The opinion
Filed 9/25/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re the Marriage of KIMBERLEY B326716
CADY and VINCENT GAMICK.
(Los Angeles County
KIMBERLEY CADY, Super. Ct. No. BD114645)
Appellant,
v.
VINCENT GAMICK,
Respondent.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Mark A. Juhas, Judge. Reversed in part and vacated in
part.
Joel S. Seidel for Appellant.
Gary J. Cohen, APLC and Gary J. Cohen; Elkins Kalt
Weintraub Reuben Gartside and Susannah Braffman Amen for
Respondent.
_______________________
This appeal requires harmonizing two statutes that govern
the financial responsibility of parents who have an adult child
with significant disabilities. Family Code section 3910 makes the
parents of an adult child “who is incapacitated from earning a
living and without sufficient means” financially responsible for
maintaining that child “to the extent of their abilit[ies].” (Id.,
subd. (a).) Such adult children often receive certain types of
government assistance, and Welfare and Institutions Code
section 12350 states that “[n]o relative shall be held legally liable
to support or to contribute to the support of any applicant for or
recipient of [such] aid,” and further that “[n]otwithstanding
[s]ection[ ] 3910 . . . of the Family Code, . . . no demand shall be
made upon any relative to support or contribute toward the
support of any applicant for or recipient of [such] aid.”
That leads to the following question: Does Welfare and
Institutions Code section 12350 mean that an adult disabled
child’s application for or receipt of government aid bars one
parent from seeking an order of child support from the other
parent pursuant to Family Code section 3910? Our answer is no.
The Legislature intended Welfare and Institutions Code section
12350 to prevent government actors from seeking reimbursement
for the cost of government assistance from relatives of aid
recipients. Because Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350
bars only the government from seeking contribution from
relatives to defray the costs of such aid, it does not bar a parent
from seeking a court order requiring the other parent to
contribute to the support of an adult disabled child under Family
Code section 3910.
Applied to the facts here, that means the family court erred
in finding a father earning approximately $2 to $3 million a year
2
had no responsibility to help financially support his disabled
adult son regardless of that child’s need because the son received
approximately $12,600 a year in government benefits subject to
Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350. Based in part on its
interpretation of the two statutes at issue, the family court also
limited the needs-based attorney’s fees awarded in favor of the
child’s mother and payable by the father. We vacate that fee
award to permit the court to reconsider it in light of our reversal
on the statutory interpretation issue.
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Schuyler Gamick is the adult son of divorced parents
Kimberley Cady (Mother) and Vincent Gamick (Father).1
Schuyler was born in 1990, has autism spectrum disorder, and
receives services from the Regional Center. He receives
government aid including Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
and aid under the State Supplementary Program for Aged, Blind
and Disabled (SSP; Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 12000-12351).
B. Mother’s Request for Order Seeking Support and
Father’s Response
1. The Parties’ Arguments, Evidence, and Stipulations
On May 26, 2020, Mother filed a post-dissolution judgment
request for order (RFO) for child support payable by Father. She
alleged Schuyler was “incapable of earning a living” and “without
sufficient means to support himself.” Schuyler lived with Mother,
1 We refer to Schuyler by his first name as he shares the
same last name as Father. We do so for ease of reference, as is
common in family law matters, and intend no disrespect.
3
who provided for his care and paid for all his expenses. Mother
alleged that Father had not contributed to Schuyler’s living
expenses since 2009, although he did provide health insurance
until Schuyler turned 26 years old. Mother also requested
attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Family Code sections 2030
and 2032 to help her litigate support owed to Schuyler.
On January 14, 2021, Father filed his response. He argued
Mother did not prove Schuyler was sufficiently incapacitated to
qualify for child support, and if the court were inclined to grant
child support, it should deviate from the guideline child support
amount because the guideline support amount “would exceed
Schuyler’s needs.” (Capitalization omitted.)
On January 25, 2021, in response to Father’s claim that
Schuyler could work, Mother submitted Schuyler’s individual
program plan from the Eastern Los Angeles Regional Center
(ELARC), a psychological assessment report, and letters and
declarations from, among others, Schuyler’s sibling, the vice
president of adult programs for an independent living skills
program, a psychologist, and a service coordinator for ELARC
attesting that Schuyler currently could not obtain and sustain a
job. Father objected to much of Mother’s evidence and identified
two expert witnesses that he intended to call regarding
opportunities for employment and workplace accommodations.
The evidentiary hearing for Mother’s RFO was eventually
scheduled for August 30, 2022. Mother’s attorney first learned in
early August 2022 that Father intended to argue that Welfare
and Institutions Code section 12350 barred Mother from seeking
child support payments related to Schuyler. Father did not seek
to have the court make a dispositive ruling on the issue in
4
advance of the evidentiary hearing, and Mother did not advise
the court of the issue.
Prior to the evidentiary hearing, the parties stipulated to
the following: in 2014, Schuyler had been diagnosed with autism
spectrum disorder; Schuyler received services from the Regional
Center, SSI totaling $764.25 per month, CalFresh benefits of
$279.50 per month, and Medi-Cal benefits; Mother’s income was
$5,449 per month; Father earned between $165,333 and $276,452
per month depending on the time period considered; and Father
did not reside in California and did not pay California state
income taxes. The parties continued to dispute whether Schuyler
was incapacitated from earning a living and whether he had
sufficient means to support himself.2
2. The Evidentiary Hearing
The court bifurcated Mother’s RFO for child support from
her request for attorney’s fees and costs and proceeded first with
the support request. Several witnesses testified, including a
psychologist, a certified public accountant, and experts in the
employability of persons with autism, vocational issues, and
disability benefits.
Mother argued that Schuyler’s disability made him unable
to work or contribute to his own support, and that he did not
have any meaningful assets. She observed that even with
2 Approximately one month before the evidentiary hearing
started, Father agreed to deposit $115,000 into a special needs
trust for Schuyler’s benefit, and Mother agreed that sum resolved
all claims for Father’s contribution to Schuyler’s support or
expenses through March 2022. Accordingly, the support sought
by Mother at the hearing did not include that time frame.
5
government aid, she has had to support Schuyler financially. She
asserted that under Family Code section 3910, Father should
assist in providing child support for Schuyler and that the
amount of support should be determined according to the child
support guidelines. Mother further argued that the Legislature
designed California’s child support statutes to prevent an adult
child from being “turned into the street” and becoming a public
charge. Accordingly, private financial resources should be used
to meet Schuyler’s needs before resorting to government aid.
Father argued Schuyler could get a job and that under the
Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act (Lanterman
Act; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 4500 et seq.), Schuyler was entitled “to
an array of services and supports, which when coupled with his
SSI/SSP and other benefits, by definition, provide sufficient
means.” Father also argued that Schuyler would lose his SSI
payments and disability benefits if he received support under
Family Code section 3910.
Father claimed that under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 12350, neither parent was “legally obligated to support
Schuyler or contribute to his support, or at least any support
obligation [was] limited by Schuyler’s SSI/SSP, Medi-Cal and
Lanterman Act and other Welf[are and] Inst[itutions] Code
benefits and rights, and, thus, [Mother]’s request must be
denied.” Father further argued that if the court found Family
Code section 3910 applicable, use of the child support guidelines
would be unjust or inappropriate and the court should deviate
from them.3
3 Father also argued that if Welfare and Institutions Code
section 12350 was interpreted to permit child support payments,
6
3. The Court’s Ruling on Mother’s RFO for Support
On September 15, 2022, the court issued a tentative
statement of decision. It held “that the broad and specific
language of [Welfare and Institutions Code section] 12350
precludes the [c]ourt from ordering support under Family Code
section 3910. As a result, the [c]ourt does not order [Father] to
pay any support for the benefit of Schuyler. . . . Nevertheless,
this [c]ourt recognizes the two statutes create ambiguity, which
may be best resolved through legislative enactment or guidance
from the Court of Appeal. [¶] Because of the nature of this
ruling, the [c]ourt does not make any other findings in the case.”
On November 4, 2022, the court issued its final order, which set
forth the same reasoning.
