Justin Schimandle v. DeKalb County Sheriff's Office

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-2151

JUSTIN SCHIMANDLE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DEKALB COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE

and JOSH DUEHNING,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.

No. 3:21-cv-50477 — Iain D. Johnston, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JANUARY 18, 2024 — DECIDED AUGUST 28, 2024

____________________

Before RIPPLE, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Justin Schimandle, a high-school

administrator, forcibly restrained a student at school. After an

investigation, Detective Josh Duehning of the Dekalb County,

Illinois Sheriff’s Office submitted affidavits to support an ar-

rest warrant against Schimandle for battery. An Illinois state

magistrate judge issued the warrant, and Schimandle turned

himself in. The criminal case proceeded to a bench trial. After

2 No. 23-2151

the prosecution rested, Schimandle moved for a directed find-

ing, which the trial court granted, and Schimandle was found

not guilty.

Schimandle then sued the Dekalb County Sheriff’s Office

and Duehning, alleging false arrest. The defendants moved

for judgment on the pleadings, and the district court granted

that motion, dismissing Schimandle’s claims. The court found

that there was probable cause to arrest Schimandle and that

Duehning was entitled to qualified immunity. Arguable prob-

able cause supported Schimandle’s arrest, so we affirm the

district court.

I

We view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party—here, Schimandle—on a motion for

judgment on the pleadings. See Lisby v. Henderson, 74 F.4th

470, 471–72 (7th Cir. 2023); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,

378 (2007). But where video recordings are referenced in the

complaint and central to the claims, we may view those vid-

eos in addition to the facts alleged in the complaint. See Scott,

550 U.S. at 378; Esco v. City of Chicago, 107 F.4th 673, 679 (7th

Cir. 2024); Bogie v. Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 609 (7th Cir. 2013).

The facts of this case are disputed. Three videos recorded

the incident. Most of the specifics of the encounter cannot be

seen on the videos, and the videos do not contain audio. Be-

low, we take Schimandle’s description as true, deviating only

where the videos contradict Schimandle or to add infor-

mation that Schimandle does not include.

A. The Underlying Incident

Schimandle was the Dean of Students at Kishwaukee Ed-

ucation Consortium, a high school in Malta, Illinois.

No. 23-2151 3

Kishwaukee offers vocational classes to juniors and seniors

with non-violent disciplinary issues from neighboring high

schools.

On September 26, 2019, during school hours, Kishwaukee

students reported to Schimandle that another student, “C.G.,”

was in a school bathroom using a vaping device. Schimandle

went to the “Commons” area to investigate the report. He

searched C.G.’s bag and found a vaping device. Schimandle

alleges that as he retrieved the device, C.G. ran up to him,

grabbed his wrist, took the bag, and ran off. Schimandle then

went to the office to notify his superiors.

Later that day, Schimandle saw C.G. in the Commons area

again. Schimandle asked C.G. to come to his office so that he

could explain why he had searched C.G.’s bag. C.G. re-

sponded with profanity and refused to speak with Schiman-

dle. Schimandle went to his office to call C.G.’s guardian to

inform him that C.G. would be suspended because of the in-

cident.

Schimandle returned to the Commons area to notify C.G.

of the suspensions. When Schimandle told C.G. about the sus-

pension, C.G. responded, “let me tell you something man to

[expletive] man. How would you like it if I searched you?”

C.G. also moved toward Schimandle, grabbed Schimandle’s

pants, and pulled Schimandle toward him. C.G. then tried to

reach into Schimandle’s pants. Schimandle grabbed one of

C.G.’s arms, fearing he would be struck with C.G.’s free arm,

and told C.G., “do not touch me again.” C.G. ignored the

warning, tried to reach into Schimandle’s pants again, became

more aggressive, and yelled profanity.

4 No. 23-2151

As Schimandle tells it, in response and out of fear for his

own safety, he bear hugged C.G. and began walking him out

of the Commons area. Holding C.G. in that manner, Schiman-

dle walked with him into the foyer through a set of doors.

