Opinion

Lawson, Julie v. COSTAR GROUP, INC., COSTAR REALTY INFORMATION, INC

  • 2024 TN WC 72
Court
Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
Filed
Oct 1, 2024
Status
Published
On the bench
Baker
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 30.7%

The opinion

FILED

Oct 01, 2024

07:00 AM(CT)

TENNESSEE COURT OF

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

CLAIMS

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS

IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS

AT NASHVILLE

JULIE LAWSON, ) Docket No. 2024-60-0333

)

Employee, )

)

v. )

COSTAR GROUP, INC., COSTAR ) State File No. 26221-2023

REALTY INFORMATION, INC. )

Employer, )

)

BERKLEY NATIONAL INS. CO., ) Judge Joshua Davis Baker

Carrier.

COMPENSATION ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

On September 17, the Court heard CoStar’s Motion for Summary Judgment. CoStar

argued Ms. Lawson’s evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of her

mental-injury claim and summary judgment is appropriate. For the reasons below, the

Court grants summary judgment to CoStar and dismisses this claim with prejudice. 1

Claim History

Ms. Lawson has pre-existing post-traumatic stress disorder and alleged the

circumstances of a work evaluation on February 28, 2023, exacerbated her mental

condition. CoStar filed a statement of undisputed material facts to which Ms. Lawson

responded. The following facts are not disputed:

During a meeting that morning, a colleague inadvertently used the word

“kidnapped.” Although the word was not directed to or about Ms. Lawson, it reminded her

of a past traumatic event from 2002.

1

This decision renders Ms. Lawson’s “Objection and Motion to Compel Employer to Produce Audio” and

“Open Letter to the Court” moot.

A couple of hours later, Ms. Lawson received her annual evaluation results from

two male supervisors, Colton Frame and Michael Upchurch, who met with her to discuss

them.

However, Mr. Frame and Mr. Upchurch had permitted another supervisor, Fred

Bidel, to write the evaluation, even though Mr. Bidel was under a Human Resources

investigation for his alleged misconduct toward Ms. Lawson during the timeframe covered

by her evaluation.

While Ms. Lawson agreed with the above statements of undisputed material facts,

she responded that several other statements were wrong, inaccurate, or incomplete. She

offered the following response, from her previously filed affidavit, as an accurate

accounting of what caused her injury:

She further explained in her affidavit that “[w]hat Mr. Frame, Mr. Upchurch, and

Mr. Bidel did, in essence, overwhelmingly recreated parts of a personal traumatic event

from 2002 that had been brought to mind that very morning when a colleague randomly

used the word ‘kidnapped’ in a team meeting.”

Law and Analysis

Before addressing the motion’s merits, the Court first considers this claim’s

procedural posture and CoStar’s compliance with applicable rules.

The Court should not entertain a motion for summary judgment until a scheduling

order is entered. Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-21-.18(1)(b) (December 2023). Here, a

scheduling order was entered and later suspended. However, the scheduling order’s

suspension did not impede discovery or otherwise affect Ms. Lawson’s ability to respond

to summary judgment.

Additionally, CoStar allowed sufficient response time and sent Ms. Lawson a copy

of applicable rules, complying with both Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04 and

Rules 0800-02-21-.18(1)(a) and (c) of the Tennessee Compilation Rules and Regulations.

Therefore, this claim is procedurally ripe for summary judgment.

Turning to the merits, summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,

if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04 (2023).

To prevail, CoStar must do one of two things: (1) submit affirmative evidence that

negates an essential element of Ms. Lawson’s claim, or (2) demonstrate that her evidence

is insufficient to establish an essential element of her claim. Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101

(2024); see also Rye v. Women's Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 264

(Tenn. 2015).

When viewing the material facts in a light favorable to Ms. Lawson, the Court finds

that CoStar has demonstrated her evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element

of her claim: that the work event resulted in a stimulus that would constitute a viable claim

for a mental injury.

Under Workers’ Compensation Law, a mental injury that is not accompanied by a

physical injury must arise primarily out of “an identifiable work related event resulting in

a sudden or unusual stimulus, and shall not include a psychological or psychiatric response

due to the loss of employment or employment opportunities.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-

102(15).

Tennessee courts apply a two-part test to determine if an injury caused by mental or

emotional stimulus is compensable. First, the injury must stem from “an identifiable

stressful, work-related event producing a sudden mental stimulus such as fright, shock, or

excessive unexpected anxiety.” Second, “the event must be extraordinary in comparison to

the stress ordinarily experienced by an employee in the same type of duty.” Edwards v.

Fred’s Pharmacy, 2018 TN Work. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 9, at *7 (Feb. 14, 2018).

The parties do not dispute the material facts—only how the law applies to them. Ms.