C. Mother’s Request for Attorney’s Fees
1. The Parties’ Arguments Concerning Fees and Costs
As mentioned previously, Mother’s May 26, 2020 RFO also
sought needs-based attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Family
Code sections 2030 and 2032. While that RFO was pending,
Father made payments to Mother in October 2020 and June 2021
totaling $37,500 subject to later allocation by the court and
potential reimbursement.4 Father agreed in July 2021 to
an equal protection issue would arise. Father has abandoned this
argument on appeal.
4 These amounts included Father’s payment of $12,500 to
Mother in October 2020. It is unclear if this amount was
intended as a support payment or as a payment towards Mother’s
fees and costs, but the court did not characterize this payment as
being for attorney’s fees when it ultimately calculated the fee
award.
7
contribute an additional $30,000 to Mother’s fees and costs;
Mother in return agreed that neither party could seek
contribution for attorney’s fees and costs incurred through
July 27, 2021.
On October 19, 2022, Mother submitted pleadings in
support of her request for fees and costs. She sought the entirety
of her attorney’s fees and costs incurred since July 23, 2021,
which totaled approximately $148,804, and forensic accounting
fees in the amount of $11,584. It is unclear why Mother sought
fees and costs beginning on July 23, 2021, given that the parties’
stipulation prohibited Mother from seeking fees and costs
incurred through July 27, 2021. Mother argued that because
Father contested that Schuyler was incapacitated from earning a
living and without sufficient means, she had to develop and
present evidence to prove each. Further, because Father was not
forthcoming about his actual income at the beginning of the
support dispute, Mother expended resources to identify and
confirm Father’s actual income before the parties were able to
stipulate to his income.
Father argued the matter was over-litigated, causing him
to incur over $200,000 in defense fees and costs, and that he had
offered to settle the matter on at least three occasions, but
Mother rejected each offer.5 Father further observed he had
5 In May 2022, Father offered to pay $7,000 per month into
the special needs trust and contribute an additional $30,000 to
Mother’s fees. In July 2022, Father raised his offer to $7,500 per
month and contributing an additional $40,000 to Mother’s fees.
In August 2022, Father offered to contribute $45,000 for fees for
an advocate to help obtain additional public services for Schuyler,
8
stipulated to Schuyler’s developmental disabilities, and,
therefore, Mother did not need to litigate that particular issue.
2. The Court’s Ruling on Mother’s Request for Attorney’s
Fees and Costs
By minute order on January 13, 2023, the trial court ruled
on Mother’s fees and costs request. The court noted Father
already contributed $55,000 in attorney’s fees and costs, that the
issue at the center of the case (the applicability of Welfare and
Institutions Code section 12350) was narrow, and that Father
made several settlement offers which would have put resources
at Schuyler’s disposal. Mother rejected those offers and instead
“chose a path that resulted in a significant expenditure of fees,
without a positive result for Schuyler.” The court wrote that
although there was “no doubt that [Father] has the ability to pay
his fees and contribute to [Mother]’s fees,” and Mother “is able to
seek redress in the [c]ourt system,” she could not do so “at all
costs, and then expect the wealthy [Father] to pay for both
party’s [sic] fees.” The court awarded Mother an additional
$20,000 in attorney’s fees and costs, bringing the total Father
contributed to Mother’s fees and costs to $75,000.
as well as a one-time payment of $75,000 in the special needs
trust, $1,000 per month into an account created under the
Achieving a Better Life Experience Act of 2014 (see 26 U.S.C.
§ 529A), and to contribute further to Mother’s fees.
9
DISCUSSION
A. Welfare and Institutions Code Section 12350 Does
Not Absolve Father of His Duty Under Family Code
Section 3910 to Support Schuyler
1. Standard of Review and Principles of Statutory
Construction
We review issues of statutory construction de novo. (Reid
v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 527.) “Our fundamental
task in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature’s
intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We first examine the
statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning.
We do not examine that language in isolation, but in the context
of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its
scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the
enactment. If the language is clear, courts must generally follow
its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in
absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the
statutory language permits more than one reasonable
interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the
statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.”
(Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 737.)
“ ‘A court must, where reasonably possible, harmonize
statutes, reconcile seeming inconsistencies in them, and construe
them to give force and effect to all of their provisions.
[Citations.] . . .’ [Citation.] . . . [W]hen ‘ “two codes are to be
construed, they ‘must be regarded as blending into each other
and forming a single statute.’ [Citation.] Accordingly, they ‘must
be read together and so construed as to give effect, when possible,
to all the provisions thereof.’ [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.] Further,
10
‘ “ ‘[a]ll presumptions are against a repeal by implication.
[Citations.]’ [Citation.] Absent an express declaration of
legislative intent, we will find an implied repeal ‘only when there
is no rational basis for harmonizing the two potentially
conflicting statutes [citation], and the statutes are “irreconcilable,
clearly repugnant, and so inconsistent that the two cannot have
concurrent operation.” ’ [Citation.]” ’ [Citations.]” (Pacific
Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012)
55 Cal.4th 783, 805.)
2. The Two Statutes at Issue
Family Code section 3910 describes parents’ duty to
support their incapacitated adult child. It states, in relevant
part, “The father and mother have an equal responsibility to
maintain, to the extent of their ability, a child of whatever age
who is incapacitated from earning a living and without sufficient
means.” (Fam. Code, § 3910, subd. (a).) This section derives from
former Civil Code section 206. (23 Cal. Law Revision Com. com.
(1993) p. 415, reprinted in West’s Ann. Fam. Code (1994 ed.) foll.
§ 3910, p. 545.) “The purpose of [former Civil Code] section 206
[was] to protect the public from the burden of supporting a person
who has a parent . . . able to support him or her.” (Chun v. Chun
(1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 589, 594.) Family Code section 3910
likewise “is ‘ “legislatively designed ‘to protect the public from the
burden of supporting a person who has a parent . . . able to
support him or her.’ [Citations.]” ’ [Citations.]” (In re Marriage
of Cecilia & David W. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1286.)
11
Schuyler receives SSP benefits under chapter 3 of division
9 of the Welfare and Institutions Code (§§ 12000-12351).6
Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350, also included in
chapter 3, states, “No relative shall be held legally liable to
support or to contribute to the support of any applicant for or
recipient of aid under this chapter. No relative shall be held
liable to defray in whole or in part the cost of any medical care or
hospital care or other service rendered to the recipient pursuant
to any provision of this code if he is an applicant for or a recipient
of aid under this chapter at the time such medical care or
hospital care or other service is rendered. [¶] Notwithstanding
[s]ections 3910, 4400, and 4401 of the Family Code,[7] or [s]ection
6 The trial court found, “There is no dispute that Schuyler
is receiving aid under ‘this chapter.’ ” In a footnote in her brief,
Mother now claims it is “unclear” whether and to what extent
Schuyler receives SSP. Mother does not, however, deny Schuyler
receives such income, and substantial evidence supports the
court’s finding. In California, recipients of SSI also receive SSP.
(See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 12150; Disabled & Blind Action
Committee of Cal. v. Jenkins (1974) 44 Cal.App.3d 74, 76, fn. 2
[“California has elected to pay SSP to all SSI recipients”].) Here,
letters from the Social Security Administration to Mother
concerning a change in SSI paid to Schuyler state, “The new
amount includes $164.24 from the State of California,” which
constitutes Schuyler’s SSP benefit.
7 Family Code section 4400 states, “Except as otherwise
provided by law, an adult child shall, to the extent of the adult
child’s ability, support a parent who is in need and unable to self-
maintain by work.” Family Code section 4401 makes binding
“[t]he promise of an adult child to pay for necessaries previously
furnished to a parent described in [Family Code s]ection 4400.”
12
270c of the Penal Code,[8] or any other provision of this code, no
demand shall be made upon any relative to support or contribute
toward the support of any applicant for or recipient of aid under
this chapter. No county or city and county or officer or employee
thereof shall threaten any such relative with any legal action
against him by or in behalf of the county or city and county or
with any penalty whatsoever.”