When they moved into the foyer, Schimandle and C.G. fell to

the ground, with Schimandle landing on top of C.G. After fall-

ing, Schimandle continued holding C.G. on the ground.

Schimandle alleges he did so because C.G. continued to strug-

gle and curse, and he feared that releasing C.G. would esca-

late the incident. Schimandle told C.G., “I can let you go when

I feel safe to do so.” At that point, a Kishwaukee employee,

referred to in Schimandle’s complaint as “Mr. Peek,” and a

school resource officer arrived to assist in restraining C.G.

Once the others arrived, Schimandle retreated from the alter-

cation.

B. The Investigation

The day after the incident, the Associate Principal of Kish-

waukee, Matthew Pierce, called the Sheriff’s Office to report

what happened. The Sheriff’s Office opened an investigation

and assigned the case to Duehning. In the course of the inves-

tigation, an officer obtained school video surveillance and a

cell phone video, which Duehning viewed.

The videos confirm much but not all of Schimandle’s story

because they do not depict the entire encounter and do not

have audio. They show Schimandle approaching C.G.

through the Commons area. C.G. was seated in a classroom

next to a partially-open room divider which separated the

classroom from the Commons area. Schimandle and C.G.

talked. During the conversation, C.G. stood up to leave, but

Schimandle reached for him to stop him. In doing so,

Schimandle pushed C.G. into the room divider, which gave

No. 23-2151 5

way. When Schimandle finally grabbed C.G., he placed him

in a bear hug. Schimandle then walked with C.G. in front of

him in that position and at times seemed to drag C.G. across

the Commons area and through a double set of doors. They

passed into a foyer and Schimandle and C.G. fell to the

ground. The videos end with Schimandle lying on top of C.G.

and holding C.G. under control while on the ground.

Duehning interviewed Schimandle and other Kishwaukee

employees involved in the incident, including Peek and

Pierce. Schimandle also gave Duehning a written timeline of

the incident. Duehning interviewed three additional Kish-

waukee employees who witnessed the incident. The record

does not state whether C.G. was interviewed.

In a report Duehning later prepared about the events, he

described these interviews. He wrote that “Schimandle’s ac-

count was similar to his written statement of events” and

noted it is “consistent to what the surveillance video depicts.”

He made this same notation about Peek’s, Pierce’s, and three

other employees’ statements.

C. Schimandle’s Arrest, Trial, and Finding of Not Guilty

On November 26, 2019, Duehning submitted four affida-

vits in support of an arrest warrant for Schimandle. Those af-

fidavits supported charges of criminal battery. Specifically,

they alleged that Schimandle caused bodily harm to C.G. and

made physical contact of an insulting and provoking nature

to C.G. while (1) carrying C.G. and falling on top of C.G. with

his body weight, and (2) carrying C.G. and using C.G.’s body

to open a door, striking C.G.’s head and side into the door.

6 No. 23-2151

They do not mention exculpatory facts, such as evidence of an

affirmative defense for Schimandle’s actions. 1

Relying on Duehning’s affidavits, a Dekalb County mag-

istrate judge found the battery charges were supported by

probable cause and issued an arrest warrant for Schimandle.

Schimandle turned himself in to the Sheriff’s Office, where he

was handcuffed and detained. Shortly after, the school district

placed Schimandle on administrative leave, and eventually

his employment with Kishwaukee was terminated.

Schimandle’s criminal case proceeded to a bench trial. Af-

ter the prosecution rested, Schimandle moved for a directed

finding. The trial court granted Schimandle’s motion, and he

was found not guilty.

