David Webb v. Miami-Dade County

USCA11 Case: 23-13395 Document: 13-1 Date Filed: 09/18/2024 Page: 1 of 15

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-13395

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

DAVID Q. WEBB,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

MIAMI-DADE COUNTY,

MAYOR, MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FL,

MIAMI DADE HOMELESS TRUST,

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, MIAMI DADE HOMELESS TRUST,

CAMILLUS HOUSE INCORPORATED, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-13395

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cv-23122-RNS

____________________

Before BRASHER, ABUDU, and HULL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

David Q. Webb, pro se, appeals the district court’s

September 26, 2023 order (1) dismissing his amended complaint

without prejudice as an impermissible shotgun pleading and

(2) denying his motions for referral to a volunteer attorney

program. Webb also appeals (1) the district court’s subsequent

October 4, 2023 order denying his motion for injunctive relief and

motion for referral to a volunteer attorney program and (2) the

district court’s October 13, 2023 entry of judgment against him.

After review, we affirm.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Initial Complaint

On August 16, 2023, Webb, pro se, filed a “verified”

complaint against 16 defendants. (Font altered.) Webb alleged

these eight counts “against each defendant”: (1) a Title VI of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 claim (“Count I”); (2) a False Claims Act

claim (“Count II”); (3) an Americans with Disability Act claim

(“Count III”); (4) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging Webb was

denied equal protection; (5) a Fourth Amendment claim

(“Count V”); (6) a Fourteenth Amendment claim (“Count VI”);

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(7) a deliberate indifference claim (“Count VII”); and (8) a “Florida

state vicarious liability culpability” claim (“Count VIII”). (Font

altered.)

On August 25, 2023, the district court sua sponte struck

Webb’s complaint as an impermissible shotgun pleading. The

district court noted that “Webb’s complaint appears to arise from

a dispute relating to the denial of his application for Permanent

Supportive Housing.” The district court pointed out the complaint

“repeatedly incorporate[d] antecedent allegations into subsequent

claims for relief.” The district court determined “Webb’s

allegations ma[d]e it nearly impossible for the [district court] to

discern (1) which allegations appl[ied] to which claims; (2) what

causes of action[] [were] alleged and as to which Defendants; and

(3) what facts support[ed] Webb’s allegations of wrongdoing.”

Because Webb’s complaint was a shotgun pleading, it did not

comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 10(b).

In its sua sponte order, the district court instructed Webb to

replead his case through an amended complaint and directed

Webb, at length, on how to cure the deficiencies in his complaint.

The district court explained that Webb’s “complaint must contain

specific allegations with respect to each Defendant, separating the

distinct allegations against the various Defendants into separate

counts, which must each identify a particular cause of action.”

The district court further instructed Webb: (1) “to plead

only facts that are tethered to a viable cause of action against each

Defendant and to identify which facts relate to which cause of

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action”; (2) to “state his claims in numbered paragraphs, each

limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances”; (3) “to

avoid conclusory or vague allegations, or to at least supplement

them with fact-based claims”; and (4) “to ensure that he endeavors

to separate different causes of action[], to the extent there is more

than one, into separate, numbered counts.” (Quotation marks

omitted.)

Webb’s amended complaint was due on or before

September 8, 2023. The district court warned Webb that failure to

comply timely with its order would result in his complaint being

dismissed without further leave to amend.

B. Webb’s Three Amended Complaints Between August 30,

2023 and September 11, 2023

On August 30, Webb filed his first amended “verified”

complaint (“FAC”). (Font altered.) The FAC brought claims

against 14 defendants, all of which were the same as his initial

complaint, with the exception of two individuals who were not

named in the FAC. Webb’s FAC alleged the same eight counts as

his initial complaint “against each defendant,” but also outlined 28

individually numbered “cause[s] of action” within the eight counts,

some of which were styled against a single defendant. (Font

altered.) For the “cause[s] of action” which were styled against a

single defendant, many included allegations against other

defendants. (Font altered.) Furthermore, some of the “cause[s] of

action” were styled against multiple defendants at once, without

specifying which defendants were directly responsible for which

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allegations. (Font altered.) For example, under Count VIII, titled

“Florida state vicarious liability culpability,” Webb included a

section styled “general allegations common to all defendants

below.” (Font altered.)