3. The Parties’ Arguments
Father argues the plain language of Welfare and
Institutions Code section 12350 that “[n]otwithstanding” Family
Code section 3910 “no demand shall be made upon any relative to
support or contribute toward the support of any applicant for or
recipient of aid under this chapter” expressly excepts him from
any duty under Family Code section 3910 to support his son
because Schuyler receives SSP. He claims that a Law Revision
Commission comment following Family Code section 3910 that
refers to Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350, stating,
“See also . . . Welf[are and] Inst[itutions] Code [section] 12350 (no
liability for support or reimbursement of support to applicant for
aid . . .)” (23 Cal. Law Revision Com. com., supra, at p. 415),
further suggests the Legislature intended Welfare and
Institutions Code section 12350 to abrogate Family Code section
3910 in situations where the adult incapacitated child receives
8 Penal Code section 270c states, “Except as provided in
[c]hapter 2 (commencing with [s]ection 4410) of [p]art 4 of
[d]ivision 9 of the Family Code, every adult child who, having the
ability so to do, fails to provide necessary food, clothing, shelter,
or medical attendance for an indigent parent, is guilty of a
misdemeanor.”
13
SSP. Father contends, “Had Schuyler refrained from applying for
and receiving government aid, this appeal would not exist.
However, he did. As a consequence, [Welfare and Institutions
Code s]ection 12350 operates to relieve Schuyler’s family—
including [Father] and [Mother]—from having to contribute to
Schuyler’s support.”
Mother argues Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350
does not relieve Father from his duty to contribute to Schuyler’s
support under Family Code section 3910. She contends that
because the purpose of Family Code section 3910 is to insulate an
adult incapacitated child from becoming a public charge, Father’s
interpretation of Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350
would lead to an absurd result. Rather than protect the public
from the burden of supporting an adult child who has a parent
able to support him or her, such an interpretation would absolve
parents from any financial responsibility for their child despite
their ability to pay support because that child receives
government assistance.
4. Welfare and Institutions Code Section 12350 Is
Ambiguous
We begin with the language of the statute, because when
“legislative intent is expressed in unambiguous terms, we must
treat the statutory language as conclusive; ‘no resort to extrinsic
aids is necessary or proper.’ [Citation.]” (Equilon Enterprises v.
Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 61.) When, on the
other hand, “[s]tatutory language susceptible to more than one
reasonable interpretation [it] is regarded as ambiguous—that is,
it has no plain meaning.” (Merced Irrigation Dist. v. Superior
Court (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 916, 925.)
14
Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350 is ambiguous.
One can read it as Father does to state that it creates an
exemption to Family Code section 3910, and bars claims for
support by one parent against another pursuant to Family Code
section 3910 when an adult disabled child applies for or receives
SSP. However, Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350 is
also susceptible to the interpretation that it bars only
governmental actors from threatening or bringing legal action
against relatives of aid recipients to seek reimbursement for the
cost of such aid. For example, the statute prohibits cities,
counties, and their officers and employees from threatening
relatives of aid recipients with legal action “by or in behalf of the
county or city and county” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 12350), but not
any other persons. This specific identification of who is barred
from threatening legal action suggests the section’s related
prohibition on following through with such threats is similarly
limited only to those identified government actors.
5. History of California Law Concerning Relative
Responsibility
Because Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350 is
ambiguous, we turn to “other aids, such as the statute’s purpose,
legislative history, and public policy” (Coalition of Concerned
Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 34 Cal.4th at
p. 737), along with such aids for Family Code section 3910 and its
interplay with Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350.
As we explain next, Family Code section 3910 is the
current iteration of a long-standing legislative policy to alleviate
the burden on the public of caring for needy persons by requiring
certain relatives who can support their own family members in
fact do so. Historically, those efforts included a related ability of
15
the government to pursue relatives for reimbursement of
government aid provided to persons in need, based on the view
that such relatives were responsible in the first instance for
providing for their family members. In 1961, California began to
abandon that reimbursement approach and to start barring such
government collection efforts. Properly understood in light of
history, public policy, and legislative intent, Welfare and
Institutions Code section 12350 bars such government collection
efforts but does not erase a history that stretches back to the
Elizabethan era of parents having not only a moral but also a
legal obligation to support adult children in need.
a. Origins of Relative Responsibility
In 1964, Professor Jacobus tenBroek described California
as having a “dual system of family law.”9 (See Jacobus tenBroek,
California’s Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin,
Development, and Present Status Part I (1964) 16 Stan. L. Rev.
257 (tenBroek, Part I); Jacobus tenBroek, California’s Dual
System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present
Status Part II (1964) 16 Stan. L. Rev. 900 (tenBroek, Part II);
Jacobus tenBroek, California’s Dual System of Family Law: Its
Origin, Development, and Present Status Part III (1965) 17 Stan.
L. Rev. 614 (tenBroek, Part III).) Generally speaking, one system
(now contained mostly in the Welfare and Institutions Code)
concerns itself with the relationship between families and the
government. The other, set forth initially in the Civil Code and
later in the Family Code once it was enacted in 1992, governs the
9 Our Supreme Court cited Professor tenBroek’s discussion
of the development of family law as “ ‘excellent.’ ” (Swoap v.
Superior Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 490, 505.)
16
relationship between family members themselves. (tenBroek,
Part I, supra, at pp. 257-258; Stats. 1992, ch. 162, §§ 2, 10,
p. 464.)
As relevant here, both systems derived to some degree from
the Elizabethan poor laws, which established “the principle of
public responsibility to maintain the destitute.” (tenBroek,
Part I, supra, at p. 262.) To reduce the public cost of supporting
the poor, the Elizabethan poor law made relatives legally liable
for supporting their poor kinsmen. (tenBroek, Part I, supra, at
p. 283.) As written in 1601, the law required that the parents,
grandparents, and children of “everie poore olde blind lame and
impotente person, or other poore person not able to worke, beinge
of a sufficient abilitie, shall at their owne Chardges releive and
maintain everie suche poore person, in that manner and
accordinge to” a rate set by a justice of the peace. (Ibid.) The law
additionally provided for a fine for any failure to comply. (Ibid.)
This concept found its way to California via the state of
New York. In 1788, New York adopted the relative responsibility
provisions of the Elizabethan poor law with little change.
(tenBroek, Part I, supra, at p. 294, citing N.Y. Sess. Laws 1788,
ch. 62; 1 N.Y. Rev. Stats. (2d ed. 1835) ch. XX, tit. 1, at pp. 621-
640.) In 1865, New York incorporated this concept of relative
responsibility into its draft Field Codes. (tenBroek, Part I, supra,
at pp. 294, 296.)
The Field Code drafters created five codes for the state of
New York, including a Political Code, a Penal Code, and a Civil
Code. (tenBroek, Part I, supra, at p. 308.) “The Civil Code
encompassed ‘the law of civil rights and obligations affecting all
the transactions of men with each other in their private relations’
and contained divisions dealing with persons, property, and
17
obligations. The organizational pattern is important: the
distribution among the codes of the branches of family law reveal
the understanding which the Field Code drafters had of its
nature. The poor law, including the family law of the poor, was
allocated to the Political Code and the Code of Criminal
Procedure. The poor law was not regarded as dealing with the
rights and relations of persons among themselves; it was not part
of the private, civil law of persons. It was defined in terms of the
functions of public officers and therefore placed in the Political
Code and in terms of the procedures by which those officers
might govern the poor and their relatives and therefore placed in
the Code of Criminal Procedure.” (tenBroek, Part I, supra, at
pp. 308-309, fn. omitted.) The Code of Criminal Procedure
likewise included provisions concerning responsible relatives of
the poor, including procedures for “summoning the relatives,
determining amounts of payment, distributing the burden among
them, reviewing the orders and enforcing the payment, and
seizing and selling the property of absconding parents and
husbands and applying the income to the maintenance of
children and wives.” (Id. at p. 310.)
“While maintaining the separation of poor law and civil
law, the [code] commissioners drew from the poor law one of its
principal features, responsibility of relatives for the support of
their poor kinsmen, and placed it in the Civil Code.” (tenBroek,
Part I, supra, at pp. 311-312.) “[T]he commissioners explained:
‘the provisions of the Poor Laws declare the duty of parents and
children to support each other . . . .’ ‘It is the object of this section
to recognize the obligation as a ground of legal liability
independent of those provisions.’ ” (tenBroek, Part I, supra, at
18
pp. 311-312, citing Draft N.Y. Civ. Code, § 97, Comm’rs’ Note,
italics added, fn. omitted.)
