Rosa Holliday v. Secretary of State

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

ROSA HOLLIDAY, FOR PUBLICATION

August 30, 2024

Plaintiff-Appellant, 9:00 a.m.

v No. 372241

Court of Claims

SECRETARY OF STATE, LC No. 24-000122-MZ

Defendant-Appellee.

CORNEL WEST FOR PRESIDENT 2024,

CORNEL WEST, MELINA ABDULLAH,

THOMAS HEIBEL, and MARIO NADHUM,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v No. 372255

Court of Claims

SECRETARY OF STATE, LC No. 24-000134-MB

Defendant-Appellant,

and

BUREAU OF ELECTIONS DIRECTOR,

Defendant.

MICHIGAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY and

LAVORA BARNES,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v No. 372256

Court of Claims

-1-

SECRETARY OF STATE and BUREAU OF LC No. 24-000115-MB

ELECTIONS DIRECTOR,

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: N. P. HOOD, P.J., and LETICA and YOUNG, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In these consolidated appeals,1 various parties challenge the August 24, 2024 order of the

Court of Claims which rejected challenges to the placement of Cornel West and Melina Abdullah

on the November general election ballot as independent candidates for the offices of President and

Vice President of the United States. Finding no errors warranting relief, we affirm.

I. FACTS

The Michigan Election Law, MCL 168.1 et seq., allows those who seek to run for the office

of President of the United States without party affiliation to do so by submitting a “qualifying

petition” containing a sufficient number of valid signatures (at least 12,000) to the Secretary of

State by 4:00 p.m., 110 days prior to the general election. See MCL 168.590a, MCL 168.590b,

and MCL 168.590c; Graveline v Benson, 992 F3d 524 (CA 6, 2021). Cornel West and Melina

Abdullah, who are seeking the offices of President and Vice President respectively, filed affidavits

of identity (AOIs) and qualifying petitions with the Secretary of State on June 17, 2024, so they

may obtain ballot access in Michigan as independent candidates.

On July 23, 2024, Rosa Holliday filed a challenge with the Bureau of Elections. Holliday

contended that the AOIs filed by West and Abdullah were defective and that MCL 168.692a

prohibited them from running as independent candidates in Michigan where West and Abdullah

are seeking election to the same offices in other states, but as affiliated candidates with various

political parties. The Bureau of Elections notified West of the challenge via e-mail on July 26,

2024, and stated that any response was due by August 2, 2024. No response was submitted by

West or his campaign.

While that challenge was being reviewed by the Bureau of Elections, the Michigan

Democratic Party (MDP) filed the first of the three lawsuits involved in this appeal, Case No. 24-

000115-MB, in the Court of Claims. This suit was filed on August 6, 2024. The MDP sought an

order disqualifying West and Abdullah from the November ballot. On August 12, 2024, which

was also before the Bureau of Elections had reached a decision on Holliday’s challenge, Holliday

filed suit in the Court of Claims, which became Case No. 24-000122-MZ. Holliday similarly

requested an order disqualifying West and Abdullah from appearing on the November ballot.

1

Holliday v Secretary of State, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered August 27,

2024 (Docket Nos. 372241, 372255, and 372256).

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On August 16, 2024, the Director of Elections, Jonathan Brater, informed West and

Abdullah that the notarization of West’s AOI was not executed in conformity with Colorado’s

Revised Uniform Law on Notarial Acts (RULONA), Colo Rev Stat, §§ 24-21-501 et seq. Before

issuing the decision, the Director consulted with the Colorado Secretary of State, who reviewed

West’s AOI and concluded that the notarization did not comply with Colorado law. The Director

identified four violations of Colorado law: (1) the AOI was notarized despite the fact that the

document contained unfilled blanks in violation of Colo Rev Stat, § 24-21-525(7); (2) the notary

certificate did not identify what notarial act was being performed in violation of Colo Rev Stat,

§ 24-21-516(1); (3) the notary certificate did not include the notary public’s title of office in

violation of Colo Rev Stat, § 24-21-516(1); and (4) the notary public’s stamp was placed on a

separate sheet of paper and not included with the notary public’s certificate in violation of Colo

Rev Stat, § 24-21-516(1). The Director further explained that, under Michigan law, strict

compliance was the standard, and because the AOI was not notarized in strict compliance with the

laws of Colorado (the state where it was notarized), MCL 168.558(4) required that West be

disqualified from appearing on the ballot. Moreover, because only a presidential candidate may

file to have a vice-presidential candidate listed as candidate for vice president, see MCL 168.590d,

this meant that Abdullah was likewise disqualified. The Director declined to consider the other

challenges made by Holliday in light of that conclusion. The letter gave West five days to respond

to the determination if he wished to do so.

When the Director issued this determination, no response to Holliday’s challenge had been

received from anyone associated with West or his campaign. Subsequently, on August 19, 2024,

West and Abdullah filed notices that they wished to intervene in the two pending Court of Claims

matters. On August 20, 2024, the two pending cases in the Court of Claims were consolidated,

with the Holliday case being reassigned to the same Court of Claims Judge before whom the MDP

case was pending. After a status conference held on August 21, 2024, arguments were set for

August 23, 2024, on the two pending cases. The court also directed that any candidate wishing to

intervene file a complaint in the Court of Claims by 3:00 p.m. that afternoon. West and Abdullah,

along with other plaintiffs, then filed their complaint, seeking declaratory and mandamus relief

against the Secretary of State and compelling their inclusion on the ballot. This suit, Case No. 24-

000134-MB, was consolidated with the MDP and Holliday matters.2

The Court of Claims held a hearing on August 23, 2024, which combined oral argument

on all three cases. On August 24, 2024, the Court of Claims issued the opinion and order

challenged in these appeals. While all parties accused others of delays resulting in prejudice, the

Court of Claims declined to apply the doctrine of laches to bar any of the suits. The Court of

Claims then held that West and Abdullah, as candidates for the offices of President and Vice

President of the United States, were not required to file AOIs under the language of MCL

168.558(1). That rendered any defects in the AOIs irrelevant. As a result, the court denied the

requests for mandamus relief, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief sought by the MDP and

Holliday.

