An opinion that concurs only in the result “is generally not the best source of legal advice on how to comply with the majority opinion.”
How later courts described this case
- An opinion that concurs only in the result “is generally not the best source of legal advice on how to comply with the majority opinion.”
- construing the provisions governing QTIPs and observing that “[i]n a statute so carefully crafted every difference counts”
- “Neither section 2044 nor the legislative history indicates that decedent should be treated as the owner of QTIP property for [purposes of aggregating stock ownership in connection with valuing the stock].”
- holding that a surviving spouse made no gift when she took under her husband’s will and thereby gave up her one-half interest in their community property because the value of property she gave up (the one-half interest
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
United States Tax Court
163 T.C. No. 5
BRUCE E. MCDOUGALL, DONOR, ET AL., 1
Petitioners
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent
—————
Docket Nos. 2458-22, 2459-22, Filed September 17, 2024.
2460-22.
—————
Upon D’s death in 2011, the residuary of her estate
passed, under the terms of her will, to a trust (Residuary
Trust) in which S, her husband, had an income interest and
their two children (C1 and C2) had remainder interests.
S, as representative of D’s estate, elected under I.R.C.
§ 2056(b)(7) to treat the Residuary Trust property as
qualified terminable interest property. In 2016, S, C1, and
C2 entered into an agreement under which the Residuary
Trust was commuted and all its assets were distributed
to S. S promptly sold some of the assets he received from
the Residuary Trust to other trusts established for the
benefit of C1 and C2 and their children, in exchange for
promissory notes.
S, C1, and C2 separately filed gift tax returns for
2016 and reported that the transactions described above
resulted in offsetting reciprocal gifts and no gift tax.
R examined the gift tax returns and issued a Notice
of Deficiency to each of S, C1, and C2 determining that
(1) the commutation of the Residuary Trust resulted in
1 Cases of the following petitioners are consolidated herewith: Linda M. Lewis,
Donor, Docket No. 2459-22; and Peter F. McDougall, Donor, Docket No. 2460-22.
Served 09/17/24
2
gifts from S to C1 and C2 under I.R.C. § 2519 and (2) the
agreement resulted in gifts from C1 and C2 to S of the
remainder interests in the Residuary Trust under I.R.C.
§ 2511. Timely Petitions for redetermination of the
deficiencies followed.
S, C1, and C2 filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
seeking a ruling that no taxable gifts occurred under the
transactions described above. R filed a Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment seeking rulings that (1) the
agreement to commute the Residuary Trust was a
disposition of S’s qualifying income interest pursuant to
I.R.C. § 2519 and resulted in gift tax liability for S, (2) the
agreement to commute the Residuary Trust resulted in
gifts to S by C1 and C2 under I.R.C. § 2511, and
(3) S’s deemed gift under I.R.C. § 2519 and C1’s and C2’s
gifts to S are not offsetting reciprocal gifts. In the
alternative to ruling (1), R requests a ruling that the
commutation coupled with the transfer of the Residuary
Trust property in exchange for promissory notes is a
disposition of S’s qualifying income interest under I.R.C.
§ 2519 and resulted in gift tax liability for S.
Held: The consequences of the transactions here are
governed by the principles set out in Estate of Anenberg v.
Commissioner, No. 856-21, 162 T.C. (May 20, 2024)
(reviewed).
Held, further, following Estate of Anenberg,
assuming there was a transfer of property under I.R.C.
§ 2519 when the Residuary Trust was commuted, S is not
liable for gift tax under I.R.C. § 2501 because S made no
gratuitous transfers, as required by I.R.C. § 2501.
Held, further, following Estate of Anenberg, the
commutation of the Residuary Trust coupled with the
transfer of the Residuary Trust property in exchange for
promissory notes did not result in gifts from S to C1
and C2.
Held, further, the agreement to commute the
Residuary Trust resulted in gifts to S by C1 and C2 under
I.R.C. § 2511.
3
Held, further, Ps’ Motion for Summary Judgment
will be granted in part and denied in part.
Held, further, R’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment will be granted in part and denied in part.
—————
John W. Porter, Keri D. Brown, and Tyler R. Murray, for petitioners.
Amy Chang, Hannah E. Linsenmayer, Melanie E. Senick, and Melissa
D. Lang, for respondent.
OPINION
TORO, Judge: In these gift tax cases, we return to a subject we
considered only a few months ago: the qualified terminable interest
property (QTIP) regime. See Estate of Anenberg v. Commissioner,
No. 856-21, 162 T.C. (May 20, 2024) (reviewed). As in Estate of
Anenberg, we address the gift tax implications of (1) the termination of
a QTIP marital trust (Residuary Trust), (2) the distribution of all the
assets of the Residuary Trust to the surviving spouse pursuant to a
nonjudicial agreement among the surviving spouse and his children who
held remainder interests in the Residuary Trust, and (3) the subsequent
sale of substantially all of those assets by the surviving spouse to trusts
for the benefit of the children in exchange for promissory notes. Also as
in Estate of Anenberg, we must decide whether the surviving spouse
made gifts as a result of these transactions. In addition, we must decide
whether the children’s transfers of their remainder interests to the
surviving spouse were gifts, a question we specifically left open in Estate
of Anenberg.
Now before us are a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
petitioners, Bruce E. McDougall (Bruce), Linda M. Lewis (Linda), and
Peter F. McDougall (Peter), and a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment filed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Applying the
principles set out in Estate of Anenberg, we conclude that Bruce (the
surviving spouse) made no gifts, but that Linda and Peter (his children)
did so. Accordingly, we will grant each Motion in part and deny each in
part.
4
Background
The following facts are derived from the parties’ pleadings,
Motion papers, the Stipulation of Facts, and the attached Exhibits.
They are stated solely for the purpose of ruling on the Motions before us
and not as findings of fact in these cases. See Rowen v. Commissioner,
156 T.C. 101, 103 (2021) (reviewed).
Clotilde McDougall died in December 2011, survived by her
husband Bruce and their two adult children, Linda and Peter. At that
time, Clotilde’s gross estate was valued at $59.76 million. Bruce served
as personal representative of Clotilde’s estate.
Under her will, Clotilde left the residue of her estate to the
Residuary Trust. Bruce was the trustee of the Residuary Trust.
The will provided for the distribution to Bruce, at least annually,
of the Residuary Trust’s net income. It also allowed the trustee to
distribute principal to Bruce, in the trustee’s discretion, “to provide for
[Bruce’s] health, maintenance and support in his accustomed manner of
living.” Stipulation of Facts Ex. 1-J, at ¶ 5.1.2.
The will granted Bruce a testamentary limited power to appoint
the principal of the Residuary Trust “to or among [Clotilde’s]
descendants, equally or unequally, outright or in trust, on such terms
and in such amounts as he shall determine.” Stipulation of Facts
Ex. 1-J, at ¶ 5.3. Upon Bruce’s death, to the extent that he did not
exercise his power of appointment, the remainder of the Residuary Trust
was to be divided “into equal shares, one share for each of [Clotilde’s]
children who is then living and one share for each of [her] children who
is then deceased with descendants then living.” Stipulation of Facts
Ex. 1-J, at ¶ 6.2.
Clotilde’s will provided that, upon the termination of any trust
created under the will, the trustee was to distribute the trust assets
among its beneficiaries. The distributions did not have to be pro rata,
“so long as the distributees receive assets of a value equal to the value
of their respective interest in the trust as of the time of distribution.”
Stipulation of Facts Ex. 1-J, at ¶ 12.8.
The parties stipulated that Bruce, as personal representative of
Clotilde’s estate, “made a qualified terminable interest property (QTIP)
election . . . with respect to the property that funded the Residuary
5
Trust.” As a result, Clotilde’s estate claimed a marital deduction of
about $54 million.
