State of Tennessee v. Johnny Ray Deyton

09/27/2024

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs September 24, 2024

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JOHNNY RAY DEYTON

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Johnson County

No. 2022-CR-91 Lisa Rice, Judge

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No. E2024-00252-CCA-R3-CD

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The Defendant, Johnny Ray Deyton, appeals his Johnson County Criminal Court

convictions of possession of twenty-six (26) grams or more of methamphetamine with

intent to sell or deliver, felony tampering with evidence, and various other misdemeanor

drug and driving related offenses, for which he received an effective sentence of thirteen

years’ imprisonment. Before trial, the Defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence

derived from the traffic stop which led to his arrest and indictment, arguing that the stop

was an unreasonable warrantless seizure of his person in violation of the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the Tennessee

Constitution. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s motion and

determined that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion of reckless driving.

The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to

suppress because the traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion. After review,

we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT H.

MONTGOMERY, JR., and JILL BARTEE AYERS, JJ., joined.

Ryan E. Carroll, Mountain City, Tennessee, for the appellant, Johnny Ray Deyton.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin A. Ball, Senior Assistant

Attorney General; Steven R. Finney, District Attorney General; and Dennis D. Brooks and

Leon T. Marshall, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of

Tennessee.

OPINION

Facts and Procedural History. On June 22, 2022, an officer with the Mountain

City Police Department (MCPD) was driving on a one-lane road when he observed the

Defendant driving a maroon truck in the opposite direction. The Defendant “increased

speed, went off [the] road striking a ditch while still maintaining [] very close contact with

[another] vehicle that had the right of way,” got back on the road and “went off [the] road

again to avoid striking” the officer’s patrol car. Within minutes, the officer initiated a

traffic stop, and as the Defendant stepped out of the truck, a bag suddenly appeared on the

ground underneath his truck. The Defendant smelled strongly of marijuana, admitted that

he did not have a driver’s license, and begged the officer not to take him to jail. Various

contraband was subsequently recovered, including marijuana and a glass pipe with white

residue from the Defendant’s person, marijuana “grinders” from inside the truck bed, and

a bag from underneath the truck containing a white crystallized substance that Tennessee

Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”) lab tests later determined to be 44.76 grams of

methamphetamine. The investigation further revealed that the Defendant’s license had

been revoked, the registration on the truck belonged to a different vehicle, and the vehicle

lacked insurance and registration. Officers also determined that the Defendant had just

been released from jail, and he had returned to the jail parking lot in violation of the

Sheriff’s Office policy. Based on this conduct, the Defendant was indicted on September

9, 2022, by a Johnson County grand jury of possession of twenty-six (26) grams or more

of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony (Count 1), tampering

with evidence, a Class C felony (Count 2), simple possession of a Schedule VI controlled

substance (Count 3), possession of drug paraphernalia (Count 4), driving on a revoked

license (Count 5), all Class A misdemeanors, and reckless driving, a Class B misdemeanor

(Count 6).

Suppression Hearing. Prior to trial, the Defendant filed a motion to suppress the

evidence recovered during the stop. As grounds, the Defendant asserted, in relevant part,

that “the way the vehicle was driven did not provide Patrolman Ricky Norris, or [Sergeant]

Thomas Brown, with reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop,” and that the Defendant

did not operate his vehicle in a manner that would constitute reckless driving in accordance

with Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-205.1 Had he struck a ditch with his vehicle, the Defendant

argued he would have been unable to continue driving and that there would have been

damage to his vehicle.

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The Defendant also argued that he was subject to custodial interrogation at the time of the stop

and sought suppression of his verbal statements to law enforcement. He does not raise this issue on direct

appeal; therefore, it is waived.

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The State filed a written response and asserted that the traffic stop was supported by

“probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic violation has occurred,”

because the Defendant operated his vehicle in an “unsafe manner, coming very close to

striking [Officer] Norris’s vehicle and the vehicle in front of him.” See Tenn. Code Ann. §

55-10-205 (noting that “any person who drives any vehicle in willful or wanton disregard

for the safety of persons or property commits reckless driving”). The State further argued

that the Defendant abandoned the bag of methamphetamine because he “discarded [it]

under the truck, after he was stopped and . . . relinquished any expectation of privacy” to

the bag.

