summary judgment for the defendants on the

first count of the complaint.

II

The plaintiff also claims that the court erred in render-

ing summary judgment for the defendants on the second

count of his complaint alleging false arrest because it

treated the complaint as alleging only an intentional

tort, as to which the city, as the real party in interest,

was entitled to qualified immunity, and concluded that

there was probable cause for the plaintiff’s arrest.

Assuming arguendo that the plaintiff properly pleaded

negligent false arrest, we agree with the trial court that

the undisputed facts establish that probable cause

existed for his arrest, and we therefore affirm the court’s

judgment as to the second count on that basis.13

The following law is relevant to our analysis. ‘‘False

arrest is the unlawful restraint by one person of the

physical liberty of another. . . . To prevail on a claim

of false arrest, the plaintiff must establish that the arrest

was made without probable cause. . . . Because prob-

able cause to arrest constitutes justification, there can

be no claim for false arrest where the arresting officer

had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Campbell

v. Porter, 212 Conn. App. 377, 390, 275 A.3d 684 (2022).

‘‘Probable cause, broadly defined, comprises such facts

as would reasonably persuade an impartial and reason-

able mind not merely to suspect or conjecture, but to

13

We note that the trial court’s conclusion that the second count is barred

by qualified immunity does not implicate the court’s subject matter jurisdic-

tion. See Vejseli v. Pasha, 282 Conn. 561, 572, 923 A.2d 688 (2007) (‘‘whereas

[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction

and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss . . . the doctrine

of governmental immunity implicates no such interest’’ (citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we address the alternative

basis for the court’s judgment as to the false arrest cause of action.

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Belton v. Dragoi

believe that criminal activity has occurred. . . . It is a

flexible common sense standard that does not require

the police officer’s belief to be correct or more likely

true than false. . . . Probable cause for an arrest is

based on the objective facts available to the officer at

the time of arrest, not on the officer’s subjective state

of mind. . . . [W]hile probable cause requires more

than mere suspicion . . . the line between mere suspi-

cion and probable cause necessarily must be drawn by

an act of judgment formed in light of the particular

situation and with account taken of all the circum-

stances. . . . The existence of probable cause does not

turn on whether the defendant could have been con-

victed on the same available evidence. . . . Indeed,

proof of probable cause requires less than proof by a

preponderance of the evidence. . . . The determina-

tion of whether probable cause exists . . . is made

pursuant to a totality of circumstances test.’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 390–91.

‘‘Whether the facts are sufficient to establish the lack

of probable cause is a question ultimately to be deter-

mined by the court, but when the facts themselves are

disputed, the court may submit the issue of probable

cause in the first instance to a jury as a mixed question

of fact and law.’’ DeLaurentis v. New Haven, 220 Conn.

225, 252–53, 597 A.2d 807 (1991).

The existence of probable cause as to any offense

defeats a false arrest claim, even if the basis for the

arrest is unrelated to the crime being investigated or

actually invoked at the time of the arrest. See Devenpeck

v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153–54, 125 S. Ct. 588, 160 L.

Ed. 2d 537 (2004); see also Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d

149, 154 (2d Cir. 2006) (‘‘[A] claim for false arrest turns

only on whether probable cause existed to arrest a

defendant, and . . . it is not relevant whether probable

cause existed with respect to each individual charge,

or, indeed, any charge actually invoked by the arresting

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Belton v. Dragoi

officer at the time of arrest. Stated differently, when

faced with a claim for false arrest, we focus on the

validity of the arrest, and not on the validity of each

charge.’’ (Emphasis in original.)). Consequently, we

must determine whether, as a matter of law, the defen-

dants had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for the

commission of any crime. We conclude that there are

no genuine issues of material fact that the defendants

had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for interfering

with an officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-

167a.14

Section 53a-167a (a) provides: ‘‘A person is guilty of

interfering with an officer when such person obstructs,

resists, hinders or endangers any peace officer or fire-

fighter in the performance of such peace officer’s or

firefighter’s duties.’’ The plaintiff argues that there is a

genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was

probable cause to arrest him for interfering with an

officer because the defendants were acting outside the

scope of their role as police officers when they sub-

jected him to a battery. The flaw in the plaintiff’s argu-

ment is that he engaged in conduct that gave rise to

probable cause of interfering with a police officer

before the defendants exercised force on him. The

defendants were investigating whether the plaintiff was

trespassing at the property based on a persistent prob-

lem of individuals not permitted to be on the property

14

In their appellee brief, the defendants argue that, in addition to the

crimes with which the plaintiff was charged, namely, disorderly conduct,

interfering with an officer, and trespass in the third degree, they also had

probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for breach of the peace in violation

of General Statutes § 53a-181. Because we conclude that the defendants had

probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for interfering with an officer, we need

not consider whether there also was probable cause to arrest him for other

crimes. See, e.g., Kee v. New York, 12 F.4th 150, 158–59 (2d Cir. 2021) (‘‘a

police officer is not liable for a false arrest . . . if probable cause to arrest

the plaintiff existed for any crime’’ (emphasis in original; internal quotation

marks omitted)).

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Belton v. Dragoi

committing crimes there. When the defendants

approached the plaintiff, he did not cooperate in their

investigation by providing his name, identification, or

any other information regarding his right to be on the

property. He also refused to comply with Dragoi’s direc-

tives to step away from the building.

Although the defendants never said that they were

placing the plaintiff under arrest at that time, they had

probable cause to do so. ‘‘[T]he broad language of § 53a-

167a reflects a recognition by the legislature that,

because police officers are confronted daily with a wide

array of diverse and challenging scenarios, it would be

impractical, if not impossible, to craft a statute that

describes with precision exactly what obstructive con-

duct is proscribed. In other words, § 53a-167a necessar-

ily was drafted expansively to encompass a wide range

of conduct that may be deemed to impede or hinder a

police officer in the discharge of his or her official

duties.’’ State v. Aloi, 280 Conn. 824, 837, 911 A.2d 1086

(2007); see id., 837, 840–41 (failure to provide police

officer with name or identification constituted violation

of § 53a-167a). The undisputed facts establish that there

was probable cause for the defendants to believe that

the plaintiff was impeding or hindering their official

duties. Consequently, because the defendants had prob-

able cause to arrest the plaintiff for a crime, his cause

of action for false arrest necessarily fails.

The judgment is reversed with respect to the granting

of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to

the count of the complaint alleging battery and the case

is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.