By 2016, the value of the assets in the Residuary Trust had more
than doubled, and Bruce, Linda, and Peter agreed that those assets
could be more effectively used if Bruce held them outright and free of
trust. In October 2016, Bruce, Linda, and Peter entered into an
agreement concerning the Residuary Trust assets (Nonjudicial
Agreement). Section 2 of the Nonjudicial Agreement provides: “The
parties hereby agree that the Trust shall be commuted and the entire
remaining balance of the Trust shall be distributed outright and free of
trust to Bruce.” Stipulation of Facts Ex. 3-J, at 4.
Section 3 of the Nonjudicial Agreement provides:
By signing this Agreement and by virtue of the QTIP
election for the [Residuary] Trust, the commutation of the
Trust results in a deemed gift, for federal gift tax purposes,
of the remainder interest in the Trust assets from Bruce to
Linda and Peter under Section 2519 of the Code. By virtue
of the distribution of all of the Trust assets to Bruce, the
commutation of the Trust does not result in a deemed gift
of Bruce’s income interest in the Trust under Section 2511
of the Code. Additionally, by signing this Agreement and
by virtue of the distribution of all of the Trust asset [sic] to
Bruce, the commutation of the Trust results in a gift, for
federal gift tax purposes, of the remainder interest in the
Trust from Linda and Peter to Bruce. The deemed gift of
the remainder interest from Bruce to Linda and Peter and
the gift from Linda and Peter to Bruce results in a
reciprocal gift transfer.
Stipulation of Facts Ex. 3-J, at 4.
On the same day that the last of the parties signed the
Nonjudicial Agreement, Bruce transferred assets he received from the
Residuary Trust to trusts established for the benefit of Linda, Peter, and
their descendants (Children’s Trusts). In exchange, Bruce received
promissory notes. 2
2 The parties disagree about some of the details of Bruce’s transfers to the
Children’s Trusts. For example, petitioners claim that the principal amount of the
6
Bruce, Linda, and Peter each filed a 2016 Form 709, United
States Gift (and Generation-Skipping Transfer) Tax Return. Each
return includes an explanatory statement that describes the taxpayer’s
view of the transactions effected by section 2 of the Nonjudicial
Agreement. Each statement accepts that the commutation of the
Residuary Trust resulted in a disposition under section 2519(a) 3 of
Bruce’s qualifying income interest in the trust with the consequence
that he was treated as having transferred to Linda and Peter the
remainder interest in the trust. But each statement also advances the
position that no taxable gifts resulted because Bruce’s deemed transfers
were offset by transfers of the same assets back to him by Linda and
Peter. For example, like section 3 of the Nonjudicial Agreement, Bruce’s
Form 709 states:
Under IRC Section 2519 (a) [sic], the commutation of the
Trust results in a deemed gift for federal gift tax purposes
of the remainder interest in the Trust assets . . . from
Taxpayer [Bruce] to Daughter [Linda] and Son [Peter]. . . .
Further, by the non-judicial agreement to distribute all
assets to Taxpayer there is a transfer of the remainder
interest from Daughter and Son to Taxpayer. Accordingly,
the deemed gift of the remainder interest by Taxpayer to
Daughter and Son, and the transfer of the same assets from
Daughter and Son to Taxpayer results in a reciprocal gift
transfer.
Stipulation of Facts Ex. 4-J, at 329.
notes Bruce received equaled the value of the assets he transferred to the Children’s
Trusts. The Commissioner disputes that those transfers “were for adequate and full
consideration.” Resp’t’s Obj. to Pet’r’s Mot. for Summ. J. (Resp’t’s Obj.) 12 n.20. In
addition, the Commissioner contends that Bruce did not transfer to the Children’s
Trusts all the assets he received from the Residuary Trust. The Commissioner claims
that “the record is devoid of facts as to what occurred with the other assets of the
Residuary . . . Trust.” Resp’t’s Obj. 13. He accepts, however, that Bruce transferred to
the Children’s Trusts “substantially all” the assets he received from the Residuary
Trust. The disputed details concerning Bruce’s transfers to the Children’s Trusts are
not material to the issues addressed in this Opinion.
3 Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to the Internal Revenue
Code, Title 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C. or Code), in effect at all relevant times, regulation
references are to the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 26 (Treas. Reg.), in effect at all
relevant times, and Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
Procedure.
7
Linda’s and Peter’s Forms 709 include statements that are
identical except for the use of different labels (Father, Sister, Brother)
for the parties.
In separate Notices of Deficiency issued on the same date, the
Commissioner determined a deficiency in the gift tax liability of each of
Bruce, Linda, and Peter for 2016. The Notice of Deficiency issued to
Bruce stated the Commissioner’s determination that the commutation
of the Residuary Trust “resulted in a gift from the Taxpayer to the
remainder beneficiaries under Internal Revenue Code sec. 2519.” The
Notices of Deficiency issued to Linda and Peter each stated the
Commissioner’s determination that the distribution to Bruce of all the
property of the Residuary Trust “constitutes a transfer of the remainder
interest in the . . . Trust and a gift by the remainder beneficiaries under
Internal Revenue Code sec. 2511.” Stipulation of Facts Ex. 8-J, at 9; id.
Ex. 9-J, at 9.
Bruce, Linda, and Peter all filed timely Petitions with our Court
for redetermination of the gift tax liabilities. They resided in the State
of Washington at the time.
The Commissioner has moved for partial summary judgment
seeking rulings that (1) “the October 31, 2016 Nonjudicial Agreement to
commute and terminate the . . . Residuary Trust . . . was a disposition
of [Bruce’s] qualifying income interest pursuant to section 2519,” (2) “the
distribution of all trust property to Bruce pursuant to the October 31,
2016 Nonjudicial Agreement to commute and terminate the Residuary
. . . Trust were gifts pursuant to section 2511 to Bruce by [Linda] and
[Peter] each of their right to receive a pro rata share of the assets
allocable to the[ir] remainder interest,” and (3) “Bruce’s deemed gift
pursuant to section 2519 and Linda’s and Peter’s gifts to Bruce . . . do
not constitute offsetting consideration for each other, and as such are
not offsetting reciprocal gifts.” Resp’t’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Partial
Summ. J. (Resp’t’s Mem.) 1–2. In the alternative to ruling (1), the
Commissioner requests a ruling that “the October 31, 2016 Nonjudicial
Agreement to commute and terminate the Residuary . . . Trust and
distribute all trust property to Bruce coupled with Bruce’s immediate
transfer of substantially all the Residuary . . . Trust property to
irrevocable trusts for the benefit of Linda and Peter and their
descendants in exchange for promissory notes is a disposition of Bruce’s
qualifying income interest pursuant to section 2519.” Resp’t’s Mem. 2.
8
Bruce, Linda, and Peter have moved for summary judgment “that
no taxable gifts occurred and that no gift tax deficiencies exist.” Pet’r’s
Mot. for Summ. J. 4.
Discussion
I. Summary Judgment Standard
The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite litigation and
avoid costly, time-consuming, and unnecessary trials. Fla. Peach Corp.
v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988). The Court may grant
summary judgment when there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and a decision may be rendered as a matter of law. Rule 121(a)(2);
Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), aff’d, 17
F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994). In deciding whether to grant summary
judgment, we construe factual materials and inferences drawn from
them in the light most favorable to the adverse party. Sundstrand
Corp., 98 T.C. at 520. The parties agree that summary adjudication is
appropriate here.