On June 2, 2023, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to suppress.

MCPD Officer Richard “Ricky” Norris testified that on June 22, 2022, he was driving his

patrol car to the Sheriff’s Office in Mountain City to pick up some paperwork when he

turned onto Honeysuckle Street, a short, narrow, one-lane road traversing a small hill.

“[O]nly one vehicle can fit on Honeysuckle Street at a time . . . [o]therwise[,] the other

vehicle would have to be off-road.” Officer Norris was traveling slowly uphill behind

another vehicle when a Ford Ranger truck, driving fast in the opposite direction, suddenly

appeared as it turned the corner at the top of the hill, heading directly for a truck in front

of Officer Norris’s patrol car. The truck narrowly avoided a collision by whipping around

the front car, driving into the ditch on the side of the road, and, in the process, damaging a

drainage pipe near the ditch. The truck then returned to the road and accelerated toward

Officer Norris’s patrol car. At this point, Officer Norris looked inside the windshield of

the truck and recognized the driver as the Defendant, with whom he had had previous

interaction. No passengers were in the truck with the Defendant.

The Defendant’s truck was about to collide with Officer Norris’s patrol car, but the

Defendant swerved his truck around the patrol car and drove off-road a second time before

returning to the road again. Through his rearview mirror, Officer Norris observed the

Defendant reach the bottom of the hill and turn left onto Crossroads Drive. Officer Norris

characterized the Defendant’s driving as “very reckless” and “erratic” and stated that he

had never seen anyone drive on Honeysuckle Street in the same manner. Officer Norris

drove up to the Sheriff’s Office parking lot to turn around and briefly lost sight of the

Defendant. Officer Norris radioed his partner, Sergeant Thomas Brown, with a description

of the truck the Defendant was driving. Sergeant Brown later confirmed that the Defendant

was driving into the parking lot area of a Quick Shop convenience store on Crossroads

Drive and Highway 421. Officer Norris drove to the location and initiated a traffic stop

for reckless driving before the Defendant parked his truck. Sergeant Brown arrived shortly

thereafter to assist.

Officer Norris parked his patrol car facing the direction of the Defendant’s truck,

observed the Defendant sitting in the truck before “coming to rest in the parking space,”

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and noted that nothing was on the ground at that time. Before Officer Norris approached

the Defendant, he observed the Defendant “rummaging” through the truck, and Officer

Norris could not see the Defendant’s hands. Officer Norris said the Defendant did not exit

his truck until after he was ordered to do so. As the Defendant opened the door, Officer

Norris observed something appear underneath the truck. Officer Norris said that it was

“strange,” that it appeared to look like a bag, and that it required further investigation.

Officer Norris continued to approach the Defendant, who appeared very nervous. The

Defendant was sweating profusely, stuttered as he spoke, and informed Officer Norris that

he had just gotten out of jail within the previous two weeks. The Defendant said he did not

have a driver’s license and begged Officer Norris not to take him to jail.

During the interaction, Officer Norris noticed the smell of marijuana emanating

from the Defendant’s person and his truck. Before searching the Defendant’s truck, Officer

Norris patted the Defendant down and found marijuana in the Defendant’s pocket and a

small glass pipe with white crystallized residue on it in the Defendant’s waistband. A

search of the Defendant’s truck revealed multiple marijuana grinders in the bed of the truck.

Officer Norris said the Defendant was “very cooperative” throughout the process. Officer

Norris then inspected the bag he observed underneath the truck. He described the bag as

packaged in what a lot of people these days are using. They’re the bags to

try to throw off narcotic K9s. So[,] the bags themselves are supposed to seal

scents that K9s can pick up on. And these bags have a picture of a jar on the

front, like a sealed jar, like a[n] airtight jar.

There was cellophane inside the bag and a white crystalized substance the field tested

positive for 47 grams of methamphetamine inside the cellophane. TBI lab tests later

determined the bag actually contained 44.76 grams of methamphetamine.

The officers ran a license check and discovered that the Defendant’s license had

been revoked, that the license plate attached to the truck belonged to another vehicle, and

that the truck was not registered. The Defendant was subsequently arrested and charged

with the above offenses. An inventory search of the truck was also conducted because the

truck was towed from the parking lot. The only video footage pertaining to the offenses

was from the Sheriff’s Office parking lot, which was recorded prior to the search of the

Defendant and his truck.