Additionally, while Webb removed some of the language

incorporating preceding counts into antecedent counts, he

nonetheless explicitly realleged and incorporated specific

numbered paragraphs of facts within counts across causes of action

against different defendants. Webb’s FAC appeared to contain the

same substantive information as his initial complaint, albeit copied

and pasted into different sections of the FAC, as well as embedded

emails and letters that he allegedly sent to various defendants.

On September 5, 2023, Webb filed a supplemental “verified”

amended complaint (“SAC”), which was largely duplicative of the

FAC. (Font altered.) On September 11, 2023, after the district

court’s September 8, 2023 deadline for filing an amended

complaint, Webb filed a second supplemental “verified” amended

complaint (“TAC”), which was also largely duplicative of the FAC.

(Font altered.)

C. District Court’s September 26, 2023 Dismissal Order

On September 26, 2023, the district court sua sponte

dismissed “Webb’s amended complaint” without prejudice

because he failed “to appreciably address” the pleading deficiencies

identified in the district court’s August 25, 2023 order. In doing so,

the district court cited the FAC, SAC, and TAC.

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In that regard, the district court first noted that Webb had

filed not one, but three “purportedly amended complaints,” had

not sought any leave from the district court to modify or

supplement his original amended pleading, and that Webb’s TAC

was filed after the September 8 deadline. The district court added:

“Nonetheless, in consideration of Webb’s status as a pro se litigant

and elderly individual, the [district court] has reviewed all his

submissions in detail.”

The district court then determined that Webb’s amended

complaint continued to qualify as a shotgun pleading. The district

court found that “the legal and factual bases for Webb’s complaint

[were] not entirely clear, and the facts supporting his claims [were]

not discernible.” Importantly, Webb’s allegations were comprised

of “conclusory allegations, intermingled with disconnected facts,

presented along a disjointed timeline of events.”

The district court also determined that Webb completely

ignored its instructions to plead facts tethered to his claims against

each specific defendant and instead attempted to address the issue

by copying and pasting the same exact allegations for different

defendants. Webb’s amended allegations were replete with

extensive paragraphs containing numerous accusations. The

district court concluded Webb’s amended complaint had failed to

shed the key characteristics of a shotgun pleading. The district

court repeated that it remained impossible to discern “(1) which

allegations apply to which claims; (2) what causes of action[] are

alleged and as to which Defendants; and (3) what facts support

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Webb’s allegations of wrongdoing.” The district court’s

September 26, 2023 order dismissed Webb’s amended complaint

and closed the case.

Nonetheless, and even though the case was closed, Webb

filed a “second amended verified complaint” on October 2, 2023,

which in effect was Webb’s fourth amended complaint. (Font

altered.) In a subsequent order, the district court stated that this

filing “was done without requesting leave from the [district court],

after the case had been closed and dismissed.” The district court

informed Webb that if he “would like to file a new complaint, he

must follow the proper procedure for amendment or for instituting

a new case.” On October 10, 2023, Webb filed a motion “in

accordance with FRCP Rule 15 and [Local Rule] 15.1” to file an

attached “second amended verified complaint.” (Font altered.)

Basically, Webb filed again his fourth amended complaint but this

time with a motion to amend. In a later order dated October 16,

2023, the district court denied Webb’s motion for leave to amend

as moot.1

In addition to filing three amended complaints in the August

to September 2023 timeframe, Webb also filed motions for

injunctive relief and motions for referral to a volunteer attorney

program during and after that time period. We recount those

motions too.

1 In this appeal, Webb does not raise any issue with the district court’s

treatment of his October 10, 2023 motion for leave to amend.

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8 Opinion of the Court 23-13395

D. Motions for Injunctive Relief

On September 11, 2023, Webb filed an “urgent” motion for

injunctive relief, seeking an injunction to prevent Miami-Dade

County Government and Camillus House from discharging him

from further homeless services and sending him “to the [s]treets of

Miami” without money, housing, or employment. (Font altered.)

In support, Webb identified letters from two doctors stating that

any emotional or physical stress would result in the exacerbation

of his angina, “resulting in life threatening heart attacks.” (Font

altered.)

On September 15, 2023, the district court denied without

prejudice Webb’s motion for injunctive relief as deficient for

(1) failing to comply with local rules, (2) failing to adequately set

forth the date by which a ruling was needed or the reason a ruling

was needed by that date, and (3) failing to meet the notice

requirements for injunctive relief. The district court also

determined that even if Webb’s motion was not procedurally

deficient, his motion would fail on the merits because, among

other defects, Webb failed to adequately argue a substantial

likelihood of success on the merits of his claims.

