The opinion
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2024 PA Super 223
MARCELO AITA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
NCB MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. :
:
Appellant : No. 510 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered January 21, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Civil Division at No(s): 2019-00981
MARCELO AITA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
NCB MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. : No. 615 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered January 21, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Civil Division at No(s): 2019-00981
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BOWES, J., STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN,
J., NICHOLS, J., KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and LANE, J.
DISSENTING OPINION BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 26, 2024
Based upon the particular facts of this case, I join the learned Dissent’s
opinion reversing the order of the trial court. I write separately, however,
because the Dissent’s correct statutory analysis of the Wage Payment and
Collection Law (“WPCL”) highlights a shortcoming that may frustrate the very
purpose of the statute.
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“The primary goal of the WPCL is to make whole again employees whose
wages were wrongfully withheld by their employers.” Ely v. Susquehanna,
Inc., 130 A.3d 6, 13 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). Under the WPCL
an employee has a remedy when any type of wage “is payable”, and the
penalty of “liquidated damages” is collectable if the wages remain unpaid for
more than 30 days, or more than 60 days in certain instances defined under
the statute. See 43 P.S. §§ 260.9a(a) and 260.10. Where statutory
language is clear and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the words
of the statute. When interpreting a statute, courts may not look beyond the
plain meaning of a statute under the guise of pursuing its spirit. See City of
Johnstown v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, 255 A.3d 214, 220
(Pa. 2021).
While I agree with the dissent’s interpretation of the plain meaning of
the phrase “is payable,” see Dis. Op. at 4-7, I am concerned that under that
interpretation, an employer could, without good reason, make a practice of
paying its employees one-to-two weeks late, with interest, which would make
it practically impossible for the employees to have wages “payable” for a
sufficient period to allow them to file suit under the WPCL and, if unpaid for
more than 30 days, seek liquidated damages. For the innumerable employees
who live paycheck to paycheck, such a practice could have dire financial
consequences, including, for example, penalties for late payment of rent or
the necessity to take a “pay day” loan at exorbitant interest rates, which could
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heavily burden an employee’s personal budget with no statutory opportunity
to be made whole. Yet under such a scenario, the employer would not be
required to pay liquidated damages and would have no disincentive to
discontinue the practice.
It is, however, not within the purview of this Court to “disregard the
letter of the statute under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” Goodwin v.
Goodwin, 280 A.3d 937, 943 (Pa. 2022) (citation omitted). The Legislature,
not this Court, is charged with the authority to make any changes in the WPCL
it deems necessary to protect employees against the hypothetical employer
practice described above. Thus, because I agree with the Dissent’s
interpretation of the plain language of the WPCL, I join the Dissent.
Judge Dubow joins this dissenting opinion.
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