In drafting the California codes, our code commissioners
and legislators considered New York’s dual system of family law.
(tenBroek, Part I, supra, at p. 317.) The five Field Codes were
embraced within four California Codes—a Code of Civil
Procedure, a Penal Code, a Political Code, and a Civil Code—to
varying degrees. (tenBroek, Part II, supra, at pp. 900-901.) “Of
the four codes adopted by California in 1872, the one which
copied most from the Field draft . . . is the Civil Code. . . . In that
part of the family law[,] . . . [concerning] the law of the child as it
touches on his relations with his parents, on public programs and
private charities, and on third persons generally[,] the Field draft
was accepted practically as it stood, . . . with its elaboration of the
reciprocity of parental rights and responsibilities, . . . [and] with
its single section declaring the general responsibility of relatives
after the manner of the poor law.” (tenBroek, Part II, supra, at
pp. 904-905, fns. omitted.) At the time of its enactment in 1872,
Civil Code section 206 stated, “ ‘It is the duty of the father, the
mother, and the children of any poor person who is unable to
maintain himself by work, to maintain such person to the extent
of their ability. The promise of an adult child to pay for
necessaries previously furnished to such parent is binding.’ ”
(County of San Bernardino v. Simmons (1956) 46 Cal.2d 394,
396.)
New York’s poor law system, derived from the Elizabethan
poor law system, “was omitted from the codes adopted in
California in 1872.” (tenBroek, Part II, supra, at p. 906.)
However, by the Pauper Act of 1901, California “enacted [the
Elizabethan poor law system],” which “included a state-imposed,
19
county-financed, county-administered duty to relieve the poor, . . .
and legal liability of an array of relatives for the support of their
destitute kinsmen.” (tenBroek, Part II, supra, at p. 939, citing
Stat. 1901, ch. CCX.) “Payments by [liable relatives] were to be
made to the county treasury quarterly and in advance, and
enforcement was to be by judicial proceedings instituted by the
district attorney and conducted as all other ‘actions for the
recovery of money.’ ” (Id. at p. 940, fn. omitted, citing Stat. 1901,
ch. CCX, §§ 6, 7.)
b. 1929: California Aid Programs
In 1929, the Legislature enacted a program for “aid in old
age” for any person at least 70 years old who had “no children or
other person able to support him and responsible under the law
of this state for his support” and whose income and assets were
below a certain threshold. (Stats. 1929, ch. 530, §§ 1, 2, 3, 4,
p. 914; see also County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente (1942) 20
Cal.2d 870, 874; tenBroek, Part II, supra, at p. 935.) Under the
law, a county providing aid could require the recipient to transfer
his or her property to the county as security for the aid advanced.
(See Stats. 1929, ch. 530, § 9, p. 916; see also County of Los
Angeles v. La Fuente, supra, at p. 874.) Additionally, if the
recipient or their spouse obtained property in excess of a
threshold amount, the government could recover any excess aid
paid. (Stats. 1929, ch. 530, § 10, p. 916.) In describing this law,
our Supreme Court observed, “the Legislature gave the county no
right to reimbursement against a responsible relative, for if the
applicant had such a relative[,] he was not entitled to benefits.
The statute apparently contemplated that an aged person,
neglected by a responsible relative, should enforce that liability
20
by legal action. (Civ. Code, § 206 . . . .)” (County of Los Angeles v.
La Fuente, supra, at p. 874.)
The Legislature also enacted a program for aid to “ ‘needy
blind persons.’ ” A blind person was eligible for aid if, among
other things, his total yearly income including the aid award fell
below a certain threshold, he was “unable to provide himself with
the necessities of life,” did not have “sufficient means of his own
to maintain himself,” and did not have “any relatives[ ]
responsible for his support under the laws of this state, who have
sufficient income to pay a tax under the provisions of the federal
income tax law.” (Stats. 1929, ch. 529, §§ 2, 3, 5, pp. 910, 911-
912.)
c. 1937-1941: Welfare and Institutions Code
In 1937, the Legislature enacted the Welfare and
Institutions Code, “thereby consolidating and revising the law
relating to and providing for protection, care, and assistance to
children, aged persons, and others specially in need thereof.”
(Stats. 1937, ch. 369, p. 1005, italics omitted.) It provided for,
among other things, aid to the aged “if in need” (Stats. 1937,
ch. 369, p. 1078; see Welf. & Inst. Code, former §§ 2000-2228 [Old
Age Security Law]) and aid to the needy blind (Stats. 1937,
ch. 369, p. 1102; see Welf. & Inst. Code, former §§ 3000-3091).
The 1937 law permitted the government to seek
reimbursement of aid from financially able responsible relatives.
For the aged, former Welfare and Institutions Code section 2224
stated, “If the person receiving aid has within the [s]tate a spouse
or adult child pecuniarily able to support said person, the board
of supervisors shall request the district attorney or other civil
legal officer of the county granting such aid to proceed against
the kindred in the order of their responsibility to support. . . .
21
Any sum so recovered shall be credited by the county to the
county and to the [s]tate in proportion to the contributions of the
county and the [s]tate respectively.” (Stats. 1937, ch. 369,
p. 1094, effective Sept. 1, 1937; see Stats. 1937, ch. 369, p. 1084;
see also Welf. & Inst. Code, former § 2160, subd. (f) [aged person
“receiving adequate support, from a husband, wife, or child, able
and responsible under the law of this [s]tate to furnish such
support” was not eligible for aid].)
Likewise, under former Welfare and Institutions Code
section 3088, if an aid recipient who was blind had a spouse,
parent, or adult child able to support the recipient but who had
failed “to perform their duty to support,” the county could
“maintain an action” “against such relatives, in the order named,
to recover for the county such portion of the aid granted as the
court finds such relative or relatives pecuniarily able to pay.”
(Ibid.; amended by Stats. 1937, ch. 406, pp. 1114-1115.)
In 1941, the Legislature amended Welfare and Institutions
Code section 2181, relating to aid to the aged, to establish that
“[t]he maximum degree of liability of the responsible relative
shall be determined by ‘Relatives’ Contribution Scale,’ ” a matrix
that took into account the responsible relative’s income and
dependents. (Stats. 1941, ch. 1254, § 1, pp. 3198-3199.) It also
amended Welfare and Institutions Code section 2224 to authorize
counties granting aid to maintain actions against the responsible
relatives “to secure an order requiring the payment of any sums
which may become due in the future for which the relative may
be liable.” (Stats. 1941, ch. 1254, § 2, pp. 3199-3200.)
22
d. 1940s and 1950s: Judicial Response to the
Potential Overlap of Civil Code Section 206 and
the Welfare and Institutions Code
In the 1940s, the judiciary acknowledged that both the
Welfare and Institutions Code and Civil Code section 206
addressed responsible relatives’ liability and attempted to
harmonize the two. (See, e.g., County of Lake v. Forbes (1941) 42
Cal.App.2d 744, 746 [concluding Welf. & Inst. Code, § 2224, and
not Civ. Code, § 206 governed lawsuit by county]; contra Garcia
v. Superior Court (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d 31, 33-34 [reading Civ.
Code, § 206 as establishing a duty and the Welf. & Inst. Code as
establishing the collection procedure], disapproved on another
ground in County of San Bernardino v. Simmons, supra, 46
Cal.2d at p. 399.)
In the 1950s, our Supreme Court twice had occasion to
consider the respective roles of Civil Code section 206 and the
Welfare and Institutions Code in county-initiated lawsuits. In
County of Contra Costa v. Lasky (1954) 43 Cal.2d 506, the court
stated, “There is a conflict in the cases as to whether the basic
liability of responsible relatives is section 206 of the Civil Code or
the provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code. It has been
held that the latter code provisions are complete in themselves
and the liability of responsible relatives to the county is thereby
established. [Citations.] Although it is not important in this
case, we believe the matter is adequately covered by the Welfare
and Institutions Code and it is the measure of the extent of the
responsible relative’s liability to the county. It is to it we must
look to ascertain whether the relative is required, in a particular
case, to reimburse the county.” (Id. at p. 509.)
23
In 1956, the Supreme Court held a county could not sue
responsible relatives to recover for aid to the aged derivatively
under Civil Code section 206. (County of San Bernardino v.