On September 19, 2023, Webb filed another emergency

motion for injunctive relief, this time seeking relief by September

21, 2023 and addressing the elements for injunctive relief. The next

day, the district court denied Webb’s motion. The district court

determined that Webb failed to provide the factual and legal

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support to justify his requested relief and continued to fail to meet

the notice requirements for injunctive relief.

After the district court dismissed Webb’s amended

complaint as a shotgun pleading and closed the case on September

26, 2023, Webb filed a third emergency motion for injunctive relief.

The next day, the district court denied Webb’s motion.

On October 2, 2023, Webb filed a fourth motion for

injunctive relief. Two days later, the district court denied Webb’s

motion for injunctive relief. The district court noted that there was

no operative complaint in the case, and thus Webb “clearly failed

to establish a likelihood of success on the merits.”

E. Requests for Referral to Volunteer Attorney Program

On August 16, 2023, the same day Webb filed his initial

complaint, he also filed a motion for referral to a volunteer

attorney program. After dismissing Webb’s initial complaint

without prejudice as a shotgun pleading and giving Webb an

opportunity to amend, the district court denied Webb’s motion for

referral without prejudice. The district court stated that “[s]hould

Webb file an amended complaint that complies with [its] order, he

may renew his motion for referral to a volunteer attorney program

at that time.”

Between August 30, 2023 and September 25, 2023, Webb

filed three motions for referral to a volunteer attorney program.

After the district court on September 26, 2023 dismissed Webb’s

amended complaint without prejudice as a shotgun pleading and

closed the case, the district court denied as moot Webb’s motions

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for referral to a volunteer attorney program because he “ha[d] not

filed a complaint that sufficiently establishe[d] how he c[ould]

validly proceed with this litigation.”

After the case was closed, Webb filed a “second expedited

motion for referral to [a] volunteer attorney program” on October

2, 2023. (Font altered.) Two days later on October 4, 2023, the

district court denied Webb’s motion for referral. The district court

explained that “Webb ha[d] not filed a complaint that sufficiently

establishes how he can validly proceed with this litigation.”

On October 10, 2023, Webb also filed another expedited

motion for referral to a volunteer attorney program based on the

urgent need to prepare properly an emergency motion for

injunctive relief.

F. October 13, 2023 Entry of Judgment

On October 13, 2023, the district court entered a “judgment”

in the case, stating: “The [district court] has dismissed this action.

Because the [September 26, 2023] order dismissing this action is a

judgment, as defined by Rule 54(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the [district court] enters judgment in this matter under

Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This matter is to

remain closed.” 2 (Internal citation omitted.)

2 This order is dated October 11, 2023, but it was entered on October 13, 2023.

The exact date of this order has no impact on Webb’s appeal.

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In a separate court only docket entry, the district court

terminated Webb’s pending October 10, 2023 expedited motion for

referral to a volunteer attorney program.

Webb timely appealed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the district court’s dismissal of a complaint on

shotgun pleading grounds for abuse of discretion. Weiland v. Palm

Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). We

similarly review the denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of

discretion, reviewing any underlying legal conclusions de novo and

any findings of fact for clear error. Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276,

1285 n.3 (11th Cir. 2020). We review the district court’s denial of a

motion for appointment of counsel for an abuse of discretion. Bass

v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 1999).

We liberally construe pro se pleadings. Pinson v. JPMorgan

Chase Bank, N.A., 942 F.3d 1200, 1206 (11th Cir. 2019). An appellant

abandons a claim when he makes only passing references to it or

raises it in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments

and authority. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridan Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681

(11th Cir. 2014); Irwin v. Hawk, 40 F.3d 347, 347 n.1 (11th Cir. 1994)

(applying this rule to a pro se litigant). “[S]imply stating that an issue

exists,” without providing reasoning and citation to authority that

the appellant relies on, “constitutes abandonment of that issue.”

Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681 (quoting Singh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 561 F.3d

1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 2009)).