2

West also filed a motion seeking leave to file an amicus curiae brief in the MDP and Holliday

matters, which was allowed. Motions to intervene in those matters were denied.

-3-

The court then explained that it would still address the challenges to the AOIs in the event

that an appellate court disagreed with its interpretation of MCL 168.558(1). The court opined that

under Colorado law, the notarization of West’s AOI was “not void or invalid” and “also included

all information required under Michigan’s notary laws.” The court held that West was improperly

disqualified by the Director on that basis. The court then turned to a challenge premised on the

fact that West and Abdullah seek to run as independent candidates in Michigan but are

simultaneously running as candidates affiliated with other parties in a number of other states. The

court held that even accepting that West and Abdullah “are affiliated with these political parties in

each respective state,” that was “insufficient evidence to render either candidate’s respective AOI

invalid.” The court explained that the AOI required West and Abdullah to identify the party

affiliation with which they wished to have appear on Michigan ballots, and that both stated they

were running without any party affiliation. That they were running as affiliated candidates in other

states did not prove that either made a false statement on their AOIs filed in Michigan.

Finally, the court addressed a challenge to Abdullah’s AOI. Abdullah’s AOI stated that

she wished for her name to be printed on the ballot in Michigan as “Cornel West”. The court

described this as an error on the AOI, but held that it would not disqualify West from appearing

on the ballot because under MCL 168.590d(2), West had until August 31, 2024 to file with the

Secretary of State the name and address of his chosen running mate.

At the time the Court of Claims issued its opinion, West and Abdullah had submitted just

shy of 27,000 petition signatures, and a staff report had estimated that about 16,000 of these

signatures were valid. The Court of Claims explained that West and Abdullah were required to

submit at least 12,000 valid signatures. But when the opinion was issued, the Board of State

Canvassers had not yet convened to determine whether a sufficient number of petition signatures

had been submitted.3 Thus, the court’s order denied the requests for relief made by the MDP and

Holliday, but granted the request for a writ of mandamus made by West and Abdullah in their

complaint. The court’s order states that the state defendants “are ordered to qualify West and

Abdullah as independent candidates for the ballot, on the condition that the Board of State

Canvassers does not determine they are disqualified after a review of the signatures on the

qualifying petitions and West complies with MCL 168.590d(2).”4

The present appeals quickly followed. We now turn to the merits of the issues raised.

3

The transcript of the hearing held in the Court of Claims reflects that there had been some

discussion of staying the Court of Claims matters to await a decision from the Board, but that

ultimately the decision was made to move forward with the Court of Claims matters and resolve

them as quickly as possible.

4

The Board of State Canvassers then convened on Monday, August 26, 2024, and considered

whether West and Abdullah submitted enough valid signatures to appear on the November ballot.

In a three-to-one vote, the Board determined that a sufficient number of valid signatures were

submitted. Holliday has recently sought mandamus relief in this Court, challenging the Board’s

decision, in Docket No. 372267. That complaint remains pending in this Court at this time.

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II. ANALYSIS

A. MANDAMUS RELIEF GENERALLY

The Court of Claims granted relief in the form of a writ of mandamus. Mandamus is a

discretionary writ, and so this Court reviews the decision whether to grant mandamus relief for an

abuse of discretion. Berry v Garrett, 316 Mich App 37, 41; 890 NW2d 882 (2016).

To obtain the extraordinary remedy of a writ of mandamus, the plaintiff must show

that (1) the plaintiff has a clear, legal right to performance of the specific duty

sought, (2) the defendant has a clear legal duty to perform, (3) the act is ministerial,

and (4) no other adequate legal or equitable remedy exists that might achieve the

same result. In relation to a request for mandamus, a clear, legal right is one clearly

founded in, or granted by, law; a right which is inferable as a matter of law from

uncontroverted facts regardless of the difficulty of the legal question to be decided.

[Id. (quotation omitted).]

“We review de novo, as questions of law, whether [a] defendant[ has] a clear legal duty to perform

and whether [a] plaintiff has a clear legal right to performance of any such duty.” Id.

B. LACHES

Holliday, the Secretary of State, and the Director5 argue that the Court of Claims erred

when it concluded that the doctrine of laches does not bar West from challenging his

disqualification from the ballot. We disagree.

In Nykoriak v Napoleon, 334 Mich App 370, 382-383; 964 NW2d 895 (2020), another

election matter, this Court explained the doctrine of laches:

As explained in Home-Owners Ins Co v Perkins, 328 Mich App 570, 589;

939 NW2d 705 (2019):

Estoppel by laches is the failure to do something which

should be done under the circumstances or the failure to claim or

enforce a right at a proper time. To successfully assert laches as an

affirmative defense, a defendant must demonstrate prejudice

occasioned by the delay. Typically, [l]aches is an equitable tool

used to provide a remedy for the inconvenience resulting from the

plaintiff’s delay in asserting a legal right that was practicable to

assert. A party guilty of laches is estopped from asserting a right it

could have and should have asserted earlier. [Quotation marks and

citations omitted; alteration in original.]

5

The MDP does not argue in its brief on appeal that laches should bar relief.

-5-

“This doctrine applies to cases in which there is an unexcused or unexplained delay

in commencing an action and a corresponding change of material condition that

results in prejudice to a party.” Wayne Co v Wayne Co Retirement Comm, 267

Mich App 230, 252; 704 NW2d 117 (2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

The doctrine of laches applies in actions in which equitable relief is sought. MCL

600.5815. Moreover, in election cases, MCL 691.1031 creates a rebuttable

presumption of laches:

In all civil actions brought in any circuit court of this state

affecting elections, dates of elections, candidates, qualifications of

candidates, ballots or questions on ballots, there shall be a rebuttable

presumption of laches if the action is commenced less than 28 days

prior to the date of the election affected. This section shall not apply

to actions brought after the date of the affected election.