II. General Legal Principles: The Marital Deduction, the QTIP
Regime, and the Gift Tax Rules
Our opinion in Estate of Anenberg sets out an extensive discussion
of the marital deduction available for estate tax purposes, the QTIP
regime, and the QTIP regime’s interaction with the gift tax rules. Estate
of Anenberg, 162 T.C., slip op. at 8–12. We see no need to repeat that
discussion here and turn instead to considering how the principles laid
out in Estate of Anenberg apply to the circumstances now before us. 4
III. Application of Estate of Anenberg
A. Lessons from Estate of Anenberg
In Estate of Anenberg, 162 T.C., slip op. at 4, we faced the question
“what happens when taxpayers subject to the QTIP regime take steps to
conform their actual legal arrangements to the regime’s legal fiction?”
As we explained, the cross-motions for partial summary judgment there
addressed the treatment of interests in property designated to be
treated as QTIP when Alvin Anenberg (Alvin), the husband of Sally J.
Anenberg (Sally), passed away. Id. The underlying property was held
4 In Part IV.A below, we address certain arguments about the scope of the QTIP
fiction that we had no occasion to consider in Estate of Anenberg.
9
in trust. Id. Following Alvin’s death, Sally obtained a qualifying income
interest for life, and, upon her death, the remainder interests in the
corpus would contingently go to trusts for the benefit of Alvin’s children.
Id. Eventually, with the consent of both Alvin’s children and Sally, the
trusts holding the underlying property were terminated by a state court
and all the property held by the trusts was distributed to Sally, putting
her in the position she would have been in if all that property had
originally passed from Alvin to her. Id. Sally later made gifts of and
sold different pieces of the underlying property to Alvin’s children and
grandchildren. Id. Sally passed away, leaving the gift tax consequences
of these transactions to be resolved by her estate. Id.
Sally’s estate argued that the transactions just described did not
result in any gift tax liability for Sally. The Commissioner disagreed,
relying on section 2519. We sided with Sally’s estate, concluding Sally
made no gift.
We began by examining the text of section 2519. It provides that,
“[f]or purposes of [the chapter imposing the gift tax] and [the chapter
imposing the estate tax], any disposition of all or part of a qualifying
income interest for life in any [QTIP] shall be treated as a transfer of all
interests in such [QTIP] other than the qualifying income interest.”
I.R.C. § 2519(a). We read the Code to say that, “for gift and estate tax
purposes, section 2519 treats any disposition of the surviving spouse’s
income interest in QTIP as if the surviving spouse transferred 100% of
the remainder interests in QTIP.” Estate of Anenberg, 162 T.C., slip op.
at 11. We then assumed (without deciding) that the termination of the
trusts through which Sally held her qualifying income interest in the
QTIP and the distribution of the QTIP to Sally by order of the court was
a disposition within the meaning of section 2519(a). Id., slip op.
at 13–14. But, as we observed,
[a] transfer alone, however, is insufficient to create
a gift tax liability. Rather, section 2501 tells us that gift
tax applies “on the transfer of property by gift during [the]
calendar year.” I.R.C. § 2501(a)(1) (emphasis added);
[United States v.] Irvine, 511 U.S. [224,] 232 [(1994)]; see
also Estate of Howard v. Commissioner, 910 F.2d 633, 636
(9th Cir. 1990) (construing the provisions governing QTIPs
and observing that “[i]n a statute so carefully crafted every
difference counts”), rev’g 91 T.C. 329 (1988). And, as the
Supreme Court observed in Irvine, “[w]e have repeatedly
emphasized that [the Code’s] comprehensive language was
10
chosen to embrace all gratuitous transfers.” Irvine, 511
U.S. at 232–33 (emphasis added); id. at 235 (“[T]he
capacious language of Internal Revenue Code §§ 2501(a)(1)
and 2511(a) . . . encompasses all gratuitous transfers of
property and property rights of significant value.”
(Emphasis added.)). In other words, a gratuitous
transfer—not just a transfer—is required to impose gift
tax.
Id., slip op. at 14.
And, under the facts in Estate of Anenberg, no gratuitous transfer
had occurred. As we noted:
To determine whether Sally made a gift, in connection with
the deemed transfer, we compare what she had before and
after the transaction. When doing so, we find that, after
the transaction, Sally had full ownership of the [QTIP]. As
a result of the Superior Court’s order, she received free and
clear the underlying property that section 2056(b)(7)
deemed her to have received from Alvin to start with and
with respect to which (we assume) section 2519(a) deemed
her to have transferred remainder interests upon the
termination of the Marital Trusts. Put another way,
Sally’s deemed transfer of the remainder interests in the
[QTIP] held in trust (other than her qualifying income
interest) resulted in her actual receipt of all the [QTIP]
unencumbered (other than those attributable to her
qualifying income interest). At the end of the day, she gave
away nothing of value as a result of the deemed transfer.
Accordingly, the termination of the Marital Trusts did not
result in any “gratuitous transfers” by Sally, deemed or
otherwise. See Irvine, 511 U.S. at 232. Because there was
no gratuitous transfer, she made no gift. A long line of
cases echoes this principle. See, e.g., Turman v.
Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1123, 1129 (1961) (holding that a
surviving spouse made no gift when she took under her
husband’s will and thereby gave up her one-half interest in
their community property because the value of property
she gave up (the one-half interest) was less than what she
received in return (a life estate in all the community
property)); Siegel v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 743, 747 (1956)
(stating on similar facts that “[i]f [the taxpayer] received
11
more than she surrendered then, of course, no gift has been
made”), aff’d, 250 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1957).
Id., slip op. at 14–15.
We went on to reject several arguments the Commissioner made
in resisting this conclusion, id., slip op. at 19–27, as well as the
Commissioner’s alternative argument that a subsequent sale of the
QTIP for promissory notes triggered section 2519(a), id., slip op.
at 18–19.
Importantly for these cases, however, while concluding that Sally
had made no gift, “[w]e express[ed] no view on whether the other
beneficiaries of the Marital Trust could be treated as making a gift to
Sally for gift tax purposes.” Id., slip op. at 18 n.18.
B. Consequences of Estate of Anenberg Holding for Cases Now
Before Us
The parties’ positions in the Motions now before us are both
similar to and different from those we faced in Estate of Anenberg.
As in Estate of Anenberg, the Commissioner maintains that the
implementation of the Nonjudicial Agreement resulted in a gift made by
Bruce or, in the alternative, that the implementation of the Nonjudicial
Agreement coupled with the subsequent sale of the trust property for
promissory notes resulted in a gift made by Bruce. We reject these
arguments for the reasons we set out in Estate of Anenberg. See id., slip
op. at 14–19; see also id., slip op. at 20–27 (addressing the
Commissioner’s counterarguments). As with respect to Sally in that
case, we conclude that Bruce made no gifts to Linda or Peter. 5
5 In view of this conclusion with respect to Bruce, we (again) need not decide
whether the implementation of the Nonjudicial Agreement gave rise to “any
disposition” of Bruce’s qualifying income interest in the QTIP. See Estate of Anenberg,
162 T.C., slip op. at 13–14. For purposes of our analysis we can assume (without
deciding) that the commutation of the Residual Trust resulted in a disposition of
Bruce’s qualifying income interest. Moreover, the analysis with respect to Linda and
Peter set out below would not change even if we were to conclude that the transactions
at issue did not give rise to “any disposition” (and therefore that no transfer under
section 2519(a) occurred with respect to Bruce). Accordingly, as in Estate of Anenberg,
we leave for another day the complicated question of whether implementing the
Nonjudicial Agreement gave rise to “any disposition” of Bruce’s qualifying income
interest for purposes of section 2519(a).
12
Unlike in Estate of Anenberg, however, here the Commissioner
also determined deficiencies against the holders of the remainder
interests, Linda and Peter. The Commissioner argues that “[w]ith
regard to Linda and Peter, there is no [QTIP] tax fiction at work.”