D. Schimandle’s Lawsuit and District Court Dismissal

As relevant to this appeal, Schimandle brought a claim un-

der 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest in violation of his Fourth

and Fourteenth Amendment rights as well as an Illinois state

law claim for malicious prosecution. He sought to hold liable

Duehning and the Sheriff’s Office, the latter under the doc-

trines of respondeat superior and indemnification. The de-

fendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that

Schimandle failed to state a cause of action for false arrest

against Duehning and that Duehning was entitled to qualified

immunity. The district court denied the motion. The

1 On appeal, Schimandle argues Duehning should have known dur-

ing his investigation that Schimandle had an affirmative defense under

105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-24. That statute allows teachers to use reasonable

force against students in self-defense. Nothing in the record indicates that

Duehning was aware of this statute or that Schimandle made him aware

of it.

No. 23-2151 7

defendants answered Schimandle’s First Amended Com-

plaint and moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule

12(c), again raising the same two defenses.

The district court granted the motion for judgment on the

pleadings and entered judgment for the defendants. The court

found that probable cause existed to arrest Schimandle and

that Duehning was entitled to qualified immunity for his ac-

tions. For probable cause, the court found, “[t]he allegations

taken in the light most favorable to Schimandle as well as the

video recordings, overwhelming[ly] establish the existence of

probable cause.” In reaching this conclusion, the court em-

phasized that Schimandle admitted to putting C.G. in a bear

hug, which satisfies the physical contact element of battery

under Illinois law. The court also disagreed with Schiman-

dle’s argument that Duehning knew or should have known

that Schimandle had authority to restrain C.G., so Duehning

must have lied about his knowledge or omitted a potential af-

firmative defense from the affidavits for an arrest warrant.

Rather than credit that contention, the court found that

Duehning’s affidavits did not contain false statements or ma-

terial omissions. On qualified immunity, the court concluded

that “[e]ven assuming probable cause did not exist,” “arguable

probable cause existed” supporting Schimandle’s arrest. This

appeal followed. 2

II

We review de novo the district court’s grant of a Rule 12(c)

motion for judgment on the pleadings. Lisby, 74 F.4th at 472.

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is subject to the same

2 The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367,

and this court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

8 No. 23-2151

standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Gill v.

City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 339 (7th Cir. 2017). A com-

plaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to demon-

strate a plausible entitlement to relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555−56 (2007); see Reed v. Palmer, 906

F.3d 540, 548 (7th Cir. 2018).

On appeal, Schimandle claims the district court erred by

ruling first, that probable cause existed to arrest him for bat-

tery, and second, that Duehning was entitled to qualified im-

munity. Whether there was “probable cause to arrest

[Schimandle] is separate from the question relating to quali-

fied immunity.” Fleming v. Livingston County, 674 F.3d 874,

879 (7th Cir. 2012); see Jump v. Village of Shorewood, 42 F.4th 782,

791–92 (7th Cir. 2022). We place to the side the first question

and address the second, although the qualified immunity

analysis requires us to consider the issue of arguable probable

cause. Both issues can be extensive, and the latter is disposi-

tive here.

A

Qualified immunity requires the court to determine: (1)

whether the record evidences the violation of a federal statu-

tory or constitutional right; and if so (2) whether the right

violated was clearly established at the time the violation oc-

curred. See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63

(2018); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Pierner-Lytge v.

Hobbs, 60 F.4th 1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 2023); Fosnight v. Jones, 41

F.4th 916, 924 (7th Cir. 2022). “If either inquiry is answered in

the negative,” qualified immunity protects the defendant of-

ficial. Gibbs v. Lomas, 755 F.3d 529, 537 (7th Cir. 2014); see Pear-

son v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231–32 (2009); Harlow v. Fitzger-

ald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Smith v. Finkley, 10 F.4th 725, 737

No. 23-2151 9

(7th Cir. 2021). Qualified immunity provides “’ample room

for mistaken judgments’ and protects all but the ‘plainly in-

competent and those who knowingly violate the law.’”

Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 639 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting

Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991)).

Schimandle bears the burden of demonstrating that the

right was clearly established at the time the alleged violation

occurred. Green v. Newport, 868 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2017).

