The opinion
Filed 8/28/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
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THE PEOPLE, C098871
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. JV138181)
v.
I.B.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County, Paul L.
Seave, Judge. Affirmed.
Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Ivan P. Marrs and Edrina
Anderson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The Legislature in the past few years has overhauled certain juvenile court laws
through juvenile justice realignment. The realignment included closing Department of
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Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) and transferring DJJ’s
responsibilities to county facilities.
Under Penal Code section 290.008 (undesignated section references are to the
Penal Code), minors who were committed to DJJ before juvenile justice realignment for
certain sex offenses, including assault with intent to commit rape, must register as sex
offenders on discharge even after DJJ’s closure. But this section does not apply to
minors who commit the same offenses after juvenile justice realignment.
Minor I.B. was committed to DJJ for two counts of assault with intent to commit
rape. At his reentry hearing, the juvenile court imposed a probation condition requiring
him to register as a sex offender under section 290.008. On appeal, minor challenges
section 290.008 on equal protection grounds for its alleged unjustifiable differential
treatment of minors like him and minors who are later committed to county facilities. He
also urges us to apply the strict scrutiny standard in reviewing his challenge.
We reject these arguments. The rational basis standard applies because the sex
offender registration requirement for minor does not involve a loss of liberty and thus
does not implicate a fundamental right. And a rational basis exists to justify the
differential treatment of minors already in DJJ’s custody and minors later committed to
county facilities, because the Legislature could have determined the latter have a lower
risk of recidivism due to more effective treatment. We affirm the dispositional order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2017, minor admitted two counts of assault with intent to commit rape (§ 220).
The juvenile court committed minor to a Level B placement. After minor completed his
Level B placement program, the juvenile court committed him to DJJ in 2019 due to
multiple probation violations.
Minor was discharged from DJJ in April 2023. At minor’s reentry disposition
hearing, the juvenile court terminated DJJ’s jurisdiction and granted minor formal
probation. Minor’s counsel objected to a probation condition that required minor to
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register as a sex offender pursuant to section 290 et seq., arguing it violated minor’s equal
protection rights. The juvenile court declined to modify the condition.
Minor timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Minor contends section 290.008 violates his state and federal equal protection
rights because there are no substantive distinctions between him and minors who later
commit the same crime but are sent to county facilities under the new law. He urges us
to apply the strict scrutiny standard in reviewing his claim because he has a fundamental
interest at stake. After a de novo review (In re M.B. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 435, 465), we
disagree with these contentions.
I
Juvenile Justice Realignment Background
A. The Closure of DJJ
Until recently, DJJ was “the state’s most restrictive placement for its most severe
juvenile offenders.” (In re Miguel C. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 899, 902.) In 2020, the
Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 823 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2020, ch. 337) as
part of its juvenile justice realignment efforts. (Miguel C., at p. 907.) Those efforts
“included the transfer of DJJ’s responsibilities to California’s counties beginning []
July 1, 2021 (§ 736.5, subd. (a)) and the closure of DJJ on June 30, 2023 ([§ 736.5],
subd. (e)).” (In re M.B., supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 448.) Beginning July 1, 2021, a
ward shall not be committed to DJJ except in criminal transfers. (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 736.5, subds. (b), (c).)
In making these changes, the Legislature noted “[e]vidence has demonstrated that
justice system-involved youth are more successful when they remain connected to their
families and communities. Justice system-involved youth who remain in their
communities have lower recidivism rates and are more prepared for their transition back
into the community.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 337, § 1(a).) Therefore, realignment aims to
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“ensure that justice-involved youth are closer to their families and communities and
receive age-appropriate treatment.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 337, § 1(b).)
B. Section 290.008
Under section 290.008, subdivisions (a) and (c)(1), “[a]ny person who . . . is
discharged or paroled from [DJJ] . . . because of” the commission of certain sex crimes,
including assault with intent to commit rape, must register as a sex offender.
Subdivision (d) of section 290.008 provides for tiered periods of registration. The
registration requirements under section 290.008 apply only to a minor committed to and
either discharged or paroled from the DJJ. (In re T.O. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 252, 265.)
After the passage of Senate Bill No. 823, the Legislature amended section 290.008
to add, among other things, subdivision (h) that defines a discharged person. The
purpose of the amendment was to “[c]larif[y] that youth currently in the custody of [DJJ]
who are required to complete . . . sex offender registration upon discharge will still be
required to do so after the closure of [DJJ].” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor
Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 160 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended
August 26, 2022, p. 3.)
II
Degree of Justification
“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no
State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’
which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”
(City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center (1985) 473 U.S. 432, 439.) “The
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection and the California Constitution’s
protection of the same right (Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a), art. IV, § 16, subd. (a)) are
substantially equivalent . . . .” (Kenneally v. Medical Board (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 489,
495.) “At core, the requirement of equal protection ensures that the government does not
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treat a group of people unequally without some justification.” (People v. Chatman
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288.)
“The degree of justification required to satisfy equal protection depends on the
type of unequal treatment at issue. Courts apply [a] heightened scrutiny when a
challenged statute or other regulation involves a suspect classification such as race, or a
fundamental right such as the right to vote, and accordingly will demand greater
justification for the differential treatment. [Citations.] But when a statute involves
neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental right, the ‘general rule is that legislation
is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.’ [Citations.] A court applying this
standard finds ‘a denial of equal protection only if there is no rational relationship
between a disparity in treatment and some legitimate government purpose.’ ” (People v.
Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 847.) Personal liberty is a fundamental right. (People v.
Olivas (1976) 17 Cal.3d 236, 245, 251.)
The mandatory lifetime sex offender registration imposed by section 290 does not
involve “loss of liberty” and therefore does not implicate a fundamental right. (People v.
McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, 1211, fn. 14; Legg v. Department of Justice (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 504, 511.) Section 290 concerns sex offender registration for adult
offenders, but it also requires a ward of the juvenile court to be registered pursuant to
section 290.008. (§ 290, subd. (f).) Moreover, “the personal liberty interest of a minor is
less comprehensive than that of an adult.” (In re Roger S. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 921, 927.)
“[E]ven where there is an invasion of protected freedoms ‘the power of the state to
control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults.’ ”
(Ginsberg v. State of New York (1968) 390 U.S. 629, 638.) We therefore conclude the
sex offender registration requirement in section 290.008 does not implicate a minor’s
fundamental right.
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Also, “juveniles have not been recognized as a suspect class” (In re J.M. (2019)
35 Cal.App.5th 999, 1010), and minor does not contend otherwise. We thus review
section 290.008 for rational basis.
Minor contends some courts have improperly evaluated section 290.008 as “terms
of imprisonment” and on that premise held rational basis review applied. He urges us to
reconsider those holdings because minors cannot be “convicted” or “imprisoned.” We
need not resolve this issue because we have separately concluded that section 290.008
does not involve a minor’s loss of liberty.
III
Equal Protection
A. Analytical Framework for Equal Protection Claims
“[W]hen plaintiffs challenge laws drawing distinctions between identifiable
groups or classes of persons, on the basis that the distinctions drawn are inconsistent with
equal protection, courts no longer need to ask at the threshold whether the two groups are
similarly situated for purposes of the law in question. The only pertinent inquiry is
whether the challenged difference in treatment is adequately justified under the
applicable standard of review. The burden is on the party challenging the law to show
that it is not.” (People v. Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 850-851.)
Minor contends section 290.008 lacks a rational basis to treat minors who commit
the same offenses differently based solely on whether the offenses happened before or
after juvenile justice realignment. Because minor challenges the distinctions drawn by
section 290.008, we inquire whether a rational basis supports the difference in treatment.
In doing so, we “ ‘may engage in “ ‘rational speculation’ ” as to the justifications for the
legislative choice.’ ” (Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881.)
“To mount a successful rational basis challenge, a party must ‘ “[negate] every
conceivable basis” ’ that might support the disputed statutory disparity.” (Ibid.)
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B. Analysis
Sex offender registration “ ‘is intended to promote the “ ‘state interest in
controlling crime and preventing recidivism in sex offenders’ ” ’ [citation] and serves ‘an
important and vital public purpose by compelling registration of many serious and violent
sex offenders who require continued public surveillance’ [citations].” (Johnson v.
Department of Justice, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 877.)
“In 2018, the Legislature adopted Senate Bill No. 1494 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)
which, amongst other things, modified sex offender registration for both juveniles and
adults to create a tiered system.” (In re T.O., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 268.) This
change suggests “the Legislature ha[s] recognized that some sex offenders, especially
juveniles, may be rehabilitated.” (Ibid.) For minors in county facilities, “the Legislature
appears to have determined that the risk of recidivism is low enough and the detrimental
effects of sex offender registration high enough to justify no sex offender registration
given their age and the amenability . . . to the types of treatment offered in local secure
facilities.” (Ibid.) In other words, the Legislature could have determined that minors in
county facilities have a lower risk of recidivism because they receive more effective
treatment, and therefore need not register as sex offenders. (See In re Bernardino S.
(1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 613, 620-621 [the Legislature acknowledged “some tension
between registration and the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile court law” and
“consciously sought to require registration only of those ‘violent or repeat offenders’
whose dangerousness warranted the imposition of a penal measure otherwise reserved for
convicted criminals”].) The view that minors receive more effective treatment in county
facilities could have supported the Legislature’s ultimate decision to close DJJ. (See
Stats. 2020, ch. 337, § 1(b) [“To ensure that justice-involved youth are closer to their
families and communities and receive age-appropriate treatment, it is necessary to close
[DJJ] and move the jurisdiction of these youth to local county jurisdiction”].) But at the
same time, the Legislature could plausibly find that minors who were already in the
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custody of DJJ have higher risk of recidivism due to lack of appropriate support and
treatment and could conclude those minors must still register as sex offenders to serve the
state’s interest in controlling crime, preventing recidivism, and protecting the public.
(See Samples v. Brown (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 787, 807 [“ ‘ “ ‘ “Where there are
‘plausible reasons’ for [the classification] ‘our inquiry is at an end.’ ” ’ ” ’ ”].) Therefore,
a rational basis exists to support section 290.008’s disparity of treatment between minors
committed to DJJ and minors committed to county facilities. (See In re Brian J. (2007)
150 Cal.App.4th 97, 124 [“we give some deference to the Legislature in that we must
presume the statute is valid ‘unless its unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and
unmistakably appears’ ”].) We find no equal protection violation.
DISPOSITION
The dispositional order is affirmed.
/s/
MESIWALA, J.
We concur:
/s/
EARL, P. J.
/s/
RENNER, J.
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