“This Court . . . reviews de novo a trial court’s decision to apply equitable doctrines such as

laches.” Knight v Northpointe Bank, 300 Mich App 109, 113; 832 NW2d 4439 (2013).

In the present matter, Holliday, the Secretary of State, and the Director generally argue that

West’s failure to respond to the challenge filed with the Secretary of State by Holliday and the

timing of his actions in the Court of Claims should result in the application of laches to bar him

from challenging his disqualification. The parties also chastise the Court of Claims for addressing

the argument in what they believe is conclusory fashion stated in a footnote. That footnote

explained that everyone claimed prejudice resulting from delays by the opposing side. The Court

of Claims noted that MCL 691.1031 creates a rebuttable presumption of laches if an action is

commenced less than 28 days prior to the election. The court then stated that, while ballot

preparation deadlines are looming, “given the time remaining until the general election, the Court

declines to apply the doctrine of laches to preclude the parties’ claims and defenses.” The court’s

reasoning is succinct, but clear: because these matters were all filed well before the point in time

in which a rebuttable presumption of laches would arise by statute, and there was sufficient time

to adjudicate the matters before ballots must be finalized, the court did not believe that applying

the doctrine was appropriate.

We agree with the Court of Claims. Clearly, MCL 691.1031 does not create a rebuttable

presumption of laches in this matter where West’s suit was filed far more than 28 days before the

November election. And as it pertains to West, he filed his suit in the Court of Claims within a

few days of receiving the Director’s letter explaining the basis for disqualifying him from the

ballot. While West may have been wise to respond to Holliday’s challenge before that

determination was made, we do not believe that his failure to do so is a basis on which to refuse to

allow him to challenge that disqualification. West acted with sufficient diligence after the Director

disqualified him.

Nor can we conclude that anyone established prejudice. The Secretary of State and

Director argue that, by failing to respond to Holliday’s challenge, they were left to resolve that

challenge without West having made his position known. But the Director was still able to review

the challenge, discuss the matter with the Colorado Secretary of State, and reach a conclusion.

And, everyone is now well aware of West’s positions on the relevant issues. Perhaps a response

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before August 16, 2024 would have been of some help, but given the Secretary of State and

Director remain unconvinced by West and Abdullah’s arguments (as evidenced by the fact that

they maintain in this Court that West should be disqualified because of alleged deficiencies in the

notarization of his AOI), it seems clear that an answer from West would not have changed the

Director’s decision. It is true that election deadlines are looming, but the parties were still able to

argue the merits of the matter before the Court of Claims, receive a thorough written decision from

the Court of Claims, and seek appellate review in this Court. And with the timing of this Court’s

decision, the parties will also be able to seek review in the Supreme Court if they wish. We thus

decline to hold that laches bars West from obtaining relief.

C. INTERPRETATION OF MCL 168.558(1)

All appellants argue that the Court of Claims erred when it concluded that, under MCL

168.558(1), candidates seeking to run without party affiliation for the offices of President and Vice

President of the United States are not obligated to file an AOI. We agree with the Court of Claims’

resolution of the issue.

This Court reviews the interpretation of a statute de novo on appeal. PNC Nat’l Bank Ass’n

v Dep’t of Treasury, 285 Mich App 504, 505; 778 NW2d 282 (2009). As this Court has explained:

The paramount rule of statutory interpretation is that we are to effect the intent of

the Legislature. To do so, we begin with the statute’s language. If the statute’s

language is clear and unambiguous, we assume that the Legislature intended its

plain meaning, and we enforce the statute as written. In reviewing the statute’s

language, every word should be given meaning, and we should avoid a construction

that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory. [Id. at 506

(quotation omitted).]

Words that are defined by statute are given the meaning ascribed by the Legislature. TRYC v Mich

Veterans’ Facility, 451 Mich 129, 136; 545 NW2d 642 (1996). But words that are not defined by

statute are given their plain and ordinary meaning. In doing so, this Court also considers the

context in which the words are used. PNC Nat’l Bank Ass’n, 285 Mich App at 506.

MCL 168.558 generally explains the process for and requirements of filing an AOI. The

provision at issue, MCL 168.558(1), explains:

When filing a nominating petition, qualifying petition, filing fee, or

affidavit of candidacy for a federal, county, state, city, township, village,

metropolitan district, or school district office in any election, a candidate shall file

with the officer with whom the petitions, fee, or affidavit is filed 2 copies of an

affidavit of identity. A candidate nominated for a federal, state, county, city,

township, or village office at a political party convention or caucus shall file an

affidavit of identity within 1 business day after being nominated with the secretary

of state. The affidavit of identity filing requirement does not apply to a candidate

nominated for the office of President of the United States or Vice President of the

United States. [Emphasis added.]

-7-

The dispute in this matter arises from the word “nominated” in the final sentence of the

statute. Essentially, those challenging West’s candidacy argue that he was not “nominated” for

the office he seeks, as he instead followed the process for those seeking inclusion on the ballot as

independent candidates. They argue that unlike candidates who are “nominated” by a political

party at a party convention or caucus and then file “nominating petitions,” an independent

candidate “qualifies” for the ballot by filing a “qualifying petition” with the required number of

signatures. Thus, according to West’s challengers, he has not been “nominated” for the office he

seeks, and so the final sentence of MCL 168.558(1) does not excuse him from the usual

requirement that a candidate file an AOI.

We note at the outset that both this Court and the Michigan Supreme Court have indicated

that this final sentence of MCL 168.558(1) encompasses anyone running for the office of President

or Vice President of the United States. In Citizens Protecting Michigan’s Constitution v Secretary

of State, 503 Mich 42, 105 n 197; 921 NW2d 247 (2018), the Supreme Court wrote: “And it is also

why all candidates for elective office in Michigan (except those running for president or vice

president of the United States) are required to file an affidavit of identity. MCL 168.558.”