To be clearly established, the right must be “sufficiently clear

that every reasonable official would understand that what he

is doing violates that right.” Id. (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577

U.S. 7, 11 (2015)); see also Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104

(2018) (per curiam). The Supreme Court has frequently cau-

tioned at this step not to define that law at too high a level of

generality. See Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (citing Ashcroft v. al-

Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)); see also City of Tahlequah v. Bond,

595 U.S. 9, 12 (2021) (per curiam); Kisela, 584 U.S. at 104.

Although the plaintiff need not point to an identical case

finding the alleged conduct unlawful, he must point to prec-

edent placing the “statutory or constitutional question be-

yond debate.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (quoting Ashcroft, 563

U.S. at 741); see also Lopez v. Sheriff of Cook County, 993 F.3d 981,

988 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341

(1986)). Otherwise, the plaintiff must persuade the court that

the conduct is so egregious and unreasonable that, notwith-

standing the lack of an analogous decision, no reasonable of-

ficer could have thought he was acting lawfully. See Wheeler,

539 F.3d at 639.

“There is no question that [Schimandle’s] constitutional

right to be free from arrest without probable cause was clearly

established at the time of the incident.” See Fleming, 674 F.3d

10 No. 23-2151

at 879 (collecting cases reiterating the constitutional right to

be free from arrest without probable cause).

But an officer is still entitled to qualified immunity in a

false arrest case when “’a reasonable officer could have mis-

takenly believed that probable cause existed.’” Id. at 880

(quoting Humphrey v. Staszak, 148 F.3d 719, 725 (7th Cir.

1998)). This inquiry is sometimes referred to as “arguable

probable cause.” Id. Although closely related, for qualified

immunity purposes, a determination of actual probable cause

is separate and distinct from arguable probable cause. Id. at

880.

Arguable probable cause is established when “a

reasonable officer in the same circumstances and possessing

the same knowledge as the officer in question could have

reasonably believed that probable cause existed in the light of

well-established law.” Id. (cleaned up). Whether arguable

probable cause “supports qualified immunity ‘is a pure

question of law’ to be decided by the court.” Cibulka v. City of

Madison, 992 F.3d 633, 639 n.2 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Thayer v.

Chiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 247 (7th Cir. 2012)) (finding in false-

arrest case that officers had arguable probable cause to arrest

appellant for disorderly conduct where he admitted to

actively resisting officers). And to decide it, we look to the

totality of the circumstances. See id. at 638; see also Illinois v.

Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232–33 (1983); Garcia v. Posewitz, 79 F.4th

874, 880 (7th Cir. 2023) (per curiam).

Turning to this case, the underlying charge for which

Schimandle claims he was falsely arrested is battery in viola-

tion of 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-3(a). Count I of the indict-

ment charged Schimandle under the first prong of that stat-

ute, which provides: “A person commits battery if he or she

No. 23-2151 11

knowingly without legal justification by any means, (1)

causes bodily harm to an individual … .” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.

5/12-3(a)(1). 3 Counts II and III of the indictment charged him

under the second prong. That prong criminalizes “physical

contact of an insulting or provoking nature.” 720 ILL. COMP.

STAT. 5/12-3(a)(2).

Each element of battery is supported here. First, Schiman-

dle had physical contact with C.G. The video and Schiman-

dle’s admissions depict him grabbing C.G. and placing C.G.

in a bear hug. Second, that physical contact could have caused

bodily harm to C.G. Schimandle pushed C.G. into the room

divider, placed C.G. in a bear hug, and walked with C.G. in

front of him through the Commons area and a double set of

doors. And Schimandle, a much bigger man, fell on top of

C.G., a child, after moving through the doors. Third, Schiman-

dle’s contact with C.G. was of an insulting and provoking na-

ture. He carries and drags C.G. as C.G. struggles to get away.

Plus, after the fall, Schimandle lays on top of C.G. to pin him

down. Last, Schimandle intended to make this contact with

C.G. Schimandle admitted he sought out C.G. and placed him

in a “bear hug.”

