The opinion
Filed 8/30/24 Zinderman v. City of Los Angeles CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
DANA ZINDERMAN, B329765
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 22STCP00655)
CITY OF LOS ANGELES,
Defendant and Respondent;
BELMONT VILLAGE L.P. et al.,
Real Parties in Interest and
Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mary H. Strobel, Judge. Affirmed.
Corin H. Kahn for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorney, Amy Brothers,
Kathryn C. Phelan, Clarissa Padilla, Deputy City Attorneys; Best
Best & Krieger, Trevor L. Rusin and Ali Tehrani for Defendant
and Respondent.
Armbruster Goldsmith & Delvac and Damon P. Mamalakis
for Real Parties in Interest and Respondents.
_________________________________________
The City of Los Angeles (City) approved construction on
Wilshire Boulevard in Westwood, where Belmont Village, L.P.
(Belmont) plans to build a 176-room eldercare facility and
Westwood Presbyterian Church (Church) plans to build a
childcare facility (the Project).1 The Project is almost 90 percent
residential and is adjacent to mass transit. The trial court denied
appellant Dana Zinderman’s petition to set aside City’s approval
of the Project. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.)
Substantial evidence supports City’s determination that
the Project qualifies as a transit priority project, allowing it to
prepare a streamlined environmental assessment in lieu of other
documentation required by the state Environmental Quality Act
(CEQA). (Pub. Resources Code, § 21155.)2 Section 21155
“reform[s] CEQA to encourage mixed use and mass-transit
adjacent development.”3 The record belies appellant’s claims
1 Belmont and Church are the real parties in interest
(RPI’s).
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Public
Resources Code. Section 21155 was enacted by Senate Bill
No. 375 in 2008.
3 Darakjian, SB 375: Promise, Compromise and the New
Urban Landscape (2009) 27 UCLA Journal of Environmental
Law & Policy 371, 385–386.
2
that the Project has “no nexus with transit” or is inconsistent
with local plans and policies. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Nature of the Project
Church owns a 1.62-acre property near the intersection of
Wilshire and Westwood Boulevards. A church, administrative
office, fellowship hall, preschool, and parking lot currently cover
95 percent of the site. RPI’s plan to preserve the church and raze
the other improvements to build the Project.
At the north end of the site, Belmont plans to build a 12-
story, 176,580 square foot eldercare facility with 53 independent
living units; 77 assisted living guest rooms; 46 memory care
rooms; and amenities for residents. A parking lot now covers the
area slated for the eldercare facility, which will have a fellowship
hall fronting Wilshire Boulevard for Church’s use.
At the south end of the site, Church plans to construct a
two-story, 19,703 square foot building that includes a 10,238
square foot preschool; administrative offices; and multipurpose
area. School enrollment will increase from its current 80 children
to a maximum of 105. There will be surface and subterranean
parking, and 70 spaces for bicycles.
City’s Administrative Decision
RPI’s applied for Project approval under CEQA. City’s
planning department concluded that this is a transit priority
project (TPP). After making a TPP determination, City decided
that a Sustainable Communities Environmental Assessment
(SCEA) would be used to streamline its environmental analysis.
The SCEA included various studies, including greenhouse
gas (GhG) emissions and transportation impacts. The SCEA
concluded that with mitigation measures, the Project would not
3
cause significant environmental impact. The SCEA was
circulated for public comment. After a public hearing, it was
adopted by City in May 2021. Appellant spoke against the
Project. City denied appeals of its decision.
City approved the Project under an eldercare ordinance
that facilitates construction of senior housing.4 It allowed zoning
deviations to increase building height and interior open space
and reduce parking requirements and yard setbacks. City
acknowledged its historical facilitation of high-rise construction
on Wilshire, including a 24-story luxury condominium building
next to the Project site.
Zinderman Petitions for a Writ of Mandate
In February 2022, appellant filed a petition for a writ of
mandate, alleging that City violated CEQA. The petition states
that the Project does not qualify as a TPP; therefore, City should
not have approved a SCEA for the Project. Appellant asked the
court to set aside City’s approval of the Project.
The Trial Court’s Ruling
The court wrote that substantial evidence supports City’s
findings that the Project is a TPP. It found no dispute that
90 percent of the Project is eldercare, rejecting Zinderman’s claim
that the facility’s corridors, elevators, dining areas, community
rooms, and service areas are not a “ ‘residential use.’ ” City’s
municipal code defines senior housing as dwelling units, common
dining areas, and community rooms.