Similarly, in Davis v Wayne Co Election Comm, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2023)

(Docket Nos. 368615 and 368628); slip op at 19, this Court, relying on MCL 168.558(1), stated:

“[T]he Legislature has made plain that those seeking to run for the office of President of the United

States are not required to file an affidavit of identity.”

We do not view either statement as controlling in this case. “Stare decisis does not arise

from a point addressed in obiter dictum.” Griswold Props, LLC v Lexington Ins Co, 276 Mich

App 551, 563; 741 NW2d 549 (2007). Obiter dictum is a “judicial comment made during the

course of delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and

therefore not precedential (though it may be considered persuasive).” People v Higuera, 244 Mich

App 429, 437; 625 NW2d 444 (2001) (quotation omitted). In Citizens Protecting Michigan’s

Constitution, the question concerned a ballot initiative. The Court was not asked to decide the

precise scope of this final sentence of MCL 168.558(1). And in Davis, the case involved a

candidate running for the office of President of the United States as an affiliated candidate, not one

running as an independent candidate. Davis had no occasion to consider the issue that is raised in

the present matter, in which the challengers assert the statute draws a distinction between affiliated

and independent candidates. Accordingly, while both this Court and the Supreme Court have made

statements that indicate all candidates seeking the offices of President and Vice President of the

United States are not obligated to file AOIs, we consider those statements to be obiter dictum that

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is not binding under the principle of stare decisis. But these statements may be considered

persuasive. Higuera, 244 Mich App at 437.6

And while we also do not consider it binding on this Court, we further note that in the

Secretary of State’s own guidance regarding appearing on the ballot as a presidential candidate,

there is no mention of the filing of an affidavit of identity. The Secretary of State’s guidance

contains a detailed explanation of the process for affiliated candidates to access the primary ballot

as presidential nominees, and how affiliated candidates then access the general election ballot,

whether as affiliated with major or minor political parties. Following that is a section detailing

how one may seek to have their name placed on the ballot as an independent candidate. This

section directs such candidates to “submit a qualifying petition bearing a sufficient number of valid

signatures, the name and address of his or her running mate, and the names, and addresses of his

or her presidential electors. This section explains how many signatures are required, what

signatures are valid, when and where to file the required documents, and how to withdraw a

petition. Yet nowhere in this section is there any mention of MCL 168.558 or the filing of an

affidavit of identity.7

The Michigan Election Law contains no definition of the word “nominated.” As such,

reference to dictionary definitions is appropriate. Koontz v Ameritech Servs, Inc, 466 Mich 304,

312; 645 NW2d 34 (2002). The word “nominate” is defined as “to appoint or propose for

appointment to an office or place” and “to propose as a candidate for election to office”. Merriam-

Webster Online Dictionary <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nominate>, accessed

August 29, 2024. Notably, the definition does not state how or by whom one must be nominated.

Rather, to be “nominated,” in the context of an election, is commonly understood as simply being

proposed as a candidate for election to an office. And West and Abdullah, through the qualifying

petition process, have been proposed as candidates for election to the offices they seek by those

who signed their qualifying petition.

The challengers, however, contend that in the context of MCL 168.558(1), one must

understand the word “nominated” as being limited to those who are nominated by political parties,

6

It is also true that “a decision of the Supreme Court is authoritative with regard to any point

decided if the Court’s opinion demonstrates application of the judicial mind to the precise question

adjudged, regardless of whether it was necessary to decide the question to decide the case.”

Higuera, 244 Mich App at 437 (quotation marks and citation omitted). But with respect to the

Supreme Court’s statement, it arose in a footnote responding to the dissent regarding a wholly

different topic, and was not, in our opinion, the application of the judicial mind to the disputed

question that has arisen in this case. Thus, while we are loathe to set aside any statement of the

Supreme Court, we do not believe that the Supreme Court has decided the issue presented in a

binding decision.

7

See Ballot Access Information for Presidential Candidates Seeking Office in 2024,

<https://www.michigan.gov/sos/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/Elections/Candidate-

information/Ballot-Access-Information-for-Presidential-

Candidates.pdf?rev=8e3c7d68b727491899b56498a5eb61bf&hash=AC60AB2D3217F04302C4F

87EC97B4D02> (accessed August 30, 2024).

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and not those who obtain access to the ballot as independent candidates via qualifying petition.

The challengers draw a distinction between those nominated via political parties (and who file

nominating petitions) and those who run as independent candidates (by filing qualifying petitions),

noting the different processes and terms used by the Legislature in the Michigan Election Code.

Ultimately, the challengers believe that only those who obtain ballot access via “nominating

petition” can be said to have been “nominated” and thus are excused from the AOI requirement by

this last sentence of MCL 168.558(1).

We disagree. We begin by noting that which is absent from the final sentence of MCL

168.558(1): either of the terms “qualifying petition” or “nominating petition.” Despite using those

terms earlier in the very same statute, this final sentence does not state that those nominated by

nominating petition are excused from the AOI requirement; nor does it state that those who are

nominated by qualifying petition are not. It simply states that those who are “nominated for the

office of President of the United States or Vice President of the United States” are not required to

file an AOI. MCL 168.558(1).

Second, the statutory scheme describes a “qualifying petition” as a type of nominating

petition. Specifically, MCL 168.590(1) provides: “For the purposes of this act, ‘qualifying

petition’ means a nominating petition required of and filed by a person to qualify to appear on an

election ballot as a candidate for office without political party affiliation.” (Emphasis added.)

Where this Court must give terms defined by statute the definition ascribed by the Legislature, that

the Legislature has defined a “qualifying petition” as a type of “nominating petition” weighs

heavily toward a conclusion that the word “nominated,” as used in MCL 168.558(1), encompasses

those who seek placement on the ballot as independent candidates via “qualifying petition.”