Simmons, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 396.) “The Welfare and
Institutions Code sets out what appears on the face of that code
to be a complete procedure for recovery by the county, when it
pays aid to a needy aged person, from a spouse or adult child who
is able to support the aged person.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) The
court concluded, “There is nothing in [Civil Code] section 206
which suggests an intention to create a liability of the child of
poor parents to public agencies which support the parents in
accord with their law-imposed duty to pay aid to such
parents . . . . On the other hand, the Welfare and Institutions
Code (particularly . . . [sections] 2181 [and] 2224 . . .) not only
purports to state the circumstances in which the named
responsible relatives are liable to the county when it has
supported or paid aid to indigents, aged, blind, etc., but also
states a procedure by which in proper cases the county can
recover from the responsible relatives. It seems apparent,
therefore, that the Legislature intended, by the Welfare and
Institutions Code, to cover completely the subject of recovery by
public agencies from responsible relatives, and that it did not
intend to create, and that there is no proper basis for the courts
to innovate, a right of recoupment derived from section 206 of the
Civil Code.” (Id. at p. 398, fn. omitted.)
e. 1957: Amendments to Welfare and Institutions
Code to Include Aid to the Needy Disabled
In 1957, the Legislature amended the Welfare and
Institutions Code to provide aid to the “ ‘needy disabled.’ ” (Stats.
1957, ch. 2411, § 2, pp. 4156-4157; see Welf. & Inst. Code, former
24
§§ 4000-4192.) To be eligible for aid, a person with disabilities
had to be at least 18 years old and could not be “receiving
adequate support from a husband or wife, or parent, or child able
and responsible under the laws of this State to furnish such
support.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, former § 4160, subds. (a), (f); Stats.
1957 ch. 2411, § 2, p. 4160.) Mirroring substantially the similar
provisions relating to aid to the aged and blind, former Welfare
and Institutions Code section 4189 stated: “If any applicant
receiving aid under the provision of this chapter has a spouse,
parent, or adult child, pecuniarily able to support him, either in
whole or in part, upon the failure of such kindred to perform their
duty to support the disabled person the board of supervisors shall
request the district attorney or other civil legal officer of the
county to proceed against the kindred in the order named. [¶]
Upon such request the district attorney, or other civil legal officer
of the county granting aid may, on behalf of the county, maintain
an action in the superior court of the county granting such aid,
against such relatives, in the order named: (1) to recover for the
county such portion of the aid granted as the courts find such
relative or relatives pecuniarily able to pay and (2) to secure an
order requiring the payment to the county of any sums which
may become due in the future for which the relative may be
liable.” (Stats. 1957, ch. 2411, § 2, pp. 4162-4163.)
f. 1961: The Legislature Repeals Relative
Responsibility for Aid for the Blind and
Disabled
In 1961, following then-Governor Edmund G. Brown’s
recommendation and pursuant to Senate Bill No. 135 and
25
Assembly Bills Nos. 729 and 730,10 the Legislature repealed the
following relatives’ responsibility provisions of the Welfare and
Institutions Code: section 3088 (blind), section 3474 (potentially
self-supporting blind), and section 4189 (disabled). (Stats. 1961,
ch. 1996, § 5, p. 4206; Stats. 1961, ch. 1996, § 2, p. 4207; Stats.
1961, ch. 1998, § 1, p. 4210.) The “[r]esponsibility of relatives
provisions, invented and always sustained to cut the costs of
public welfare, were abolished in California’s blind and disabled
programs because of increasing popular and professional opinion
that they are not fiscally productive, [were] disruptive of family
relations and rehabilitation plans, and ha[d] other socially
undesirable consequences.” (tenBroek, Part III, supra, at p. 679.)
In their place, the Legislature enacted Welfare and
Institutions Code former sections 3011, 3411, and 4011. (Stats.
1961, ch. 1995, § 1, p. 4205; Stats. 1961, ch. 1996, § 1, pp. 4206-
4207; Stats. 1961, ch. 1998, § 2, p. 4211.) Similar to today’s
Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350, these sections
10 Governor Brown’s recommendation stated the following:
“This bill will eliminate the requirement that relatives must
support disabled persons who qualify for aid under the Aid to
Needy Disabled program. For the most part, recipients of aid
under this program are suffering from extreme illnesses and
disabilities which require considerable attention and care from
their relatives. It is expected that relatives will continue to
extend this care to these disabled persons regardless of their
legal liability. However, many relatives have had to do so with
great deprivation to themselves and to other members of the
family who have a responsibility. The bill will relieve them of the
legal force of the responsible relatives support law.” (Governor’s
message to Leg. on Sen. Bill No. 135 (May 9, 1961) Assem. J.
(1961 Reg. Sess.) at p. 5690.)
26
stated, “No relative shall be held legally liable to support or to
contribute to the support of any applicant for or recipient of aid
under this chapter. No relative shall be held liable to defray in
whole or in part the cost of any medical care or hospital care or
other service rendered to said recipient pursuant to any provision
of this code if he is an applicant for or a recipient of aid under
this chapter at the time such medical care or hospital care or
other service is rendered. [¶] Notwithstanding the provisions of
[s]ection 206 of the Civil Code, or [s]ection 270c of the Penal
Code, or any other provision of this code no demand shall be
made upon any relative to support or contribute toward the
support of any applicant for or recipient of aid under this chapter.
No county or officer or employee thereof shall threaten any such
relative with any legal action against him, by or in behalf of the
county or with any penalty whatsoever.” (See Welf. & Inst. Code,
former §§ 3011, 3411, 4011.)
However, the 1961 amendments did not relieve relatives of
recipients of aid to the aged from contributing to their support.
(See Stats. 1961, ch. 1997, §§ 1-2, pp. 4208-4210; see Welf. & Inst.
Code, former §§ 2181, 2181.06, 2224.) Welfare and Institutions
Code former section 2224, amended by Statutes 1961, chapter
1997, section 2, stated, in part, “If an adult child living within
this State fails to contribute to the support of his parent as
required by [s]ection 2181, the county granting aid under this
chapter may proceed against such child. Upon request to do so
the district attorney or other civil legal officer of the county may
maintain an action, in the superior court of the county granting
such aid, to recover that portion of the aid granted as it is
determined that the child is liable to pay, and to secure an order
requiring payment of any sums which may become due in the
27
future.” Still, the Legislature “alter[ed] the figures in the liability
table to exempt roughly [97] per[]cent of the relatives obligated to
make payments.” (tenBroek, Part III, supra, at p. 635, fn.
omitted.)
g. Equal Protection Challenges and Legislative
Response
In County of San Mateo v. Boss (1971) 3 Cal.3d 962,11 the
Supreme Court addressed equal protection challenges to then-
Welfare and Institutions Code section 12100, which permitted a
county to proceed against an adult child for aid to an aged
relative, and to then-Welfare and Institutions Code section
12101, which established the responsible relative’s maximum
monthly contribution. The court explained that in a related
context the costs to the government for care of a mentally ill
parent could be charged to a person who had a preexisting duty
to support the recipient. (County of San Mateo v. Boss, supra, at
p. 969.) The county had argued that Civil Code section 206 was
such a preexisting duty and provided a rational basis for the
imposition of relative responsibility under the Welfare and
Institutions Code for the needy aged. (County of San Mateo v.
Boss, supra, at p. 969.) The court, however, found the facts did
not show that the adult child’s mother was a “ ‘poor person’ ” and
he thus owed her no duty of support under Civil Code section 206.
(County of San Mateo v. Boss, supra, at p. 969.) The court did not
reach the issue of whether the duties imposed by Welfare and
11 County of San Mateo v. Boss, supra, 3 Cal.3d 965 was
later overruled by Swoap v. Superior Court, supra, 10 Cal.3d at
page 502, footnote 10.
28
Institutions Code former sections 12100 and 12101 had a rational
basis. (County of San Mateo v. Boss, supra, at p. 971, fn. 8.)
In 1971, in response to County of San Mateo v. Boss, the
Legislature amended Civil Code section 206. (See Swoap v.