Lawson argues an identifiable work event (the “evaluation-during-investigation”) resulted

in a sudden or unusual stimulus for her. Her analysis requires using a subjective standard

that incorporates her pre-existing mental or psychological condition to explain how the

stressful work event produced a sudden and unusual stimulus for her when it would not

have for someone else.

That subjective standard “is not the law in Tennessee.” Ireton v. Horizon Mental

Health Mgmt., LLC, No. E2015-00296-SC-R3-WC, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 3, at *28 (Tenn.

Workers’ Comp. Panel Jan. 19, 2016). Rather, “our Supreme Court has mandated the

application of an objective test for this determination.” An “objective standard is required

. . . even [when] medical experts have opined that the Employee suffered PTSD stemming

out of the particular event or stress.” Id. at *28-29.

Notably, applying an objective standard “is not inconsistent with the principle under

Tennessee law that an employer takes an employee as it finds him[,]” for the following

reason:

[I]t is only after the court first determines that an event or stress was

abnormal, extraordinary, or unusual under the objective standard that the

court then applies the principle that the employer takes the employee as it

finds him to the determination of whether the abnormal, extraordinary, or

unusual event or stress was, in fact, the medical/psychological cause of the

employee’s injuries.”

Id. at *30-31.

This “objective standard . . . is consistent with the Court’s recognition that the

workers’ compensation system does not embrace every stress or strain of daily living or

every undesirable experience encountered” during employment. Id. (citations omitted).

So, CoStar has shown that although Ms. Lawson has identified a work event, her

claim is missing an essential element: “a sudden or unusual stimulus” under an objective

standard that “shall not include a psychological or psychiatric response due to the loss of

employment or employment opportunities.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(15).

Ms. Lawson has not responded with facts to show the circumstances of her

evaluation would have produced a sudden or unusual stimulus such as fright, shock, or

excessive unexpected anxiety in another employee.

Certainly, permitting a supervisor who is under investigation for his conduct toward

his supervisee to write her evaluation could produce unpleasant emotions like anger,

powerlessness, or feelings of subjugation. But those feelings are not uncommon or

unexpected in a workplace where supervisors must wield and exert authority even if the

results seem unfair. Ms. Lawson acknowledged her physical safety was not harmed or

threatened. Instead, the threat of harm and loss was to her employment and employment

opportunities.

Statutory law and caselaw direct that a mental injury does “not include a

psychological or psychiatric response due to the loss of employment or employment

opportunities.” Id. at subsection 102(15). A “concern over employment terms and

conditions occurs in all types of occupations and is an inevitable concomitant of any

contract of employment.” Cigna Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sneed, 772 S.W.2d at 424

(Tenn. 1989). As the Tennessee Supreme Court wrote:

If the employee in this case under these facts was entitled to recover benefits,

then any employee who becomes anxious or depressed over an adverse

employment decision or action, such as the possibility of losing a job; a poor

evaluation; a transfer; a demotion; a layoff; and the like, would be able to

recover benefits. Hence the rule that generalized fear or worry regarding job

performance or job security does not rise to the level of a compensable injury.

Goodloe v. State, 36 S.W.3d 62, 67 (Tenn. 2001)

CoStar has met its burden to show that Ms. Lawson is missing an essential element

of her claim: an event that would produce a sudden and unusual stimulus for an ordinary

employee and that does not involve the threat of harm or loss to employment or

employment opportunities. Because Ms. Lawson did not respond with facts showing a

genuine issue for trial under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.06, the Court finds

summary judgment is appropriate and CoStar is entitled to summary judgment as a matter

of law.

IT IS ORDERED as follows:

1. Ms. Lawson’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits is dismissed with prejudice

to its refiling.

2. Absent an appeal of this order, it shall become final thirty days after issuance.

3. The filing fee of $150.00 is taxed to CoStar under Tennessee Compilation Rules and

Regulations 0800-02-21-.07, to be paid to the Court Clerk and for which execution

might issue as necessary.

4. CoStar shall prepare and file the SD-2 with the Clerk within ten days of this order

becoming final.

IT IS ORDERED.

1 2024.

ENTERED October ___,

______________________________________

Joshua Davis Baker, Judge

Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1 2024.

I certify that a copy of this Order was sent as indicated on October ___,

Name Certified Fax Email Service sent to:

Mail

Julie Lawson, X julie.lawson0207@gmail.com

Employee

Allen Callison, X allen.callison@mgclaw.com

Employer’s Attorney

______________________________________

Penny Shrum, Court Clerk

Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims

wc.courtclerk@tn.gov

Right to Appeal:

If you disagree with the Court’s Order, you may appeal to the Workers’ Compensation

Appeals Board. To do so, you must:

1. Complete the enclosed form entitled “Notice of Appeal” and file it with the Clerk of the

Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims before the expiration of the deadline.