And third, the Court of Claims also recognized another statutory indication that the final

sentence of MCL 168.558(1) encompasses a candidate such as West. In MCL 168.590h(1), the

Legislature has provided the form of qualifying petitions. And in that form, those signers of the

petition state that they “nominate” the designated person as a candidate, “without party affiliation,”

for a particular office. MCL 168.590h(1).8 This too leads to the conclusion that a “qualifying

petition” is one method by which one may become nominated for an office.9

The challengers believe that the second sentence of MCL 168.558(1) provides meaning to

the third. In the second sentence, the Legislature has explained when, exactly, candidates

8

Contrary to arguments made by Holliday on appeal, the inclusion of the word “nominate” in this

form is not the decision of a “form designer” or the work of the “arbitrary hands of scriveners.” It

is in the form created by the Legislature itself, and for which the Legislature has stated “must” be

used. See MCL 168.590h(1) (stating, “The petition must be in the following form:”, and then

providing the form that is required, including the word “nominate”).

9

This is not to say that simply filing a qualifying petition with a sufficient number of signatures is

the end of the process. Rather, the Board of State Canvassers must certify the signatures after

canvassing them and considering challenges. See MCL 168.552(8) to (14). But the fact remains

that an independent candidate who obtains ballot access via qualifying petition has been

“nominated” for the office sought—that person has been proposed as a candidate for elected office.

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“nominated for a federal, state, county, city, township, or village office at a political party

convention or caucus” must file their AOI with the Secretary of State. MCL 168.558(1) (emphasis

added). They argue that the use of the word “nominated” in the third sentence reflects the use of

the same word in the second. According to the challengers, because the word “nominated” in the

second sentence was clearly in reference to those nominated at political party conventions or

caucuses, the word “nominate” in the third sentence must also mean to refer to those same persons.

We disagree. Undoubtedly, those nominated via convention or caucus are “nominated” for

election to an office. But that does not mean that this is the exclusive method by which someone

can be “nominated”. The purpose of the second sentence of the statute is to explain when those

nominated via nominating petitions must file AOIs—which is “within 1 business day after being

nominated . . . .” MCL 168.558(1). No more, and no less. It is not a definition of the word

“nominated” and does not somehow preclude a broader understanding of the word “nominated” in

the final sentence as including those nominated via a different method.

This conclusion is further supported by Legislative history. 10 Prior to the enactment of

2002 PA 163, which was the first time that MCL 168.558(1) was amended to add a sentence

excusing candidates for President and Vice President of the United States from filing AOIs, MCL

168.558(1) read as follows:

When filing a nominating petition, filing fee, or an affidavit of candidacy,

or within 1 business day of being nominated by a political party convention or

caucus, for a county, state, national, city, township, village, or school district office

in any election, a candidate shall file with the officer with whom the petitions or

fee is filed 2 copies of an affidavit. The affidavit shall contain the candidate’s name;

address; ward and precinct where registered, if qualified to vote at that election; a

statement that the candidate is a citizen of the United States; number of years of

residence in the state and county; other information that may be required to satisfy

the officer as to the identity of the candidate; a statement that, as of the date of the

affidavit, all statements, reports, late filing fees, and fines required of the candidate

or any candidate committee organized to support the candidate’s election under the

Michigan campaign finance act, 1976 PA 388, MCL 169.201 to 169.282, have been

filed or paid; and a statement that the candidate acknowledges that making a false

statement in the affidavit is perjury, punishable by a fine up to $1,000.00 or

imprisonment for up to 5 years, or both. If a candidate files the affidavit with an

officer other than the county clerk or secretary of state, the officer shall immediately

forward to the county clerk 1 copy of the affidavit by first class mail. The county

clerk shall immediately forward 1 copy of the affidavit for state and national

candidates to the secretary of state by first class mail. An officer shall not certify

10

We acknowledge that Courts do not resort to Legislative history to cloud statutory text that is

plain and unambiguous. In re Certified Question from US Court of Appeals for Sixth Circuit, 468

Mich 109, 116; 659 NW2d 597 (2003). And to be clear, we do not find the text of the statute

ambiguous. But we nonetheless note that the history of the relevant statutes supports our

interpretation of MCL 168.558(1).

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to the board of election commissioners the name of a candidate who fails to comply

with this section. [MCL 168.558(1), as amended by 1999 PA 217.]

At the same time, MCL 168.590(1), which has been unchanged since 1988, see 1988 PA 116,

stated: “For the purposes of this act, ‘qualifying petition’ means a nominating petition required of

and filed by a person to qualify to appear on an election ballot as a candidate for office without

political party affiliation.” Thus, it seems that prior to the enactment of 2002 PA 217, any person

seeking to be placed on the ballot was required to file an “affidavit” (now an AOI), even if seeking

the office of President or Vice President of the United States. There was no exception in the

statute. And, where a “qualifying petition” was defined as a “nominating petition” by MCL

168.590(1), and the first sentence of MCL 168.558(1) imposed the affidavit filing requirement on

those filing “nominating petitions”, one could conclude that at least at that time, independent

candidates for President or Vice President of the United States were also required to file the

required affidavit.

But in 2002, the Legislature enacted 2002 PA 163. This act made several changes to

various statutes. But the Legislative bill analyses11 make clear that the main purpose of these

alterations to the Michigan Election Law was to address concerns with candidates being able to

have their titles (such as Assistant Attorney General or State Representative) listed on the ballots

purportedly to avoid confusion where other candidates on the same ballot had similar names, but

in reality, were requested for political gain.12 But it also appears that the Legislature took the

opportunity to reorganize and amend MCL 168.558. Now, MCL 168.558(1) provided:

When filing a nominating petition, qualifying petition, filing fee, or

affidavit of candidacy for a federal, county, state, city, township, village, or school

district office in any election, a candidate shall file with the officer with whom the

petitions, fee, or affidavit is filed 2 copies of an affidavit of identity. A candidate

nominated for federal, state, county, city, township, or village office at a political

party convention or caucus shall file an affidavit of identity within 1 business day

after being nominated with the secretary of state. The affidavit of identity filing

requirement does not apply to a candidate nominated for the office of president of

11

Legislative bill analyses have limited value, but “do have probative value in certain, limited

circumstances.” Kelly Servs, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury, 296 Mich App 306, 317; 818 NW2d 482

(2012).