Superior Court, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 499; Stats. 1971, ch. 578,
§ 3.) The 1971 amendments substituted the phrase “person in
need” for the phrase “poor person” in the first sentence and added
a third sentence that, “A person who is receiving aid to the aged
shall be deemed to be a person in need who is unable to maintain
himself by work.” (Stats. 1971, ch. 578, § 3, p. 1137.) Thus, “[b]y
virtue of this amendment, all adult children of persons receiving
aid to the aged have a duty of support under Civil Code section
206.” (Swoap v. Superior Court, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 499.) The
Legislature amended the Welfare and Institutions Code,
including adding section 12101.1, which stated, “Relatives’
contributions under [s]ection 12101 shall be paid to the county
department and be treated by the county as recoveries on aid
granted.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 12101.1; Stats. 1971, ch. 578,
§ 34, p. 1169.)
In 1973, the Supreme Court again considered equal
protection challenges to then-Welfare and Institutions Code
sections 12100 and 12101 and determined they were
constitutional. (Swoap v. Superior Court, supra, 10 Cal.3d at
p. 493.) The court further held that relative responsibility
obligations under the Welfare and Institutions Code “are entirely
independent of Civil Code section 206, and that the right of the
county granting aid to the aged ‘to recover that portion of the aid
granted as it is determined that the child is liable to pay’
[citation] is created solely by the pertinent sections of the Welfare
and Institutions Code and does not devolve upon the county by
29
subrogation of any right which the parent may have against the
child under Civil Code section 206. It is manifest, then, that the
liability of the child now being subjected to constitutional
scrutiny is that imposed by [the relative responsibility sections]
in themselves. It is equally clear that the rationality of the basis
for such liability does not and should not depend upon the exact
subrogation of an individual duty, factually established, under
Civil Code section 206.” (Swoap v. Superior Court, supra, 10
Cal.3d at p. 502, italics omitted.) After explaining that Civil
Code section 206 itself derives from “a long tradition of law, not
to mention a measureless history of societal customs,” the court
concluded, “[a] rational basis for such classification is found in,
and provided by, Civil Code section 206, which itself rests
soundly on our Anglo-American legal tradition.” (Swoap v.
Superior Court, supra, at pp. 503, 507.)
h. 1973-1974: SSP and Restructuring the Welfare
and Institutions Code
“The 1972 Congress substantially changed the system of
paying welfare to needy adults. . . . This new system, known as
the [SSI] program, guarantee[d] a monthly federal payment to
needy blind, aged and disabled persons. Unlike payments under
the former [federal] grant-in-aid programs, an individual’s
eligibility for SSI payments d[id] not depend upon state action,
since the program is fully administered by the Social Security
Administration under nationwide standards. [¶] The federal SSI
payment is less than the amounts which many of the states paid
under the former grant-in-aid programs. For that reason,
Congress invited the states to pay additional moneys to SSI
recipients (42 U.S.C. § 1382e(a).) These additional payments are
30
called [SSP].” (Disabled & Blind Action Committee of Cal. v.
Jenkins, supra, 44 Cal.App.3d at p. 76, fn. omitted.)
In 1973, the Legislature restructured the Welfare and
Institutions Code to, among other things, group together the
state supplementary program for the aged, blind, and disabled in
a new chapter 3. (Stats 1973, ch. 1216, § 37, p. 2903; see Welf. &
Inst. Code, former §§ 12000-12600; Disabled & Blind Action
Committee of Cal. v. Jenkins, supra, 44 Cal.App.3d at p. 77
[“Chapter 3 (Old Age Security), chapter 4 (Aid to the Blind), and
chapter 6 (Aid to the Needy Disabled), all were repealed; and in
their place a new chapter 3 was enacted, dealing with all three
categories”].)
Although chapter 3 concerned aid to all three groups,
article 8, entitled “Relatives’ Responsibility,” and beginning with
a section 12350 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, seemed to
only address aid to the aged. As of this time, Welfare and
Institutions Code section 12350 stated, in part, “If an adult child
living within this state fails to contribute to the support of his
parent as required by [s]ection 12351, the state may proceed
against such child. Upon request to do so, the attorney general
may maintain an action in the superior court of the county of
residence of the responsible relative, to recover that portion of the
aid granted as it is determined that the child is liable to pay, and
to secure an order requiring payment of any sums which may
become due in the future.” (Id., former § 12350; Stats 1973,
ch. 1216, § 37, p. 2912.)
In 1974, the Legislature added Welfare and Institutions
Code section 12361 to clarify that article 8 did not apply to the
relatives of applicants or recipients of aid to the blind or disabled.
(Stats. 1974, ch. 75 § 10, p. 168; see Welf. & Inst. Code, former
31
§ 12361.) Thus, the Legislature confirmed the continuity of the
policy that began in 1961 not to hold relatives of such aid
recipients financially liable for the cost to the government of the
recipient’s support.
i. 1975: Legislature Repeals Relative
Responsibility for Aid to the Aged
Although relative responsibility for aid to the aged
continued, support for this approach diminished and skepticism
arose regarding the rationale for pursuing such claims against
adult children. (E.g., Dept. of Finance, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Sen.
Bill No. 46 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 18, 1975, pp. 1-2; Health
and Welfare Agency, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 46 (1975-
1976 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 18, 1975, p. 2.) “Court challenges and
legislative efforts to amend and repeal the law questioned
whether it violated the due process rights of the contributing
adult children . . . and whether the detrimental effect on family
relationships outweighed fiscal benefits to the state.” (Comment,
Domestic Relations (1976) 7 Pacific L.J. 411, 420.) “[O]nly one
out of every six potentially liable adult children actually
contributed under the [Relatives’ Responsibility] Act. In
addition[, there were claims] that the state agencies collecting
the contributions under the law resorted to illegal acts (such as
sending threatening letters to elderly welfare recipients to obtain
the names of their children) in their collection efforts.” (Id. at
p. 421; see also Health and Welfare Agency, Enrolled Bill Rep. on
Sen. Bill No. 46, supra, p. 4 [referring to the relatives’
responsibility program as inequitable and unfair]; Assem. Ways
and Means Com., Analysis for Sen. Bill No. 46 as amended
Aug. 14, 1975, p. 2 [describing enforcement difficulties].)
32
Thus, in 1975, pursuant to Senate Bill No. 46, the
Legislature repealed article 8 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code and added a new article 8, including a new Welfare and
Institutions Code section 12350. (Stats 1975, ch. 1136, §§ 1, 2,
p. 2811.) Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350 was
amended to state, “No relative shall be held legally liable to
support or to contribute to the support of any applicant for or
recipient of aid under this chapter. No relative shall be held
liable to defray in whole or in part the cost of any medical care or
hospital care or other service rendered to the recipient pursuant
to any provision of this code if he is an applicant for or a recipient
of aid under this chapter at the time such medical care or
hospital care or other service is rendered. [¶] Notwithstanding
the provisions of [s]ection 206 of the Civil Code, or [s]ection 270c
of the Penal Code, or any other provision of this code, no demand
shall be made upon any relative to support or contribute toward
the support of any applicant for or recipient of aid under this
chapter. No county or city and county or officer or employee
thereof shall threaten any such relative with any legal action
against him by or in behalf of the county or city and county or
with any penalty whatsoever.” (Stats 1975, ch. 1136, § 2,
p. 2812.)
Notably, an enrolled bill report for Senate Bill No. 4612
observed this amendment “does not alter the fundamental state
12 “ ‘While enrolled bill reports prepared by the executive
branch for the Governor do not necessarily demonstrate the
Legislature’s intent [citation], they can corroborate the
Legislature’s intent, as reflected in legislative reports, by
reflecting a contemporaneous common understanding shared by
33
policy[ ] that able adult children should assist in the support of
their needy aged parents, as that requirement remains
untouched in Civil Code Section 206. The bill simply removes the
state’s authority to be involved in what is essentially a family
matter.” (Health and Welfare Agency, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Sen.
Bill No. 46, supra, p. 4; see also id., p. 3 [“The duty of children to
support their parents who are ‘in need’ (Civil Code [section] 206)
is not changed by this bill”].)
j. 1992: Enactment of the Family Code
In 1992, the Legislature enacted the Family Code. (Stats.