Resp’t’s Mem. 72. Rather, he says, “[t]hey received a remainder interest
in the Residuary QTIP Trust assets at Clotilde’s death.” Id. The
Commissioner observes that “[t]his is a valuable property interest that
became part of their estates at that time, and with respect to which they
agreed to an immediate transfer to Bruce pursuant to the Nonjudicial
Agreement.” Id. The Commissioner reminds us “that federal gift tax is
an excise tax on the transfer of property,” and he concludes that “the
transfers of Linda[’s] and Peter’s rights to a pro rata share of the
Residuary QTIP Trust assets are taxable gifts.” Id. He reasons that,
“[b]ecause the assets are no longer part of either of their taxable estates
and cannot be further transferred by Linda and Peter, they are no longer
subject to further transfer taxation therein.” Id. at 72–73.
The Commissioner’s argument is well taken. Under the
“gratuitous transfer” framework described in Estate of Anenberg, Linda
and Peter plainly made gratuitous transfers. Before the
implementation of the Nonjudicial Agreement, they held valuable
rights, i.e., the remainder interests in the QTIP. 6 After the
implementation of that agreement, which required their consent, Linda
and Peter had given up those valuable rights by agreeing that all of the
Residuary Trust assets would be transferred to Bruce. And they
received nothing in return. By giving up something for nothing, Linda
and Peter engaged in quintessential gratuitous transfers and are
therefore subject to gift tax under sections 2501 and 2511. See Estate of
Anenberg, 162 T.C., slip op. at 14–15; see also Jewett v. Commissioner,
455 U.S. 305, 310 (1982) (“Our expansive reading of the statutory
language [of section 2501] in Smith [v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 180
(1943)] unquestionably encompasses an indirect transfer, effected by
means of a disclaimer, of a contingent future interest in a trust.”). 7
6 To review, the QTIP assets that funded the Residuary Trust initially were
worth approximately $54 million and had more than doubled in value by 2016. While
Bruce was entitled to the income generated by the assets during his life, he could
receive distributions of principal only to provide for his “health, maintenance and
support in his accustomed manner of living.” The remainder interests belonged to
Linda and Peter.
7 Given the procedural posture of the case, we do not of course decide here the
value of the gifts Linda and Peter made to Bruce. That factual issue remains open for
decision in future proceedings.
13
IV. Petitioners’ Arguments
Petitioners’ efforts to refute the conclusion that Linda and Peter
made gifts to Bruce are unavailing.
A. Scope of the QTIP Fiction
We begin with a preliminary point. The fundamental premise of
petitioners’ argument seems to be that the QTIP fiction should apply
with equal force to the children, not just the surviving spouse. And,
moreover, that the fiction that the surviving spouse owns the property
persists for all purposes of the Code. In essence, in petitioners’ view, for
gift tax purposes, the children simply had nothing that they could give
away. Petitioners’ arguments would have us apply the QTIP fiction too
broadly, as the Commissioner points out.
We have already recognized that the QTIP fiction does not apply
for all purposes. See Estate of Mellinger v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 26,
36–37 (1999) (“Neither section 2044 nor the legislative history indicates
that decedent should be treated as the owner of QTIP property for
[purposes of aggregating stock ownership in connection with valuing the
stock].”). This principle is entirely consistent with the function of the
QTIP regime—“namely, not eliminating or reducing tax on the transfer
of marital assets out of the marital unit, but rather permitting deferral
[of that transfer tax] until the death of or gift by the surviving spouse.”
Estate of Anenberg, 162 T.C., slip op. at 20. All the provisions through
which Congress enacted the QTIP regime are focused on deferring,
imposing, and collecting that single tax. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)
(permitting through an estate tax deduction deferral of the transfer tax
on assets leaving the marital unit); I.R.C. § 2519 (triggering the deferred
transfer tax if the surviving spouse makes an inter vivos gift of a portion
of the QTIP); I.R.C. § 2044 (triggering the deferred transfer tax on the
QTIP when the surviving spouse dies); I.R.C. § 2207A (providing rules
for the collection of the deferred transfer tax once it is triggered). Again,
the focus of these rules is on the transfer of marital assets outside the
marital unit. As the Commissioner points out, they say nothing about,
and do not apply to, transactions that transferees outside the marital
unit, such as Linda and Peter, may undertake with respect to their own
interests in QTIP.
In short, Linda and Peter cannot invoke the QTIP fiction, which
applies for the limited purpose of determining Bruce’s transfer tax
14
liability when marital assets leave the marital unit, to escape transfer
tax on their own transactions.
B. Reciprocal Gifts
As noted above, petitioners’ primary position is that Bruce, Linda,
and Peter made reciprocal gifts that offset each other. The position is
unpersuasive.
Petitioners’ argument is based on the premise that “the
commutation of the Trust results in a deemed gift, for federal gift tax
purposes, of the remainder interest in the Trust assets from Bruce to
Linda and Peter under Section 2519 of the Code,” as the Nonjudicial
Agreement puts it. But this premise is incorrect. As we have already
held (in concluding that Bruce made no gifts), by its terms,
section 2519(a) does not deem a gift; it merely deems a transfer. Thus,
there are no deemed gifts from Bruce to Linda and Peter to offset the
very real gifts from Linda and Peter to Bruce. 8
Nor did Linda and Peter ever actually obtain anything of value
from Bruce as a result of the Nonjudicial Agreement. Under state law,
they already had the remainder rights with respect to the Residuary
Trust. 9 And a deemed transfer under section 2519(a) added nothing to
their bundle of sticks. In other words, no matter the outcome under
section 2519(a), nothing of value passed to Linda and Peter that offset
the value they gave up by relinquishing their remainder rights.
C. Bruce’s Existing Interest in the QTIP
Petitioners also argue that Linda and Peter cannot have
transferred anything to Bruce because, under the QTIP regime, Bruce
was already deemed to own all of the QTIP. The argument is misplaced
8 In view of this conclusion, we need not decide whether United States v. Estate
of Grace, 395 U.S. 316 (1969), and Revenue Ruling 69-505, 1969-2 C.B. 179, bear the
reading petitioners give to those authorities. See Stromme v. Commissioner, 138 T.C.
213, 218 n.8 (2012) (observing that we should decide only what is needed to dispose of
the case before us); see also PDK Labs Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (same).
9 For rules governing the allocation of principal and income for purposes of the
Residuary Trust, see the Principal and Income Act, 2002 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 345
(West) (codified at Wash. Rev. Code Ann. ch. 11.104A (West 2003)), repealed and
replaced by Uniform Fiduciary Income and Principal Act, 2021 Wash. Legis. Serv.
ch. 140, §§ 2101–2809 (West) (codified at Wash. Rev. Code Ann. ch. 11.104B (West
2022)).
15
as well. Any rights Bruce may have been deemed to hold because of the
QTIP fiction do not negate the very real interests Linda and Peter held
because of Clotilde’s will. And their decision to transfer those rights to
Bruce gives rise to the potential gift tax consequences here. The focus
of the analysis is whether Linda and Peter transferred valuable rights
gratuitously. That Bruce may have already been deemed to hold those
rights for purposes of determining his transfer tax liability is of no
moment. As the governing regulations note:
The gift tax is not imposed upon the receipt of the property
by the donee, nor is it necessarily determined by the
measure of enrichment resulting to the donee from the
transfer, nor is it conditioned upon ability to identify the
donee at the time of the transfer. On the contrary, the tax
is a primary and personal liability of the donor, is an excise
upon his act of making the transfer, is measured by the
value of the property passing from the donor, and attaches
regardless of the fact that the identity of the donee may not
then be known or ascertainable.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(a).