Before the suppression hearing, Officer Norris measured Honeysuckle Street, the

vehicles involved that day, and took photographs from his vantage point at the time he

encountered the Defendant, which were admitted into evidence. The only difference in the

photographs was that there was “not as much [black plastic] pipe” in the drainage ditch

because on “the date of the actual occurrence . . . it had been driven over and crushed.” In

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one of the photographs, Officer Norris circled the ditch line at the top of the hill where the

first encounter between the Defendant’s truck and the truck in front of Officer Norris’s

patrol car took place. He also illustrated the ditch line where the Defendant’s truck went

“off-road through and back onto the road.” Officer Norris measured Honeysuckle Street

and determined it was approximately “ten to [eleven] feet” wide, which he opined was not

wide enough for two full-size vehicles.

On cross-examination, Officer Norris identified by photograph the first point he

observed the Defendant as “not on top of the hill, but . . . coming off that crest . . . of the

hill.” He agreed that he could not see the Defendant “behind the house” from his angle

coming up the road, and conversely, that the Defendant could not see him. He denied that

a driver would have to “drive off-road” to avoid hitting oncoming vehicles. He explained

that it is customary for drivers on Honeysuckle Street to pull into a turn off on the right

side of the road at the top of the hill to let other vehicles pass. However, given the

Defendant’s speed and the fact that he drove past the turn off, his only option was to drive

off-road to avoid a collision. If the Defendant had not driven off-road, he would have

struck another vehicle. Officer Norris agreed there was no accident and no actual contact

between the vehicles.

Officer Norris said that his partner observed the Defendant’s truck at the Quick Shop

parking lot within a minute of the initial encounter. Officer Norris clarified that the

Defendant did not exit the truck until he was instructed to do so, and that the Defendant

did not have anything in his hands. He described the bag recovered from underneath the

Defendant’s truck as approximately eight inches in length and five inches wide, and he

agreed that if the Defendant had exited the truck with it, Officer Norris would have seen it.

Officer Norris further confirmed that his encounter with the Defendant was not captured

on his body camera or the dash camera of his vehicle. Officer Norris testified that the

Defendant struck the ditch pipe causing property damage; however, he was not charged

with vandalism. On redirect examination, Officer Norris said the Defendant had enough

room to have stopped and allowed the oncoming vehicles to pass in front of him without

driving off-road.

The Defendant called Sergeant Thomas Brown to testify as part of his proof.

Sergeant Brown testified consistently with the testimony of Officer Norris; however, he

recalled the Defendant was already outside his truck before he was advised to exit the

vehicle. Sergeant Brown said it causes “alarm” in a traffic stop any time a door is opened

before someone is asked to get out of the vehicle. Sergeant Brown also recalled asking the

Defendant about Amber Gary, who had a drug-related criminal history. He did not test any

of the items recovered from the Defendant’s truck for fingerprints. On cross-examination,

Sergeant Brown agreed that he could have been mistaken about whether the Defendant was

outside of his truck before being asked to exit it.

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Following argument of the parties, the trial court orally denied the motion to

suppress and reasoned, in pertinent part, as follows:

So the — obviously probable — proof beyond a reasonable doubt was

not required for the officer’s assessment. And it’s the Court’s opinion that

the, -- and the Court finds that reckless driving is somewhat of a subjective

analysis for an officer on duty.

And the Court finds that the officer testified that he was creeping

slowly when [the Defendant] drove around the road there on Honeysuckle;

crested the hill; went into the ditch; sped up; went into the ditch a second

time. And when he turned to follow him, based upon what his perception of

— of the driving as reckless was, [the Defendant] was already out of view.

The . . .

And then he found him at the Quick Shop market.

So the Court finds that there’s some subjectivity here on the part of

the officer to determine based on his observations that clearly this Court’s

not privy to and the description as provided by the officer could clearly

constitute a willful and wanton disregard for the safety and property of others

based upon the officer’s description here today. So that takes us to the

exception for, the search once the officer stops [the Defendant] based upon

his observation of his driving and his analysis that what he observed was, in

fact, reckless.