12

See Senate Committee Summary, HB 5335 (February 1, 2002); Senate Floor Analysis, HB 5335

(February 12, 2002); Senate Bill Analysis, HB 5335 (March 6, 2002); House Legislative Summary,

HB 5335 (October 31, 2001); House Legislative Analysis, HB 5335 (December 4, 2001); and

House Legislative Analysis, HB 5335 (July 22, 2002). These documents are available at

<https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Bills/Bill?ObjectName=2001-HB-5335> (accessed August 30,

2024).

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the United States or vice president of the United States. [MCL 168.558(1), as

amended by 2002 PA 163.][13]

The Legislature then explained in MCL 168.558(2) what must be contained in the affidavit of

identity, thus moving that language from where it had previously been in MCL 168.558(1) and

setting it aside in a separate subsection. MCL 168.558(2), as amended by 2002 PA 163.

As we understand these revisions, the Legislature generally sought to make the statute

easier to read by breaking up the cumbersome language of the former version of MCL 168.558(1)

and spreading it into two subsections. It also appears that the Legislature wished to make clear

that the AOI filing requirement applied to those seeking a place on the ballot by filing qualifying

petitions. And, as is the focus of this matter, the Legislature made a significant, substantive change

when it created the final sentence of MCL 168.558(1) that exists today, exempting those seeking

the offices of President and Vice President of the United States from the AOI filing requirement.

All of this aids the conclusion that this final sentence applies to all candidates for those

offices, and not just those who seek the office via nominating petition. First, the Legislature clearly

had independent candidates in mind when it amended the statute. The Legislature specifically

referenced those filing “qualifying petition[s]” in the first sentence of the statute, which it had not

done previously. Yet the Legislature did not at the same time add any language to the statute

indicating that those seeking the offices of President or Vice President of the United States as

independent candidates (by filing qualifying petitions) would not be excused from filing AOIs.

The Legislature simply referred to those “nominated” for these offices without further limitation.

Second, as we understand the second sentence of the statute as enacted in 2002, the

Legislature’s only intent was to take the language regarding when the necessary affidavit must be

filed by certain candidates (those nominated at party conventions or caucuses) out of the first

sentence of MCL 168.558(1) and set it aside in its own sentence. This reinforces our conclusion

stated earlier in this opinion: the second sentence of MCL 168.558(1) as it presently exists simply

concerns the timing of filing an AOI.14

Third, nowhere in the Legislative bill analyses is there any indication that, when it chose

to include this final sentence of MCL 168.558(1), the Legislature had any thought that the

exception would apply to affiliated candidates, but not those running as independents. There is

virtually no discussion of the sentence in the analyses, other than mentions that the amendment

would specify that the AOI filing requirement does not apply to those nominated for the offices of

President or Vice President of the United States. And indeed, we have discovered no indication

13

Currently, MCL 168.558(1) is almost identical. The only change has been to the first sentence,

where the Legislature has added “metropolitan district” to the list of offices in which candidates

must file an AOI. The words “metropolitan district were added by way of 2012 PA 586, which

added the same phrase to a number of statutes.

14

For those filing “qualifying petitions,” the first sentence states the timing requirement: for those

independent candidates required to file AOIs, the AOI must be filed at the same time one files their

qualifying petition. MCL 168.558(1).

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in the Legislative analyses that, in enacting 2002 PA 163, the Legislature ever considered having

any rules be different for those running as independent candidates as opposed to those running

with party affiliation.

In sum, we agree with the Court of Claims: as a candidate who has been nominated (via

qualifying petition) for the office of President of the United States, West is not required to file an

AOI under the plain and unambiguous language of MCL 168.558(1). And as a candidate for the

office of Vice President of the United States, Abdullah likewise has no obligation to file an AOI.

MCL 168.558(1). We do not believe that this leaves any portion of the statutory framework

surplusage or nugatory. It simply recognizes that there are multiple ways that one can be

“nominated” for an office—and that one such method is by qualifying petition. The Legislature

has chosen to exempt those nominated for the offices of President and Vice President of the United

States from the AOI filing requirement, regardless of the exact method of nomination. MCL

168.558(1). West and Abdullah are plainly such candidates, and are exempt from the AOI filing

requirement.

The Secretary of State and Director argue in their brief that, even if the Court of Claims

correctly interpreted MCL 168.558(1), mandamus relief would still not be appropriate because

judicial interpretation of the statute was required, and so the Secretary of State and Director cannot

be said to have had a clear legal duty. But as this Court has explained, the right to mandamus

relief does not disappear because a difficult legal question is at play. In the context of a request

for mandamus relief, a “ ‘clear legal right’ is a right that is ‘clearly founded in, or granted by, law;

a right which is inferable as a matter of law from uncontroverted facts regardless of the difficulty

of the legal question to be decided.’ ” Neilson v Bd of State Canvassers, ___ Mich App ___, ___;

___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 371256); slip op at 4, quoting Rental Props Owners Ass’n of

Kent Co v Kent Co Treasurer, 308 Mich App 498, 519; 866 NW2d 817 (2014) (emphasis added).

D. CHALLENGES TO THE AOIS FILED BY WEST AND ABDULLAH

Between the various challengers to West’s candidacy, a number of arguments have been

raised to the sufficiency of West’s and Abdullah’s AOIs. Holliday argues that West’s AOI was

not correctly notarized. The Secretary of State and Director similarly argue that the notarization

of West’s AOI was invalid, as explained by the Director in his August 16, 2024 letter. The MDP

argues that the notarization of West’s AOI was defective. And, the MDP argues that West’s and

Abdullah’s AOIs both failed to comply with the Michigan Election Law because West and

Abdullah failed to disclose their party affiliations in other states, and that Abdullah’s AOI further

violates the Michigan Election Law because she wrote on the AOI that she wished for her name to

appear on the ballot as “Cornel West”.