4 In a related appeal, Westwood Neighbors For Sensible
Growth v. City of Los Angeles (July 19, 2024, B329768) [nonpub.
opn.], this court determined that RPI’s are entitled to a permit
under City’s eldercare facility ordinance.
4
The court rejected Zinderman’s claim that a TPP cannot
include an eldercare facility, where residents lack the mobility of
an average household. The court concluded that section 21155
does not differentiate between residential projects whose
occupants can or cannot drive. Residents, visitors, and employees
can make use of public transit near the facility.
The court found substantial evidence to support City’s
conclusion that the Project is consistent with open space and
other zoning requirements in City’s municipal code. It rejected
claims that the Project impermissibly requires removal of a
single-family residence, or is inconsistent with the sustainable
communities policy. The Project is in a highly urbanized area,
amid high-rise buildings, and is well served by public transit.
City reasonably found that the removal of one house to build a
two-story childcare facility will not negatively impact housing.
The court determined that approving the SCEA was not a
prejudicial abuse of City’s discretion. It denied Zinderman’s
petition and entered judgment for City and RPI’s.
DISCUSSION
Appeal and Review
We review appellant’s CEQA claim under Code of Civil
Procedure section 1094.5, which allows agency decisions to be
challenged for a prejudicial abuse of discretion. (Pub. Resources
Code, § 21168; Sacramentans for Fair Planning v. City of
Sacramento (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 698, 722.) “[A]buse of
discretion is established if the court determines that the findings
are not supported by substantial evidence in the light of the
whole record.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (c); id., subd. (b).)
City’s approval of a TPP and SCEA “shall be reviewed under the
5
substantial evidence standard.” (Pub. Resources Code, § 21155.2,
subd. (b)(7).)
We scrutinize the administrative record for substantial
evidence to support agency findings. (Topanga Assn. for a Scenic
Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 514.)
We view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the agency’s
findings, drawing all inferences in support of those findings”
(Akella v. Regents of University of California (2021) 61
Cal.App.5th 801, 814) and “resolve reasonable doubts in favor of
the administrative findings and decision.” (Topanga, at p. 514.)
City’s findings “come before us ‘with a strong presumption
as to their correctness and regularity.’ ” (Schreiber v. City of Los
Angeles (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 549, 558.) “ ‘We may not
substitute our judgment for the City’s and reverse because we
believe a contrary finding would have been equally or more
reasonable.’ ” (Walnut Acres Neighborhood Assn. v. City of Los
Angeles (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1312–1313.)
Overview of the Sustainable Communities
and Climate Protection Act
The Sustainable Communities and Climate Protection Act
in Senate Bill No. 375 (Stats. 2008, ch. 728) “seeks to reduce GhG
emissions by promoting growth patterns in high-density, mixed-
use developments located around mass transit hubs, and thereby
indirectly encourage people to drive less. The bill shifts the
development emphasis from sprawl-inducing suburban
development and planning to urban and metropolitan
development and planning. The message that SB 375 clearly
sends to public agencies, developers, and other stakeholders is
that dense, transit-oriented, and mixed-use development is a
critical goal for GhG emissions reduction and the collective good.”
6
(Davidoff et al., SB 375: Lion or Mouse? (Mar. 2009) 32 Real
Property Law Reporter, No. 2, p. 1.) To meet this goal, Senate
Bill No. 375 requires metropolitan planning agencies to regularly
update regional plans to support development of transportation
networks that reduce emissions. (Id., p. 2.) Regional agencies
work with the California Air Resources Board (CARB) to set
emission targets and prepare a sustainable community strategy.
(Id., p. 3.) CARB must determine if a sustainable strategy meets
emission targets. (Gov. Code, § 65080, subd. (b)(2)(J)(ii).)
Senate Bill No. 375 offers a streamlined CEQA process if a
TPP is a sustainable communities project. To qualify, a project
must be “consistent with the general use designation, density,
building intensity, and applicable policies specified for the project
area” under the sustainable community strategy. (§ 21155, subd.
(a).)5 A TPP is reviewed through a SCEA, and subject to a public
hearing. (§ 21155.2, subd. (b).) The SCEA is not required to
reference, describe, or discuss growth-inducing impacts or the
impact of vehicle trips generated by the project on global
warming or regional transit networks. (§ 21159.28.)