1992, ch. 162, § 10, p. 464.) In doing so, it repealed Civil Code
section 206 and placed the provisions previously contained
therein into Family Code sections 3910 (support of an adult
incapacitated child), 4400 (support of parents), and 4401 (promise
of adult child to pay for necessities). (Stats. 1992, ch. 162, §§ 2,
10, pp. 464, 580, 596.) Family Code section 3910 no longer used
the phrase “in need” that had appeared in Civil Code section 206.
Rather, it stated, “The father and mother have an equal
responsibility to maintain, to the extent of their ability, a child of
whatever age who is incapacitated from earning a living and
without sufficient means.” (Fam. Code, § 3910, subd. (a).) The
Law Review Commission Notes stated, “See also . . . Welf[are
and] Inst[itutions] Code [section] 12350 (no liability for support
or reimbursement of support to applicant for aid under Burton-
Moscone-Bagley Citizens’ [Income] Security Act for Aged, Blind
participants in the legislative process from both the executive
and legislative branches.’ [Citation.]” (Kaufman & Broad
Communities, Inc. v. Performance Plastering, Inc. (2005) 133
Cal.App.4th 26, 41, italics omitted.)
34
and Disabled Californians).” The Legislature also amended
Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350 to replace the
reference to Civil Code section 206 with references to Family
Code sections 3910, 4400, and 4401. (Stats. 1992, ch. 163, § 153,
p. 839.)
6. This Legislative History Demonstrates Welfare and
Institutions Code Section 12350’s Prohibition Is
Limited to Government Efforts to Recover the Cost of
Aid Provided to Recipients
The above history shows Family Code section 3910
maintains our state’s longstanding policy to alleviate the burden
on the public of caring for needy persons by making sure certain
identified relatives shoulder that burden in the first instance
where financially able to do so. Father acknowledges that Family
Code section 3910 restated, without substantive change, former
Civil Code section 206’s requirement that parents maintain their
adult incapacitated child and “simply represent[s] a new
arrangement of the provisions of former Civil Code section 206.”
(See 23 Cal. Law Revision Com. com., supra, at p. 415.) This
history also establishes that Welfare and Institutions Code
section 12350 arose from a legislative policy decision to stop
imposing liability on relatives for pre-payment or repayment of
government aid given to those relatives’ family members, and is
confined to that purpose.
The provenance of these statutes further demonstrates that
properly construed they do not conflict. The Welfare and
Institutions Code developed to address the relationship between
the government and families, while the Family Code derived from
laws that governed the relationship between family members
themselves. (See tenBroek, Part I, supra, at pp. 257-258.) Here,
35
Family Code section 3910 permitted Mother to seek contribution
from Father to help pay for the support of their adult disabled
child. Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350 did not
insulate Father from his financial responsibilities to Schuyler
simply because his son was receiving SSI/SSP and services
subject to that section; Father has a legal obligation to provide
necessary support if he is financially able to do so regardless of
such aid. Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350 operates
only to protect Father from a lawsuit by state government actors
for recoupment of the SSI/SSP paid to Schuyler.
7. Case Law Construing Welfare and Institutions Code
Section 12350 Supports this Interpretation
County of Ventura v. Stark (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 1112
(Stark) supports this interpretation of the two statutes at issue.
In Stark, a disabled minor resided in a care facility paid for by
the Social Security Administration and the County of Ventura.
(Id. at p. 1115.) The county’s contribution was comprised of aid
paid under (now former) Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC; Welf. & Inst. Code, former § 11200 et seq.) as
well as aid paid under the aged, blind, and disabled (ABD)
program (the same program under which Schuyler receives SSP).
The county sought reimbursement for the amounts it paid under
AFDC, which, at the time, it was entitled to do under then-
Welfare and Institutions Code section 11350. The minor’s mother
argued Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350 relieved her
of any obligation to reimburse the county for such AFDC aid.
(Stark, supra, at p. 1115.)
The court determined that “the prohibitions of [Welfare and
Institutions Code] section 12350 are limited to aid under the
ABD program, and services under any provision of the Welfare
36
and Institutions Code.” (Stark, supra, 158 Cal.App.3d at
p. 1116.) It reasoned, “It makes no sense for the Legislature to
enact a detailed procedure for enforcement of child support
obligations in chapter 2 (AFDC) only to abolish its collection in
chapter 3,” pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section
12350. (Stark, supra, at p. 1117.) Thus, Stark did not read
Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350 to prohibit any
demand upon a relative for support when the person to be
supported is receiving ABD aid. Instead, it limited Welfare and
Institutions Code section 12350 to its historical purpose just as
we do.
Father argues Stark is distinguishable because it involved
a direct conflict between two provisions of the Welfare and
Institutions Code whereas here Welfare and Institutions Code
section 12350 creates an exception to Family Code section 3910.
Father’s argument ignores that Welfare and Institutions Code
section 12350 creates exceptions not only for Family Code section
3910, but also “any other provision of” the Welfare and
Institutions Code itself. Although Family Code sections 3910,
4400, 4410, Penal Code section 270c, and other provisions of the
Welfare and Institution Code recognize that relatives have an
obligation to provide support to immediate relatives to the extent
of their ability, the government may not collect or seek to collect
any reimbursement or advance from such relatives for SSP aid or
for the cost of hospital care, medical care, or other service
provided under the Welfare and Institutions Code to an SSP aid
recipient. Thus, Father does not meaningfully distinguish Stark.
37
8. Father’s Arguments Based on the Text of Welfare and
Institutions Code Section 12350 Are Unpersuasive
Lastly, we address Father’s remaining arguments that the
text of Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350 supports his
construction of that statute. Father first notes the use of the
word “notwithstanding” in the sentence “Notwithstanding
[s]ections 3910, 4400, and 4401 of the Family Code, or [s]ection
270c of the Penal Code, or any other provision of this code, no
demand shall be made upon any relative to support” would be
unnecessary if Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350
applied only to the government. He claims if Welfare and
Institutions Code section 12350 applied only to government
claims for aid contribution, there would be no conflict as the
government would never be subject to Family Code sections 3910,
4400, or 4401, and the word “[n]othwithstanding” would be
surplusage.
We read this “Notwithstanding . . .” language differently, in
a way that gives effect to the language of the entire statute.
Recall that in both the mid-1950s and the early 1970s, our
Supreme Court addressed whether one could bootstrap the
responsibilities imposed by Civil Code section 206 (the
predecessor to Family Code section 3910) to justify government
collection efforts against the relatives of aid recipients. (Swoap v.
Superior Court, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 502; County of San Mateo
v. Boss, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 969; County of San Bernardino v.
Simmons, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 396.) When the
“Notwithstanding . . .” sentence first appeared in 1961 in the
predecessor statute to Welfare and Institutions Code section
12350, the Supreme Court had not yet opined on whether the
relative responsibility provisions then in force with respect to aid
38
to the aged depended on an independent, preexisting duty such
as that articulated in Civil Code section 206. (See Swoap v.
Superior Court, supra, at p. 500; County of San Mateo v. Boss,
supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 969, 971, fn. 8.) We assume the
Legislature was aware of these cases when it amended Welfare
and Institutions Code section 12350 (People v. Garcia (2006) 39
Cal.4th 1070, 1088), and sought to make clear through the
“Notwithstanding . . .” sentence that government actors could not
use Family Code section 3910 and similar statutes as a ground to
evade Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350’s bar on
government collection efforts.
County of Contra Costa v. Lasky, supra, 43 Cal.2d 506 and
County of San Bernardino v. Simmons, supra, 46 Cal.2d 394
further support this interpretation. These cases maintained a
“wall of separation” between the Welfare and Institutions Code
and the Civil Code provisions that became the Family Code.
(tenBroek, Part III, supra, at pp. 635, 637-638.) In County of
Contra Costa v. Lasky, the court flagged the potential conflict
between the two codes, but observed the Welfare and Institutions
Code provisions “are complete in themselves and the liability of
responsible relatives to the county is thereby established” in
them. (County of Contra Costa v. Lasky, supra, at p. 509, italics
added.) In County of San Bernardino v. Simmons, the court
again emphasized that the Legislature intended the Welfare and
Institutions Code “to cover completely the subject of recovery by
public agencies from responsible relatives” and that the
government could not proceed under Civil Code section 206 to
recoup aid. (County of San Bernardino v. Simmons, supra, at
pp. 396, 398, italics added.) Notably, the Legislature took no
action to indicate it disagreed with these opinions. “It is
39
presumed, of course, that where a statute has been construed by
judicial decision, and that construction is not altered by
subsequent legislation, the Legislature is aware of the judicial
construction and approves of it.” (Rehabilitation Inst. of Chicago
v. Einhorn (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 1036, 1040, citing People v.