The Commissioner correctly points out that “[i]f Linda and Peter
were to transfer their remainder interests to a third party, the transfers
would clearly be a gift and Petitioners admit as much.” Resp’t’s Resp.
to Pet’r’s Resp. to Ct. Order 20–21, Dec. 22, 2023 (citing Pet’r’s Resp. to
Ct. Order 14 n.19, Nov. 27, 2023). That Bruce was the recipient of
Linda’s and Peter’s largesse does not change this conclusion.
D. Economic Positions of the Parties
Petitioners also maintain no gift occurred because the economic
positions of the parties were unchanged. That is simply not so. Before
the implementation of the Nonjudicial Agreement, despite the QTIP
fiction, Bruce did not own the assets of the Residuary Trust outright and
could not do with them what he wished. After the implementation of
the Nonjudicial Agreement, he did and could.
On the other hand, before the implementation of the Nonjudicial
Agreement, Linda and Peter had remainder rights with respect to the
Residuary Trust. After, they did not. Of course, under the terms of
Clotilde’s will, Bruce could have decided in his own will to reduce one of
16
the children’s share significantly. 10 But the Nonjudicial Agreement
reduced both children’s rights with respect to the Residuary Trust to
nothing. And, as far as we can tell, going forward nothing in the
Nonjudicial Agreement precluded Bruce from excluding Linda and Peter
from a future will altogether. Moreover, while trusts established for
their benefit (the Children’s Trusts) eventually acquired assets
transferred to Bruce from the Residuary Trusts, that was in exchange
for issuing secured promissory notes to Bruce. Thus, the Children’s
Trusts would have to pay (albeit in the future) for the assets they
received. Nothing came to those trusts simply as a result of the
provisions of Clotilde’s will (as might have occurred in the absence the
Nonjudicial Agreement).
In short, the economic positions of the parties were indeed altered
by the Nonjudicial Agreement.
V. Conclusion
In view of the foregoing, petitioners’ Motion for Summary
Judgment will be granted to the extent it asks us to conclude that Bruce
did not make any gifts as a result of the transactions at issue. But that
Motion will be denied to the extent it asks us to conclude that Linda and
Peter did not make any gifts as a result of the transactions at issue
either.
Relatedly, the Commissioner’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment will be granted to the extent that it asks us to conclude that
Linda and Peter made gifts as a result of the transactions at issue. But
that Motion will be denied to the extent it asks us to conclude that Bruce
made gifts as a result of the transactions at issue.
We have considered all of the parties’ arguments and, to the
extent not discussed above, conclude they are irrelevant, moot, or
without merit. 11
The import (if any) of these terms for the value of Linda’s and Peter’s
10
remainder rights remains to be decided. See supra note 7.
11 The analysis in the Opinion Concurring in the Result misreads the holding
of Estate of Anenberg and our holdings in these cases. See Students for Fair
Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 600 U.S. 181, 230 (2023) (An
opinion that concurs only in the result “is generally not the best source of legal advice
on how to comply with the majority opinion.”). And the analytical path it offers is
17
To reflect the foregoing,
An appropriate order will be issued.
Reviewed by the Court.
KERRIGAN, FOLEY, BUCH, NEGA, PUGH, ASHFORD, URDA,
COPELAND, JONES, GREAVES, MARSHALL, and WEILER, JJ.,
agree with this opinion of the Court.
HALPERN, J., concurs in the result.
neither more straightforward nor sounder than the one we adopt. See concurring op.
pp. 18, 29–30.
18
HALPERN, J., concurring in the result: While I agree with the
results the majority reaches, I believe an alternative analysis to reach
those results would have been preferable. The majority’s analysis raises
questions it does not adequately address. I therefore offer an alternative
analysis that avoids those questions and, in my judgment, provides a
sounder basis for the Court’s conclusions.
I. Questions Raised by the Majority’s Analysis
A. Estate of Anenberg’s Alternative Rationales
The majority suggests that its conclusion that “Bruce . . . made no
gifts” can be reached by “[a]pplying the principles set out in Estate of
Anenberg.” Op. Ct. p. 3. In Estate of Anenberg v. Commissioner, No. 856-
21, 162 T.C. (May 20, 2024), we addressed the consequences under
section 2519(a) of the distribution to a surviving spouse of all the
property in two QTIP trusts upon the trusts’ termination. We concluded
that, even if the termination of the trusts and the distribution to the
surviving spouse of the trust property effected a “disposition,” within the
meaning of section 2519(a), the resulting deemed transfer was not a
taxable gift.
We offered two alternative rationales for our conclusion in Estate
of Anenberg that any deemed transfer under section 2519(a) would not
have been a gift. First, Sally Anenberg, the surviving spouse, “received
free and clear the underlying property that section 2056(b)(7) deemed
her to have received from Alvin [her deceased husband] to start with
and with respect to which (we assume) section 2519(a) deemed her to
have transferred remainder interests upon the termination of the
Marital Trusts.” Estate of Anenberg, 162 T.C., slip op. at 15.
We observed that “[a] long line of cases echoes th[e] principle” that
transfers that are not gratuitous are not gifts. Id. We cited two cases
as examples: Siegel v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 743 (1956), aff’d, 250 F.2d
339 (9th Cir. 1957), and Turman v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1123 (1961).
Each case addressed a situation in which a wife gave up her share of
community property to take under her deceased husband’s will. The
husband’s will provided for the creation of a trust in which the wife
received a life interest. The trust was funded with the couple’s
community property. By taking under her husband’s will, the wife gave
up the remainder interest in her share of the community property. And
she received a life interest in the property that came from her husband.
In each case, we concluded that the wife made a gift only to the extent
19
that the value of what she gave up exceeded the value of what she
received. We viewed what she received as consideration for what she
gave up. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained
in affirming our decision in Siegel: “When the husband makes a
testamentary disposition of more than half of the community property
and the wife chooses to take under the will, the half interest in the estate
which she surrenders is a contract supported by adequate
consideration.” Commissioner v. Siegel, 250 F.2d at 345.
Our opinion in Estate of Anenberg, 162 T.C., slip op. at 17, invoked
section 2512 as “further confirm[ation]” that what Sally received in
exchange for any deemed transfer under section 2519(a) made that
transfer not gratuitous. Section 2512(b) provides: “Where property is
transferred for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or
money’s worth, then the amount by which the value of the property
exceeded the value of the consideration shall be deemed a gift . . . .” We
noted that “[a] necessary corollary” of the rule stated in section 2512(b)
“is that no taxable gift results to the extent the value of transferred
property is equal to or less than the value of the consideration received.”
Estate of Anenberg, 162 T.C., slip op. at 17. “[T]o the extent section 2519
viewed Sally as transferring away the interests in property that the
QTIP regime treated her as holding in the first place,” we reasoned, “it
is hard to understand why Sally would not have received full and
adequate consideration in return when she was also at the receiving end
of the transfer of the property unencumbered.” Id.
As an alternative rationale for our conclusion that any deemed
transfer by Sally under section 2519(a) was not a taxable gift, we
observed that, under Treasury Regulation § 25.2511-2, “any gift by Sally
would appear to be viewed as wholly incomplete.” Estate of Anenberg,
162 T.C., slip op. at 16. “[E]ven if we deem Sally to have transferred the
remainder interests,” we noted, “no value would appear to have passed
from her to anyone else because she ultimately received all the property
held by the Marital Trusts as part of the same transaction, leaving
nothing on which the ‘excise’ could operate.” Id. (citing Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2511-2(a)). “[A]fter the termination of the Marital Trusts,” we
observed, Sally “had full control over the disposition of the assets
previously held in trust.” Id. Sally was in the same position as if she
had reserved and “promptly exercised” a “power to revest title in the
property in herself.” Id., slip op. at 17.