Exhaustion of Remedies Requirement
Raising an issue in administrative proceedings lets
agencies “ ‘ “ ‘learn the contentions of interested parties’ ” ’ ” and
5 A TPP “shall (1) contain at least 50 percent residential
use, based on total building square footage and, if the project
contains between 26 percent and 50 percent nonresidential uses,
a floor area ratio of not less than 0.75; (2) provide a minimum net
density of at least 20 dwelling units per acre; and (3) be within
one-half mile of a major transit stop or high-quality transit
corridor included in a regional transportation plan.” (§ 21155,
subd. (b).)
7
gives them an opportunity to act, making litigation
“ ‘ “ ‘unnecessary.’ ” ’ ” (Sierra Club v. City of Orange (2008) 163
Cal.App.4th 523, 535.) The “ ‘ “exact issue” ’ ” must be presented
to an agency and objections “ ‘ “must be sufficiently specific so
that the agency has the opportunity to evaluate and respond to
them.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 535–536.)
Exhaustion of remedies “ ‘is a jurisdictional prerequisite to
maintenance of a CEQA action.’ ” (Covington v. Great Basin
Unified Air Pollution Control Dist. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 867,
872.) The petitioner must show (1) the alleged noncompliance
with CEQA was presented in public comments or at a hearing,
and (2) the party filing the CEQA action objected to the project in
public comments or at a hearing. (Id. at p. 873; § 21177.)
The Project Qualifies as a TPP
A TPP requires a residential use; density of 20 dwelling
units per acre; and proximity to a major transit stop or transit
corridor. (§ 21155, subd. (b).)6 City concluded that the Project
qualifies as a TPP “because it contains more than 50 percent
residential use; provides a minimum net density greater than 20
units an acre; and is within 0.5 mile of a major transit stop or
high-quality transit corridor included in a regional transportation
plan.” Appellant does not dispute that the Project is in a transit
priority area. As discussed below, substantial evidence supports
City’s findings.
6 Appellant argues that a TPP requires—beyond the
elements of section 21155—a nexus between the land use and the
likelihood its users will replace car trips with other
transportation. She cannot rewrite the statute to add elements
the Legislature did not contemplate.
8
a. Requirement of 50 Percent Residential Use
To qualify as a TPP, a project must “contain at least 50
percent residential use.” (§ 21155, subd. (b).) City found that the
eldercare facility is residential and encompasses some 90 percent
of the Project. The record supports the finding. It shows that the
total square footage of the new buildings is 196,283: Of this,
19,703 is the child education center and administration, and
176,580 is the eldercare facility.
In administrative proceedings, appellant’s counsel
effectively conceded the point. Counsel listed each existing and
proposed structure, including the church sanctuary, pinpointing
“Non-Residential” use at 27.4 percent. Counsel divided the rest
into “Non-Conventional Residential” (assisted living or memory
care) and “Conventional Residential” (independent living). By
this measure, with over 70 percent of the Project being
“residential,” section 21155 is satisfied.7
On appeal, appellant claims that the childcare facility is 40
percent of the Project. The Project’s square footage belies
appellant’s claim. Appellant’s brief shows that childcare is
10,238 square feet in a project that is almost 200,000 square feet,
i.e., 5 percent of the total.
b. Eldercare Facilities Are Residential
Appellant claims that only “households” are a residential
use. While agreeing that supportive living facilities “are forms of
housing,” appellant contends that the Project is not residential
because it serves dependent elders, comparing it to a hotel or
7 Because the record shows the Project is over 50 percent
residential, we need not address whether it is “mixed-use.” (See
§ 21159.28, subd. (d) [referring to “residential or mixed-use
residential” projects].)
9
hospital. Appellant ignores that hotels and hospitals provide
temporary beds, not permanency for seniors as they transition
from private homes to residences that ease the burdens of daily
life and reduce social isolation.
Respondents assert that appellant failed to raise the
“households” claim in administrative proceedings. (Sierra Club v.
City of Orange, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 535.) In written
opposition submitted to City, counsel for appellant argued that
eldercare “is not a multi-family residential project despite the
fact that it is an allowable use in the R-5 Zone” and suggested
that only condominiums or apartments qualify for TPP status.
Counsel did not argue that “residential” means “household.”
Nonetheless, the claim to City that a TPP requires “multi-family”
housing sufficiently preserved the claim that eldercare is not
“residential.”
As noted above, appellant’s counsel conceded to City that
the Project is largely “residential,” whether conventional or non-
conventional. (§ 21155, subd. (b).) However, counsel reasoned
that the Project does not “resemble the multi-family residential
land use contemplated in Senate Bill 375” and therefore does not
qualify as a TPP.