Given the videos capturing the physical altercation, the

multiple eyewitness interviews, and Schimandle’s own ad-

missions, a reasonable officer considering the same circum-

stances could have reasonably believed probable cause

3 Per Illinois Jury Instruction 11.05, the phrase “without legal justifi-

cation” is used “whenever an instruction is to be given on an affirmative

defense contained in Article 7 of Chapter 38.” Because Schimandle had an

affirmative defense, but the case proceeded as a bench, not a jury, trial, we

note this caveat but leave the phrase in the text above.

12 No. 23-2151

existed for each of those charges. See Mwangangi v. Nielsen, 48

F.4th 816, 825 (7th Cir. 2022).

The conclusion that there was at least arguable probable

cause to arrest is supported by precedent. In many respects,

the analysis here is similar to a recent decision from this court.

In Gaddis v. DeMattei, the plaintiff complained of false arrest.

This court held that the officer there had a reasonable belief

that probable cause existed to arrest the plaintiff for an Illinois

disorderly conduct violation. 30 F.4th 625, 631 (7th Cir. 2022).

The officer interviewed bystanders, who discussed the dis-

turbance plaintiff caused and plaintiff’s pattern of disruptive

behavior. Based on those interviews, the officer made his own

assessment. After the investigation, the officer concluded that

the plaintiff posed a risk to others and arrested him. Id. In the

court’s analysis, it noted that the facts were “gleaned

firsthand” by the officer and cited our precedent on arguable

probable cause. Id.

Here, like the officer in Gaddis, Duehning had firsthand in-

formation from interviews about a disturbance. He even had

corroborating video showing the altercation. Both the inter-

views and videos confirmed that Schimandle grabbed C.G.,

placed him in a bear hug, and pushed him through a double

set of doors, supporting an inference Schimandle caused bod-

ily harm to C.G. and showing that he had physical contact

with C.G.

Unlike in Gaddis, Duehning did not believe Schimandle’s

conduct was ongoing or a problem beyond this isolated inci-

dent. Also unlike that case, Schimandle told Duehning that he

placed C.G. in a bear hug. Thus, Schimandle admitted to some

of the elements of Illinois battery, while the plaintiff in Gaddis

did not admit to the elements of a crime. The information

No. 23-2151 13

provided to and collected by Duehning in his investigation

made it reasonable for him to believe probable cause existed

to arrest Schimandle for battery.

Moreover, the magistrate judge’s approval of the arrest

warrant bolsters the officer’s reasonable belief that probable

cause supported the warrant and the application of qualified

immunity. Cf. Fleming, 674 F.3d at 881 (explaining the fact that

the officer had consulted with the District Attorney prior to

arresting the plaintiff-arrestee “goes a long way toward solid-

ifying his qualified immunity defense”); see also Johnson v. My-

ers, 53 F.4th 1063, 1070 n.2 (7th Cir. 2022) (same); Burritt v.

Ditlefsen, 807 F.3d 239, 251 (7th Cir. 2015) (same). The Su-

preme Court has noted that “[w]here the alleged Fourth

Amendment violation involves a search or seizure pursuant

to a warrant, the fact that a neutral magistrate has issued a

warrant is the clearest indication that the officers acted in an

objectively reasonable manner or … in ‘objective good faith.’”

Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012) (citing

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922–23 (1984)); see also Socha

v. City of Joliet, 107 F.4th 700, 710 (7th Cir. 2024). We heed that

direction and give credence to the magistrate judge’s determi-

nation here.

Last, Schimandle agrees that his Illinois state law claim for

malicious prosecution stands or falls on the existence of

arguable probable cause for his arrest. See Brief for Plaintiff-

Appellant at 23, Schimandle v. Dekalb Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., No.

23-2151 (7th Cir. Aug. 14, 2023), ECF No. 9. Other than this

concession, the parties do not discuss this claim. Given this

lack of development, and our conclusion that arguable prob-

able cause existed here, we do not disagree with this conces-

sion.

14 No. 23-2151

B

Schimandle lodges two additional arguments. He con-

tends that even if there was at least arguable probable cause,

Duehning is not entitled to qualified immunity because he fal-

sified information and intentionally omitted material, excul-

patory evidence from the warrant affidavits.