The order denying the motion to suppress was filed on June 2, 2023. The evidence

presented at trial was consistent with the proof at the motion to suppress, and the Defendant

was convicted as charged. The Defendant filed an unsuccessful motion for a new trial,

again challenging the constitutionality of the traffic stop. He later filed a timely notice of

appeal, and this case is now properly before this court for review.

ANALYSIS

Standard of Review. The standard of review applicable to suppression issues

involves a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Garcia, 123 S.W.3d 335, 342 (Tenn.

2003). “[A] trial court’s findings of fact in a suppression hearing will be upheld unless the

evidence preponderates otherwise.” State v. Cox, 171 S.W.3d 174, 178 (Tenn. 2005)

(quoting State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996)). The Tennessee Supreme Court

explained this standard in State v. Odom:

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Questions of credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the

evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to

the trial judge as the trier of fact. The party prevailing in the trial court is

entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence adduced at the

suppression hearing as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that

may be drawn from that evidence. So long as the greater weight of the

evidence supports the trial court’s findings, those findings shall be upheld.

Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23. “However, this court reviews a trial court’s application of law

to the facts under a de novo standard of review with no presumption of correctness.” State

v. McKinney, 669 S.W.3d 753, 764 (Tenn. 2023) (citing State v. Echols, 382 S.W.3d 266,

277 (Tenn. 2012)). The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article

I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution protect against unreasonable searches and

seizures. The stop of a vehicle and the detention of its occupants constitutes a seizure

within the meaning of both constitutions. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10,

(1996); State v. Day, 263 S.W.3d 891, 902 (Tenn. 2008); State v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215,

218 (Tenn. 2000).

A warrantless seizure “is presumed unreasonable, and evidence discovered as a

result thereof is subject to suppression unless the State demonstrates that the . . . seizure

was conducted pursuant to one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant

requirement.” State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997) (citing Coolidge v.

New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Bartram, 925 S.W.2d 227, 229-30

(Tenn. 1996)). Under these exceptions, “the stop of an automobile is constitutionally

reasonable, under both the state and federal constitutions, if the police have probable cause

or reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” State v. Vineyard,

958 S.W.2d 730, 734 (Tenn. 1997) (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 810).

Probable cause exists if “at the time of [a seizure], the facts and circumstances

within the knowledge of the officers, and of which they had reasonably trustworthy

information, are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the defendant had

committed or was committing an offense.” State v. Dodson, 450 S.W.3d 1, 50 (Tenn.

2014) (quoting Echols, 382 S.W.2d at 277-78). Probable cause requires a law enforcement

to have more than a mere suspicion that an offense has occurred. Echols, 382 S.W.2d at

278 (citing State v. Lawrence, 154 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tenn. 2005)).

If an officer lacks probable cause, a traffic stop will still be constitutional if, based

on the totality of circumstances, the officer has “a reasonable suspicion, supported by

specific and articulable facts, that a criminal offense has been or is about to be committed.”

State v. Bridges 963 S.W.2d 487, 492 (Tenn. 1997) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21

(1968); Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d at 630; State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 394 (Tenn. 1992)).

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“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause . . . .” Id. (quoting

Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)). “Reasonable suspicion is a particularized

and objective basis for suspecting the subject of a stop of criminal activity and must be

‘something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” State v.

Davis, 484 S.W.3d 138, 150 (Tenn. 2016) (internal citations omitted) (internal quotations

omitted).

“Many of [Tennessee’s] traffic statutes create offenses which render it simple for

an officer to determine whether a motorist has committed a violation. . . . When a police

officer sees a motorist commit such an offense, the officer will have probable cause to stop

the motorist.” State v. Smith, 484 S.W.3d 393, 400-01 (Tenn. 2016). Under Tennessee

law, reckless driving occurs when a person “drives any vehicle in willful or wanton

disregard for the safety of persons or property.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-205(a). “Willful

and wanton disregard for another’s safety is a factual question properly determined from

all the circumstances. It exceeds negligence in that the actor willfully breaches a duty.”

State v. Wilkins, 654 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Tenn. 1983). It involves “‘a heedless and reckless

disregard for another’s rights, with the consciousness that the act or omission to act may

result in injury to another.’” Id. (quoting Burgess v. State, 369 S.W.2d 731, 733

(Tenn.1963)).

