Young v. Com.

Present: Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and

Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J.

ANGELA L. YOUNG OPINION BY

SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL

v. Record No. 071436 April 18, 2008

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

This appeal requires us to determine whether the evidence

at trial was sufficient to support a conclusion, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that the defendant, while in possession of a

controlled substance, was aware of its nature and character.

Facts and Proceedings

The facts will be stated in the light most favorable to

the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial. See e.g.,

Parker v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 150, 155, 654 S.E.2d 580, 583

(2008). In the pre-dawn hours of November 24, 2005, Officer

S. Blystone, of the Portsmouth Police Department, stopped the

driver of a maroon Oldsmobile for failing to stop at an

intersection in Portsmouth. The driver and sole occupant was

Angela L. Young, the defendant. She was cooperative with

Blystone, who gave her a warning and told her she was free to

leave. Blystone then told her that she was in a “high-crime,

high-drug area” and asked for her permission to search her car

before she left. She consented to the search. Blystone

searched the car and found the defendant’s purse. Among the

contents of the purse, he found a prescription bottle labeled

with the name of Stephanie Woody. The label identified the

contents of the bottle as “OxyContin,” which Blystone knew to

be a controlled drug. The bottle contained two blue tablets

and six white tablets. Blystone could not determine the

nature of the pills, but nevertheless handcuffed the defendant

and asked her about the bottle and its contents. She

responded, but the trial court subsequently granted the

defendant’s motion to suppress her statements because she had

received no Miranda warnings before making them.

Subsequently, the blue tablets were identified as morphine, a

Schedule II substance, and the white tablets were identified

as Trazodone, a Schedule VI substance. No “OxyContin” or its

generic equivalent, oxycodone, was found in the pill bottle,

notwithstanding its label.

The defendant was indicted for possession of a Schedule I

or Schedule II controlled substance in violation of Code

§ 18.2-250. At a bench trial, she entered a plea of not

guilty but was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for two

years, with six months suspended conditioned on supervised

probation. The Court of Appeals granted her an appeal but

affirmed her conviction. We awarded her this appeal.

At the trial on the merits, the only witnesses to testify

about the events of November 24, 2005 were Officer Blystone

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and Stephanie Woody. The latter stated that she lived with

her uncle, Andre Gatewood, who was the owner of the maroon

Oldsmobile the defendant was driving, and that the defendant

was Gatewood’s girlfriend and would have had permission to

drive his car. Stephanie Woody also testified that the pills

were hers, that she had inadvertently left them in her uncle’s

car when they had fallen out of her purse, and that the

defendant had called her, telling her that she had them. She

stated that she carried different pills in one bottle so that

she would not have to carry multiple bottles with her. She

surmised that the defendant “must have picked them up to bring

them to me.” The court received in evidence an exhibit

showing that Stephanie Woody had prescriptions for morphine,

trazodone and oxycodone, along with a large array of other

prescription drugs that she said she took for chronic migraine

headaches.

The trial court found from the evidence that the

defendant was in possession of the morphine at the time of her

arrest. The court accepted Stephanie Woody’s testimony that

the pills were hers and that she had valid prescriptions for

them, but refused to accept her speculation as to how the

pills came into the defendant’s possession. The court stated

that the finding of guilt was based upon the defendant’s

undisputed possession of the morphine, coupled with the facts

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that she had no prescription for it, that it belonged to

someone else, and that it was contained in a bottle labeled

with a different drug that was also a controlled substance.

The Court of Appeals noted that the defendant did not

contest the issue of her actual possession, dominion and

control over the drugs at the time of her arrest, and

concluded that the dispositive question was whether she was

aware of the nature and character of the morphine found in the

pill bottle. In affirming the conviction in an unpublished

opinion, the Court of Appeals held that possession of a

controlled drug gives rise to an inference that the defendant

was aware of its character.

Analysis

On appeal, great deference is given to the factfinder

who, having seen and heard the witnesses, assesses their

credibility and weighs their testimony. Thus, a trial court’s

judgment will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is plainly

wrong or without evidence to support it. Walton v.

Commonwealth, 255 Va. 422, 426, 497 S.E.2d 869, 871 (1998).