¾ If the order being appealed is “expedited” (also called “interlocutory”), or if the

order does not dispose of the case in its entirety, the notice of appeal must be filed

within seven (7) business days of the date the order was filed.

¾ If the order being appealed is a “Compensation Order,” or if it resolves all issues

in the case, the notice of appeal must be filed within thirty (30) calendar days of

the date the Compensation Order was filed.

When filing the Notice of Appeal, you must serve a copy on the opposing party (or attorney,

if represented).

2. You must pay, via check, money order, or credit card, a $75.00 filing fee within ten calendar

days after filing the Notice of Appeal. Payments can be made in-person at any Bureau office

or by U.S. mail, hand-delivery, or other delivery service. In the alternative, you may file an

Affidavit of Indigency (form available on the Bureau’s website or any Bureau office)

seeking a waiver of the filing fee. You must file the fully-completed Affidavit of Indigency

within ten calendar days of filing the Notice of Appeal. Failure to timely pay the filing

fee or file the Affidavit of Indigency will result in dismissal of your appeal.

3. You are responsible for ensuring a complete record is presented on appeal. If no court

reporter was present at the hearing, you may request from the Court Clerk the audio

recording of the hearing for a $25.00 fee. If you choose to submit a transcript as part of your

appeal, which the Appeals Board has emphasized is important for a meaningful review of

the case, a licensed court reporter must prepare the transcript, and you must file it with the

Court Clerk. The Court Clerk will prepare the record for submission to the Appeals Board,

and you will receive notice once it has been submitted. For deadlines related to the filing of

transcripts, statements of the evidence, and briefs on appeal, see the applicable rules on the

Bureau’s website at https://www.tn.gov/wcappealsboard. (Click the “Read Rules” button.)

4. After the Workers’ Compensation Judge approves the record and the Court Clerk transmits

it to the Appeals Board, a docketing notice will be sent to the parties.

If neither party timely files an appeal with the Appeals Board, the Court Order

becomes enforceable. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(d)(3) (expedited/interlocutory

orders) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (compensation orders).

For self-represented litigants: Help from an Ombudsman is available at 800-332-2667.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Tennessee Bureau of Workers’ Compensation

www.tn.gov/workforce/injuries-at-work/

wc.courtclerk@tn.gov | 1-800-332-2667

Docket No.: ________________________

State File No.: ______________________

Date of Injury: _____________________

___________________________________________________________________________

Employee

v.

___________________________________________________________________________

Employer

Notice is given that ____________________________________________________________________

[List name(s) of all appealing party(ies). Use separate sheet if necessary.]

appeals the following order(s) of the Tennessee Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims to the

Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board;ĐŚĞĐŬŽŶĞŽƌŵŽƌĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂďůĞďŽdžĞƐĂŶĚŝŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĞĚĂƚĞĨŝůĞͲ

ƐƚĂŵƉĞĚŽŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƉĂŐĞŽĨƚŚĞŽƌĚĞƌ;ƐͿďĞŝŶŐĂƉƉĞĂůĞĚͿ͗

□ Expedited Hearing Order filed on _______________ □ Motion Order filed on ___________________

□ Compensation Order filed on__________________ □ Other Order filed on_____________________

issued by Judge _________________________________________________________________________.

Statement of the Issues on Appeal

Provide a short and plain statement of the issues on appeal or basis for relief on appeal:

________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

Parties

Appellant(s) (Requesting Party): _________________________________________ ‫܆‬Employer ‫܆‬Employee

Address: ________________________________________________________ Phone: ___________________

Email: __________________________________________________________

Attorney’s Name: ______________________________________________ BPR#: _______________________

Attorney’s Email: ______________________________________________ Phone: _______________________

Attorney’s Address: _________________________________________________________________________

* Attach an additional sheet for each additional Appellant *

LB-1099 rev. 01/20 Page 1 of 2 RDA 11082

Employee Name: _______________________________________ Docket No.: _____________________ Date of Inj.: _______________

Appellee(s) (Opposing Party): ___________________________________________ ‫܆‬Employer ‫܆‬Employee

Appellee’s Address: ______________________________________________ Phone: ____________________

Email: _________________________________________________________

Attorney’s Name: _____________________________________________ BPR#: ________________________

Attorney’s Email: _____________________________________________ Phone: _______________________

Attorney’s Address: _________________________________________________________________________

* Attach an additional sheet for each additional Appellee *

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, _____________________________________________________________, certify that I have forwarded a

true and exact copy of this Notice of Appeal by First Class mail, postage prepaid, or in any manner as described

in Tennessee Compilation Rules & Regulations, Chapter 0800-02-21, to all parties and/or their attorneys in this

case on this the __________ day of ___________________________________, 20 ____.

______________________________________________

[Signature of appellant or attorney for appellant]

LB-1099 rev. 01/20 Page 2 of 2 RDA 11082

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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