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Dismissal as Shotgun Pleading

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of

the claim” showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Further, claims should be stated “in

numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single

set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). “Shotgun” pleadings

include complaints that: (1) contain multiple counts where each

count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts; (2) are “replete

with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously

connected to any particular cause of action”; (3) do not separate

each cause of action or claim for relief into separate counts; or

(4) assert multiple claims against multiple defendants without

specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts

or omissions. Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321-23. A shotgun pleading is

characterized by its failure “to give the defendants adequate notice

of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim

rests.” Id. at 1323.

A district court may dismiss a complaint on shotgun

pleading grounds under its “inherent authority to control its docket

and ensure the prompt resolution of lawsuits.” Vibe Micro Inc. v.

Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks

omitted). However, in the case of a non-merits dismissal on

shotgun pleading grounds, the district court is required to sua

sponte allow the litigant one chance to remedy the deficient

pleading. Id. at 1295-96. Similarly, a plaintiff proceeding pro se

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generally must receive at least one opportunity to amend the

complaint if he might be able to state a claim by doing so. Woldeab

v. Dekalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291-92 (11th Cir. 2018).

If the district court permits the plaintiff to amend and explains in

its repleading order how the offending complaint violates the

shotgun pleading rule, but the plaintiff still fails to remedy the

shotgun pleading issues, the district court generally does not abuse

its discretion in dismissing the case with prejudice. Vibe Micro,

878 F.3d at 1296.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing

Webb’s amended complaint without prejudice as a shotgun

pleading because: (1) the district court gave Webb an opportunity

to replead with detailed instructions on how to cure those

deficiencies; (2) Webb did not comply with those instructions; and

(3) Webb’s amended complaint still contained all the features of a

shotgun pleading, including, inter alia, asserting multiple claims

against multiple defendants without specifying which of the

defendants were responsible for which acts and incorporating facts

and allegations from preceding causes of action.

B. Denial of Preliminary Injunction

To be entitled to a preliminary injunction, a movant must

demonstrate that “(1) it has a substantial likelihood of success on

the merits, (2) the movant will suffer irreparable injury unless the

injunction is issued, (3) the threatened injury to the movant

outweighs the possible injury that the injunction may cause the

opposing party, and (4) if issued, the injunction would not disserve

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the public interest.” Horton v. City of St. Augustine, 272 F.3d 1318,

1326 (11th Cir. 2001). Procedurally, the district court generally

may issue a preliminary injunction only after notice has been given

to the adverse party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1).

On appeal, Webb challenges the district court’s dismissal of

his October 2, 2023 “second emergency motion for injunctive

relief.” (Font altered.) In dismissing Webb’s motion, the district

court noted that “[t]he instant emergency motion [wa]s Webb’s

fourth request for [injunctive] relief, and the second one since the

[district court] dismissed his complaint as a shotgun pleading.” The

district court found that Webb failed to establish a likelihood of

success on the merits because there was no operative complaint.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Webb’s motion for injunctive relief because, as discussed above,

Webb’s amended complaint was properly dismissed as a shotgun

pleading. Therefore, Webb cannot establish that his claims, which

were already dismissed, had a substantial likelihood of success on

the merits.

C. Denial of Referral to Volunteer Attorney Program

Civil litigants have no absolute constitutional right to

counsel. Bass, 170 F.3d at 1320. However, under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(1), a district court may appoint counsel for an indigent

plaintiff. Id. “Appointment of counsel in civil cases is, rather, a

privilege justified only by exceptional circumstances, such as the

presence of facts and legal issues [which] are so novel or complex

as to require the assistance of a trained practitioner.” Kilgo v. Ricks,

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983 F.2d 189, 193 (11th Cir. 1993) (quotation marks omitted)

(alterations in original).

We do not need to determine whether extraordinary

circumstances exist here. Webb only references in passing the

district court’s denial of his motions seeking referral to a volunteer

attorney program and offers no substantive argument on that

point. Webb thus abandoned any challenge to the denial of his

motions for referral to a volunteer attorney program. See Sapuppo,

739 F.3d at 681.

In any event, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

denying Webb’s requests for a referral to a volunteer attorney

program. The district court denied Webb’s requests as moot, after

it dismissed his complaint as a shotgun pleading.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court’s

(1) September 26, 2023 order that dismissed Webb’s complaint

without prejudice and denied Webb’s motions for referral to a

volunteer attorney program, (2) October 4, 2023 order that denied

Webb’s motion for injunctive relief and motion for referral to a

volunteer attorney program, and (3) entry of judgment for the

defendants.

AFFIRMED.