Senate Bill No. 375 does not define “residential.” Absent a
definition giving a statute special meaning, or an inherent
ambiguity, we give words “their ordinary, everyday meaning.”
(Halbert’s Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th
1233, 1238.) “Residential” covers conventional homes as well as
facilities serving residents.8 The Legislature defines “residential”
8 The Merriam-Webster online dictionary defines
“residential” as “used as a residence or by residents;” “providing
living accommodations for students;” or “provided to patients
10
property as “any dwelling or unit that is intended for human
habitation.” (Civ. Code, § 1954.51, subd. (e) [Costa-Hawkins
Rental Housing Act].) Senior housing easily satisfies dictionary
and legislative definitions of “residential.”
The Legislature would not have used a broad term like
“residential” if it intended to limit Senate Bill No. 375 to “multi-
family households.” Senate Bill No. 375 does not distinguish
between conventional and non-conventional residents. No
authority suggests that housing is not residential if some
residents need assistance with daily living activities, or has
communal kitchens and dining rooms, or wide hallways. On the
contrary, City’s municipal code deems all types of eldercare to be
“residential housing.” (L.A. Mun. Code, § 12.03.) Moreover, the
Regional Transportation Plan/Sustainable Communities Strategy
(RTP/SCS) defines household as including a “person living alone
in a housing unit” or “a group of unrelated people” sharing
housing. We reject appellant’s claim that housing for seniors is
not “residential.”
Consistency With Regional Policy
A TPP must be “consistent with the general use
designation, density, building intensity, and applicable policies
specified for the project area.” (§ 21155, subd. (a).) A project is
residing in a facility,” e.g., “a residential treatment center.”
(<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/residential> [as
of Aug. 21, 2024], archived at <https://perma.cc/Z9PT-46MU>.)
The Oxford English Dictionary defines it as “Serving or used as a
residence; in which one resides; providing accommodation in
addition to other services.” (<https://www.oed.com/dictionary/
residential_adj1?tl=true> [as of Aug. 21, 2024], archived at
<https://perma.cc/G8SV-4JJX>.)
11
consistent if it “ ‘ “ ‘will further the objectives and policies of the
general plan and not obstruct their attainment.’ ” ’ ” (Save
Livermore Downtown v. City of Livermore (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th
1116, 1124 (Livermore).) Officials determine if a project, even if
not perfect, is “compatible” or “ ‘ “in harmony” ’ ” with the general
plan; courts do not “ ‘micromanage these development decisions’ ”
and defer to local findings “ ‘unless no reasonable person could
have reached the same conclusion.’ ” (Ibid.; Sequoyah Hills
Homeowners Assn. v. City of Oakland (1993) 23 Cal.App.4th 704,
717–720.)9
The applicable policies are established by The Southern
California Association of Governments (SCAG), a planning
organization for the County of Los Angeles. SCAG adopted the
2016–2040 RTP/SCS, a long-range plan affecting land use and
transportation strategies to achieve GhG reduction goals of
CARB. This includes promoting development of housing and jobs
near existing transportation networks to encourage public transit
use for residents and employees.
City characterized the Project site as being in an urban and
city neighborhood. It is over 64 percent residential with high-
and mid-rise towers, has retail space, is well-served by transit,
and residents can walk or bicycle for their daily needs. It
concluded that an eldercare facility “is consistent with the range
9 Consistency with the general plan does not require that
GhG emissions be “quantified,” contrary to appellant’s claim.
Appellant cites Center for Biological Diversity v. Department of
Fish & Wildlife (2015) 62 Cal.4th 204, 219–220, which
acknowledges that emissions are global and are “as inevitable as
population growth.” Our Supreme Court then wrote that
“efficiency is superior to a simple numerical” analysis because
CEQA is not “a population control measure.”
12
of residential densities contemplated by both the Urban and City
Residential place types” and “consistent with the general use
designation, density, building intensity, and applicable policies”
of the RTP/SCS prepared by SCAG.
The record shows that the Project is within walking
distance of services, entertainment, and commerce; is close to
public transit; and is accessible. The general plan contemplates
building heights ranging from 5 to 40 stories, meaning that the
12-story eldercare facility is within range. The Project “is located
within one of the densest areas of development within the
region.” It “has an extensive transit network” with 21 transit
lines operated by six agencies. At rush hour, some 170 bus trips
pass nearby. The Project will be within walking distance of a
light-rail transit line from downtown Los Angeles to the ocean.