Falsifying the factual basis for a warrant violates the

Fourth Amendment. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171

(1978) (holding a search or seizure pursuant to a warrant is

unreasonable if the affidavit supporting the warrants contains

deliberate “falsity or reckless disregard” for the truth); see also

Rainsberger v. Benner, 913 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2019); Hart v.

Mannina, 798 F.3d 578, 591 (7th Cir. 2015). This rule applies

equally to material omissions. See United States v. Glover, 755

F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Garcia, 79 F.4th at 879

(“[A]n official violates the Fourth Amendment by intention-

ally or recklessly omitting from a warrant application infor-

mation that is material to determining probable cause.”).

Schimandle provides little information as to what those

false statements or material omissions were. 4 Viewing his ar-

guments in their best light, he seems to contend that the falsi-

fications or omissions were: (1) that Duehning noted

Schimandle’s testimony was “consistent” with the video yet

still signed affidavits for an arrest warrant; and (2) that

Duehning knew about and omitted Schimandle’s claimed af-

firmative defense under 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-24 (a statute

permitting teachers and other qualified individuals in schools

4 At oral argument, we inquired as to the nature of the omissions, but

Schimandle’s counsel did not offer an explanation. See Oral Arg. at 6:10–

7:28.

No. 23-2151 15

to use “reasonable force” to maintain safety in some situa-

tions). Neither argument has merit.

First, Schimandle states that Duehning reported,

“Schimandle’s account was similar to his written statement of

events and is consistent to what the surveillance video de-

picts.” This argument has two parts. The court should con-

clude that Duehning believed Schimandle’s description of the

incident matched what the surveillance videos showed. So,

Duehning must have falsified information on the affidavits by

determining Schimandle committed battery because the

video did not depict a battery.

The problem is that the videos only show clips of the al-

tercation between Schimandle and C.G. Duehning had no ev-

idence of what happened before the altercation began. The

videos started too late, and the witnesses did not see anything

until Schimandle already had C.G. in a bear hug. Addition-

ally, there is no audio recording of the conversation between

Schimandle and C.G., so there is no way to tell what Schiman-

dle and C.G. are saying, if anything. Duehning had to make

his own conclusions and could not have fully adopted

Schimandle’s version of events because he had no evidence

beyond Schimandle’s account of the conversation occurring

during the altercation. Duehning would have also gleaned

additional facts from the videos that are not reported in

Schimandle’s version of events. These additional facts are

consistent with Schimandle’s version of events but provide

further support for the elements of battery. One example is

the portion of the video showing Schimandle pushing C.G.

through the room divider in Schimandle’s attempt to grab

C.G. and stop him from fleeing. Schimandle did not discuss

this part of the altercation, but Duehning would have seen it

16 No. 23-2151

in the video and been able to draw his own conclusion based

on such information. Therefore, this argument does not

support the contention that Duehning falsified information

because the video and Duehning’s attestations did not contra-

dict the affidavits for an arrest warrant.

Second, Schimandle argues that Duehning knew or

should have known about Schimandle’s claimed affirmative

defense under 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-24 and that Duehning

purposely omitted it from the affidavits supporting Schiman-

dle’s arrest warrant.

We are far from certain that statute provides an affirma-

tive defense in this type of action. Even assuming that it could

apply, once a law enforcement officer discovers sufficient

facts to establish probable cause, he has no constitutional ob-

ligation to conduct any further investigation in the hope of

discovering exculpatory evidence or possible defenses. See

Eversole v. Steele, 59 F.3d 710, 718 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Madero

v. McGuinness, 97 F.4th 516, 522–23 (7th Cir. 2024). An officer

“‘may not ignore conclusively established evidence of the ex-

istence of an affirmative defense,’” but the Fourth Amend-

ment imposes no duty to investigate whether a valid defense

exists. McBride v. Grice, 576 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 2009) (quot-

ing Hodgkins ex rel. Hodgkins v. Peterson, 355 F.3d 1048, 1061

(7th Cir. 2004)); see also Madero, 97 F.4th at 523; Doe v. Gray, 75

F.4th 710, 719 (7th Cir. 2023).