Estate of Anenberg’s “adequate and full consideration” rationale
and its “wholly incomplete gift” rationale are necessarily alternatives to
20
each other. Either rationale could justify the conclusion that any
deemed transfer by Sally under section 2519 was not a taxable gift. But
they cannot both support that conclusion simultaneously. Sally may
have made a complete transfer for which she received adequate and full
consideration. Or she might have made a wholly incomplete transfer for
which she was not entitled to consideration. She cannot have done both
at the same time.
In Estate of Anenberg, we had no reason to choose between the
alternative rationales we offered. Either rationale supported our
resolution of the only issue in that case.
B. Implications of Estate of Anenberg’s Alternative Rationales
for Linda and Peter
The cases now before us, however, raise an additional issue:
whether Linda and Peter made taxable gifts to their father when they
allowed him to receive the shares of Residuary Trust property that
would otherwise have gone to them. Resolving that issue requires us to
choose between Estate of Anenberg’s alternative rationales. Even if the
choice of rationales does not affect our resolution of the additional issue
now before us, that choice will at least affect the relevant analysis.
Under Estate of Anenberg’s wholly incomplete gift rationale, we
could readily conclude that Linda’s and Peter’s transfers to Bruce were
taxable gifts. Bruce’s deemed transfer under section 2519(a) could not
be viewed as having provided Linda and Peter with adequate and full
consideration—regardless of the scope of the fiction underlying the
QTIP rules—if Bruce’s deemed transfer were wholly incomplete.
The majority’s discussion of the scope of the QTIP fiction,
however, suggests that it relies primarily on Estate of Anenberg’s
adequate and full consideration rationale. Linda’s and Peter’s transfers
to Bruce provided him with adequate and full consideration for any
deemed transfer by him under section 2519(a), but his deemed transfer
cannot be viewed as having provided adequate and full consideration for
Linda’s and Peter’s transfers to him. As the majority writes: “Linda and
Peter cannot invoke the QTIP fiction” because that fiction (that Bruce
owned, and could transfer, the interests in the QTIP other than his
qualifying income interest) “applies for the limited purpose of
determining Bruce’s transfer tax liability when marital assets leave the
marital unit.” Op. Ct. pp. 13–14. Linda and Peter thus cannot “escape
transfer tax” on their “very real” transfers to Bruce by claiming that a
21
deemed transfer by Bruce under section 2519(a) provided them with
adequate and full consideration. Op. Ct. p. 14.
The majority, as I understand it, thus treats the same transfers
differently in determining the transfer tax consequences for the
transferors (Linda and Peter) and the transferee (Bruce). Linda’s and
Peter’s “very real” transfers to Bruce were, from his perspective,
consideration for any deemed transfer he may have made under section
2519(a) but, from Linda’s and Peter’s perspective, their transfers were
wholly gratuitous and thus taxable gifts. 1 I question whether the
bounds of the QTIP fiction are so clearly delineated as to justify that
differential treatment.
C. The Scope of the QTIP Fiction
As the majority observes, Linda and Peter did not “actually obtain
anything of value from Bruce as a result of the Nonjudicial Agreement.”
Op. Ct. p. 14. In particular, any “deemed transfer [by Bruce] under
section 2519(a) added nothing to [Linda’s and Peter’s] bundle of sticks.”
Id. Therefore, “nothing of value passed to Linda and Peter that offset
the value they gave up by relinquishing their remainder rights.” Id.
I agree with all of that. Given that Bruce provided “nothing of value” to
Linda and Peter, how can they be viewed as having provided
consideration for nothing? Precisely because Linda and Peter received
nothing of value from Bruce, they had no cause to provide him
consideration.
Estate of Anenberg’s adequate and full consideration rationale
thus posits that a surviving spouse can receive consideration for a
transfer of property that the surviving spouse does not actually own—a
deemed transfer that provides nothing of value to any transferee. That
proposition lacks a clear statutory basis. Section 2519(a) requires that
a “disposition” of a surviving spouse’s qualifying income interest in QTIP
“be treated as a transfer of all interests in [the QTIP] other than the
1 Linda and Peter did not actually transfer any of the Residuary Trust property
to their father. Instead, upon its termination, the trust distributed all its property
directly to Bruce. Under a longstanding principle of tax law, however, if a taxpayer
entitled to a payment directs the payor to make the payment to a third party, the
taxpayer constructively receives the payment and then transfers the property so
received to the ultimate recipient. See, e.g., Old Colony Tr. Co. v. Commissioner, 279
U.S. 716 (1929). The majority, in describing Linda and Peter as having made “very
real” transfers to their father, apparently accepts the application of that principle in
the present cases. So do I.
22
qualifying income interest.” But neither section 2519(a) nor any of the
other provisions addressing QTIP expressly provide that the surviving
spouse can be treated as having received consideration for a deemed
transfer of interests in property that the surviving spouse does not
actually own. The adequate and full consideration rationale thus
extends the QTIP fiction beyond what the relevant statutory provisions
expressly provide.
How far, then, does the QTIP fiction extend beyond the express
terms of the relevant statutory provisions? The majority views
petitioners as asking that we “apply the QTIP fiction too broadly.”
Op. Ct. p. 13. It describes petitioners as contending that “the fiction that
the surviving spouse owns the [QTIP outright] persists for all purposes
of the Code.” Id. If that is what petitioners contend, and if that
contention were correct, Linda and Peter could not have made taxable
gifts of any interest in the QTIP. If Bruce were treated for all purposes
as owing the QTIP outright, as the majority says, it would follow that
Linda and Peter “simply had nothing [that is, no interest in the QTIP]
that they could give away.” Id.
But the majority mischaracterizes petitioners’ argument,
knocking down a straw man. Petitioners do not argue that Bruce has to
be treated as the owner of all of the Residuary Trust property for all
purposes relevant under the Code. As the majority acknowledges,
petitioners “admit” that gratuitous transfers by Linda and Peter to a
third party of their remainder interests in the Residuary Trust would be
taxable gifts. Op. Ct. p. 15.
Similarly, the majority seizes on petitioners’ use of what I would
view as an infelicitous label to reject petitioners’ “primary position.”
Op. Ct. p. 14. Petitioners sometimes refer to the transfers between
Bruce and his children as “reciprocal gifts.”
The phrase “reciprocal gift” is a misnomer. Offsetting, reciprocal
transfers are not gifts. I am unaware of any “reciprocal gift” doctrine.
The authorities petitioners cite when they refer to reciprocal gifts
or transfers, United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316 (1969), and
Revenue Ruling 69-505, 1969-2 C.B. 179, deal with the “reciprocal trust”
doctrine, which applies when each of two settlors creates a trust for the
other’s benefit. To prevent the avoidance of section 2036, which includes
in a decedent’s estate property transferred subject to a retained life
23
estate, the courts may treat each settlor as the grantor of the other’s
trust.
The reciprocal trust doctrine has no bearing on the present cases.
The Residuary Trust is the only trust relevant to the issues before us.
We have no occasion to “uncross” transfers to reciprocal trusts.
Thus, the majority sees no need to “decide whether United States
v. Estate of Grace . . . and Revenue Ruling 69-505 . . . bear the reading
petitioners give to those authorities.” Op. Ct. p. 14 n.8. As I understand
petitioners, they rely on Revenue Ruling 69-505 only for the general
proposition that offsetting transfers result in a taxable gift only to the
extent that the value of one transfer exceeds the other. (The ruling
illustrates how that principle applies to the creation of a trust by joint
tenants.)