Hallner (1954) 43 Cal.2d 715, 719.)
Father next argues that Welfare and Institutions Code
section 12350 explicitly references government actors only in its
last sentence, where it states, “No county or city and county or
officer or employee thereof shall threaten any such relative with
any legal action against him by or in behalf of the county or city
and county or with any penalty whatsoever.” The prior sentences
barring any demand and/or legal liability for payment do not
specify to whom they apply. Father suggests this means the first
part of the statute applies to everyone without limitation, and the
last sentence is the only portion directed at government actors.
As described above, the legislative history indicates the
Legislature passed Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350
and its predecessors to repeal the counties’ and cities’ statutorily-
granted power to require responsible relatives to contribute
towards support. The negative consequences of the responsible
relatives’ program outweighed its limited fiscal benefits, and
government actors had abused their power by, for example,
writing threatening letters to aged aid recipients. (See Comment,
Domestic Relations, supra, 7 Pacific L.J. 421.) Keeping this
history in mind, a more sensible reading of the statute is that it
does not distinguish between two groups of actors but rather
prohibits two types of actions—demands and threats—by the
identified group of government actors. (See tenBroek, Part III,
supra, at pp. 634-635 & fn. 872 [stating that the Legislature not
40
only repealed relative responsibility, but in prohibiting threats it
also “proscribe[d] administrative pressure on relatives to make
contributions in the absence of their legal liability”].) Indeed, if
the first part of the statute barring attempts to hold someone
liable applied to everyone, one would expect the provisions
against threatening legal action also to apply to everyone, but
that is not what the statute says. It makes little sense to prohibit
everyone from bringing legal action but restrict the prohibition
against threatening legal action to obtain payment in lieu of legal
action to only a subset of actors. The more reasonable reading,
consistent with the legislative history, is that Welfare and
Institutions Code section 12350 prohibits the specified
government actors (and not others) from either threatening or in
fact bringing a lawsuit against relatives seeking contribution for
aid payments.
A recent amendment to Family Code section 3910 further
contradicts Father’s position that Welfare and Institutions Code
section 12350 stands for the proposition that once the state has
undertaken the obligation to provide support, the state alone
bears the financial burden for such support. For a disabled
person over the age of 18 to be eligible for SSI (and therefore
SSP), his or her income and resources must be below a certain
level. (See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1100.) In June 2024, the Legislature
amended Family Code section 3910 to clarify that a court may
order a parent to pay support pursuant to Family Code section
3910 into a “special needs trust” within the meaning of title 42 of
the United States Code section 1369p(d)(4)(A) or (C). (Fam.
Code, § 3910, as amended by Stats. 2024, ch. 2397, § 1; see 2024
Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 25 (Assem. Bill No. 2397).) Under such an
arrangement, court-ordered support can potentially be exempted
41
from the calculation of whether an individual has the financial
means to support themselves or instead qualifies for government
assistance. (See Assem. Com. on Judiciary, com. on Assem. Bill
No. 2397 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.) p. 2. [“A primary purpose for
establishing a special needs trust . . . is to preserve funds that
can improve the beneficiary’s quality of life without disqualifying
that person from eligibility for SSI and other benefits”].) In other
words, this amendment shows the Legislature expects that adult
children with significant disabilities may be entitled to both
government aid and court-ordered child support.
9. Public Policy Supports Our Construction of Welfare
and Institutions Code Section 12350
In addition to being unsupported by legislative history and
the statutory text, Father’s interpretation of Welfare and
Institutions Code section 12350 would lead to problematic policy
results. Family Code section 3910, which prevents where
possible an incapacitated adult from becoming a public charge,
would instead keep someone a public charge once they applied for
or accepted aid. Parents of adult children with significant
disabilities would have no obligation to contribute to the support
of children who are unable to provide for themselves, even where
those parents are indisputably able to contribute, whenever those
children apply for or receive certain government aid. It would not
matter if the children’s needs far outstripped the aid they receive,
or if contribution by a financially able parent would relieve the
public of needing to provide support so that government aid
dollars could be allocated to others in need. Such children or
their caretaker parent would face a Hobson’s choice: forego
government aid to which the child is entitled in the hopes of later
making a recalcitrant parent pay through a family law RFO, or
42
accepting government aid given immediate needs and foregoing
the possibility of additional necessary support.
Father argues one can avoid these results simply by first
petitioning for an order of support under Family Code section
3910, and then (and only then) applying for aid. That way,
Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350 is not at issue when
a court considers an RFO pursuant to Family Code section 3910.
However, Father’s interpretation of Welfare and Institutions
Code section 12350 means it does not matter whether the family
court RFO or the application comes first. Even if Mother had
filed a successful RFO for support under Family Code section
3910 before Schuyler applied for aid, the later application for aid
would void the prior family court order for support because
Father could no longer “be held legally liable to support or to
contribute to the support” of Schuyler given his son’s application
for or receipt of such aid. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 12350.)
Father counters that, “Viewed from the perspective of a low
income family, [his interpretation of Welfare and Institutions
Code s]ection 12350 makes a great deal of sense. The family is
relieved from having to contribute to the support of their disabled
relative, because the government is footing the bill.” However,
Family Code section 3910 requires only that parents are
responsible to maintain an incapacitated adult child “to the
extent of their ability,” and thus already accounts for the fact
that not all parents may be able to pay support. Our construction
of Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350 gives proper effect
to both that section and Family Code section 3910 without regard
to a parent’s financial ability to provide support.
43
10. Conclusion
Because the trial court erred in giving preemptive effect to
Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350, we remand for
further proceedings. Given its ruling, the trial court did not
make factual findings on contested issues such as whether
Schuyler is incapacitated from earning a living and without
sufficient means, and, if so, what amount of support would be
appropriate (including whether any such amount should be
guideline support or something else), and to whom any support
should be paid. We express no opinion on these issues, which are
for the trial court to address in the first instance.
B. The Attorney’s Fees and Costs Ruling Is Vacated
We review a family court’s decision on the amount of fees
and costs to award for abuse of discretion. (Pont v. Pont (2018) 31
Cal.App.5th 428, 440.) “Usually, when a trial court applies the
incorrect legal standard in exercising its discretion, the
appropriate disposition is to remand for the court to apply the
proper standard. [Citation.]” (Doe v. Atkinson (2023) 96
Cal.App.5th 667, 679.) “Because we reverse the [ruling on the]
child support order, we do not reach the attorney’s fee issue. The
[family] court will reconsider the attorney’s fee issue on remand
after redetermining the merits of the child support order.” (In re
Marriage of Corman (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1492, 1502.)13
13 Father moves to strike portions of Mother’s reply brief,
claiming they raise new arguments about the attorney’s fees
award. We deny that motion. Mother’s reply brief does not raise
new arguments that were not fairly reflected in her opening brief.
In any event, as we do not reach the attorney’s fees issue, any
allegedly new arguments have not prejudiced Father.
44
The family court did not bifurcate the proceeding so that
the alleged preclusive effect of Welfare and Institutions Code
section 12350 was decided before the evidentiary hearing. It
nevertheless limited its award in part on its belief that the
litigation presented a dispositive narrow legal issue such that the
parties did not need to incur the expense of the full-blown
evidentiary hearing the court conducted on Mother’s RFO. As we
hold Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350 did not bar
Mother’s RFO for support, numerous expenses that the court
disallowed as unnecessary relating to things such as the extent of
Schuyler’s disabilities, his ability to support himself, and his
reasonable needs were incurred on issues that will in fact need to
be decided. Accordingly, the family court is to reconsider its
attorney fees award on remand in connection with determining
the merits of Mother’s child support request.
45
DISPOSITION
The order denying Mother’s RFO for child support
pursuant to Family Code section 3910 is reversed, the order
granting Mother $20,000 in attorney’s fees and litigation costs is
vacated, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.
Mother is awarded her costs on appeal.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
KLINE, J.*
* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
46