All of these challenges are subsumed by this Court’s holding that neither West nor

Abdullah was required to file an AOI in the first place. MCL 168.558(4) prohibits certification of

candidates “who fail[] to comply with this section,” or who “execute[] an affidavit of identity that

contains a false statement with regard to any information or statement required under this section.”

But where West and Abdullah did not have any obligation to file an AOI, neither failed to comply

with MCL 168.558, nor has either executed an AOI containing a false statement with regard to

any information that either was required to provide. We thus decline to reach the underlying

challenges to the AOIs themselves.

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E. MCL 168.692a

Holliday raises an additional challenge premised on MCL 168.692a and the fact that West

and Abdullah are currently running for President and Vice President of the United States in several

other states, but as candidates affiliated with various political parties. Holliday contends that MCL

168.692a precludes West and Abdullah from seeking placement on Michigan’s ballot as

independent candidates while simultaneously running for the same offices in other states as

candidates affiliated with political parties. We disagree.

This issue again turns on interpretation of a statute. As explained previously, in Michigan,

West and Abdullah are seeking placement on the ballot as independent candidates via the

qualifying petition method of nomination provided by MCL 168.590 et seq., which is chapter

XXIVA of the Michigan Election Law. With that in mind, MCL 168.692a provides:

A person who files a partisan nominating petition or filing fee as a candidate

of a political party, or who is nominated by a political party convention, committee,

or caucus and accepts the nomination, shall not file a qualifying petition under

chapter XXIVA for an office to be elected at that election or at an election held

during the same calendar year.

The Court of Claims did not address MCL 168.692a in its decision, although it did conclude

that West’s and Abdullah’s AOIs were not defective because of a failure to identify that they were

running as affiliated candidates elsewhere. As explained, we need not be concerned with whether

the AOIs filed by West and Abdullah complied with Michigan law because neither candidate was

obligated to file an AOI in the first place. Yet this does not resolve the challenge made under MCL

168.692a. MCL 168.692a is a prohibition against certain candidates filing qualifying petitions to

run as independent candidates in Michigan. Given that West and Abdullah seek placement on the

ballot by filing qualifying petitions under chapter XXIVA, the question is whether MCL 168.692a

disqualifies them from doing so.15

There is no doubt that West and Abdullah are seeking election to the same offices of

President and Vice President of the United States, in this year’s election, and in other states. And,

there is likewise no question that in a number of other states, they are doing so as candidates

affiliated with various political parties. Holliday contends that a plain reading of MCL 168.692a

means that, by running as affiliated candidates in other states in this election cycle, West and

Abdullah cannot simultaneously be placed on the ballot in Michigan as independent candidates.

Holliday argues that the statute “refers to ‘a’ political party without geographical restriction or

15

Holliday argues at length that disaffiliation statutes (statutes that require one to disassociate from

political parties for a period of time if running as an independent candidate) are constitutionally

permissible. We need not decide whether this statute is a constitutional exercise of the

Legislature’s authority to resolve this matter, and as such, do not address any constitutional

concerns. See Dep’t of Health and Human Servs v Genesee Circuit Judge, 318 Mich App 395,

407; 899 NW2d 57 (2016) (explaining that under the rule of constitutional avoidance, “we first

consider whether statutory or general law concepts are . . . dispositive” before reaching

constitutional issues).

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limit as to type—national, state, or local. It is not restricted to being the candidate of a political

party in Michigan.” Holliday explains that the Legislature could have limited the scope of MCL

168.692a geographically, by referring to candidates of Michigan political parties or to those

nominated at conventions or caucuses held in Michigan. Holliday contends that limiting the

geographic scope of the statute to Michigan would amount to adding language to the statutory text

that the Legislature did not include.

We conclude that MCL 168.692a does not prohibit West from seeking placement on the

ballot in Michigan as an independent candidate. This Court must discern the meaning of MCL

168.692a from the plain text of that statute. But context matters, and it this Court cannot “cherry-

pick” words and phrases from the statute and read them in isolation from the rest of the text.

TruGreen Ltd Partnership v Dep’t of Treasury, 338 Mich App 248, 256; 979 NW2d 739 (2021).

“This focus on the big picture echoes a primary canon of construction: the individual, discrete

words of a statute must be read holistically ‘within a view to their place in the overall statutory

scheme.’ ” Id. at 257, quoting Davis v Mich Dep’t of Treasury, 489 US 803, 809; 109 S Ct 1500;

103 L Ed 2d 891 (1989). As the Michigan Supreme Court has explained:

The statutory language must be read and understood in its grammatical context,

unless it is clear that something different was intended. Moreover, when

considering the correct interpretation, the statute must be read as a whole.

Individual words and phrases, while important, should be read in the context of the

entire legislative scheme. While defining particular words in statutes, we must

consider both the plain meaning of the critical word or phrase and its placement

and purpose in the statutory scheme. A statute must be read in conjunction with

other relevant statutes to ensure that the legislative intent is correctly ascertained.

The statute must be interpreted in a manner that ensures that it works in harmony

with the entire statutory scheme. [Bush v Shabahang, 484 Mich 156, 167; 772

NW2d 272 (2009) (quotation marks and citations omitted)].

Reviewing MCL 168.692a in the context of the entire statutory scheme, we conclude that

the intent of the statute is to preclude those who seek to run in Michigan as an affiliated candidate

from also running as an independent candidate in Michigan during the same calendar year. MCL

168.692a identifies those affected by the prohibition as those who file “a partisan nominating

petition or filing fee as a candidate of a political party, or who is nominated by a political party

convention, committee, or caucus and accepts the nomination . . . .” It is true that there is no

geographical limitation expressly stated in the statute. But that limitation is apparent from context.