Moreover, the existence and validity of an affirmative de-

fense does not necessarily negate probable cause to arrest. See

Humphrey, 148 F.3d at 724 (validity of affirmative defense is

irrelevant to whether police officer sued for false arrest had

probable cause to make arrest). The “[p]olice are entitled to

leave to the criminal process the full examination of potential

No. 23-2151 17

defenses[,]” Phillips v. Allen, 668 F.3d 912, 914 (7th Cir. 2012),

and “[a] person’s ability to explain away seemingly damning

facts does not negate the existence of probable cause, even

though it might provide a good defense should the case go to

trial.” Deng v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 552 F.3d 574, 577 (7th Cir.

2009).

Plus, there is no evidence that Duehning knew teachers

could use force against students in certain situations.

Schimandle does not allege that he told Duehning about his

authority to restrain C.G. or that anyone else told Duehning.

He just asserts that Duehning “knew or should have known”

about the defense. After viewing the videos, questioning

Schimandle and other witnesses, and reasonably determining

probable cause existed to arrest Schimandle for battery,

Duehning did not need to investigate possible defenses and

their potential application. See Madero, 97 F.4th at 523.

Even if Duehning should have investigated possible

affirmative defenses and included that information in the af-

fidavits, it would not have changed the probable cause deter-

mination. Again, only omitting material facts violates the

Fourth Amendment. See Garcia, 79 F.4th at 879; Glover, 755

F.3d at 820. “[A]n omitted fact is material if its inclusion

would have negated probable cause.” Whitlock v. Brown, 596

F.3d 406, 411 (7th Cir. 2010). We weigh materiality by asking

“whether a hypothetical affidavit that included the omitted

material would still establish probable cause.” Hart, 798 F.3d

at 593.

Information about the claimed affirmative defense was ul-

timately immaterial. Duehning would have had to consider

whether Schimandle’s use of force was reasonable, one way

or the other.

18 No. 23-2151

An objectively reasonable officer could still find probable

cause in the face of Schimandle’s affirmative defense.

Schimandle admitted to placing C.G. in a bear hug, and the

video shows Schimandle moving with C.G. through a door-

way, then Schimandle later falling on top of C.G. That could

be enough to show willful and wanton conduct that may not

fall under the affirmative defense Schimandle raised. So even

assuming omission, that omission does not negate probable

cause and is immaterial. See, e.g., id. at 592–93 (omission of ex-

culpatory information from affidavit was immaterial because

the omitted information did not change the probable cause

determination). Duehning was not required to include

Schimandle’s affirmative defense in the affidavits for an arrest

warrant.

* * *

“Rarely do we see qualified immunity awarded at the

pleading stage.” Roldan v. Stroud, 52 F.4th 335, 337 (7th Cir.

2022); see Reed, 906 F.3d at 548. That is because whether qual-

ified immunity applies “most often depend on facts a plaintiff

is not required to plead at the outset of litigation to avoid

dismissal.” Roldan, 52 F.4th at 337. But here, the district court

appropriately analyzed videos of the incident, witness testi-

mony, and reports incorporated in Schimandle’s pleadings.

That substantial evidence allowed the district court—and us

now—to consider and recognize qualified immunity at this

stage.

III

We conclude by noting that despite this prosecution end-

ing with Schimandle’s vindication—he is not guilty of the

charged offense—Schimandle lost his job and endured

No. 23-2151 19

prosecution and scrutiny. Notwithstanding the difficulties

Schimandle faced, the law of qualified immunity compels an

affirmance here. Because arguable probable cause supported

Schimandle’s arrest, entitling Duehning to qualified immun-

ity and barring Schimandle’s malicious prosecution claim, we

AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Schimandle’s com-

plaint.