I agree with the majority that, if any deemed section 2519(a)
transfer is not a gift, that transfer and Linda’s and Peter’s transfers
cannot be reciprocal gifts, whatever that might mean. But I would not
dismiss petitioners’ primary position on the basis of their occasional use
of an anomalous phrase. While petitioners sometimes refer to reciprocal
gifts, they more often describe Bruce, Linda, and Peter as having made
“reciprocal transfers.” They argue that Bruce made a deemed transfer
under section 2519(a) and that that transfer and Linda’s and Peter’s
transfers to him offset so that none of the transfers were taxable gifts.
The majority does not dispute that any deemed transfer by Bruce
under section 2519(a) and Linda’s and Peter’s transfers to him were of
equal value. That point is obvious: The offsetting transfers were of the
same property (all of the interests in the Residuary Trust property other
than Bruce’s qualifying income interest). Instead, the majority
recognizes the offsetting transfers only for the purpose of determining
Bruce’s transfer tax liability and not for the purpose of determining the
transfer tax owed by Linda and Peter. It justifies that selective
recognition of offsetting transfers by perceived limits on the scope of the
QTIP fiction.
Returning to that question, for petitioners to prevail in their claim
that Linda’s and Peter’s transfers to Bruce were not gifts because they
were made for adequate and full consideration, petitioners need not
establish that Bruce must be treated, for all purposes, as the owner of
all the interests in the Residuary Trust property. Instead, their position
can rest on a simple point of transactional consistency. If Linda’s and
24
Peter’s transfers to Bruce provided him with adequate and full
consideration for his deemed transfer under section 2519(a), then their
transfers cannot have been gratuitous. Transfers that, from Bruce’s
perspective, were consideration paid to him should be viewed, from
Linda’s and Peter’s perspectives, as consideration paid by them.
II. An Alternative Analysis
A. Following Estate of Anenberg’s Wholly Incomplete Gift
Rationale
Questions about how far beyond the express terms of the relevant
statutes the QTIP fiction extends could be avoided by choosing Estate of
Anenberg’s wholly incomplete gift rationale over its adequate and full
consideration rationale. Whether the QTIP fiction can, in some
instances, treat a surviving spouse as receiving consideration for a
deemed transfer of interests in property that the surviving spouse does
not actually own, that treatment is inappropriate when the deemed
transfer is, under the principles of Treasury Regulation § 25.2511-2, a
wholly incomplete gift. A transferor who makes a wholly incomplete
transfer is not entitled to any consideration. And any deemed transfer
by Bruce under section 2519(a) would properly be characterized as
wholly incomplete because, after that transfer, he owned all of the
property he would be deemed to have transferred. Section 2519(a), if
applicable, would treat Bruce as having transferred “all interests in [the
Residuary Trust] property other than [his] qualifying income interest.”
But after that deemed transfer, Bruce owned all the interests in the
Residuary Trust property. As noted above, if any deemed transfer by
Bruce under section 2519(a) was a wholly incomplete gift, it cannot have
provided adequate and full consideration to Linda and Peter for their
transfers to him.
The wholly incomplete gift analysis, however, may prove too
much. It calls into question whether a disposition of Bruce’s qualifying
income interest in the Residuary Trust property occurred in the first
instance. Bruce cannot have disposed of all or part of his qualifying
income interest in the Residuary Trust property when he was left
owning all the interests in that property.
B. No Disposition Under Section 2519(a)
Citing a 1981 edition of Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary, respondent advises us that “[t]he ordinary meaning of the
noun ‘disposition’ is a placing elsewhere, a giving over to the care or
25
possession of another, or a relinquishing; the transfer of property from
one to another (as by gift, barter, or sale or by will) or the scheme or
arrangement by which such transfer is effected.”
Accepting respondent’s proposed definition, Bruce obviously did
not “plac[e]” his qualifying income interest “elsewhere.” Both before and
after the commutation of the Residuary Trust and the distribution of all
the trust property to him, Bruce was solely entitled to the income
produced by the trust property. Similarly, Bruce did not “giv[e] over”
his qualifying income interest “to the care or possession of another.” He
did not “transfer” his qualifying income interest “to another,” by “gift,
barter, . . . sale . . . by will,” or any other means. Therefore, whether the
distribution of all the Residuary Trust property to Bruce effected a
“disposition” of his qualifying income interest, within the ordinary
meaning of the word, depends on whether he can be viewed as having
“relinquished” that interest.
That Bruce could be viewed as having relinquished his beneficial
interest in the Residuary Trust is of no moment. By its terms, section
2519(a) applies to “any disposition of all or part of a qualifying income
interest in property to which this section applies.” In the present cases,
the property to which section 2519 applies is the property for which
Clotilde’s estate was allowed a deduction “under section 2056 by reason
of subsection (b)(7) thereof.” § 2519(b)(1). In other words, section 2519
applies to the property that, under the terms of Clotilde’s will, funded
the Residuary Trust. Bruce’s beneficial interest in the trust is not the
property to which section 2519 applies. Therefore, the question before
us is not whether Bruce disposed of his beneficial interest in the trust
but whether he disposed of his qualifying income interest in the trust
property. Cf. Estate of Anenberg, 162 T.C., slip op. at 13 n.14 (describing
Sally, the surviving spouse, as having relinquished her interests in the
Marital Trusts).
The proper framing of the question makes the answer clear: After
the commutation of the Residuary Trust and the distribution of all the
trust property to Bruce, he owned all the interests in the property. He
might have relinquished his beneficial interest in the Residuary Trust,
but he cannot have relinquished any interest in the property held in
trust.
I accept that the distribution of all the Residuary Trust property
to Bruce terminated his qualifying income interest for life. The right to
income from property is one of the rights inherent in fee simple
26
ownership. But the right to income inherent in fee simple title is not
limited to the owner’s life. Therefore, if “termination” were an
acceptable synonym for “disposition,” the distribution of the Residuary
Trust property to Bruce could be viewed as a disposition of his qualifying
income interest for life.
In Revenue Ruling 98-8, 1998-1 C.B. 541, 542, the Internal
Revenue Service took the position that “[t]he term ‘disposition,’ as used
in § 2519, applies broadly to circumstances in which the surviving
spouse’s right to receive the income is relinquished or otherwise
terminated, by whatever means.” The ruling purports to rely on H.R.
Rep. No. 97-201, at 161 (1981), as reprinted in 1981-2 C.B. 352, 378,
which states that property subject to a QTIP election is subject to
transfer taxes if the surviving spouse “disposes (either by gift, sale, or
otherwise) of all or part of the qualifying income interest.” The
committee report does not support the broad reading that Revenue
Ruling 98-8 gives to the term “disposition.” It indicates only that the
term is not limited to gifts and sales. It does not follow that any
termination of a qualifying income interest, by any means, is a
disposition.
I thus conclude that, while the distribution of all the Residuary
Trust property to Bruce terminated his qualifying income interest in the
property, he did not relinquish that right. The termination of Bruce’s
qualifying income interest in the Residuary Trust property occurred
without Bruce’s having surrendered his right to the income from the
trust property. He simply accepted the interests in the property that he
had not beneficially owned before the commutation of the trust. He did
not give up or surrender any interest in the trust property. Acceptance
of additional rights to property that add to those previously owned
cannot be viewed as a relinquishment of the previously owned rights.
Because Bruce owned the trust property outright after the commutation
of the trust and the distribution of all trust property to him, he cannot
be viewed as having relinquished any interest in the property.