The Defendant argues that the June 22 traffic stop was unconstitutional because

Officer Norris lacked reasonable suspicion that the Defendant had engaged in reckless

driving. Specifically, the Defendant contends that, before nearly crashing into two

vehicles, he was driving around a very sharp, blind curve, and that his view of oncoming

traffic was obstructed by the house at the top of the hill. The Defendant insists that the

only way for the Defendant to have avoided a collision was to drive off-road and that it is

unreasonable to suspect someone of reckless driving for driving off-road to avoid an

accident. Finally, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding that the State

had presented specific, articulable facts showing Officer Norris had reasonable suspicion

to conduct a traffic stop because Officer Norris’s testimony was not supported by video

evidence.

Conversely, the State contends that Officer Norris not only had reasonable

suspicion, but probable cause to stop the Defendant. In the State’s view, the Defendant’s

choice to drive off-road to avoid hitting two vehicles, even though there was both a ditch

and a home on the side of road, and to accelerate rather than slow down when he

approached Officer Norris’s patrol car, clearly establishes probable cause of reckless

driving. If these facts were sufficient to support a unanimous jury verdict of reckless

driving, the State argues, they are sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of probable

cause during the suppression hearing. Lastly, the State asserts that at a minimum, the stop

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was supported by reasonable suspicion because the Defendant’s conduct created a

dangerous situation for oncoming traffic and nearby property. We agree with the State.

Our review of the record shows that the trial court properly denied the motion to

suppress. Officer Norris observed the Defendant driving in the opposite direction on a

narrow one-lane road. The Defendant suddenly appeared as he turned the corner at the top

of the hill, heading directly for a truck in front of Officer Norris. The Defendant’s truck

narrowly avoided a collision by whipping around the front vehicle, driving into the ditch

on the side of the road, and, in the process, damaging a drainage pipe near the ditch. The

Defendant’s truck returned to the road and accelerated toward Officer Norris’s patrol car.

The Defendant was about to collide with Officer Norris’s patrol car, but he swerved around

the patrol car and drove off-road a second time before returning to the road again. Officer

Norris characterized the Defendant’s driving as “very reckless” and “erratic” and stated

that he had never seen anyone drive on Honeysuckle Street in the same manner. These

facts demonstrate that the Defendant drove his truck with willful or wanton disregard for

the safety of Officer Norris, the car in front of him, and the drainage pipe, and thus,

provided Officer Norris with probable cause to initiate a traffic stop for the offense of

reckless driving. See Davis, 484 S.W.3d at 150 (declining to address reasonable suspicion

and clarifying that when an officer observes a driver actually committing a traffic

infraction, the officer has probable cause to initiate a traffic stop).

Regarding the Defendant’s arguments to the contrary, we acknowledge the

Defendant’s claim that Officer Norris testified on cross-examination there would have been

a collision had the Defendant stayed on the road. However, Officer Norris also testified

that drivers customarily wait in the turn off area at the top of the hill to let oncoming traffic

pass, that the Defendant did not stop when he had the opportunity to do so, and that Officer

Norris had never seen anyone drive on Honeysuckle Street in the same manner as the

Defendant. The Defendant next argues that he was not charged with vandalism of the

drainage pipe; therefore, his driving could not have been reckless. The fact that the

Defendant was not charged with vandalism or property damage to the pipe in the ditch

when his truck went off-road does not negate his disregard for the safety of Officer Norris

or the other vehicle in front of Officer Norris which provided Officer Norris with probable

cause to initiate a traffic stop for reckless driving. Finally, the Defendant asserts that the

trial court erred in finding that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion

because Officer Norris’s testimony was not supported by video evidence. However, the

credibility of witnesses are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact, and

Officer Norris’s testimony was deemed credible. Furthermore, video evidence is not

required to corroborate an officer’s otherwise credible testimony. Because the record does

not preponderate against the determination of the trial court, the Defendant is not entitled

to relief.

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CONCLUSION

Because Officer Norris observed the Defendant commit a traffic infraction by

driving his vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of other persons or property

in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-205(a), Officer Norris had probable cause to

initiate the traffic stop of the Defendant. Accordingly, Officer Norris’s seizure of the

Defendant did not violate the Defendant’s constitutional rights, and the trial court did not

err in denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment

of the trial court.

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CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, PRESIDING JUDGE

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