In a prosecution for possession of a controlled

substance, the Commonwealth must produce evidence sufficient

to support a conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant’s possession of the drug was knowing and

intentional. Burton v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 711, 713, 213

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S.E.2d 757, 758 (1975). Actual or constructive possession

alone is not sufficient. Id. at 713, 213 S.E.2d at 759. “The

Commonwealth must also establish that the defendant

intentionally and consciously possessed it with knowledge of

its nature and character.” Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis

added). That knowledge is an essential element of the crime.

Such knowledge may be shown by evidence of the acts,

statements or conduct of the accused. Garland v.

Commonwealth, 225 Va. 182, 184, 300 S.E.2d 783, 784 (1983).

Other circumstantial evidence may also support a finding of a

defendant’s knowledge of the nature and character of the

substance in his possession, such as the drug’s distinctive

odor or appearance, or statements or conduct of others in his

presence that would tend to identify it.

The issue in the present case is whether the record

contains evidence from which any “rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319

(1979). The Court of Appeals, in affirming the conviction,

relied on its decision in Josephs v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App.

87, 390 S.E.2d 491 (1990), in which the court held that

“[p]ossession of a controlled drug gives rise to an inference

of the defendant’s knowledge of its character.” Id. at 101,

390 S.E.2d at 498-99. In Josephs, the defendant was a

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passenger in the back seat of a stolen rental car travelling

through Virginia en route from Florida to New York. When the

car was searched, her luggage was found in the trunk,

surrounded by 130 pounds of marijuana packed in closed garbage

bags. The marijuana nearly filled the trunk, leaving little

room for her luggage. Id. at 90-91, 100-01, 390 S.E.2d at

492, 498. When the trunk was opened, there was “a strong odor

of marijuana.” Id. at 91, 390 S.E.2d at 492. The defendant,

when asked about the marijuana by the arresting officer,

responded, according to the officer’s notes in evidence:

“Said she didn’t know about drugs. 1st time I’ve driven with

that stuff.” The Court of Appeals held that statement to be a

proper basis for the trial court’s conclusion that the

defendant knew the marijuana was present in the trunk. Id. at

100, 390 S.E.2d at 498.

In Josephs, there was ample circumstantial evidence to

support the trial court’s conclusion that the defendant was

aware of the nature and character of the drugs that she

jointly possessed, and it was unnecessary for the Court of

Appeals to rely on an inference of guilty knowledge based on

possession alone. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals’

statement in Josephs that “[p]ossession of a controlled drug

gives rise to an inference of the defendant’s knowledge of its

character,” insofar as that statement can be read to imply

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that bare possession, without more, may furnish proof, beyond

a reasonable doubt, of the essential element of guilty

knowledge. Countless scenarios can be envisioned in which

controlled substances may be found in the possession of a

person who is entirely unaware of their nature and character.

We adhere to our holding in Burton, quoted above, that actual

or constructive possession alone is not sufficient. To the

extent that the holding in Josephs is inconsistent with our

holding here, i.e., that possession alone, without more, is

insufficient to support an inference of guilty knowledge, we

overrule that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

In the present case, after the trial court granted a

motion to suppress the defendant’s statements on Miranda

grounds, the record is devoid of evidence of any acts,

statements or conduct tending to show guilty knowledge on her

part. Unlike the odoriferous contents of the trunk in

Josephs, the contents of the pill bottle in this case gave no

indication of their character. Officer Blystone, after

examining the pills, could not determine their nature without

submitting them for laboratory analysis, and there is no

reason to infer that the defendant was any better informed.

The ambiguous circumstantial evidence concerning the

appearance of the bottle and its contents is as consistent

with a hypothesis of innocence as it is with that of guilt.

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It is thus insufficient to support the conviction in this

case. See Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 215, 218, 441

S.E.2d 342, 344 (1994) (evidence must establish guilt of the

accused beyond a reasonable doubt and exclude every reasonable

hypothesis of innocence).

Conclusion

Because we find the record devoid of evidence sufficient

to support a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the

defendant possessed morphine with knowledge of its nature and

character, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of

Appeals and dismiss the indictment.

Reversed and dismissed.

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