The conclusion that the distribution of all the Residuary Trust
property to Bruce did not effect a disposition of his qualifying income
interest in the trust property is fully consistent with the policies
underlying the marital deduction rules in general and the QTIP rules in
particular. The trust property would have been included in Bruce’s
gross estate under section 2033 unless consumed or transferred by inter
27
vivos gift. 2 In that event, section 2033 would have served the role that
would otherwise have been served by section 2044(a). 3 It is thus
unobjectionable that Bruce’s acquisition of full ownership of the
Residuary Trust property terminated his qualifying income interest in
that property and negated the application of section 2044(a). Section
2519(a) need not serve as a backstop to section 2044(a). 4
If the Residuary Trust had been commuted in accordance with the
terms of Clotilde’s will, with each beneficiary receiving a share of the
trust assets with a value equal to his or her interest in the trust, the
trust’s termination would have effected a disposition of Bruce’s
qualifying income interest in the trust assets. In that event, Bruce
would have relinquished any interest in the trust assets distributed to
Linda or Peter. As explained above, however, the policies of the marital
deduction rules would not justify ignoring that, pursuant to the
Nonjudicial Agreement, Linda and Peter allowed their father to receive
the shares of trust property that would otherwise have been distributed
to them. 5
2 Section 2033 includes in a decedent’s gross estate “the value of all property
to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death.”
3 Section 2044(a) requires the value of QTIP in which a surviving spouse has a
qualifying income interest to be included in his gross estate.
4 In fact, Bruce transferred to the Children’s Trusts, in exchange for promissory
notes, at least some, and perhaps substantially all, of the property he received from
the Residuary Trust. To the extent that the value of the property Bruce transferred
exceeded the value of the notes, the transfer was a taxable gift. To the extent that the
value of the transferred property did not exceed the value of the notes, the notes simply
replaced the property for which Bruce received them, resulting in no diminution in
Bruce’s estate.
5 Respondent argues that section 2 of the Nonjudicial Agreement effected “two
discrete transactions.” First, “Bruce, Linda, and Peter each received a right to a share
of the trust assets in the form of a terminating distribution.” And second, Linda and
Peter transferred to Bruce “their right to receive their terminating distributions.”
Respondent would have us give “independent significance” to those two transactions.
Even if section 2 of the Nonjudicial Agreement were viewed as effecting two
transactions, those transactions were not independent. They were effected by a single
provision of a single agreement. As noted in the text, the policies of the relevant
statutory provisions do not require viewing the transactions as separate, finding a
disposition of Bruce’s qualifying income interest by viewing the first step by itself,
without taking into account the effects of the second step. Cf. Estate of Anenberg, 162
T.C., slip op. at 26–27 (“In analyzing the tax consequences of the deemed transfer
section 2519 contemplates, we cannot ignore that, as part of the same transaction,
Sally in fact wound up with the unencumbered Al-Sal shares.”). That said, viewing
28
Under their primary position, consistent with their reporting,
petitioners accept that the Bruce made a section 2519 disposition of his
qualifying income interest in the Residuary Trust assets. They contend
that “the fair market value of Bruce’s deemed § 2519 transfer is offset
by Linda’s and Peter’s simultaneous ‘transfer’ of the same assets to
Bruce.”
But petitioners also advance an alternative argument. They
question how Bruce can be viewed as having “relinquished anything as
a result of the NJA [Nonjudicial Agreement], including a ‘qualifying
income interest’ in the assets formerly held in the Residuary Trust, since
he was entitled to all of the income from those assets both before and
after the execution of the NJA.” “If Bruce did not relinquish his income
interest in the properties of the Residuary Trust,” they observe, “then
§ 2519 has not been triggered.”
Petitioners invoke Treasury Regulation § 25.2519-1(e) in support
of the conclusion that Bruce did not dispose of his qualifying income
interest in the Residuary Trust property. Treasury Regulation
§ 25.2519-1(e) provides: “The exercise by any person of a power to
appoint [QTIP] to the donee spouse is not treated as a disposition under
section 2519, even though the donee spouse subsequently disposes of the
appointed property.” 6
As explained above, Bruce did not relinquish any interest in the
Residuary Trust property and thus cannot be viewed as having disposed
of his qualifying income interest in the property. But I agree with
petitioners that Treasury Regulation § 25.2519-1(e) provides further
support for that conclusion. The commutation of the Residuary Trust
and the distribution of all trust property to Bruce had the same effect as
the exercise of a power to appoint the Residuary Trust property to Bruce.
Respondent contends that any analogy of the transactions in
issue to the exercise of a power of appointment fails both factually and
the steps as part of a single plan does not justify collapsing them and thus disregarding
the constructive transfers from Linda and Peter to Bruce that resulted from their
agreement to allow their father to receive their shares of the Residuary Trust property.
6 A surviving spouse does not hold a qualifying income interest for life in
property if any person “has a power to appoint any part of the property to any person
other than the surviving spouse.” § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii)(II). A power to appoint the
property to the surviving spouse, however, does not disqualify the surviving spouse’s
qualifying income interest for life. Treasury Regulation § 25.2519-1(e) simply draws
out the obvious implication of section 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii)(II).
29
legally. As a factual matter, he observes, “the parties . . . structured
their transaction as a commutation and termination of the Residuary
QTIP Trust and not as the exercise of a power of appointment.” As a
legal matter, Clotilde’s will did not give anyone an unlimited “power to
appoint all the Residuary QTIP Trust assets to Bruce.”
I agree that Bruce did not actually receive the Residuary Trust
assets by exercise of a power of appointment. Therefore, Treasury
Regulation § 25.2519-1(e) does not apply to the transactions in issue.
Nonetheless, the regulation provides further support for a conclusion
that can readily be reached on the basis of the statutory text alone:
Because the exercise of a power of appointment in Bruce’s favor would
not have been a disposition, the transactions effected by section 2 of the
Nonjudicial Agreement should not have effected a disposition either.
III. Conclusion
If the commutation of the Residuary Trust and the distribution of
all trust property to Bruce did not effect a “disposition,” within the
meaning of section 2519(a), of Bruce’s qualifying income interest in the
Residuary Trust property, then Bruce cannot be treated under that
section as having transferred all the interests in that property other
than his qualifying income interest. Linda’s and Peter’s constructive
transfers to Bruce cannot have provided adequate and full consideration
to Bruce for a transfer he did not make. If section 2519(a) did not apply,
we would have no occasion to impose asymmetrical treatment on a single
exchange, treating Linda’s and Peter’s constructive transfers to Bruce
as, simultaneously, (1) adequate and full consideration to him for a
deemed transfer by him to Linda and Peter, and (2) wholly gratuitous,
and thus taxable gifts by them to him. If Bruce made no deemed
transfer under section 2519(a) to Linda and Peter, then, as the majority
concludes, he made no taxable gifts to them, and their “very real”
transfers to him stand alone as taxable gifts.
Again, concluding that Bruce made no section 2519(a) disposition
of his qualifying income interest in the Residuary Trust property, in my
judgment, provides a sounder basis for the conclusions the majority
reaches. The analysis I suggest does not depend on treating a surviving
spouse as receiving consideration for a deemed transfer for property he
does not actually own—a transfer that is entirely a fiction created by the
QTIP rules. Moreover, that analysis does not depend on treating a
single exchange differently from the perspective of the transferors and
the transferee. The majority views as “complicated” the “question of
30
whether implementing the Nonjudicial Agreement gave rise to ‘any
disposition’ of Bruce’s qualifying income interest for purposes of section
2519(a).” Op. Ct. p. 11 n.5. I do not share the majority’s reluctance to
answer that question. Instead, I view the questions the majority takes
on as more complicated than the disposition question. Concluding that
the implementation of the Nonjudicial Agreement did not effect a
disposition of Bruce’s qualifying income interest provides a more
straightforward justification for the conclusions that Bruce did not make
a taxable gift but Linda and Peter made taxable gifts to him.