Under the RTP/SCS, it is in an area where high density
development is encouraged.
Appellant did not refute the Project’s consistency with the
general plan or carry the burden “to affirmatively show there was
no substantial evidence in the record to support the City’s
findings.” (California Native Plant Society v. City of Rancho
Cordova (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 603, 626.) This requires setting
forth “all of the evidence material to the City’s finding, then
show[ing] that that evidence could not reasonably support the
finding.” (Ibid.) Appellant has not done so.
Instead, appellant notes that few of Belmont’s residents
will drive, thereby generating less traffic than other types of
development. RPI’s estimate that only 20 residents will own
cars. Appellant claims that residents will “remain within their
housing” and opines that public transit use will be “virtually
nonexistent.” Appellant’s unsupported (and ageist) claim fails. It
13
is equally reasonable to infer that residents who lack cars will
walk or use public transit, as City concluded.
Appellant writes that Belmont’s facility will provide
“employment for hundreds of people working in three shifts,
seven days each week, 24 hours each day.” The record does not
support her claim that the employees will shun public transit.
Belmont told City that 40 percent of the employees at its existing
facility in Westwood carpool or use public transit. City could
reasonably find that the Project provides “job opportunities near
transit.” Belmont will encourage non-car modes of
transportation.
Appellant asserts that the eldercare facility lacks a
sufficiently dense “ ‘floor area ratio’ ” or FAR. Appellant
subtracts 41 percent from the FAR encompassing common rooms,
hallways, and service areas, counting only the space where
residents sleep. Appellant further subtracts rooms for memory
care and assisted living residents, reasoning that they will not
use public transit. Appellant’s math does not add up. The FAR
applies only to projects containing 26 to 50 percent nonresidential
uses. (§ 21155, subd. (b).) This project is 90 percent residential.
Substantial evidence supports City’s conclusion that the
Project is “consistent with the general use designation, density,
building intensity, and applicable policies specified for the project
area.” (§ 21155, subd. (a).) The goal is to encourage urban
concentration and discourage sprawl into suburban areas lacking
public transit. An eldercare facility that replaces a surface
parking lot and a preschool serving local residents, next to
Wilshire Boulevard, fulfills City’s goal of increasing density.
14
Consideration of the Project’s Impact
City must identify “all significant or potentially significant
impacts” of the TPP requiring mitigation. (§ 21155.2, subd.
(b)(1).) Appellant believes that City sidestepped “the State’s
emphatic goal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from
automobiles.” However, if a proposed project meets the criteria of
section 21155 (50 percent residential use, density of 20 or more
dwelling units per acre, and proximity to public transit), City is
not required to consider its impact on global warming.
(§§ 21155.2, subd. (b)(1), 21159.28, subd. (a).)
Appellant did not show that the sustainable communities
strategy for the area fails to satisfy state GhG reduction targets.
(§ 21155, subd. (a).) City concluded that the Project would have a
“Less Than Significant” GhG impact. Appellant fails to identify
exactly how City’s analysis is wrong. Because only 20 out of 176
residents are likely to own cars, the Project is not a large
contributor to GhG.
Relocating the Project to the suburbs would require
lengthier car trips for everyone, residents, visitors, and
employees alike. Proximity to medical care at UCLA justifies
placing elder housing in Westwood, as noted by one of City’s
commissioners. Employees would be compelled to drive if it were
located in the hinterlands. Because the Project qualifies as a
TPP, appellant’s discussion of other, hypothetical uses (such as
condos or apartments) need not be addressed.
CONCLUSION
The issues raised by appellant do not justify judicial
micromanagement of City’s decision. (Livermore, supra, 87
Cal.App.5th at p. 1124.) The Project qualifies as a TPP, is
compatible with the general plan, and there is no basis for
15
concluding that no reasonable person would have reached City’s
determination. (Ibid.) By approving the Project in a densely
populated part of Los Angeles, on a major thoroughfare that is
well served by buses and will be served by a subway, City is
furthering the Legislature’s efforts “to constrain suburban
sprawl” and “encourage compact development” to reduce private
vehicle use and reduce GhG emissions.10
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Appellant will bear all costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
LUI, P. J.
We concur:
ASHMANN-GERST, J.
HOFFSTADT, J.
10 Darakjian, SB 375: Promise, Compromise and the New
Urban Landscape, supra, 27 UCLA Journal of Environmental
Law & Policy at pp. 373, 379–380.
16