As a starting point, the Legislature’s authority is to regulate elections in Michigan, not in

other states. See US Const, art 1, § 4, cl 1; 1963 Const, art 2, § 4. See also In re Request for

Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 479 Mich 1, 18-19; 740 NW2d 444

(2007) (explaining that states “retain the power to regulate state and local elections, subject to

federal constitutional and statutory limitations”). Thus, in enacting the Michigan Election Law,

we presume that the Legislature’s focus was on regulating Michigan elections and not any attempt

at regulating those of other states. See In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394, 404; 852 NW2d 524 (2014)

(“Statutes are presumed to be constitutional . . .”).

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With that in mind, MCL 168.692a begins by referring to those who file a “partisan

nominating petition or filing fee . . . .” While not explicit in the statute, that is a clear reference to

the filing of a nominating petition and filing fee in Michigan, not the filing of similar documents

or fees in any other state. The next part of the sentence refers to those who are “nominated by a

political party convention, committee, or caucus and accept the nomination . . . .” Again, the

statute fails to specifically reference those events occurring in Michigan, but that seems apparent

from context. The statutes in the Michigan Election Law that immediately precede MCL 168.692a

clearly refer to party conventions and caucuses held in Michigan. MCL 168.686 explains that the

state central committee of each political party must canvass the proceedings of its state convention

and determine its nominees. The committee must then forward a list of candidates nominated to

the Secretary of State. MCL 168.686.16 MCL 168.686a describes the process for certain parties

to nominate candidates via county caucus or state convention. And MCL 168.686b explains, with

regard to the nomination process of candidates of minor political parties:

A political party that is not a major political party, as defined in section 16,

and that is required to nominate candidates at a county caucus or state convention

shall, at least 10 days before holding the county caucus or state convention to

nominate candidates, notify in writing the secretary of state and the bureau of

elections of the date, time, and location of the county caucus or state convention of

that political party.

What is clear is that these statutes are discussing how candidates are selected to be placed on

Michigan ballots.

Reading the whole statutory scheme, and not isolated words in MCL 168.692a, we

conclude that MCL 168.692a does not prohibit those who seek political office as affiliated

candidates in other states from seeking office in Michigan as independent candidates. It is clear

from the overall context of the Michigan Election Law that MCL 168.692a seeks to prohibit those

who run as affiliated candidates in Michigan from then running as independent candidates in

Michigan for offices “to be elected at that election or at an election held during the same calendar

year.” Here, West and Abdullah have only filed qualifying petitions to run in Michigan as

independent candidates. That they also are running in other states as affiliated candidates does not

run afoul of MCL 168.692a.

F. INTRA-PARTY DISPUTE

Finally, Holliday asserts that West cannot appear on the ballot in Michigan because of an

intra-party dispute involving different factions of the Natural Law Party. We disagree.

16

MCL 168.686 also contains provisions directing the state committee to forward candidates for

President and Vice President of the United States to the Secretary of State after national

conventions are held to determine those candidates. But again, the statute refers to action by a

state committee to place a candidate on a Michigan ballot. And in any event, West and Abdullah

have not been nominated for the offices sought at a national convention.

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Holliday’s brief explains that, and by reference to news articles, there is a dispute among

“factions” of the Natural Law Party. Holliday explains that West sought the nomination of the

Michigan Natural Law Party, but did not obtain it; the Michigan Natural Law Party selected Robert

F. Kennedy, Jr. as its presidential candidate. The Natural Law Parties of Florida and Mississippi

have selected West as their nominee. Holliday argues that the state need not resolve that intra-

party dispute; rather, under American Indep Party v Secretary of State, 397 Mich 689; 247 NW2d

17 (1976), the burden is on the feuding political party to resolve its internal fight and present a

single candidate for president. Holliday accuses West of trying to circumvent that rule by filing

as an independent candidate in Michigan.

Notably, American Indep Party involved two factions of the same political party in

Michigan. As the opinion explains:

The American Independent Party is entitled to a column on the 1976 general

election ballot because of the vote its principal candidate received in the 1974

general election. MCLA § 168.685; MSA § 6.1685. On March 6, 1976, the State

Central Committee, chaired by Vern G. Morse, called the ‘fall’ state convention.

MCLA § 168.598; MSA § 6.1598. That same day a faction of the American

Independent Party headed by Josephine Chapman split, formed its own State

Central Committee, and called its own state convention. This faction apparently

considered itself entitled to the name ‘American Independent Party’ and made no

attempt to qualify as a new party under MCLA § 168.685.

Each faction held a convention, nominated candidates for state offices for

the 1976 general election ballot, and presented its slate to the State Director of

Elections under the vignette and name of the American Independent Party of the

State of Michigan. The director advised each that he would accept An American

Independent Party slate certified by both chairmen. [American Independent Party

of Mich, 397 Mich at 692-693.]

The Supreme Court explained that the Legislature had provided means for a new party to

obtain a place on the ballot, while “old parties may continue on the ballot. Only one American

Party has qualified for a column.” Id. at 695. The Court held that the Director “correctly left to

the American Independent Party the resolution of the intra-party dispute.” Id. at 696.

In the present case, there is no intra-party dispute in Michigan. Accepting Holliday’s

factual statements as true, West sought the nomination of Michigan’s Natural Law Party. He did

not obtain it, and instead the nomination went to Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. West now seeks to run as

an independent candidate. That leaves no intra-party dispute to be resolved in Michigan. There

simply is no dispute in Michigan between competing factions of a single party. American Indep

Party of Mich thus does not provide any means of relief to Holliday.

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III. CONCLUSION

Finding no errors warranting relief, we affirm the Court of Claims’ opinion and order.

/s/ Noah P. Hood

/s/ Anica Letica

/s/ Adrienne N. Young

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